


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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

NOTE ON RIGVEDA I. 48 (Hymn to the Dawn), 15.

THE second half of this verse runs as follows :

Prá no yachatād avṛkám pṛthú chardīḥ prá devi *gómatīr íshah*;
“Do thou proffer to us a wolfless wide shelter, do thou, O
goddess, proffer to us — —.”

The last two words, *gómatīr íshah*, are generally explained as an instance of metonymy, which is common in the Rigveda: ‘*drinks having cows*,’ i.e. ‘*drinks having milk, milky drinks*.’ This is perhaps the meaning which Delbrück assigns to the words under discussion, for in the Index to his *Vedische Chrestomathie* (1874) he translates the adj. *gōmant* in this passage by ‘*kuhreich*’ (p. 68), and *ísh* by ‘*Saft, Trank, Labung*’ (p. 57), so that his translation would be ‘*kuhreiche Tránke*’ by which he presumably means ‘*milky drinks*.’ If this translation is correct, we may compare the similar metonymy in Hymn III. 42 (276), 1 and 7:—1, *Ūpa naḥ sutám á gahi sómam indra gávāçiram* “O Indra, do thou come to our pressed soma-juice, mixed with *milk* (lit. ‘mixed with *cows*’),” and 7, *Imám indra gávāçiram yávāçiram ca naḥ piba* “O Indra, do thou drink this our *milk-* (lit. *cow-*) mixture and our barley-mixture.”

That *ísh* often has the meaning ‘*Trank, Labetrunk, Nah-*

rungssaft, insbesondere Milchtrank' (the first meaning given to it by Grassmann, Wörterb. zum RV. 1873) will be denied by none; but this is not the only meaning. The fifth and sixth meanings given by Grassmann are '*Kraft*' and '*vielleicht Beute [vgl. vāja].*' Cf. Fick, Vergl. Wörterb. der Idg. Sprachen, I⁴ p. 176, who gives '*Saft und Kraft, Fülle, Gedeihen.*' And it seems that in the meanings '*Kraft, Fülle, Gedeihen,*' we have the key to the explanation of *gómātīr īshah* in the passage under discussion.

The Idg. word **is* (Skr. *īsh*) is doubtless the first component of Skr. *īsh-irā-s* translated '*eilend, regsam, frisch*' by Brugmann, Grundr. II. § 74, Greek Att. *ιέρó-s* translated by Brugmann (l. c.) '*regsam, frisch, kräftig, heilig*' (cf. the analysis of the words by Brugmann l. c., and Osthoff in Morph. Unters. IV 151 and Zur Geschichte des Perfects p. 439). It seems thus that the primitive meaning of the Greek word is '*strong*' (cf. Leaf on Homer Iliad I 366 and Fick op. cit. pp. 7, 176, 359). This meaning '*strong*' is probably still to be seen in Homer Il. I 366 *ιέρην πόλιν Ἡετίωνος*; [V 499 *ιέρās κατ' ἀλώας*]; XVI 407 *ιέρων ἰχθύων*; VIII 66 *ιέρων ἡμαρ* and XI 194 *κνέφας ιέρων*; X 56 *φυλάκων ιέρων τέλος*, XXIV 681 *ιέρους πυλαωρούς*, and Od. XXIV 81 *Ἀργείων ιέρους στρατός*. (See the editions of Walter Leaf and D. B. Monro.) Thus then the fifth meaning '*Kraft*' assigned to Skr. *īsh* by Grassmann must have been Idg. or at any rate as old as Graeco-Indian.

May we not find the best explanation of *gómātīr īshah* in this meaning '*Kraft*,' or even in Grassmann's sixth meaning '*Beute [vgl. vāja]*' which is merely the outcome of the fifth meaning? Fick's '*Fülle, Gedeihen*' are moreover nearly synonymous with '*Kraft*.' '*Strength in cows*' or '*wealth of cows*' was naturally an object of great importance among the pastoral people of the Rigveda; to quote one instance out of many: Rigveda VII 67 [Hymn to the Aśvins (= 583)] 9, "Verily may ye two be inexhaustible to the wealthy sacrificers, who with their wealth urge on liberality, who help on their friends with good hymns, pouring out abundantly wealth *composed of cows and of horses.*" And, indeed, twice already in our own hymn (I 48, 2 and 12) the poet has sung of *cows* :—

Verse 2. "They (the Dawns) being rich in horses, *rich in cows*, often used to come (= have come) to shine."

Verse 12. "O Dawn, do thou there be pleased to place (i.e. give) among us *wealth of cows* and wealth of horses, give us wealth worthy to be praised, give us abundance of male children."

Does it not seem likely, and quite in keeping with Vedic poetry, that at the close of his hymn the bard repeats his prayer for '*strength in* (i.e. *wealth of*) *cows*,' as being that on which his social position most chiefly depended?

L. HORTON-SMITH.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

THE following pages contain only a negative and partial criticism of the interpretation of Plato put forward by Dr Jackson under the above title in earlier volumes of this Journal. The same interpretation appears also, with certain modifications, in Mr Archer Hind's editions of the *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*. My criticism is directed against one part of it only, though that a central and perhaps vital part: but I must endeavour in the first place to give briefly a general summary of the "later theory" as conceived by Dr Jackson¹. I do so for the sake of clearness, and in order to recall the main points to those already familiar with them, rather than in the attempt to make a very intricate piece of argument intelligible to any readers to whom it is here presented for the first time.

According to traditional opinion, the Theory of Ideas as stated in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* is the clearest and most positive account of Plato's philosophical convictions. Against this opinion Dr Jackson maintains that these dialogues represent an immature phase of Plato's thought, which was later subjected to unsparing criticism: and that he afterwards developed a new and elaborate dogmatic system, which is preserved in the six dialogues *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, as well as in certain allusions in Aristotle.

¹ Dr Jackson's six papers are contained in Volumes x, xi, xiii, xiv and xv of this *Journal*. References in the following pages are made as follows: (on *Sophist* 205) always means Dr

Jackson's article and the page of the *Journal*, while a number simply following the name of a dialogue (*Sophist* 250) refers to the marginal page of Plato's works.

According to Dr Jackson, the "later theory of ideas," while it retains the fundamental proposition—

"Besides sensibles there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas,"

rejects the two corollaries attached thereto in the earlier period:—

(1) Wherever we find a plurality of particulars called by the same name, we assume a corresponding idea (*Rep.* 596 A).

(2) A particular is what it is by reason of the presence (*παρουσία*) or immanence of the idea, or by its participation (*μέθεξις*) in the idea.

For these two propositions the "later theory" substitutes the statement that the only true substantial ideas (*αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη*) are "natural types" of the *infimae species* of living things, and perhaps also of the four elements. These ideas are not present or immanent in particulars, and particulars do not participate in them. The only relation between ideas and particulars is that the former are types (*παραδείγματα*) which the latter imitate (*μίμησις*).

These ideas cannot be objects of human knowledge, though by the study of particulars we may approximate to knowledge of them. They are known only to universal or absolute mind.

Besides these substantial ideas, however, Dr Jackson's statement of the "later theory" admits also certain unsubstantial ideas, as I shall call them (*μὴ αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶδη*), which are not under any obligation (as the ideas proper are) to be unities, but in which, it is stated, the particulars may still be said to participate. The nature of these unsubstantial ideas will form a main subject of the subsequent discussion.

The theory above summarised raises many questions which I shall leave untouched. In particular I am not concerned with the elaborate metaphysical development of it which is based chiefly on the *Timaeus*. The main point that I wish to raise is easily put in a single question. The earlier theory of ideas was devised, as Dr Jackson says, largely as an explanation of the problem of predication or judgment. Does the "later theory" afford a satisfactory substitute for the old explanation?

Let us start with the *Theaetetus*, a dialogue which gives trouble to all interpreters of Plato, and not least to the advocates of the "later theory." In a central passage (*Theaet.* 156) Socrates expounds a theory of sensation based on the doctrine of universal flux in its most thoroughgoing form. This theory is attributed to certain persons not named, but described as "much more subtle"¹ (*κομψότεροι*) than certain other materialist Philistines. Who are these "more subtle" persons? According to Dr Jackson, the *κομψότεροι* "represent Plato himself" (on *Soph.* 204). This view is supported by a historical argument (on *Theaet.* 255), as to which I will here say only that it does not seem to me convincing². The decision must turn on the internal evidence. Is the doctrine of the *κομψότεροι* identical or compatible with that which we recognise elsewhere as Plato's own?

"According to the *κομψότεροι* subject and object are potentialities" which are "actualized in the process of sensation" (on *Theaet.* 268). What grounds have we for attributing this view to Plato? First, does he reduce the subject to a potentiality of sensation? We have only to turn one page forward or a few pages back, to find Dr Jackson calling our attention to the "weighty passage" in which Plato "notes that sensation does not account for the whole of the soul's furniture." How could a potentiality of sensation possess furniture—much more the very peculiar sort of furniture in question, the capacity of apprehending what is not given in sensation? But perhaps then Dr Jackson and the *κομψότεροι* do not really mean to deny outright that the mind is a unity, that it has a "synoptic" faculty in virtue of which it binds together its manifold sensations? Let us go further.

According to the *κομψότεροι*—and Plato therefore—(on *Soph.* 205), "mind is pluralised both in space and time, pluralised in space so that one mind differs from another mind, pluralised in time so that the thought of each mind at one

¹ The word is I think more than half ironical, as usual.

² Perhaps I may appeal to those familiar with Plato's way of speaking

whether a description of himself as "much more ingenious" than the Philistines is in accord with his usual attitude of haughty self-effacement.

moment differs from its thought at another moment¹." Dr Jackson observes elsewhere: "Plainly the paradox of the impossibility of error was one which, however futile, Plato could not afford to ignore." Certainly he could not, if the *κομψότεροι* represent him; for according to this doctrine Error and Truth are equally impossible; Contradiction also, so that Antisthenes was right after all. How can I say, "Error is possible"? By the time I have finished speaking I mean both by "Error" and "possible" something different from what I meant when I began, since my thought at one moment differs from my thought at another moment. Still more clearly the person whom I address understands by "Error" and "possible" something different from what I do, and is therefore unable either to agree or contradict. "Without the consciousness that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before," all judgment, true or false, is impossible.

It is just the same with the "object." If Plato, as is alleged, held that "things are sensations within the mind," and that "the existence of the thing is the recurrence of the sensation" (on *Tim.* 21, 22), not only will it on this basis be very difficult to explain Error, but we must further ask, how do we come to speak of the "thing" in the singular? We hear something of a "fictitious externalisation" due to the mutual externality of the percipient minds; but it must be replied, first that if the unity of the object is a fiction, fiction is the only possible foundation of fact: and secondly that the fiction is one of which the human mind is on the hypothesis of the *κομψότεροι* incapable.

It is supposed that we are led to the fiction by observing "the identity or, to speak more exactly, the similarity" of our sensations². But this perception of similarity among sensations is just what the *κομψότεροι* have no right to ascribe to a mind which is merely a potentiality of sensations. There may be a

¹ For reasons indicated below, I venture to detach this statement from the context, which, it should in fairness be stated, greatly qualifies it.

² It will appear throughout that I

follow Plato in thinking that by *μεγάλη ἀνάγκη* (*Parm.* 132 D), similarity, speaking exactly, can be nothing but partial identity.

sensation of smell one day, and a sensation of smell next day, but the resemblance between the two cannot be smelt.

I am quite aware that the above criticisms appear captious, and depend on a rather one-sided and unfair treatment of certain phrases. But it seems worth while to set them forth, because the looseness of statement covers the real and central difficulty of the "later theory." Dr Jackson does not, it appears, really mean to deny outright that the mind has Thought as well as Sensation: but he does not make clear exactly how much he allows to Thought. In the passages quoted, his intention is to shew that Plato has seen through materialism; but as he for some reason declines to recognise the idealism which bases things on Thought, he has to force on Plato the so-called idealism which reduces things to sensations. He is divided between the attempt to deny Thought altogether, and the attempt to treat it as an actual mental phenomenon, which is yet deceptive or fictitious.

The question is—what explanation does the later theory offer of predication or judgment? The earlier doctrine of the *Republic* and *Phaedo* was devised largely as an explanation of this problem. To what extent was it abandoned, and what is the evidence of its abandonment? Dr Jackson holds that "the paradox of predication" is solved in the later period by the discovery that *great* and *small*, *like* and *unlike* denote *relations*, and that consequently "the theory of the immanence of the idea" becomes superfluous. Further, it becomes impossible, since the objections raised against it in the *Parmenides* are held to be fatal—fatal, that is, to the unity and substantiality of the idea. Consequently in the "later theory" the true substantial ideas are not immanent, nor participated in by particulars.

I cannot think that the problem is so easily solved by the mere application of the term "*relation*," or that Plato was ever really unaware of the fact that "it is by comparison with one thing that Simmias is tall, and by comparison with another that he is short" (on *Parm.* 321). Rather, to say that likeness is a *relation*, is not to solve the problem, but to state it: with some hint perhaps of a solution, inasmuch as *relation* implies

the plausibility does not disappear when the passage is read in its context. The result of the above speech of Socrates is not, as might have been expected, that his interlocutor exclaims, "Now at last I see through that tiresome puzzle of Zeno's!" No, Theaetetus, in spite of his experience in such matters, confesses himself "utterly dumbfounded and befogged"! One might think that this would irritate Socrates after he has just given a "sufficient explanation"; but no! his retort (can his *εἰρωνεία* have become irony?) is to congratulate Theaetetus on his truly philosophic turn of mind: such perplexity, or wonder, he says, is the true source of philosophy.

Surely, if we are to take Plato seriously, he means that he still regards such difficulties, as he did the similar difficulties in *Republic* VII., as being *ἐλκτικὰ πρὸς οὐσίαν*, introductory to the theory of ideas.

On the objections raised in the *Parmenides* to the theory of the immanence of the idea, and the participation of particulars in it, I can only touch briefly. So far from agreeing with Dr Jackson in thinking that they destroy the theory, I believe that they are meant to remove misconceptions of it—perhaps to point out obscurities still attaching to it. The comparison e.g. of the idea as *ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς* to a sail which covers many men, seems to me only one degree more formidable than the objection ascribed to Antisthenes (*Euthydemus* 301 A): "If the presence of beauty is what makes things beautiful, does it not follow that when an ox is present to you, you are an ox?" The moral is not that ideas cannot be present in particulars, but that the terms "participation" and "immanence" are, in a sense, metaphors which must not be pressed with materialistic literalness. Is there any reason to attribute to Plato the belief that the relation between the immaterial unextended idea and the material extended thing was more than inadequately symbolised by the relation between a material extended whole and the parts which by their juxtaposition compose it? Or shall we taunt him with the "glaring inconsistency" involved in talking of the *ἀχρώματος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος οὐσία* as *θεατή* (how can you look at that which has neither colour nor shape?) and even of *εἶδη* which are

ἀειδῆ (Phædo)? It may be true that to use metaphors is to leave a mystery unsolved: but the metaphor of "immanence" seems at least as good as any other. Thus Dr Jackson himself falls into using it in the very attempt to deny it (on *Soph.* 228). "When we say that this is a dog we mean..... that this particular is the eternal unity 'dog' brought into imperfect existence, transient and phenomenal, in the region of time and space." Surely if anything is brought into existence in a region, it is "present" or "immanent" in it.

Let us, however, suppose for the sake of argument that the theory of immanence and participation was abandoned, and proceed to scrutinise the substitute. Dr Jackson only gives incidental hints on the subject, and I am afraid that in trying to systematise them I may misrepresent him.

We will first examine propositions in which the predicate corresponds to (if that is the right phrase) a substantial idea, or natural type: we have an example quoted above. "This is a dog" means "not that this particular is, or has in it, the idea of dog, but that this particular belongs to the natural group which has the idea of dog for its type, or that this particular is the eternal unity 'dog' brought into imperfect existence, transient and phenomenal, in the region of time and space; so that the *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος* is not predicated of its particulars." What then *is* predicated of the particular? Can it be denied that in this judgment we qualify a particular by a general conception? But what is this general conception? It cannot be the substantial idea, according to the later theory, for two good reasons:

(1) that we are absolutely cut off from the knowledge of the idea by reason of the finitude of our intelligence;

(2) there are many particulars that we qualify by this general conception "dog," and it is a fundamental tenet of the "later theory" that whatever is thus "multiplied" loses its unity.

We seem driven to the conclusion that in the case of natural kinds there is not only a substantial idea, but also an unsubstantial idea, used in predication. But the difficulties in which this view would involve the "later theory"

are so great that it ought not to be thrust upon it without Dr Jackson's express authority.

It may here be observed that any attempt to clear up the mystery by the creation of intermediate entities between the idea and the particular will certainly, on the principles of the "later theory," be unsuccessful. Thus Mr Archer Hind lays stress on the statement of the *Timaeus* (50 C) that, while the idea "goes not forth into aught else," "the shapes which pass in and out (τὰ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα) are likenesses of the eternal existences." These likenesses he says are the *πέρας ἔχοντα* or *πέρατος γέννα* of the *Philebus*, as opposed to the *πέρας* itself (Introd. to *Timaeus*, p. 24). We must ask: do not these *εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα* all possess in common their resemblance to the one idea? Obviously they must: yet it is exactly this existence of a unity amid plurality which the "later theory" finds an insuperable difficulty. In the language of the *Philebus*, if the "offspring of the Limit," being many, all "possess the Limit" (*πέρας ἔχοντα*), can we resist the inference that they possess it in common or *participate* (*μετέχοντα*) in it? Which is absurd, according to the "later theory¹."

Let us next proceed to propositions dealing with conceptions other than those of natural kinds. In the first and simplest case, where neither subject nor predicate represents a natural kind, such as "The Greeks were Aryans," it seems that we may despair of truth at once, since "the relations of non-natural groups cannot be ascertained, because their limits are arbitrary and variable" (on *Pol.* 289). To the same effect, we are told that for the unsubstantial ideas which are "under no obligation" to be unities "*μέθεξις* is retained" (on *Soph.* 214). But if these ideas have lost their unity, how can *μέθεξις* be retained? If two boys eat each a different bun, do we say they have shared one cake? To say that anything which is "possessed in common" is not *one* is perilously near a contradiction in terms. The old point recurs: if every

¹ Further, if *πέρας* is the idea, and it is the new and important doctrine of the *Philebus* that ideas are not im-

manent, it is hard to puzzle readers at the start with the phrase *πέρας καὶ ἀπειραν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξυμφυτὸν ἔχοντων*.

thought is different from every other thought, judgment is impossible.

But Dr Jackson has his answer. The unsubstantial idea has no real unity, but it has an apparent unity. It is what Plato hinted at in the *Parmenides*, in the seventh hypothesis as to the relations of εἶν and τᾶλλα. "τᾶλλα in the absence of εἶν attain to a semblance of unity by congregation in a group." The unsubstantial idea is an ὄγκος εἰς φαινόμενος, ὧν δ' οὐ. These groups are the foundation, not of knowledge, but of opinion¹ (on *Parm.* 317).

The ingenuity of this theory cannot be denied, but let us understand precisely where it leaves us. It is, in a word, not a theory of knowledge, but a theory of ignorance. Does it explain judgment or predication? It does in a sense. It explains how the unwary fall into the trap of judging and predicating. But no one who accepts it with full understanding will ever make a judgment again. We are reduced to unmitigated scepticism; not a scepticism which, while it denies certain knowledge, leaves us more or less probable Opinions, but one which for its adherents makes any opinion whatever strictly impossible. Take any proposition, such as "Socrates was just." This seems to be an assertion which puts Socrates into connection with other persons who are also just. But we know now that this connection is an illusion. Justice is "under no obligation" to have one and the same meaning in different cases: nay, the very fact of "participation" makes it impossible that it should do so. Perhaps it will be said: the justice in Socrates is not the same as justice in other people; there is no unity, but only resemblance: still this resemblance is enough to give a meaning to the proposition. No doubt there is some truth in this; but unfortunately it is precisely the plea which an advocate of the "later theory" is debarred from using. For him, Likeness is the

¹ Combining this with the statement (on *Soph.* 187) that the "groups make no pretension to objectivity" we get the result that Opinion makes no pretension to objectivity. But it is not

to be supposed that this can really be the meaning, for we are told (on *Th.* 259) that while Sensation is relative, Opinion is not so.

first and most obvious of those unsubstantial ideas which, because they are "capable of indefinite multiplication," are incapable of preserving their unity, or of making any "pretension to objectivity." Consequently the judgment that one thing is like another is the last to which he can suppose any validity to attach.

For the later theory, however, those propositions afford the crucial test which profess to qualify an object supposed to belong to a natural kind: e.g. "man is a mammal," "the dog is a quadruped." The difficulty is here the same, but the "later theory" affords us rather ampler statements for criticism (on *Pol.* 289). "Plato regards any characteristic which distinguishes all the members of one natural kind from all the members of another natural kind, as a characteristic of the type of the natural kind first mentioned. We cannot indeed examine all the members of a natural kind, and consequently we can never have an absolute assurance that the observed characteristic is a characteristic of the type. But provisional assurance is something, and may be made to approximate to absolute assurance. Thus, whereas the limits of non-natural groups cannot be ascertained because their limits are arbitrary and variable, the relations of natural kinds are known to infinite intelligence, and to its knowledge of them finite intelligence may approximate by the careful observation of an ever-increasing number of particulars."

Is this "regarding" a judgment, or if not, what is it? Is "characteristic" only another word for predicate, or if not, what does it mean? Is there any meaning in saying that a characteristic "distinguishes all the members of a natural kind" unless it means that they all share the characteristic? If they share in it (*μέθεξις*), can it preserve its unity? If it cannot preserve its unity, how can it be a characteristic of an eternal unity? On these points we need further explanation.

Let us make an experiment in "careful observation of particulars." We have seen above the difficulty of saying of any object "This is a dog." But suppose we have caught a dog: what can we observe about him? Nothing that we can express in words: we are too painfully conscious of the "un-

certainty, relativity and mutability" of general names (on *Soph.* 186). Shall we say "The dog is a quadruped"? It is of little use to do so, for that fourfootedness in one animal is the same as, or even resembles fourfootedness in another, is an illusion from which we have been "freed." The group of "quadrupeds" is "a class arbitrarily constructed and consequently liable to alteration": the appellation is "arbitrary," and makes "no pretension to objectivity," and so on. Yet we are to hope that by industry in amassing such scraps of foggy error we shall obtain provisional assurance, approximating to absolute assurance, about the eternal realities! This assurance will be as to the "relations of likeness and unlikeness in which the ideas stand to one another." Has then the word likeness still no definite meaning? the idea of likeness no real unity or objectivity? If not, what a display of human fallibility was that last modest hope that we might go on learning more and more about the relations of the eternal unity Ass to the eternal unity Thistle!

This point is especially noticeable in connection with the method of *διαίρεσις* in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, which is held to afford important evidence for the "later theory." According to that theory the only knowable groups, because the only permanent and natural groups, are the *infimae species*, Man, Dog etc. or whatever they may be. And Dr Jackson tries with very great ingenuity to shew that the *διαίρεσις* of the *Sophist* are meant to illustrate, by a *reductio ad absurdum* of classification by means of arbitrary groups, "the uncertainty, relativity and mutability of certain general names." But we ask in surprise, what other classification is possible? Each step in the process is necessarily a descent through higher groups, orders, families, genera etc. down to the *infimae species*. None of these higher groups can be, according to the "later theory," natural, permanent, or objective, and every classification will be as unsatisfactory as those which the *Sophist* is supposed to shew up. Accordingly, when Dr Jackson (on *Parm.* 326) appeals in support of his theory to the doctrine in the *Philebus* of the intermediate Many between *ἐν* and *ἄπειρα*, it may be replied that, since the *Philebus* clearly recognises *genera* as

well as *species* (we are to divide and subdivide often), it rather discountenances the view that only the *infimae species* are knowable.

Dr Jackson supposes Plato to say: the "general name" Sophist has borne different meanings with different persons at different times: therefore there is no fixed idea corresponding to it, and the dogma of the *Republic* that there is an idea for every general name must be given up.

I think this view hardly does Plato justice. The dogma of the *Republic* is stated, it is true, without the qualifications which are necessary to make it technically accurate. Especially an exception must be made in the case of ambiguous terms: it cannot be supposed, for instance, that corresponding to the word *φοίνιξ* there is one idea and one only, which by its immanence makes the essence alike of a Phoenician, crimson, a palm-tree, a date, a musical instrument, and a kind of grass¹. But the real point for Plato, early or late, is this: When I use a word, I imply that it has a definite meaning, that it expresses a conception which is what it is, and is one and the same with itself; and when I apply the same description to several objects, I mean that they have something in common—if I did not, I should be talking nonsense. Plato was surely quite aware that different persons may use the same word to express different meanings. Indeed, he mentions the fact as a motive for the dialectic method. Before definition, persons "have only the name in common": at its close they have the conception also (*Soph.* 218 B, 221 A). And when Dr Jackson asserts that this conception has no real unity, he is in effect contradicting rather than interpreting Plato. So far from treating the diversity of definitions of Sophist as a ground for denying the unity of the conception, Plato emphatically says (*Soph.* 231 C, 232 A): Theaetetus may well wonder, after all these attempts at definition, what the true

¹ Aristotle puts the point with characteristic technical exactitude (*Met.* 1106 a 35). It makes no difference if there are several meanings, so long as they are limited, or defined; for a

separate name might be given to each conception. If however it is said that the meanings are indefinite or unlimited (*ἀπειρα*) plainly in that case rational speech is impossible.

account of the Sophist may be; still, wherever a man appears to possess various *ἐπιστήμαι*, but is yet called by the name of one *τέχνη*, there is something wrong in the appearance: we must have failed to discover *that element of the Art, to which all these branches of learning have reference*: and to acquiesce in this would be disgraceful laziness. Whereas, according to the "later theory," Theaetetus' perplexity was quite uncalled for; the *φάντασμα* was perfectly *ὑγιές*, so far as any thought or speech can be: acquiescence is not laziness, but prudent because inevitable.

In fact, Aristotle seems to me to reduce the Plato of the "later theory" to a vegetable (as he says) very successfully when he observes (*Met.* 1006 a): The assertion that words have not one definite sense makes all speech and indeed all thought impossible: *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἔν.*

I will touch on one more point of detail in the *Sophist*, which is not without importance. Dr Jackson holds that the idealists of the *γίγαντομαχία* represent the earlier form of Platonism: and besides other points of resemblance, argues that the doctrine of the "incommunicability of ideas" (*ἀκοινωνησία τῶν εἰδῶν*) which is attributed to the Friends of Ideas is implied in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* (on *Soph.* 200 to 202). This argument seems, however, to rest on an ambiguous word. In the *Sophist* *κοινωνία* has two meanings which, though perhaps ultimately allied, are surely quite distinct. It means:

(1) our relation to that which we apprehend, as *σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσκει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν* (*Soph.* 248 A).

(2) the mutual relation of ideas which makes it possible to unite them in judgment (*Soph.* 251).

Now the inconsistency with which the Friends of Ideas are taunted concerns the former sense alone. They assert the *κοινωνία* between Mind and ideas, but do not see that this involves Action and Passion¹. There is no hint that they denied or affirmed the *κοινωνία* of ideas in the second sense. Further

¹ To be precise, therefore, they assert *κοινωνία*, and do not deny it as Dr Jackson says.

on, indeed, we do come to thinkers who denied the mutual *κοινωνία* of ideas; but they are not the Friends of Ideas, and receive very different treatment; they are the *ὀφίμαθεῖς*, the philosophical paupers, who are generally identified with the Cynics.

So far then as the evidence of the *Sophist* goes, we are by no means driven to the conclusion that Plato at any time conceived ideas to be unrelated to each other: and a detailed examination of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* would yield the same result without, as it seems to me, the possibility of doubt.

I have tried to shew that the "later theory" leads to speechless scepticism. The advocates of that theory would hardly attribute such scepticism to Plato. But they acknowledge and maintain that the "later theory" is in some degree sceptical. The ideas are said to be "incognisable"; "we are cut off absolutely from the knowledge of the idea" (on *Timaeus* 26, 27): the finite intellect can only "approximate" to knowledge.

In the first place, however, are we not bound to say that a reality from the knowledge of which we were in a strict sense "absolutely cut off," would be a non-entity, and the assertion of its existence non-sense? As a matter of fact, the "later theory" gives us a great deal of information, and bids us hope for more, about ideas. But if we are to "approximate" to knowledge of ideas, a difficulty presents itself. Shall we know that we are so approximating? Hardly, for to know that we are approaching something we must necessarily have some knowledge of the goal: which is here *ex hypothesi* not the case. Shall we then merely suppose or opine that we are approximating? This again seems to involve a supposition or opinion about the goal: but surely to say that ideas are the objects of opinion as distinguished from knowledge would be too much for any student of Plato (and especially of the *Timaeus*) to venture. Further, as a matter of evidence, the grounds for attributing even a partial scepticism to the Plato of the six dialogues do not seem to be conclusive: at any rate there are emphatic statements in an opposite sense. According to the "later theory," the argument in the *Parmenides* (133, 134) to shew

that ideas are unknowable is finally valid (on *Parm.* 295). It may be observed that both at its introduction and conclusion Parmenides hints that with time, trouble—and metaphysical genius—it is not unanswerable. But in any case, whether the argument be good or bad, it has very little to do with the “later theory.” It rests entirely on the assumption that the *αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ εἶδη* are ideas of relations, such as Master and Servant. Then it proceeds to shew that, since ideas correlate with ideas, and things *παρ’ ἡμῶν* with things *παρ’ ἡμῶν* exclusively, absolute Truth can only correlate with absolute Knowledge: consequently our knowledge is limited to the truth *παρ’ ἡμῶν*, and cannot reach ideas. Now since according to the “later theory” there is no idea of knowledge, and generally no correlation of this sort among the *αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ εἶδη*, the argument falls to the ground. We must seek some fresh ground for attributing scepticism to Plato. Mr Archer Hind appears to find it in the *Timæus* (Introduction, p. 28); where, he does not mention. In the most obvious passages we have the definite statements (37 B, 51 E):

First, true opinion exists.

Secondly, distinct from this, reason or knowledge exists in completeness (*ἀποτελείται*) among men.

Is not this definite enough? It is hardly necessary to quote the passages which speak of the substantial ideas, the *ὄντως ὄντα*, as *νοούμενα* (51 D), *νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτά* (28 A), *τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν*. Can these expressions be reconciled with the statement that we are “cut off absolutely from knowledge of the idea”? Nor is it clear that the other dialogues bid us “refrain from ambitious dreams” of knowledge. Of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* Campbell truly says that Plato nowhere shews a greater confidence in the reality and comprehensiveness of science. The same might be said of the *Philebus*: see especially the description of the troop of sciences (58 A, 62 A) led by Dialectic, which, as dealing with eternal Being, is *μακρῶ ἀληθεστάτη γνῶσις*.

These references lead naturally to one more criticism. It may be admitted to be not unlikely that Plato reflected upon and to some extent modified his system; and that he was led

to assign a position of peculiar importance to those ideas which form a basis for science. When however the "later theory" limits ideas to the types of animals, plants, and the four elements, it surely ascribes to Plato too narrow a conception of science. According to the six dialogues, at any rate, Plato was so far from limiting science to what we call "natural science" (and indeed, as would appear from the "later theory," to a small part of that) that he included in the first rank "moral sciences," such as Ethics and Politics, and, I think we should add, Psychology and Political Economy. If so, he must have continued to maintain the existence of genuine ideas wherever, in modern language, there are definite conceptions on which the "*Geistes-wissenschaften*" are based.

First, what evidence is there against such ideas? Dr Jackson sees in the phrase of the *Parmenides* παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστῶτα an indication that henceforward ideas will be only "natural types" of animals, etc.¹ But surely we have no right to transfer the modern associations of "nature" and "natural" to the Platonic φύσις. When Dr Jackson argues (on *Parm.* 323 note) that since ideas are to be described in the above phrase, it is a "fair inference that there are no ideas of σκευαστά such as οἰκία and δακτύλιος," we need only remember the reference a few pages back to the "Bed in Nature" (*Rep.* 597 B) which is a pattern for human artists. The phrase ἐν τῇ φύσει was almost a technical term for the transcendent as opposed to the immanent idea (*Phaedo* 103 B): just as φύσις is the watchword of teleology and rationalism against empiricism in the *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus* and elsewhere. Especially with regard to ethical judgments, φύσις is the word regularly used to express the view that they are not arbitrary or conventional, but have a validity of their own: see for instance *Theaet.* 172 B. Probably then the first meaning (not the only

¹ I am not convinced by Dr Jackson (on *Parm.* 292) that this suggestion is accepted by Parmenides, any more than any of Socrates' other propositions. "Parmenides' inference is not that Socrates' conception of the εἶδος as a παράδειγμα is erroneous, but that

ὁμοίτης is not the basis of its relationship to its particulars." But in what does the relation of παράδειγμα to ὁμοίωμα consist, except ὁμοίτης? There may be priority in time of course, if that is relevant.

possible meaning) of the phrase *παραδείγματα ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστῶτα* which would occur to a pupil of Plato's would be not "natural species" but "ethical types," as with the corresponding phrase *παραδείγματα ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστῶτα* (*Th.* 176 E): compare also *Rep.* IX. 592, *παραδείγμα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἀνακείμενον*, and v. 472 c.

Mr Archer Hind admits that there is no direct statement to shew that ideas of Qualities were banished from the later Platonism: but "we have the indirect evidence that they are never mentioned in the later dialogues" (Introd. to *Timaeus*, p. 26). This remark seems to require some rather peculiar interpretation to justify it. Does not the *Philebus* (62 A) set before us in black and white knowledge *αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅτι ἔστιν* as the highest knowledge because its object is eternally self-identical being? Again in the *Parmenides* the danger of the agnostic argument is that it may shut us off from *αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν* and the rest: and this, it is to be observed, is not before, but after the foundation of the new system is supposed to have been laid by Socrates' suggestion as to natural types. And in the *Sophist* (247 A) what is the immaterial being the reality of which is driven home to the materialists? Again, Justice: the argument being that souls are just only through the possession and presence (*παρουσία*) of justice, and since that which can come and go must exist, justice exists¹. As to the *Politicus*, there is a notable passage (285, 286) which Dr Jackson quotes in support of his theory (on *Pol.* 288). We do not, the Eleate says, seek for a definition of weaving for its own sake. But while some *ὄντα* have *αἰσθηταὶ ὁμοιότητες* which can be easily observed, others, and these the most important and valuable, have no image made obvious for men, by sensible perception of which an inquirer can be satisfied. We must therefore practise so as to be able *λόγον ἐκάστου δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι*: for by *λόγος* alone can immaterial things be shewn clearly, and these are the most valuable and important: and for their sake all the present discussion is carried on. Dr Jackson reduces this to an intimation

¹ This brief proof seems to indicate that the flux teaching of the *Theaetetus* would not supersede ideas of qualities (on *Th.* 269).

that "the discovery of *νοητά*" is the object of enquiry: thus neglecting the distinction between the two kinds of *ὄντα*. Surely another interpretation is obvious, which will not however harmonise with the "later theory." All *ὄντα* are properly *νοητά*, but there are sensible images of some, e.g. of Weaving, Horse, etc.: while others are entirely immaterial, i.e. have no sensible images, for instance (may we not say by comparison with the *Sophist*?) Justice, Likeness, etc. The latter are the most important, and we practise the method of division on material objects only with the purpose of applying it afterwards to the immaterial. At any rate, whatever the superior *ὄντα* may be, can it be denied that the "types of natural kinds" which are to be studied through "careful observation of particulars" that imitate them, must fall into the inferior class of *ὄντα* above described, those of which we can give an account by applying our senses to their *αἰσθητὰ ὁμοίότητες* or *εἶδωλα*? In fact, so far is this passage from limiting Science to Zoology and Botany that it is rather a defence of the introduction of those studies into the Academic *προπαιδεία*.

And does the *Politicus* more generally strike one as an *intentional reductio ad absurdum* of attempts at scientific politics? as an illustration of the truth that all political conceptions are "arbitrary and mutable"? Yet this is said to be the intention of the *διαίρέσεις* of the *Sophist*, and the same must apply here. Dr Jackson argues plausibly (on *Pol.* 281) that the true statesman is the same as the philosopher. At any rate, if anything is clear in the dialogue, it is clear that the true statesman has knowledge. But of what has he knowledge? According to the "later theory," all he can have is approximate knowledge of natural types. But could Plato (in pre-Darwinian days) possibly have held that "acquaintance with the affinities" of the pig and the horse was the essential qualification of a statesman? Laws are, or ought to be, *μιμήματα τῆς ἀληθείας* (*Pol.* 300 c). Will Dr Jackson suggest a law which imitates "the eternal unity dog"?

A similar difficulty occurs, on the hypothesis of the "later theory," as to the relation of the *Politicus* and *Timaeus* to the *Republic*. It is argued (on *Pol.* 298—300) that whereas the

metaphysic of the *Republic* is superseded, its ethical and political teaching is in the "later theory" emphatically restated and endorsed: the theory of an ideal state in the *Timaeus*, the distinction between philosophic and customary morality in the *Politicus*: and thus, apart from the necessary "revision and reconstruction" of its ontology, the *Republic* "still retains its position as the authoritative statement of the principles of academic education and the programme of academic study." The way in which the *Timaeus* is attached to the *Republic* certainly needs some explanation, but is this a possible one? Plato once believed that his politics and his theory of education were intimately connected with his metaphysic: "his morality is founded in the very depths of his ontology," says Mr Archer Hind on the *Phaedo*. Did he then come to see how greatly he had been deluded, and to acknowledge that Politics and Ethics could stand alone? Such "*inconstantia*" is not strictly impossible: but surely it is logically impossible that the particular Ethics and Politics expounded in the *Republic* should so stand alone. For the "later theory" man is nothing but a featherless biped. The ideal state, *ἐν λόγοις κειμένη*, the pattern laid up in heaven, is discovered to be "arbitrarily constructed and consequently liable to alteration." It is not that we have apprehended it inadequately—that might be easily admitted; the trouble is, that one apprehension of it is just as good (or bad) as another. And what difference remains between customary and philosophical ethics, if there are no ethical ideas to know? The method of study recommended in the *Republic* is the *ψυχῆς περιαιγωγή* away from sensible things to intelligible being: but in what sense can this recommendation be maintained if "careful observation of particulars" is the only road to knowledge? In fact, the "later theory" does not leave one stone standing on another in the *καλλίπολις*; and it would seem rather disingenuous in Plato to pretend (in the *Timaeus*) that this really made no difference.

Lastly we return to the *Theaetetus*. At a critical point in the discussion Socrates asks Theaetetus whether he is pleased with the notion that nothing *is*, but is ever becoming, Good, Right and the rest. If this question was pressed on the advo-

cates of the "later theory," what could they reply? It is really difficult to predict. On their view, Plato undoubtedly ought to say that he is very well pleased indeed¹. But paradox is hardly the word for the suggestion that this answer is what Socrates really wishes to bring out, or is the final result of the *Theaetetus* as a whole. The general outcome of the dialogue seems to me clear in this respect: though it must be admitted that there are many perplexing and doubtful points. But in one passage at all events there is an unmistakable declaration—in the episodic description of the philosopher; and whatever the precise significance of the episode may be, I cannot doubt that it is seriously meant (*Theaet.* 175, 176). What shall we make of the "pure justice and injustice" which the philosopher studies? And what are the "patterns fixed in reality; one divine, the other godless"? Do not these expressions prove that ideas of qualities were not banished from the later Platonism?

I will end with one more remark as to the *κομψότεροι* of the *Theaetetus*. Dr Jackson points out that their theory of sensation is closely related to the theory of *δύναμις* as a criterion of reality which is put forward in the *Sophist* (248). It seems to me indisputable that the phrase *πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυνιόντων γιγνόμενον* does recall the *Theaetetus*. But does it therefore follow that Plato (as represented by the Eleate in the *Sophist*) agrees with the *κομψότεροι*? I think there is another interpretation which fits the situation better. The aim of the *κομψότεροι* is to eliminate "being," to represent the universe without unity or permanence. Surely then the theory of the *Sophist* is not in agreement with them, but a retort (and a forcible one) upon them. When they assert: "Subject and Object do not exist, but are only potentialities"; Plato replies: "Because they are potential, they must in the fullest sense (*παντελῶς*) exist². I will accept the words

¹ Cf. "Socrates" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

² Compare Mr Bradley's criticism of Mill's *Permanent Possibility of Sensation*: "A real possibility means some-

thing which in itself and in fact is no possibility, but must be something actual" etc. (*Principles of Logic*, p. 196).

ποιεῖν and πάσχειν to express the relation of subject and object, the word δύναμις to express the relation between reality and phenomena: but you shall not use the conception of potentiality as a cloak behind which to conjure away reality. How to conceive this δύναμις by which reality passes into phenomena is indeed a puzzle, δυσφραστὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν (*Timaeus* 50 c): or rather it is the puzzle which after all I must confess I have not yet solved. But since no basis for knowledge is otherwise possible, if I am confronted with a choice of alternatives, and bidden to ascribe to reality either eternal unchanged substantiality or creative efficient causality, I cannot help myself (πᾶσα ἀνάγκη), I must say, κατὰ τὴν τῶν παιδῶν εὐχὴν, ξυναμφοτέρα (*Soph.* 249)."

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NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. BOOK I.

THE following notes are with special reference to the new edition by Susemihl and Hicks, to which indeed I am entirely indebted for what knowledge of the subject I possess. It is assuredly with no great confidence that I venture to differ from them in any instance, and should but one of these suggestions be adopted it will be ample satisfaction for what trouble I have bestowed upon them.

I 2 (1253 a 20).

ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη.

Is it possible that *ἀναιρουμένου* can mean "if we take away in our imagination, if we remove logically"? Then the sentence will simply mean: "neither foot nor hand exists in its true sense, if we separate it in idea from the whole body, any more than a hand of stone is a hand in the true sense (as defined by its capacity for grasping). For being spoilt (as it will be by this separation, seeing that it will no longer be able to perform its function) it will be on the same footing as *ἡ λιθίνη*."

Liddell and Scott quote *ἐκ μέσου ἀναιρεῖν βλασφημίας* from Demosthenes. Perhaps this use is as metaphorical as that which I propose here. If Aristotle had meant "destroyed" he must have used a past participle, but the present seems to me conceivable if he means only "removed in idea." At the same time I should have expected the past tense even so.

I 6.

Aristotle argues at the beginning of this chapter as follows. It is plain that there is a natural ground of slavery, to wit *ἀρετή*, yet there is a great deal in what is said by the opponents of this (the Aristotelian) view. For if the word *δοῦλος* is used equivocally, there is such a thing as *δοῦλος φύσει* and also as *δοῦλος νόμῳ*. And this latter conventional slavery has the justification or ground of defence that in war the conquered belong to the conquerors. But this justification (*τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον*) is attacked by many on the ground that it is outrageous (*ὡς δεινὸν < ὄν > ?*) the conquered should be slave of one who has no superior merit whereby to claim lordship over him except superior force. Opinions of philosophers are divided between these two theories.

Now comes the *crux* (1255 a 12). *αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὖνοια δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.* The meaning of this passage I take to be this: "the cause of this difference of opinion and what makes the two views overlap," viz. the view that *ἀρετὴ* is the justification of slavery, and the view that *βία* is the justification, "is the fact that as a general rule *ἀρετὴ* if equally well-provided with war-material is also able *βιάζεσθαι* its opponents and the conqueror always has a superiority in good of some sort (bravery, wisdom, etc.), so that *βία* always appears to be in company with *ἀρετὴ*." You do not find a morally and intellectually inferior race enslaving a morally and intellectually superior, because the latter is pretty sure to have more *βία* as well as more *ἀρετὴ*, other things being equal. Of course if the superior race has allowed its *χορηγία* to be lamentably deficient, the case may be altered. The *λόγοι ἐπαλλάττουσι* because *βία* and *ἀρετὴ* nearly coincide in this instance,

and so the corresponding *λόγοι* nearly coincide also. Take ten cases of one nation making slaves of another in war and eight or nine of them will be instances of a race superior in *ἀρετή* overcoming an inferior. Such I conceive to be Aristotle's reasoning, whatever we may think of its cogency.

To resume the translation: *ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου κ.τ.λ.* "*< As then the cases coincide, or nearly so, it is not a practical question >* but only a theoretical one about the ground or justification of the proceeding. For it is because of this," because the two *λόγοι* nearly coincide, "that people differ, some saying (as I do) that loyalty is the true ground of slavery," which is the same as saying *ἀρετή*, "others that it is the right of the stronger: for if the two *λόγοι* were removed quite apart and did not overlap, there would be no force or plausibility in the second *λόγος* that not *ἀρετή* but *βία* is the justification of slavery." If, that is, we found people who were not superior in *ἀρετή* enslaving their superiors, if *ἀρετή* and *βία* did not generally coincide, the view that *βία* is the sole justification would not find anyone to support it; it would be robbed of its plausibility. And why? Because, I imagine, we should then find barbarians enslaving Greeks, and where was the philosopher who would have defended *that* on any grounds whatever?

The essential point where my interpretation differs from those of Susemihl and Jackson is in understanding the two *λόγοι* to be:

- i. *ἀρετή* is the *δίκαιον* of slavery,
- ii. *βία* is the *δίκαιον* of slavery,

whereas both those scholars agree in thinking the *λόγοι* to be:

- i. All slavery is unjust,
- ii. All slavery is just.

The whole of the rest of the translation depends primarily on this one point.

But who then are the persons to whom Aristotle now goes on? *ὅλως δὲ ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δίκαιον τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δίκαιαν, ἅμα δὲ οὐ φασιν.* Here again I find myself at variance with both of my guides. Both of them say that the third set of

thinkers agree with the second practically, but differ in their reason for thinking all slavery to be just. My view is that the third and second set are not to be distinguished at all, that the alleged difference of reasons for defending slavery is an imagination of modern critics. The second set of thinkers say that all slavery is just, *ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστίν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν*. The third set, says Susemihl, "adhere to the principle 'what is legal is right,'" with which Jackson agrees. But what, one may well ask, is the distinction between saying that "all slavery is just because of the νόμος by which the conquered are the property of the conqueror," and that "all slavery is just because what is legal is right"? Surely they come to absolutely and precisely the same thing. Aristotle is harking back to the second view, and bringing up a new argument against its adherents in a manner only too familiar in his writings; in fact it is one of the consequences of the "open note-book for lecture."

A great deal of the interpretation proposed above agrees with that of Bernays, but no one seems to take my view of the passage as a whole.

I 8 (1256 b 23).

διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς), ἣ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον ὄντα τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον.

Translate: "So natural war also falls under the head of κτητικὴ, just as hunting does, which κτητικὴ (war + hunting) must be employed against animals and men who are only fit to be ruled but object to it, for we must assume that this sort of war is naturally justifiable."

The parenthesis appears to me thrown in to answer possible objectors. "War is a branch of acquisition; perhaps some one may doubt this, but he is wrong if he does, for hunting is a branch of acquisition and this sort of war is on the same footing as hunting." Aristotle ought then to have continued: "As we use the hunting branch of κτητικὴ against animals, so we are

justified in using the polemic branch of it against barbarians." Instead of this he has put down his note so briefly that it is all in confusion.

I 9 (1257 a 35).

διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὃν εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν.

That πρὸς τὸ ζῆν is nonsense has been long observed. The corrections proposed are *βαστάζειν* and the like. But it is clear that nothing more is required after *εὐμεταχείριστον*, which by itself gives the ideas of easiness of carrying and easiness of exchange. It has occurred to me that if we transpose the words πρὸς τὸ ζῆν before εἶχε we shall get a very good sense out of them, though it must be admitted that they are still superfluous. ὃ (τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὃν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν) εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον. Compare *χρημάτων πρὸς ζῶν ἀναγκαίων* (1256 b 29).

I 9 (1258 a 6).

ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν.

Surely Aristotle never wrote such a sentence even as a lecture note, and surely no student ever took such a note down. Was not the original something like ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ οὔσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, <καὶ> τὴν ποιητικὴν <αὐτῆς ἐν ὑπερβολῇ> ζητοῦσιν? This gives the sense which is imperatively demanded, but the ordinary reading gives no sense at all, to say nothing of the extraordinary composition. People seek money *in excess*, and they do so because they want pleasure in excess. But to say that they "seek money" ἀπλῶς, omits an essential part of the statement. Compare the corresponding phrase just above: εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὔσης, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (not τῶν ἀπείρων ποιητικῶν which would have corresponded to τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν).

I 11 (1258 b 30).

ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, οἶον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική.

“Compare *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 : κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι (Jackson).” But if there is one thing in the world which produces πρόσοδοι more than another, it is ἡ μεταλλευτική. How then could Aristotle describe it as ἄκαρπος if by ἄκαρπος he meant that it brought in no revenue? Clearly he is contrasting this branch of τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων with the ordinary produce of γῆ, namely κάρποι, crops and fruits, γεωργία ψιλή τε καὶ πεφυτευμένα.

ARTHUR PLATT.

EMENDATIONES HOMERICAE (IL. XIII—XVIII).

N 62 αὐτὸς δ', ὡς τ' ἴρηξ ὠκύπτερος ὄρτο πέτεσθαι,
ὅς ῥά τ' ἀπ' αἰγίλιπος πέτρης περιμήκεος ἀρθεὶς
ὄρμήση πεδίοιο διώκειν ὄρνεον ἄλλο.

Heartily endorsing Menrad's excellent *περίμηκες ἀερθεὶς*, "soaring to a great height", no less admirably adapted to describe the action of the falcon, than the whole simile is to refute the absurd tradition of the blindness of the poet, I proceed to suggest further that *ὄρμήση*, "starts", can hardly be anything else than a corruption of *οἰμήση*, "swoops". Perhaps it would be sufficient for my purpose to adduce:—

X 139 ἤντε κίρκος ὄρεσφιν, ἐλαφρότατος πετεηνῶν,
ῥηιδίως οἶμησε μετὰ τρήρωνα πέλειαν.

X 308 οἶμησεν δὲ ἀλείς ὡς τ' αἰετὸς ὑψιπετής, (= ω 537)
ὅς τ' εἰσιν πεδίονδε διὰ νεφέων ἐρεβεννῶν
ἀρπάξων ἢ ἄρν' ἀμαλὴν ἢ πτώκα λαγών
ὡς Ἐκτωρ οἶμησε.

Clearly the colourless *ὄρμήση*, cf. Φ 265 *ὄρμήσειε—στήναι*, is a very ineffective and inadequate term to depict the downward dart or swoop of this noble bird, even if no serious exception could be taken to the word on grammatical grounds. But, as it happens, not only special propriety but even essential accuracy of expression seems to have been sacrificed to the influence of mere association, for the combination of *διώκειν* with *ὀρμάομαι* was a familiar one from K 359 *τοὶ δ' αἶψα διώκειν ὀρμήθησαν*.

The case for the intransitive use of *ὀρμάω*, if we exclude the present passage, is singularly weak and unconvincing. One form alone, *ὀρμήσειε*, presents itself,—a fact perhaps not without significance:—

X 194 *ὄσσάκι δ' ὀρμήσειε πυλάων Δαρδανιάων
ἀντίον ἀίξασθαι ἐνδμήτους ὑπὸ πύργους,*

where two of the best MSS. L. Lips. give *ὀρμήσαιτο*, which, I submit, might well be accepted.

Φ 265 *ὄσσάκι δ' ὀρμήσειε ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς
στήναι ἐναντίβιον καὶ γινώμεναι.*

These two passages must, of course, stand or fall together. If *ὀρμήσαιτο* be right in one, it is also right in the other. The only remaining instance is

Δ 334 *ἔστασαν, ὀππότε πύργος Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἐπελθὼν
Τρώων ὀρμήσειε καὶ ἄρξειαν πολέμοιο,*

against which, while correction is easy and in accord with usage, cf. Φ 595, may be set the truer acceptation of the same mood and tense in:—

σ 376 *εἰ δ' αὖ καὶ πόλεμόν ποθεν ὀρμήσειε Κρονίων.*

*

N 256 *ἔρχομαι, εἴ τί τοι ἔγχος ἐνὶ κλισίῃσι λέλειπται
οἰσόμενος· τό νυ γὰρ κατεάξαμεν, ὃ πρὶν ἔχεσκον,
ἀσπίδα Δηϊφόβοιο βαλὼν ὑπερηγορέοντος.*

It is no wonder that the plural form *κατεάξαμεν* has been a continual offence and stumbling block to readers and critics. The plural is so deeply embedded here in surrounding verbs and participles of the singular number, *ἔρχομαι*, *οἰσόμενος*, *ἔχεσκον*, *βαλὼν*, that it avails little to point out the few occasions, on which in a perfectly natural manner Homer has used *ἡμεῖς* and *ἡμέτερος* for *ἐγὼ* and *ἐμός*, e.g. β 60, π 44, 442, λ 562, Ο 224, Π 244, Τ 73, whereas in κ 97 ff. the usage is unnatural, and that line may safely be condemned as an interpolation from l. 148 (Nitzsch, Platt). Still less does it avail to show with Schol. A, that Euripides, whose facial resemblance

to Homer in the presentments of sculpture cannot be said to extend to his poetry, indulged with considerably less reserve in a somewhat similar mis-usage, cf. Eur. Ion 391 :—

κωλυόμεσθα μὴ μαθεῖν ἂ βούλομαι.

Dr Leaf refers also to ll. 1250—1 of the same play and to Tro. 904: *ὡς οὐδὲ δικαίως, ἦν θάνω, θανούμεθα.*

He finally, perhaps reluctantly, if I may say so, acquiesces in the text, *κατεάξαμεν*. A variant, *κατέαξα μὲν*, an inadmissible one of course, is mentioned in the scholia. Bentley long ago suggested *κατέαξά μοι*, giving a very questionable position to the enclitic pronoun. The supposition of Thiersch, that *κατεάξαμεν* is Aeolic for *κατεαξάμην*, does not commend itself, except possibly to a follower of Fick, by any special probability.

In dismissing these suggestions we need not hesitate to make the admission, that no remedy can be at all acceptable, which does not easily and readily account for the corrupt vulgate. For example *κατέαξ' ἐγώ* is clearly not the original, because it suggests no obvious or likely method of generation for *κατεάξαμεν*. I venture to think the reading I now offer is free from this antecedent improbability.

τό νυ γὰρ κατέαξ' ἐμόν, ὃ πρὶν ἔχεσκον.

Let us suppose, as I have done before (Λ 758), that the earliest writing was *ἐκ πλήρους* and did not recognise elisions. In that case *κατεαξαμεν* might without much difficulty become by successive stages *κατεαξαμον* and *κατεαξαμεν* from the accidental retention of *α* instead of *ε*, followed by the slight change of *ο* into *ε* necessitated by that retention.

The above emendation gives a form of expression not materially different from

H 295 *σοὺς τε μάλιστα ἔτας καὶ ἐταίρους οἳ τοι ἔασιν.*

What is more important, it is in accord with the requisite sense of the passage. Meriones is contrasting the ownership of the broken spear with that of the weapon he has come to appropriate to his own use, if he can find one. He says in effect: 'I am going to fetch a shaft of yours, because I have

broken my own'. This opposition, though clear, is not emphatic enough to have been an efficient safeguard to the possessive pronoun, the loss of which is to a considerable extent covered by the following relative clause, δ *πρὶν ἔχεσσκον*. This clause however must not be regarded as an epexegetis pure and simple of *ἐμόν*, although for that matter no reasonable objection would lie against such a well-known feature of Homeric style, e.g. I 124, N 482, γ 383, ι 271. The adjectival sentence here is obviously far from being a piece of mere tautology. It conveys substantial additional information, just as if the hero had said: 'mine, though I have now lost it', 'mine, for I had it a while ago'.

*

Ξ 456 *ἀλλά τις Ἀργείων κόμισε χροῖ*, (sc. *ἄκοντα*).

The local dative *χροῖ* may seem not altogether indefensible. It would certainly be too much to say it is necessarily wrong; but the usage in Homer of both *χρῶς* and *κομίζω*, separately and in combination, points so strongly to the desirability of the preposition here, that it can hardly be rash to propose

κόμισ' ἐν χροῖ,

as at least a highly probable correction.

First of all, for the two words in combination we may appeal to the very similar passage:—

X 286 *ὡς δὴ μιν σφ' ἐνὶ χροῖ πᾶν κομίσαιο*.

Next we may add the consideration, of less weight indeed as a piece of absolute evidence but still tending in the same direction, that *ἐν χροῖ* is the phrase used in the only other two passages, in which *χροῖ* is found in connection with wounding by spears or arrows, viz.

Θ 298 *πάντες δ' ἐν χροῖ πῆχθεν ἀρηιθόων αἰζηῶν* (sc. *οἰστοί*).

Ο 315 *ἄλλα μὲν ἐν χροῖ πῆγνυτ' ἀρηιθόων αἰζηῶν* (sc. *δοῦρα*).

Lastly the passages, in which *κομίζω*, *κομίζομαι*, are followed by the preposition *ἐν*, have some slight bearing on the question and will at all events serve to establish the sense of *κόμισε* here, which I take to be 'has taken charge of', 'has hospitably

received', a flippant but sufficiently grim sarcasm. These passages are:—

ψ 355 κτήματα μὲν τά μοί ἐστι κομιζέμεν ἐν μεγάροισι.
 π 82 εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις, σὺ κόμισσον ἐνὶ σταθμοῖσιν ἐρύξας.
 Θ 284 καί σε νόθον περ ἔοντα κομίσατο φ᾽ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

*

Ο 645 στρεφθεὶς γὰρ μετόπισθεν ἐν ἀσπίδος ἄντυγι πάλτο,
 τὴν αὐτὸς φορέεσκε ποδηκεῖ, ἔρκος ἀκόντων,
 τῇ ὅ γ' ἐνὶ βλαφθεὶς πέσεν ὕπτιος.

The first movement of the Homeric warrior in executing a retreat in face of the enemy was to throw his shield over his back, as Ajax does Λ 545, cf. Ζ 117—8. Periphetes, whose fate is here described, had so placed his shield. In stepping backward he plants his heel on the rim with the result that he falls on his back. Hector seizes the opportunity and kills him. *στρεφθεὶς* seems for the nonce to express merely reversal of direction, that the forward movement has been changed for a backward one without any turning round; for it is plainly impossible that the man, after he had turned round, could by tripping fall otherwise than on his face. Whether he has his shield before or behind is in this respect an immaterial consideration. His fall must be in the direction of his movement.

The difficulty of *πάλτο* is a very serious one. This word is supposed to be an epic aorist of *πάλλω* 'to shake', 'to brandish': but the unsuitability of this meaning here is so glaring, that it is worth while to examine the usage of the verb in detail. The active is common enough. *πάλλε(ν)*, *πάλλομεν*, *πάλλων*, *πάλλειν*, *πῆλε* and *πῆλαι* are all used. The middle or passive occurs: X 452 *στήθεσι πάλλεται ἦτορ ἀνὰ στόμα*. 461 *παλλομένη κραδίην*. Ο 191 *παλλομένων*. Ω 400 *παλλόμενος*. The two latter instances refer to casting lots. Ψ 692 I shall remark on later. This particular form, *πάλτο*, only recurs in a passage, the accuracy of which is rendered just a little doubtful by reason of the presence of a diminutive, *σφονδυλίων*:—

Τ 481 ὁ δὲ φασγάνῳ αὐχένα θείνας
τῆλ' αὐτῇ πῆληκι κάρη βάλε· μινεὸς αὐτε
σφονδυλίων ἔκπαλθ'. ὁ δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ κεῖτο τανυσθεῖς.

There are however four other passages, into which it is barely possible, though very undesirable, not to say erroneous, to read it. They are:—

Τ 351 οὐρανοῦ ἔκκατέπαλτο δι' αἰθέρος.
Θ 85 ἀλγίστας δ' ἀνέπαλτο, βέλος δ' εἰς ἐγκέφαλον δῦ.
Τ 424 ὡς εἶδ', ὡς ἀνέπαλτο, καὶ εὐχόμενος ἔπος ἦδα.
Ψ 694 ὡς πληγεῖς ἀνέπαλτ'· αὐτὰρ μεγάλθυμος Ἐπειός.

On the first of these Dr Leaf remarks, that it is *ἐκ-κατ-ἐπαλτο*, comparing Λ 94 *κατεπάλμενος*—a conclusive proof, if ever there was one. It follows then that in the three remaining lines the word is *ἀν-ἐπ-αλτο*, not *ἀν-ἐπαλτο*, and if this be so in the last instance, Ψ 694, then unquestionably in Ψ 692, which begins the simile,

ὡς δ' ὅθ' ὑπὸ φρικτὸς Βορέῳ ἀναπάλλεται ἰχθῦς,

ἀναπάλλεται is an incorrect writing of *ἀνεπάλλεται*, corrupted because the later Greeks did not care to recognise *ἄλλομαι* with a smooth breathing, v. Λ 192 *ἄλεται*, but *ἄλεται* A, adopted by Mr Platt. Φ 536 *ἄληται*, but *ἄληται* AC should be accepted. Doubtless Λ 298 *καθαλλομένη* (*ἄλλομένη* D) was originally *καταλλομένη*. Whether *ἄλμασιν* (θ 103) should be *ἄλμασιν* is perhaps more open to doubt.

It appears then that *πάλτο* has little real justification outside this passage, which may be thus emended:—

στρεφθεῖς γὰρ μετόπισθεν ἐν ἀσπίδος ἄντυγ' ἔπαλτο

'Retiring he sprang on the rim of the shield at his back'.

In the first place *ἄντυγι* would probably be written without elision in the oldest writing; next the later Greeks would accept almost any form rather than an elision of *ι* of the dat., if it could be got rid of, e.g. H 453. So we need not hesitate to restore the suitable *ἔπαλτο* for the unsuitable *πάλτο*. By doing this we should leave *πάλτο* in precarious dependence on Τ 483 alone, and as it would perhaps be more merciful to relieve it

altogether of the burden of such an existence, I will endeavour to hasten its departure from the pages of Homer by suggesting as a possible original:—

μυελὸς αὐτε

σφονδύλου ἐξανέπαλθ'· ὁ δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ κείμε τανυσθεῖς.

There is no reason why the singular should not stand, even though we do not go so far as to give it the precise scientific reference to the second very large vertebra of the neck, which it denotes in medical writers. The critic, who introduced the diminutive, may however have done Homer an injustice even in this respect. Misled by inferior knowledge he may have thought the plural a necessity, but could not introduce it without adopting the diminutive form also, a form, as we see, here particularly to be deprecated.

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Ο 710 ἀλλ' οἳ γ' ἐγγύθεν ἰστάμενοι, ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντες,
ὀξέσι δὴ πελέκεσσι καὶ ἀξίνησι μάχοντο
καὶ ξίφεσιν μεγάλοισι καὶ ἔγχεσιν ἀμφιγύοισι.

This passage is taken from a long description of the fierce and stubborn fight between the Greeks and Trojans near the ship of Protesilaus. οἳ γ' refers to both sides, as does the whole of line 710. The next line applies, as editors have remarked, to the use made by the Greeks, in the stress of the struggle, of the carpenters' tools, which the ship may be supposed to have carried. On the other hand l. 712 primarily, though not exclusively, describes the weapons of the attacking Trojans.

We are quite justified therefore in disregarding the athetesis of Aristarchus, laid, as Aristonicus informs us, upon l. 712, because in the opinion of the great critic there should be uniformity in the weapons employed, in his own words, ἡ ἰδιότης τῆς μάχης οὐ σώζεται.

There is no variant of importance. ξίφεσι is read by Lips. and should be adopted, as the paragogic ν is needless before μεγάλοισι. It is only in regard to the first line, that any question of the accuracy of the traditional reading need be raised. The hiatus before ἕνα is altogether unsatisfactory. It

is not even licitus. The sense of the phrase *ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντες* 'with one heart and soul', 'with unanimity' may seem unexceptionable to a modern reader: but it is noteworthy that the unanimity, here spoken of, is only the limited kind, which we are in the habit of describing with humorous sarcasm, now become a little stale and hackneyed, as 'agreeing to differ'.

I greatly fear that this little conceit is after all not Homeric, and that we ought to read in spite of all MSS. discovered or undiscovered:—

ἀλλ' οἳ γ' ἐγγύθεν ἰστάμενοι, δίχα θυμὸν ἔχοντες.

The introduction of *δίχα* here is defended by

Τ 32 *βὰν δ' ἴμεναι πόλεμόνδε θεοὶ δίχα θυμὸν ἔχοντες,*

to which may be added the not very different

Φ 385 *ἐν δ' ἄλλοισι θεοῖσιν ἔρις πέσε βεβριθυῖα
ἀργαλέη, δίχα δέ σφιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἄητο.*

The rejection of *ἕνα* is justified by the following passages, in all of which (and I have not consciously omitted any) the phrase *ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε(ς)* expresses a complete unison of feeling, an absolute accord, such as existed between the two masters of state-craft, Nestor and Odysseus. The former declares:—

γ 127 *οὔτε ποτ' εἰν ἀγορῇ δίχ' ἐβάζομεν οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ,
ἀλλ' ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε νόφ καὶ ἐπίφροσι βουλῇ
φραζόμεθ' Ἀργείοισιν, ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο.*

This complete accord may exist between two or more persons with the result that they join their forces to fight against a common enemy; but assuredly not, as in the passage under consideration, with the result that they fight against one another. The other passages, that I have to quote in illustration of this point, are:—

Π 218 *πάντων δὲ προπάροιθε δὺ' ἀνέρε θωρήσσοντο,
Πάτροκλός τε καὶ Αὐτομέδων, ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
πρόσθεν Μυρμιδόνων πολεμιζέμεν.*

P 266 *αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
ἔστασαν ἀμφὶ Μενoitιάδῃ ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντες.*

The unconscious recollection of either of these latter passages might cause a rhapsodist to introduce *ἔνα* instead of *δίχα* into O 710; but neither, if considered with more deliberate attention, supports its retention there, condemned, as it is, by both metre and usage.

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Π 259 *ἀντίκα δὲ σφήκεσσι εἰοικότες ἐξεχέοντο*
εἰνοδίοις, οὓς παῖδες ἐριδμαίνωσιν ἔθοντες,
 [αἰεὶ κερτομέοντες, ὀδῶ ἔπι οἰκί' ἔχοντας,]
νηπίαχου· ξυνὸν δὲ κακὸν πολέεσσι τιθείσιν.

There is no doubt that Aristarchus was right in condemning l. 261 (*ἀθετεῖται*), for a more patent specimen of an adscript or gloss, reduced to metre, cannot be found in the Homeric poems. *αἰεὶ κερτομέοντες* is equivalent to *ἐριδμαίνωσιν ἔθοντες*, or at least is intended to be so, though it lacks the precise accuracy, which makes *ὀδῶ ἔπι οἰκί' ἔχοντας*, as a definition of *εἰνοδίοις*, worthy of a lexicographer. I take notice of these points for this reason only, because l. 260 is fairly entitled to such testimony as l. 261 affords to its correctness in its present form. This correctness I make bold to challenge, though the corruption, if any, must be of considerable antiquity, indeed anterior to the concoction of l. 261.

In l. 260 the two concluding words, *ἐριδμαίνωσιν ἔθοντες*, particularly claim our attention. Of *ἔθοντες* for the moment it is sufficient to say that the form recurs only in I 540, of the Calydonian boar,

ὁς κακὰ πόλλ' ἔρδεσκεν ἔθων Οἰνήος ἀλώην·

We are told that it means 'habitually', *ἐξ ἔθους*, more suo, in fact as Dr Watts sang to our infancy 'for 'tis their nature to'.

ἐριδμαίνωσιν is ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, and objection has been taken to the form of the word, needlessly I think, for it is evidently related to *ἐρίζω*, as *σκυδμαίνω* (Ω 592 *σκυδμαινέμεν*) is to *σκήζομαι*. The difficulty arises, when we come to the meaning we are obliged to attribute to the word here, 'to irritate', 'provoke'. Obviously no other meaning will suit the passage. It is equally obvious however, that except for this

local reason no one would ever dream of giving any other sense to ἐριδμαίνω than that which is unquestionably borne by the cognate ἐρίζω, 'to contend', 'vie', 'rival'. ἐρίζω is quite of common use in Homer, and the same may be said of ἐρεθίζω, to which in sense, and not to ἐρίζω, we are forced, unwarrantably I submit, to assimilate ἐριδμαίνω.

Now if this act of violence, for it is nothing less, in interpretation can be avoided by an inconsiderable change, a change so inconsiderable that the appearance of the vulgate becomes no matter for surprise, the lack of MSS. authority may well be disregarded, and the line read thus:—

εἰνοδίους, οὓς παῖδες ἐριδμαίνωσ' ἐρέθοντες

'which lads vie with one another in provoking'. The loss of ἐρ- in ἐρέθοντες, a loss so easy, if ἐριδμαίνωσι were written, as it probably was, without elision, not to mention that ερεθ might be mistaken for a dittography, results at once in the appearance of ἔθοντες.

ἐρέθω is not an Attic form, and therefore in later times there would be no over-eagerness to preserve it: but it is unquestionably Homeric, cf.

A 519 Ἡρη, ὄτ' ἄν μ' ἐρέθησιν ὄνειδείοισι ἔπεσσιν.

τ 517 ὄξειαι μελεδῶνες ὄδυρομένην ἐρέθουσι.

Now a comparison of the strictly analogous ἐρέθω, ἐρεθίζω with ἔθω, ἐθίζω justifies a doubt, whether ἔθω could ever have meant anything but *I accustom, I habituate*, as a transitive verb. Consequently the vulgate, ἐριδμαίνωσιν ἔθοντες, would mean, if rightly taken, 'they contend, or vie in habituating them',—a sufficiently humorous view of the proceedings of boys at a wasps' nest. The young philosophers are only eager to educate the wasps in some undefined way.

But what is to be done with the positive testimony of

I 540 ὃς κακὰ πόλλ' ἔρδεσκειν ἔθων Οἰνῆος ἀλφήν

where ἔθων, 'after its kind', seems so appropriate? Well, this sense is, as we have seen, not altogether beyond question, and the support that ἔθων can derive from Π 260 turns out to be little more substantial than that given by the proverbial broken

reed, so that after all we may not be far from the truth if we divide the letters thus:—

ἔρδεσκ' ἐνέθων

lying or wallowing in it, ἐπικείμενος (ἐπενήνοθε: ἐπήν, ἐπέκειτο Apollon. Lex.), v. Buttmann's Lexil. s. v. ἀνήνοθε &c. Monro H. G. § 22 (8).

But having already laid violent hands on ἔθοντες, I should hardly now venture an assault on ἔθων as well, lest peradventure in the silent hours of the night the two participles, ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε, should rise in visible semblance before me, uttering the plaintive words:—

'Twas all very well to dissemble your love:

But why did you kick us down stairs?

I turn therefore to the clause ξυνὸν δὲ κακὸν πολέεσσι τιθεῖσι. The boys by irritating the wasps cause them to attack the passers-by in the manner described in the following lines. κακὸν τιθεῖσι 'cause mischief' refers to the boys and not, as Dr Leaf states, to the wasps. It may be distinguished from κακὸν ῥέζουσι 'inflict injury', 'do mischief', which would be the correct expression to describe the action of the wasps.

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Π 352 ὡς δὲ λύκοι ἄρνεσσιν ἐπέχραον ἢ ἐρίφοισι
σίνται, ὑπέκ μῆλων αἰρέυμενοι, αἴ τ' ἐν ὄρεσσι
ποιμένος ἀφραδίησι διέτμαγεν.

Considerable difficulty is here caused by the words ἐκ μῆλων, 'from the midst of the herds', which are in direct contradiction with the statement in the following clause, and also involve a harsh change of gender, μῆλων—, αἴ τε, a change very faintly defended by E 140, itself greatly in need of justification.

In a case like this, where Dr Leaf in his excellent edition seems almost prepared to accept Fick's excision of ἢ ἐρίφοισι—αἰρέυμενοι, it is surely permissible to suggest a correction of no great magnitude, which would enable us to retain the assailed clause with an improved sense, and at the same time to account in the simplest manner for the corruption. With due regard

to these conditions the original expression may be supposed to have run thus:—

ὑπέκ μητρῶν αἰρεύμενοι,

‘taking them from their dams’ (Schol. *ὑφαιρούμενοι*). ‘Violently seizing’ is, I venture to say, in every respect better than ‘selecting’, the usual rendering here. *ὑπέκ* also gains in force and precision.

The form *μητρῶν* would be *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*, in itself a sufficient reason for its disappearance from our MSS., but the Homeric usage of similar words affords, if I am not mistaken, very fair cause for admitting the genuineness of such a form in spite of its novelty. The gen. and dat. sing. *μητρός* and *μητρί* are much more frequently used in Homer than *μητέρος* and *μητέρι*, though this does not carry us very far. Then there is the analogy of *θυγατήρ*, which exhibits *θυγατρῶν* regularly, while *πατήρ* in addition to the usual *πατέρων* shows *πατρῶν* in two places, δ 687, θ 245, with guarantee of metre. Lastly *δαήρ*, of which the penultimate is unquestionably long (v. Curtius Gr. Etym. p. 230), has *δαέρων* in the texts (Ω 762, 769), a metrical equivalent of *μητέρων*, but as in the latter passage it begins the line, *δαρῶν* is certainly right. In later times of course these contracted forms were partially disallowed, but in earlier ages they seem to have been legitimate throughout. Should these analogies be insufficient to convince, then we must sorrowfully and resignedly acquiesce in *μήλων*, which the later Greeks, as I have stated, doubtless deliberately preferred in spite of both sense and grammar.

*

P 481 *ὡς ἔφατ’*, *Ἀλκιμέδων δὲ βοηθόον ἄρμ’ ἐπορούσας*.

It seems to me a matter of comparatively little moment, whether we write the adjective here *βοηθόον*, as Aristarchus enjoins, *ὑφ’ ἔν*, or divisim, *βοῆ θόον*, with his opponents, who in this instance are designated *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σχολῆς* (Schol. V). In sense at least the expression is one and indivisible. Few or none will be disposed to follow Döderlein in connecting *βοῆ* with *ἐπορούσας*.

Perhaps *ἐπορούσας*, which elsewhere always has a dative to follow, should be *ἐσορούσας* or, what amounts to the same, *ἐς ὀρούσας*, cf. *Λ 359 ἐς δίφρον ὀρούσας*. However this may be, there is certainly room for question, whether *βοηθόον*, however written, is an epithet that can be rightly applied to a chariot. The only other occurrence of the word in Homer is

N 476 ὡς μένεν Ἴδομενεὺς δουρικλυτός, οὐδ' ὑπεχώρει,
Αἰνείαν ἐπιόντα βοηθόον.

Whatever meaning be given to *βοή* within the limits fixed by its origin, for it is fairly certain that it must have properly denoted the battle-cry or war-whoop, it is hardly conceivable that the compound epithet could be attached with propriety to any inanimate object. It seems necessarily to belong to a living man, a warrior, who is 'vigorous or active in battle', or possibly, 'in raising the shout of onset'. Even under the highly improbable supposition, which has been suggested by the later use of the verb, *βοηθέω*, that the sense is 'rescuing', the argument would still retain some of its weight. I submit therefore that the line would be more correctly and intelligibly read with *βοηθόος*, which we may suppose has in process of time accidentally been made to agree with *ἄρμα* instead of *Ἄλκιμέδων*:—

ὡς ἔφατ', Ἄλκιμέδων δὲ βοηθόος ἄρμ' ἐπορούσας.

The traditional concord may be plausibly traced to the separation of the adjective into its components, for *θοόν* is as natural an epithet for a chariot, v. *Λ 533*, *P 458*, as *θoή* is for a ship.

*

P 570 καὶ οἱ μυίης θάρσος ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ἐνήκεν,
ἧ τε καὶ ἐργομένη μάλα περ χροὸς ἀνδρομείου
ἰσχανάα δακέειν· λαρὸν δέ οἱ αἰμ' ἀνθρώπου.

That *τε* should be removed from l. 571 (Bentley) is certain, and the choice between *ἧ καὶ ἐργομένη* and *ἧ καὶ ἐεργομένη* (*ἧ τε καὶ ἐεργομένη* Frgm. Mosc.) may reasonably be determined in favour of the latter, cf. N 525, also M 201, 219.

But for the complete restoration of this line a further change is needful.

ἦ καὶ ἐεργομένη μάλ' ἀπὸ χροὸς ἀνδρομέοιο.

Two considerations may be adduced in favour of this emendation, not in itself a very violent one. The first is, that *μάλα περ* in the traditional text occupies a false position. Mr Monro in a note on the line rightly remarks, that the order is an unusual one for *μάλα περ χροὸς (ἐ)εργομένη*. This statement is confirmed by the unvarying usage of Homer elsewhere. Compare

- N 317 αἰπύ οἱ ἐσσεῖται, μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ χροὸς ἀνδρομέοιο μάχεσθαι.
 Ξ 58 νωλεμές· οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι γνοίης μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ σκοπιάζων.
 375 Ἔκτορα Πριαμίδην μενέειν μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ μεμαῶτα.
 O 604 Ἔκτορα Πριαμίδην μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ μεμαῶτα καὶ αὐτόν.
 Ω 298 νῆας ἔπ' Ἀργείων ἰέναι μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ μεμαῶτα.
 P 710 νῦν ἰέναι μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ κεχολωμένον Ἔκτορι δίω.
 β 200 οὐτ' οὖν Τηλέμαχον μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ πολύμυθον ἐόντα.
 ε 341 οὐ μὲν δὴ σε καταφθίσει μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ μενεαίνων.
 485 ὄρη χειμερῆν, εἰ καὶ μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ χαλεπαίνου.
 ζ 87 καλὸν ὑπεκπύροεν μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ ῥυπόωντα καθῆραι.
 λ 350 ξείνος δὲ τλήτω μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ νόστοιο χατίζων.
 ν 280 δόρπου μνηστῆς ἔην μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ χατέουσιν ἐλέσθαι.
 ξ 155 πρὶν δέ κε, καὶ μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ κεχρημένος, οὐ τι δεχοίμην.
 τ 324 ἐνθάδ' ἔτι πρήξει μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ κεχολωμένος αἰνῶς.
 χ 172 σχήσομεν ἔντοσθεν μεγάρων μάλ᾽ ἀπὸ μεμαῶτας.

The second point in favour of the change is the singular frequency, with which *ἔεργω (ἔεργαθεν)* is followed by or combined with *ἀπὸ*.

The first instance here given has a direct bearing on the proposed reading.

- Δ 130 ἦ δὲ τόσον μὲν ἔεργεν ἀπὸ χροός, ὡς ὅτε μήτηρ
 παιδὸς ἔεργη μυῖαν.
 λ 503 οἱ κείνον βιόωνται ἔεργουσὶν τ' ἀπὸ τιμῆς.
 Ξ 349 πυκνὸν καὶ μαλακόν, ὃς ἀπὸ χθονὸς ὑψόσ' ἔεργε.
 (ἀέρθη?)
 Ω 238 αἰθούσης ἀπέεργε ἔπεσσ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἐνίσσων.

E 147. πλῆξ' ἀπὸ δ' αὐχένος ὤμον ἐέργαθεν ἢ δ' ἀπὸ νότου.
 Λ 437 πάντα δ' ἀπὸ πλευρῶν χροῖα ἔργαθεν οὐδέ F' ἔασε.
 Φ 599 ἀντὰρ ὁ Πηλεΐωνα δόλῳ ἀποέργαθε λαοῦ.
 φ 221 ὧς εἰπὼν ῥάκεα μεγάλης ἀποέργαθεν οὐλῆς.

In Φ 325 and γ 296 ἀποέργει occurs without a genitive to follow. Once only the simple verb is found with a genitive but without ἀπό:—

N 525 ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἦσαν ἐεργόμενοι πολέμοιο.

It seems not unlikely, that the removal of ἀπό from P 571 is due to the influence of this very line, for these two lines afford the only examples of the use of the pres. part. pass.

ἰσχανάα in l. 572 should be ἰχανάα, cf. Ψ 300 δρόμου ἰχανόωσαν. There is nothing whatever in Homeric usage to justify the translation of ἰσχανάα by 'persists'. This verb has the well-established sense of 'to check', 'stay', 'detain', as witness E 89, O 723, ο 346, M 38, T 234, η 161. Here and θ 288, where ἰσχανῶν φιλότητος is properly corrected by Hermann, the only suitable verb is ἰχανάω 'to yearn for', 'to be bent upon'.

*

Σ 485 ἐν δὲ τὰ τεῖρεα πάντα, τὰ τ' οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται.

τεῖρεα is usually connected (v. Curtius Gr. Et. p. 206) with the Vedic staras, târâ, Gothic stairnô, Latin stella = sterula, Greek ἀστήρ, στεροπή and the rest. So possibly ἐν δὲ στεῖρεα may be right here, τεῖρεα being due to a wish to identify the ἄπαξ λεγόμενον with the more familiar τέρας. We might thus be relieved from the necessity of choosing between ἐν δὲ τὰ and ἐν δέ τε (L Lips. Harl.).

However this may be, τὰ τ' οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται, on which there is a curiously corrupt annotation by Didymus, ζηνόδοτος οὐρανὸν ἐστηρικη, ἀρίσταρχος οὐρανὸν ἐστεφάνωκε, is worth consideration. Bekker is probably right in making ἐστηρικη into ἐστήρικται, so that Zenodotus may have read τὰ τ' οὐρανῶ ἐστήρικται. It is at any rate clear that neither Zenodotus nor Aristarchus was satisfied with the vulgate, which offers a form

of expression at variance with Homeric usage. Whatever Aristarchus read may be supposed to have been in conformity with this usage. Now our knowledge of the meaning and construction of *ἔστεφάνωται* (-το) is drawn from the following examples:—

- Ε 739 (*αἰγίδα*) *δεινήν, ἣν πέρι μὲν πάντη Φόβος ἔστεφάνωται.*
 κ 195 *νῆσον, τὴν πέρι πόντος ἀπείριτος ἔστεφάνωται.*
 Λ 36 (*ἀσπίδα*) *τῇ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν Γοργῷ βλοσυρῶπις ἔστεφάνωτο.*
 Ο 153 *ἤμενον· ἀμφὶ δέ μιν θύοεν νέφος ἔστεφάνωτο.*

To these instances from Homer may be added:—

- Hym. Aph. 120 *παίζομεν, ἀμφὶ δ' ὄμιλος ἀπείριτος ἔστεφάνωτο·*
 Hes. Sc. Herc. 204 *περὶ δ' ὄλβος ἀπείριτος ἔστεφάνωτο.*

Accordingly the reading of Aristarchus, of which Didymus gives the blurred version already quoted, was in all probability:—

τά τ' οὐρανῷ ἔστεφάνωται

“which are set in the sky in a ring.”

For further assurance let us note the construction of the active *στέφω*, used in Homer for obvious reasons instead of *στεφανόω*.

The instances are few:—

- Σ 205 *ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ κεφαλῇ νέφος ἔστεφε δια θεάων.*
 θ 170 *ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεισι στέφει.*

Turn these expressions into the passive, and we get *κεφαλῇ νέφος ἔστεφάνωτο* (cf. Ο 153 supra) and *μορφῇ ἔπεισι στέφεται* (*ἔστεφάνωται*), just as we actually read:—

- θ 175 *ἀλλ' οὐ οἱ χάρις ἀμφιπεριστέφεται ἐπέεσσιν.*

The uniformity of the evidence is however broken unfortunately or fortunately as the case may be, by one exception:—

- ε 303 *οἴοισιν νεφέεσσι περιστέφει οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν Ζεύς.*

This clearly reverses the established usage; but then *περι-*

στέφει happens to be a mere blunder for περιτρέφει, 'curdles,' 'thickens', 'denset', and ought to be corrected as such, cf.

E 903 (γάλα) ὑγρὸν ἔόν, μάλα δ' ὤκα περιτρέφεται κυκλώωντι.
ξ 477 καὶ σακέεσσι περιτρέφεται κρύσταλλος.

Accordingly let us read:—

οἴοισιν νεφέεσσι περιτρέφει οὐρανὸν εὐρύν.

The expression, as restored, is not altogether unlike Virgil's (Geo. i. 248)

obtenta densentur nocte tenebrae.

*

Σ 582 τὼ μὲν ἀναρρήξαντε βοὸς μεγάλῳ βοείην
ἔγκατα καὶ μέλαν αἷμα λαφύσσετον, οἱ δὲ νομῆες
αὐτῶς ἐνδίσαν ταχέας κύνας ὀτρύνοντες.

ἐνδίσαν may be described very briefly, but very truly, as a vox nihili. δίωμαι, δίηται (five times), δίωνται, δίοιτο and δίσσθαι (four times), all these bear the sense of 'drive'. διένται (Ψ 475) and δίσσθαι (M 304) occur each once with a passive meaning. Add the doubtful δίων or δίες (δίων?) of X 251 and no further trace of this verb can be found in Homer; for it would be absurd to include δίε (δφίε) used four times = 'he feared'. Fortunately we may hope to recover the true reading of 584 without conjuring up a form δίημι, dependent for its meaning upon the two forms already noticed (Ψ 475, M 304), and without following Autenrieth in his ἐδίσαν, which is certainly inappropriate in sense, 'sought to terrify', even if it were possible in form.

The meaning must be, as Dr Leaf gives it, 'tarred on', 'set on'. Dismissing therefore δίσσθαι from the problem, as beside the mark, let us see whether Homer himself does not give the solution ready to our hands in

Ξ 131 ἄλλους δ' ὀτρύνοντες ἐνήσομεν.

These few words, expressing the same idea, naturally present in combination the identical participle and verb here employed:—

αὐτῶς ἐννίσαν ταχέας κύνας ὀτρύνοντες.

Nor does the emendation depend solely upon the striking similarity of the two passages. For two MSS. L^r, admittedly the most valuable and trustworthy for this portion of the Iliad (v. Dr Leaf, Journ. Phil. No. xxxvi.), indicate not obscurely *ἐνίημι* as the required verb by giving *ἐν δ' ἴεσαν*. Moreover the curious *ἐνδέεσαν* of Ptolemy of Ascalon (La Roche) points to the same fact. The δ' seems to have been originally inserted, stupidly enough, as a metrical stop-gap, and in course of time has become incorporated with the verb. For the lengthening of the preposition it is sufficient to point to *ἐννεσίησι*, nor is the case of *ἐννεπε* necessarily, or even probably, of a different character, though much has been written to that effect.

With respect to the insertion of *δέ*, utterly out of place as it is, I will venture to hint that the same phenomenon, equally gratuitous in its origin, may have caused the generation of another abnormal moon-calf, to wit, *δενδίλλων* in I 180

δενδίλλων ἐς ἕκαστον, Ὀδυσσῆι δὲ μάλιστα

from an original *ἐννίλλων* = *ἐνίλλων* (cf. σ 11 *ἐπιλλίζουσιν*): but I refrain at present from more than this passing reference to a line, which is fairly entitled as a whole to more detailed consideration.

T. L. AGAR.

TIBULLIANA.

TIBULLUS I. iii. 47 sqq.

non acies, non ira fuit, non bella, nec ensem
immiti saeuus duxerat arte faber.
nunc Ioue sub domino caedes et uulnera semper,
nunc mare, nunc leti mille repente uiae.

Though the text of 47 has been often attacked and numerous substitutes for *acies* proposed, *animi* by Broukhusius, *facinus* by Baehrens, *rabies* by Burmann, and what would have been a more probable suggestion (cf. Hor. *carm.* 1. 3. 30) *macies* by E. Wölflin, it appears perfectly sound as soon as it is rightly interpreted. *acies* means the host arrayed for battle, *ira* their passion and eagerness for the fray, *bella* the actual fighting. One book of Lucan will give all these senses in order: VII 218 'miles...non temere immissus campis stetit ordine certo, | infelix *acies*' (of the Pompeians); ib. 386 'ergo utrimque pari procurrunnt agmina motu | *irarum*' (cf. 103 'si modo uirtutis stimulis *iraeque* calore | signa petunt'); 502 'ciuilia *bella* | una *acies* patitur, gerit altera.' So *bellum* in 112, 117, 287, 332, 548.

ib. v. 13 sq.

ipse procuraui ne possent saeua nocere
sonnia, ter sancta deueneranda mola.

It is inexplicable why Tibullus should say that he ought to have propitiated the dreams with a pious offering of meal, if he actually did so; and that is obviously the case here. Read *DEVENERATA*. The confusion of past participle and gerundive is very common in Latin MSS; and *ueneratus* is used passively more than once in poetry.

ib. vii. 23 sqq.

Nile pater, quanam possim te dicere causa
aut quibus in terris occuluisse caput?
te propter nullos tellus tua postulat imbres, 25
arida nec Pluuio supplicat herba Ioui.
te canit atque suum pubes miratur Osirim
barbara, Memphitem plangere docta bouem.
primus aratra manu sollerti fecit Osiris
et teneram ferro sollicitauit humum *et q. s.*

It may possibly be matter of question whether Tibullus regarded Nilus and Osiris as different divinities. But whether he did or not, the traditional reading is equally inappropriate, as the necessary translation shows: 'The Egyptians chant your praises, *and* marvel at their own Osiris.' We must read VTQVE.

ii. ii. 17 sqq.

uota cadunt. utinam strepitantibus aduolet alis
flauaque coniugio uincula portet Amor,
uincula quae maneant semper dum tarda senectus
inducat rugas inficiatque comas.

It can hardly be denied that the statement in *uota cadunt*, 'your prayers (*vv.* 10 sqq. 'en age quid cessas? annuit ille; roga. | auguror, uxoris fidos optabis amores') *are* realized, Cornutus,' does not accord with the wish in '*utinam* coniugio uincula portet Amor,' where the *uincula* are the token that the wife will be true to her lord. Baehrens therefore read 'aduolat,' 'portat' and changed *utinam* to *ut iam*. But it is easier and simpler to read 'uota cadant utinam!' For the position of the last word compare Verg. *Aen.* 2. 110.

ii. v. 65 sqq.

[haec cecinit uates et te sibi, Phoebe, uocauit, 65
iactauit fusas et caput ante comas.
quicquid Amalthea, quicquid Marpesia dixit
Herophile, Phoeto Graia quod admonuit,
quasque Aniena sacras Tiburs per flumina sortes
portarit sicco pertuleritque sinu, 70

(haec fore dixerunt belli mala signa cometen,
 multus ut in terras deplueretque lapis;
 atque tubas atque arma ferunt strepitantia caelo
 audita et lucos praecinuisse fugam;
 ipsum etiam Solem defectum lumine uidit 75
 iungere pallentes nubilus annus equos
 et simulacra deum lacrimas fudisse tepentes
 fataque uocales praemonuisse boues):
 haec fuerant olim; sed tu iam mitis, Apollo,
 prodigia indomitis merge sub aequoribus.] 80
 * * * * *
 et succensa sacris crepitet bene laurea flammis
 omine quo felix et sacer annus eat.

Thus did Baehrens print this passage; and it is not surprising that he regarded nearly the whole of it as spurious, though what motive there was for such an interpolation it would be hard to say.

Let us first consider lines 67—70 in relation to their present context. The utterances of certain Sibyls are there referred to. Now there are two ways in which a mention of these utterances might be made to cohere with the subjects of our poem: either (a) it might be said that whatever these Sibyls foretold was due to the inspiration of the same Phoebus who inspired the prophecy to Aeneas, 39 sqq.; or (b) it might be said that all the evils which they had predicted were now past and done with. The second appears to be the sense generally assigned to the words; but how is it arrived at? By making 71—78 a parenthesis and taking 67—70 as the antecedent to '*haec fuerant olim.*' With this result: 'All the evils that the Sibyls foretold—they predicted an ominous comet and showers of stones and *men say* (ferunt) defeat was portended by signs in the sky and sacred groves: the Sun was *seen* in eclipse, statues *wept* and kine *uttered* weirds—have passed away.' It is hardly needful to add anything to this paraphrase. If it be, it is enough to say that prophetesses do not predict *omens*, but that both omens and prophetesses foretell *events*, and that no writer who had any claim to coherence would link the

statement that Sibyls had predicted a comet to the statement that noises in the sky had predicted defeat. It follows then that lines 69—70 must be detached from lines 71 sqq. with which they have no immediate connexion. Which of the two hypotheses, (a) or (b), would provide the more probable supplement, it is, in the pitiably mangled condition of the poem, impossible to be sure. But I may anticipate the following discussion so far as to say that some supplement of the nature of (b) is probable on other grounds. Though the lines cannot be restored to their pristine condition, we can, I think, do something for them. The *Phyto Graia* of Huschke (for 'Phoebo grata') and the *Aniena—Tiburs* of the Italians for *Albana*¹—*Tiberis* seem certain; and *pertulerit* (70) for *perluerit* is on the right track. But the *Quas* of the Guelferbytanus is an ill-judged correction of the *Quod* of the Ambrosianus (A) and the Vaticanus (V). A nominative is clearly wanted. Again 'portarit,' 'pertulerit' are ungrammatical as Heyne saw, a past tense of the indicative being required. Lastly 'portarit' is intolerably weak, especially with 'pertulerit' following. We should read therefore

quaEque Aniena sacras Tiburs per flumina sortes

RAPTARAT sicco pertulerATque sinu,

and mark a lacuna after the pentameter.

To resume, the subject of the following lines has been identified by more than one commentator. It is that of the portents which followed on the death of Caesar; Dio Cass. 45. 17, Verg. *Georg.* 1. 466—490², Ov. *Met.* 15. 782—798. To come to the words, I have already said that the subject of *dixerunt* (71) cannot be the Sibyls nor again can it be that of 'ferunt' (73) 'people in general.' There is thus nothing for it to refer to. Let us turn to the MS tradition. This is 'cometē' (A, 'cometēm' V)—'multus *et*—deplueritque.' An intruding nasal stroke has wrought confusion in many passages of the Latin writers; but in none more than here. 'cometē' then is for 'comete,' i.e.

¹ Scaliger did ill to conjecture *Albāna*, although the MS variants point to the word. *Albana* is simply a corruption of *Albūnea*, a gloss upon *Ti-*

burs, by which *Aniena* was expelled.

² In his imitation 1. 525 sqq. Lucan for obvious reasons transfers the portents to the beginning of the civil wars.

'cometae.' For the plural see Verg. *G.* l. c. l. 488 'nec diri totiens arsere *cometae*,' *Aen.* 10. 273 sq. 'liquida si quando nocte *cometae* | sanguinei lugubre rubent,' Manilius 1. 892 'talìa significant lucentes nocte *cometae*'; with *belli signa* compare what follows ib. 896 'quin et bella canunt ignes subitosque tumultus | et clandestinis surgentia fraudibus arma.' Passing on to the pentameter, it is strange that the changes *ut* and *deplueretque* should have been so generally accepted. Apart from the sense, the construction involved is as far from the simplicity of Tibullus as anything could be: 'dixerunt haec fore' [or 'fore cometem'] '*foreque* ut multus lapis in terras deplueret.' Maybe the postponement of the *que* to the second half of the pentameter has beguiled the judgment of the editors. But this most characteristic metrical trait, found only in the genuine work of Tibullus², is never used where the meaning and construction are not obvious at the first reading. I. 1. 40 'fictilia antiquus primum sibi fecit agrestis | pocula de facili composuit*que* luto'; 3. 14, 38, 56 'Messallam terra dum sequitur*que* mari'; 4. 2 'ne capiti soles ne noceant*que* niues'; 6. 54 'ut uolnere nostro | sanguis, ut hic uentis diripitur*que* cinis'; 72; 7. 62; 10. 54. II. 3. 38; 54; 4. 54; 5. 22 (wrongly condemned by Baehrens as spurious), 70 (do.), 86, 90; 6. 16. It would seem therefore that we shall do well to retain *et*, discard 'deplueretque,' the conjecture of the interpolated MSS for 'deplueritque' (A, 'depuleritque' V), in favour of '*depluit usque*' the conjecture of Baehrens and take 'depluit' as a historical present.

The couplet then emerges as follows:

haec fore dixerunt belli mala signa cometæ,
multus et in terras DEPLVIT VSQVE lapis,

running in every point parallel to the descriptions of the portents in the following six lines.

¹ The plural seems to include 'meteors' as Voss points out on the passage.

² That is, only in books I, II, III 11. 8 (iv 5. 8) 'perque tuos oculos per genium*que* rogo' is no exception. For Tibullus does not postpone the *que*, if

another *que* precedes in the pentameter, a subtlety which it is easy to overlook. Nor again is III 13. 4 (iv 7. 4) one. For there 'in nostrum sinum' belongs, if anything, more to 'attulit' than to 'deposuit.'

It is followed by two lines in which the present is contrasted with the past, in words which require a good deal more attention than, as I believe, they have yet received.

haec fuerant olim; sed tu *iam* mitis, Apollo,
prodigia *indomitis* merge sub *aequoribus*.

And first, *iam* strikes the note that is struck by other writers when speaking similarly of *prodigia*, by Horace in the famous ode (I. 2) '*iam* satis terris niuis atque dirae | grandinis misit pater,' ib. v. 30 sqq. '*tandem* uenias precamur | nube candentes umeros amictus, | *augur* Apollo' and by Manilius 906 sqq. comets and other fiery phenomena in the heavens 'ciuilis etiam motus cognataque bella | significant; nec plura alias incendia mundus¹ | sustinuit quam cum ducibus iurata cruentis | arma Philippeos implerunt sanguine campos, | uixque etiam sicca miles Romanus harena | ossa uirum lacerosque prius superastitit artus, | imperiumque suis confluxit uiribus ipsum, | perque patris pater Augustus uestigia uicit. | *nequid finis erat. restabant Actia bella* | dotali commissa acie repetitaque rerum (915) | alea et in ponto quaesitus rector Olympi, | femineum sortita iugum cum Roma pependit | atque ipsa Isiaco certarunt fulmina sistro. | restabant profugo seruilia milite bella | cum patrios armis imitatus filius hostis (920) | aequora Pompeius cepit defensa parenti². | *sed satis hoc fatis fuerit. iam* bella quiescant' etc. Now there appears to be little doubt that the ode of Horace was written after B.C. 31, the year of Actium. Let us see how a similar date would sort with our passage. In the first place the connexion of Apollo and the raging main would become intelligible. What had the ordinary Apollo, the sun god and the god of prophecy and song, to do with the sea? Why should he usurp the province of Neptune? Between the *Actian* Apollo on the other hand and the *indomita aequora* the connexion is obvious. The fleet of Antony suffered severely in the battle from the heavy seas, see Plutarch, *Ant.* 68, Dio Cass. 30. 31, Martial 4. 11. 6 'obruit *Actiaci* quod grauis ira freti'; and to the favour of the god of Actium, as is well

¹ Compare the words of Virgil *Georg.* order here, putting the more important
i. l. c. war first.

² Manilius inverts the chronological

known, the victory was officially ascribed. For a fact so notorious it is hardly necessary to quote authority; but see Verg. *Aen.* 8. 704 sq. Propert. 4 (5). 6. 27 sqq. esp. 57 and 67. Lastly we must not overlook the double significance of *prodigia*. To the Romans of that day the victory of Antony meant the domination of Cleopatra, the 'fatale monstrum' as Horace calls her in his ode of thanksgiving (1. 37); it meant the perpetuation of the portentous enslavement of Romans to a sexless and degraded crew. Compare the language of Horace *Epod.* 9. 9 sqq., Propertius 3 (4). 11. 33 sqq. These outrages upon nature were now by the mercy of Apollo sunk for ever beneath the rolling billows of Actium.

Again let us turn to the beginning of the poem and see if it furnishes indications in accord or discord with these. The god is invoked to sing *laudes* or the good deeds of war, for *laudes* have a special regard to military achievements. The reference is fixed by 10 'ad *laudes* flectere uerba nouas' (meas the MSS), in which it is said that he is to come in the guise in which men tell that he 'Saturno rege *fugato* | *uictori laudes* concinuisse Ioui.' The situation is clear. The contest for the sovereignty of the world is over. Saturn has been defeated and Jove is enthroned; 'in ponto quaesitus rector Olympi' as Manilius says. This dwelling upon the dress and habit of Apollo is not the mere accident of poetic fancy or ornament. It appears again in Propertius 4 (5). 6, also an inaugural poem. At Actium the god was not the *Apollo Citharoedus*, 'non illa attulerat crines in colla solutos | aut testudineae carmen inerme lyrae | sed quali aspexit Pelopeum Agamemnona uultu | egressitque auidis Dorica castra rogis' *et q. s.* But after the battle, says the poet, 'arma satis cecini, *citharam* iam poscit Apollo | uictor et ad placidos exiit arma choros.' The change in the god's attire was a matter of no slight moment to Rome. It would mean much if the god whom all Rome saw, probably in the same triumphal procession of B.C. 29 in which was carried the waxen figure of Cleopatra and the asp, shooting his arrows against the hosts of his eastern enemy¹, was to be,

¹ The descriptions of Virgil *Aen.* 8. 704 'Actius haec cernens arcum in- tendebat Apollo | desuper' and Propertius 4 (5). 6. 29 sqq. 'astitit Augusti

as in the veiled warning of one of the 'inspired' odes of Horace, 'nunquam umeris positurus arcum' (3. 4. 60); and his intentions must, as a matter of urgent and practical politics, be cleared of all ambiguity. The pose and dress here described have been identified with those of the Apollo Citharoedus which stood inside the temple of the Palatine Apollo, the dedication or opening (B.C. 28) of which is commemorated by Horace *carm.* 1. 31, and Propertius 2. 31. In this temple, a most magnificent monument to the Actian god, were placed the Sibylline books¹; and our poem commemorates the inauguration of Messallinus, one of the two sons of Messalla, as one of the fifteen custodians and interpreters of the sacred documents.

Besides this our poem is an expression of loyalty to the new regime which was the outcome of the battle of Actium.

II. vi. 9 sq.

castra peto, ualeatque Venus ualeantque puellae;
et mihi sunt uires et mihi facta tuba est.

The only sense which the second half of the pentameter can bear is 'I have made a trumpet' or 'I have had a trumpet made.' Did Tibullus then intend to join the regimental band? And is this the meaning of his next couplet: 'magna loquor sed magnifice mihi magna locuto | excutiunt clausae fortia uerba fores'? 'These be prave 'ords' for an intending *tubicen* to use. Heyne conjectured *flata*, the fatal objection to which is that it would naturally mean 'I have blown the trumpet' when the

puppim super...dixerat, et pharetrae pondus consumit in arcus...Actius hinc traxit Phoebus monimenta quod eius | una decem uicit missa sagitta rates' seem based on some pictorial representation. This natural inference is considerably strengthened by the circumstance that Virgil's description is in some other respects obviously taken from the Actian triumphal procession, e.g. in the introduction of the Nile: 'magno maerentem corpore Nilum | pudentemque sinus et tota ueste uocantem | caeruleum in gremium latebrosaque flumina uictos,' compared

with Propertius 2. 1. 30 sqq. 'aut Ptolomaei litora capta Phari | aut canerem Aegyptum et Nilum cum atratus in urbem | septem captiuus debilis ibat aquis | aut regum auratis circumdata colla catenis | Actiaque in sacra currere rostra uia.'

¹ When they were first placed here is uncertain. It does not follow from Suetonius' words (*Aug.* 31) that previously to the pontificate of Augustus they had not been kept there. They were still in this temple in the reign of Julian, Ammianus Marcellinus 23. 3. 3.

sense desired is 'the trumpet has been blown for me.' In this connexion *tuba* may mean either 'trumpet' or 'trumpet's sound,' cf. e.g. Prop. 'et tuba sit facti uana querella mei.' Lucan 7. 25 'nullas tuba uerberet aures' and in the common phrase *ante tubam*, *ante tubas* 'before the charge is sounded.' As sense bars our way by the first route, let us try the second. All that we require is the slight change to *LAETA* 'I rejoice to hear the trumpet.' This quasi-active use of *laetus* 'gladdening,' though quite classical (see the lexicons), might easily puzzle a scribe.

III. (Lygdamus) iv.

Di meliora ferant nec sint mihi somnia uera
 quae tulit hesternā pessimā nocte quies.
 ite procul, uani, falsumque auertite uisum;
 desinite in uotis quaerere uelle fidem.
 diui uera monent, uenturae nuntia sortis 5
 uera monent Tuscis exta probata uiris.
 somnia fallaci ludunt temeraria nocte
 et puidas mentes falsa timere iubent.
 †et natum maturas hominum genus omina noctis
 farre pio placant et saliente sale? 10
 et tamen, utcumque est, siue illi uera moneri,
 mendaci somno credere siue uolent:
 efficiat uanos noctis Lucina timores
 et frustra inmeritum pertimuisse uelit
 si mea nec turpi mens est obnoxia facto 15
 nec laesit magnos impia lingua deos.

The writer of these lines is not a great literary artist. But he cannot have written these lines as they stand, not even with the changes *uanum* (V marg.) l. 3, *nobis* l. 4, *natum in curas* l. 9 which appear in Hiller's last text. To pass over other objections which are evaded in different ways by emendation, what does *tamen* (11) mean if it has just been said that dreams are false (7, 8)? *uani* in 3 again, though I believe it to be genuine, cannot be defended by the supposition that it refers to *somni*, an equivalent of *somnia*. A similar looseness of expression is sometimes found, e.g. in Lucretius (Munro on l. 352,

6. 188, Brieger praef. xix), but the sense is always clear, which is not the case here, as the reader would naturally suppose the *di* (cf. *auertite*) were addressed. Once more, the future *uolent* (12) is the wrong tense. The manuscripts of Tibullus are deeply corrupt, whatever some may say to the contrary, and in the present case, though I think the passage may with certainty be restored in its general outlines, it is impossible to feel complete confidence about the beginning of line 9 and the first syllable of the adjective in line 4.

I submit the following restoration, only adding that in 11 I should prefer *monenti*, the elegant conjecture, if such it be, of the corrector in G (the Guelferbytanus), did I feel sure that it was not too good for Lygdamus.

Di meliora ferant nec sint mihi somnia uera	
quae tulit hesternae pessima nocte quies.	2
diui uera monent, uenturae nuntia sortis	5
uera monent Tuscis exta probata uiris.	
somnia fallaci ludunt temeraria nocte	
et pauidas mentes falsa timere iubent?	
AN VERVM MONITVRA hominum genus omina noctis	
farre pio placant et saliente sale?	10
et tamen, utcumque est, siue illi uera moneri,	
mendaci somno credere siue SOLENT,	
efficiat uanos noctis Lucina timores	
et frustra inmeritum pertimuisse uelit.	
si mea nec turpi mens est obnoxia facto	15
nec laesit magnos impia lingua deos,	
ite procul uani falsumque auertite uisum;	3
desinite in SANCTIS quaerere uelle fidem.	4

The *timores* are addressed in l. 3, the *uani* taking up the *uanos* of 13.

ib. vi. 1 sqq.

candide Liber, ades: sic sit tibi mystica uitis
 semper, sic hedera tempora uincta feras;
aufer et ipse meum pariter medicando dolorem:
 saepe tuo cecidit munere uictus amor.

The specious conjecture of Waardenburg *patera medicante* is put out of court by the fact that Lygdamus would not drink out of the sacred *patera*. The other conjectures are not worth recording. I propose

aufer et ipse meum, pariLES medicATE, dolorem.

'You have healed others: heal me.'

Just below the MSS have

ite procul durum, curae, genus, ite labores; 7
fulserit hic niueis Delius alitibus.

What are the white birds of Phoebus? And what is he doing as an antithesis to Cares and Toils? Mr Housman conjectures *Idaliis hic Venus*. The results of the ingenious conjecture are good; but the process is too expensive. We need do little more than shift the letters of Delius and we get the required result: IDALIS, i.e. *Idalie* Ov. *Met.* 14. 694. *Idalis* is the feminine of Ἰδαλεύς Steph. Byz.¹ Cf. Cypris, Cythereis. Thus Venus has her snow-white swans again. From Horace, whom Lygdamus imitates a good deal², we may compare *carm.* 4. 1. 9 sqq. 'tempestiuus in domum | Pauli *purpureis ales oloribus* | *comissabere* Maximi.'

ib. 17 sqq.

haec Amor et maiora ualet sed poscite Bacchi
munera: quem uestrum pocula sicca iuuant?
conuenit ex aequo nec toruus Liber in illis
qui se quique una uina iocosa colunt. 20
non uenit iratus nimium nimiumque seuerus:
qui timet irati numina magna, bibat.
quales his poenas qualis quantusque minetur
Cadmeae matris praeda cruenta docet.

In line 21 *seuerus* should of course be a plural, as *his* in 23 shows. Editors also attack *non uenit*, which appears to me to be genuine, while in 19 they leave *conuenit* with a use for which

¹ The word itself occurs in Lucan 3. 204 'gelido tellus perfusa Caico | *Idalis*'; but this cannot of course mean the Idalium of Cyprus.

² e.g. 4. 10 (quoted above) is Horace (*carm.* 3. 23. 19) almost word for word 'mollit auersos Penatis | *farre pio et saliente mica*.'

no justification that I know of has been adduced. Palaeographically it makes no difference whether we alter *non uenit* into *conuenit*, as Lachmann does (reading *seueros*), or into *nam uenit* or *iam uenit* in 21; or *conuenit* into *non uenit* in 19, which I prefer, reading and punctuating thus :

NON uenit ex aequo nec toruus Liber in illis
 qui se quique una uina iocosa colunt ?
 non uenit iratus nimium nimiumque seueris ?

It is however clear that thus we get a better correspondence in the two members of the comparison. The quasi-absolute use of *uenit* is found more than once in other writers, e.g. Verg. 'iniussae ueniunt felicius uuae'; Prop. 1. 10. 25 'irritata uenit quando contemnitur illa.'

ib. 65 sq.

saeuus Amor docuit ualidos temptare labores;
 saeuus Amor docuit uerbera posse pati.

The hexameter of this couplet is found only in F, the excellent Cuiacian fragment; but it is clearly corrupt, for *ualidos labores* (for which L. Mueller conjectured *uarios l.* and Baehrens *uastos l.*) is an unintelligible phrase. Of the two Baehrens' proposal is the better; but neither is quite satisfactory. Let us consider the context.

Phoebus is advising Lygdamus not to fight against the tyranny of Love. It is no greater in his case than it has been in that of many others, including the god himself. He continues in 73 sqq. '*nescis quid sit amor, iuuenis, si ferre recusas | immitem dominam coniugiumque ferum. | ergo ne dubita blandas adhibere querelas: | uincuntur molli pectora dura prece.*' There is an obvious implication: 'You have only to contend with the cruelty and savagery of a *mistress*. It might be worse.' Now look at Propertius' account of the hard task-mastership of Love 1. 1. 9 sqq. '*Milanion nullos fugiendo, Tulle, labores | saeuitiam durae contudit Iasidos. | nam modo Partheniis amens errabat in antris | ibat et hirsutas ille uidere feras; | ille etiam Hylaei percussus uerbere rami | saucius Arcadiis rupibus ingemuit. | ergo uelocem potuit domuisse*

puellam, | tantum in amore preces et benefacta ualent.' With this compare another passage where the same fable is referred to, with a touch of the humour which often lights up the poetry of Propertius: 2. 19. 17 sqq. 'ipse ego uenabor. iam nunc me sacra Dianae | suscipere et Veneris ponere uota iuuat. | incipiam captare feras et reddere pinu | cornua et audaces ipse monere canes, | non tamen ut uastos ausim *temptare leones* | aut celer agrestes comminus ire sues.' 'I will come into the country to you, Cynthia, but I will not chase wild beasts, as Milanion did for Atalanta.' The last-quoted passage will give us the word that we require: ualidos temptare LEONES. For the epithet compare Lucr. 5. 1309 sqq. 'expertique sues saeuos sunt mittere in hostes | et *ualidos* partim prae se misere *leones* | cum doctoribus armatis saeuisque magistris,' *ib.* 984 sqq. 'eiectique domo fugiebant saxea tecta | spumigeri suis aduentu *ualidique leonis* | atque intempesta cedebant nocte pautes | hospitibus saeuis instrata cubilia fronde.' It will be observed that in both these passages *saeuus* occurs in the immediate context. I have observed the confusion of *labores* and *leones* elsewhere, I think in the MS variants of Manilius.

Panegyricus 18 sqq.

alter dicat opus magni mirabile mundi
 qualis in immenso desederit aere tellus
 qualis et in curuum pontus confluerit orbem 20
 et uagus, e terris qua surgere nititur, aer
 huic et contextus passim fluat igneus aether
 pendentique super claudantur ut omnia caelo.

The subject is the favourite one of the detachment of the various elements from the original chaos. To the vulgate reading of 22, which I have given above, there is the serious objection that in this cosmogony the elements are represented as forming layers and so the fiery ether is not 'interwoven' (contextus) with the atmosphere, as lilies with amaranths (Lygd. 4. 33), but is completely separated from it and envelopes it like a wall. One citation is enough to make this clear. Manilius 1. 149 sqq. 'ignis in aethereas uolucer se sustulit auras | summaque complexus stellantis culmina caeli | flammaram *uallo*

naturae moenia fecit. | proximus in tenuis descendit spiritus
 auras | *aeraque* extendit medium per inania mundi.' The
 proper preposition to be used of such an encircling wall we can
 learn from e. g. Prop. 4 (5). 4. 7 'huic Tatius frontem *uallo*
praecingit acerno.' We should accordingly read *PRAEtextus*.
 Cf. 1. 4. 43 'praetexens picea ferrugine caelum—arcus.' The
 prefixes *prae-* and *con-* are not unfrequently confused in MSS,
 e. g. at Prop. 2. 1. 41. In the same line it is clear that we
 should accept *ut* for 'et' from the 'Itali,' as otherwise *aer* has
 no verb. It is not however clear that we should change
hinc into *huic* with the inferior MSS. I prefer to keep *hinc*
 as making it plain that the ether bounds the air on the outside
 or on the side (*hinc*) where it strives to rise from the earth.

III. xiv (IV. viii).

Inuisus natalis adest qui rure molesto
 et sine Cerintho tristis agendus erit.
 dulcius urbe quid est? an uilla sit apta puellae
 atque Arretino frigidus amnis agro?
 iam, nimium Messalla mei studiose, quiescas 5
 neu tempestiuae saepe propinque uiae.
 hic animum sensusque meos abducta relinquo,
 arbitrio quam uis non sinit esse meo.

The most heroic champions of the MS tradition of Tibullus
 obelize verse 6. The attempts at healing have been almost as
 numerous as they are unsatisfactory. But it appears possible
 to extract something from the débris. In the first place,
tempestiuae—uiae appears, as all allow, to be genuine. If so,
 then, as the plain sense of the author shows, an *unseasonable*
 journey can only be referred to and *tempestiuae* must receive a
 negative. This is provided by the lection of the inferior MSS
non which R. Unger accepts, reading *saeue* and making *uiae*
 depend on *quiescas*¹. There is no doubt that this is an easy
 change, and at first sight it seems to give a good sense. On
 examination however two objections emerge. (1) *iam—qui-*
escas 'do be quiet' seems a more natural combination of words

¹ Cited by Baehrens ad loc. who says '*hoc si probas lege quiescas ceu tempestiuae, saeue propinque, niae*'!

here than the proposed construction would give. (2) *saeue* is a much stronger word than should be applied in l. 6 to the same person who is only *mei nimium studiose* in l. 5. I suggest with diffidence another solution which proceeds on the hypothesis that, as Baehrens says, 'uerba saepe propinque grauitur corrupta.' *propinque*, as every one can see, is not wanted, and may well be a gloss explaining the relation of Messalla to the lady whose inclinations he was forcing. *saepe* is often a corruption of *semper*; and *propinque*, though it cannot bear the sense of *dedite*, may have replaced a word which did. Such a word would be AMICE. For this use of *amicus* we may compare passages like Horace *Ep.* 1. 2. 26 '*amica luto sus*,' Cicero *nat. d.* 2. 43 '(Fortuna) *amica uarietati constantiam respuit*,' Sil. It. 13. 723 '*nunc auro Curium non umquam cernit amicum*' (similarly *inimicus* Apul. *Met.* 9. c. 14 '*inimica fidei, hostis pudicitiae*,' of a woman); perhaps also Prop. 1. 13. 12 '*nec noua quaerendo semper amicus eris*.' Except for the epithet of *uia* the phrase will range with that of Tib. 1. 1. 26 '*nec semper longae deditus esse uiae*.'

In the last line the division of *quamuis* (AV) and the change of *simis* to *sinit* give a certain emendation. I had thought that I could claim it as my own; but I find now that it is as old as Statius. Perhaps one of the reasons that it has been neglected is that Baehrens quotes it in a mutilated and unintelligible form.

J. P. POSTGATE.

Postscript. In II. vi. 10 an attempt has been made to give *facta* the sense of *idonea*. To substitute this for the plain meaning of the phrase is obviously a desperate expedient. It may be added that this use of *factus* is confined to persons, the active *facere* being used of things. It should be mentioned that Muretus adopted *grata* from some inferior MSS. This would do, though *laeta* seems preferable.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

VII THE SUPPOSED PRIORITY OF THE *PHILEBUS* TO THE *REPUBLIC*.

“Auf den Sophisten”, says Zeller in his *Philosophie der Griechen* II i 546, 4th edition (1889), “weist der Parmenides zurück, auf diesen der Philebus, welcher seinerseits ebenso, wie der Politikos, von der Republik vorausgesetzt wird”: and accordingly his whole theory of the “Reihenfolge” of Plato’s writings depends upon the proposition that the *Philebus* is prior to the *republic*. This priority he seeks to establish, *loc. cit.* p. 548 note 2, by comparison, first of *republic* VI 505 B ff (the controversy about the Good) with the principal argument of the *Philebus*, and, secondly, of *republic* IX 583 B ff (the theory of true and false pleasures) with certain portions of that argument. In an earlier paper, *über die Unterscheidung einer doppelten Gestalt der Ideenlehre*, in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy, 3 March 1887, pp. 219, 220, he has a somewhat fuller statement of the former of his two proofs, and to this statement he appeals in the *Ph. d. Gr. loc. cit.* Finally, the statement contained in the *Ph. d. Gr. loc. cit.* is explicitly endorsed in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* IV 196 (1891). I propose to inquire whether Zeller’s argument, set forth in the *Sitzungsberichte* in 1887, enlarged in the *Ph. d. Gr.* in 1889, and reaffirmed in the *Archiv* in 1891, warrants him in regarding the priority of the *Philebus* to the *republic*, not merely as a presumption to be weighed against other presumptions, but as a fixed and incontrovertible datum to which all speculation must of necessity conform itself. For as such he

seems to present it, and as such it has been accepted by some of his less critical readers¹.

§ 1 *The controversy about the Good.*

The former of Zeller's proofs is stated (*Ph. d. Gr.* II i 548) as follows: "Denn wenn es Rep. VI, 505 B heisst: ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις, wenn also genau die Frage, welche das Thema des Philebus bildet (vgl. II B—E. 19 C f. 66 D f.), hier als eine wohlbekanntere behandelt wird, und die beiden dort ausführlich kritisirten Annahmen mit wenigen Bemerkungen abgethan werden, so wird man darin gerade so gut eine Verweisung auf den Philebus finden müssen, wie in den a. a. O. angegebenen Stellen des letzteren eine Verweisung auf den Parmenides, Phädo 72 E (s. o. 477, 1) auf den Meno, Gess. v, 739 B f. (vgl. m. plat. Stud. 16 f.) auf die Republik; und dass Dem so ist, und nicht etwa der Philebus auf die Rep. zurücksieht, wird durch den Umstand bestätigt, dass der Philebus bei der Beantwortung jener Frage auf die Bestimmungen der Rep. über das Gute keine Rücksicht nimmt, so nahe ihm diess auch 28 D ff. gelegen hätte. (Vgl. Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. 1887, Nr. 13, S. 220 ff.)"

Thus, according to Zeller, (1) the question discussed in *republic* 505 B ff is the question which forms the theme of the *Philebus*; (2) in *republic* 505 B ff this question is treated as a familiar one, the two contemporary theories being rapidly disposed of, whereas in the *Philebus* they are dealt with in detail; (3) consequently the *republic* refers to the *Philebus* rather than the *Philebus* to the *republic*; and (4) the silence of the *Philebus*, especially at 28 D ff, in regard to the theory of the Good presented in the *republic*, is a further proof of this. About all these propositions I shall have something to say.

¹ In this paper I avoid all reference to those considerations, mainly derived from the study of the Platonic ontology,

which had led me to a different conclusion.

(1) According to Zeller *the question discussed in republic 505 B ff is the question which forms the theme of the Philebus*¹.

In the *Philebus* we hear of *three* questions: (a) 'which of the two, pleasure or intelligence, is the Good', debated between Socrates and Philebus before the dialogue begins (11 A—C), but constantly regarded as the origin of the conversation between Socrates and Protarchus; (b) 'which of the two, pleasure or intelligence, is the Human Good', discussed between Socrates and Protarchus, but not without interruption, from 11 C to 22 C; (c) 'which of the two, pleasure or intelligence, is the more nearly related to the Human Good, and therefore entitled to take precedence of its rival', formulated provisionally at 11 D E, and kept steadily in view from 22 C to the end of the dialogue at 67 B. Which of these questions is it which appears in *republic* 505 B ff also? Not the *third*, which, while it occupies nearly forty-five out of the fifty-six marginal pages, and thus has a *prima facie* claim to be regarded as the theme of the *Philebus*, in *republic* 505 B ff is nowhere mentioned: not

¹ "Wenn ausser dem Sophisten auch der Philebus für jünger gehalten wird, als die Republik, so steht dieser Annahme, wie schon Schleiermacher (Pl. W. III, 1, 570 f.) gezeigt hat, eine Stelle in der letzteren, vi, 505 B; entschieden entgegen. Nachdem hier Sokrates den Glaukon daran erinnert hat, dass die Idee des Guten, wie er ja oft gehört habe, das μέγιστον μάθημα sei, fährt er fort: "Aber auch das ist dir bekannt, dass die meisten die Lust für das Gute halten, die Höherstrebenden (κοιμψότεροι) dagegen die Einsicht (φρόνησις); dass aber die letzteren nicht anzugeben wissen, was für eine Einsicht diess ist, sondern sich schliesslich genöthigt sehen, zu sagen, es sei die Einsicht in das Wesen des Guten." Um das gleiche Dilemma dreht sich die Untersuchung über das höchste Gut im *Philebus* vom Anfang bis zum Ende: Philebus sucht dasselbe in der Lust, Sokrates in der Einsicht; doch

der letztere mit dem Vorbehalt, dass die Einsicht, wenn es sich zeigen sollte, dass sie selbst nicht das Höchste sei, diesem wenigstens zunächst stehe (*Phil.* 11 B—E. 19 C f. 66 D f.). Hierbei handelt es sich nun allerdings im *Philebus* um die ethische Frage, was das höchste Gut für den Menschen, die *ἐξίς καὶ διδθεσις ψυχῆς* sei, welche sich dazu eigne, *ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονα παρέχειν* (11 D); in der *Republik* um die metaphysische nach der Idee des Guten, dem vollkommenen Wesen, welches der Grund alles Seins und als solcher von der Gottheit nicht verschieden ist. Trotzdem erhellt aber aus der Gleichheit der Fragestellung, dass die beiden Untersuchungen nach der Absicht des Schriftstellers mit einander in Verbindung gebracht und der Leser bei der einen an die andere erinnert werden sollte." *Sitzungsberichte*, p. 219 (23). For the subsequent context, see p. 69.

the *second*, which, as is shown by the *ὁμολογία* at 11 D 'Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν, is concerned with the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, whereas the ἀγαθόν of *republic* 505 B ff is not thus limited: but the *first*, which, as stated at 11 B Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι, μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ξυγγενῆ, δόξαν τ' ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, κτλ, is none other than the contemporary issue formulated in *republic* 505 B Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φρόνησις.

Now this, the first of the three questions formulated in the *Philebus*, is *not* discussed within the limits of the dialogue. All that we are told about it, is, that it has been already debated between Socrates and Philebus before the conversation between Socrates and Protarchus begins, and that that conversation arises out of it. If then it is this question, and not the second or the third, which is the equivalent of the question discussed in *republic* 505 B ff, the question discussed in *republic* 505 B ff is certainly *not* the theme of the *Philebus*¹.

¹ Forgetting that the debate between Philebus and Socrates has ended before the dialogue begins, and that Philebus studiously declines all responsibility for the opinions subsequently expressed by Protarchus, Zeller on the strength of *Philebus*' contention ("Philebus sucht dasselbe in der Lust") plainly affirms that from beginning to end the dialogue is concerned with the contemporary controversy ("Um das gleiche Dilemma dreht sich die Untersuchung über das höchste Gut im *Philebus* vom Anfang bis zum Ende"). Then, in justification of this position, he cites, but does not quote, 11 B—E Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν

καὶ τέρψιν κτλ, 19 c f Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν κτλ, and 66 d f Φίληβος τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐτίθετο ἡμῶν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελεῆ, κτλ. But manifestly those parts of these recapitulatory passages which refer to the antecedent debate between Socrates and Philebus, are worthless as evidence of the matters discussed between Socrates and Protarchus within the compass of the dialogue. What they really prove, is, that Plato, when he wrote the *Philebus*, while he had much to say about certain derived issues, did *not* care to discuss the contemporary controversy formulated in *republic* 505 B.

(2) According to Zeller, *the question discussed in republic 505 B ff is there treated as a familiar one, the two contemporary theories being rapidly disposed of, whereas in the Philebus they are dealt with at length*¹.

The question discussed in *republic 505 B ff* is, without doubt, familiar, in the sense that it was, by admission, matter of contemporary controversy. Zeller however means much more than this. In his judgment the opening words of the passage² imply that the reader has already made acquaintance with the controversy in one of Plato's writings, which, Zeller continues in the *Sitzungsberichte*, since the theory that the Good is intelligence nowhere else appears, must needs be the *Philebus*.

Now if the words 'Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα carry the implication which Zeller supposes them to do, the argument used in the *republic* to overthrow the doctrine of the *κομψότεροι* ought most certainly to occur in the *Philebus*: for, in the *republic*, not only the controversial issue, but also the refutation

¹ "Es kann daher nur darnach gefragt werden, ob die Stelle der Republik auf den Philebus zurückweisen oder ihn ankündigen will, der Philebus die Republik vorbereitet oder voraussetzt. Und hier spricht nun für die erste von diesen Annahmen, und somit für die Priorität des Philebus, schon die Art, wie die Frage in der Republik eingeführt wird. 'Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα—diess lautet doch ganz anders als der Anfang des Philebus. In diesem werden die zwei Behauptungen, zwischen denen entschieden werden soll, erst ausdrücklich festgestellt: in der Republik werden sie als bekannt vorausgesetzt, und diese Voraussetzung wird von Glaukon wiederholt bestätigt. Woher sollen sie nun dem Leser bekannt sein, wenn nicht eben aus dem Philebus? Denn sonst werden sie sich in keiner platonischen Schrift so gegenübergestellt, und wird die Annahme, dass die Einsicht das Gute

sei, in keiner berührt. Wäre der Philebus später verfasst als die Republik, so müsste man erwarten, dass jener Gegensatz der Bestimmungen über das Gute nicht in dieser, sondern in jenem als bekannt vorausgesetzt würde, und dass die Republik, statt jede der zwei streitenden Ansichten mit ein paar kurzen Worten zur Seite zu schieben, entweder genauer auf sie einträte oder eine künftige Besprechung in Aussicht stellte." *Sitzungsberichte*, p. 219 (23). For the antecedent context, see p. 67: for the subsequent context, see p. 71.

² 'Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φρόνησις. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἐχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοῖως. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, κτλ. 505 B.

of the *κομψότεροι* is known to Socrates' interlocutor—Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, κτλ. But in the *Philebus* this refutation nowhere appears. Thus the argument from the words 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸδε γε οἶσθα' proves too much, and accordingly falls to the ground¹.

Nor can I assent to the proposition that the contemporary controversy, which in *republic* 505 B ff is rapidly disposed of, is in the *Philebus* "ausführlich kritisirt." For, first, the *Philebus* discusses, not the original issue considered however briefly in the *republic*, but that issue as amended by agreement between Socrates and Protarchus. And, secondly, the amended issue, though in the *Philebus* it occupies a larger space, namely, from two to three marginal pages 20 B—23 A, than that allotted in the *republic* to the original controversy, is not submitted to any thorough examination; the criticism is neither stringent nor far-reaching, Protarchus' defence of pleasure is feeble, and in behalf of intelligence Socrates has not one word to say; in fact, there is here no more than will suffice to justify Socrates and Protarchus in proceeding to the study of the third or principal question.

(3) Therefore, says Zeller, the *republic* refers to the *Philebus* rather than the *Philebus* to the *republic*.

Hitherto I have been concerned with the details of Zeller's demonstration: it will be convenient at this point to regard it as a whole.

Holding that *republic* 505 B ff and the *Philebus* occupy the same field, and therefore that one of the two is no more than a recapitulation of the other, Zeller asks himself which of the two recapitulates, which of the two is recapitulated: and on the grounds, that the opening words of *republic* 505 B ff refer to a previous investigation in some former Platonic writing, and that the inquiry in the *republic* is more concise and less complete than that in the *Philebus*, he confidently concludes

¹ If 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸδε γε οἶσθα' meant, as Zeller supposes, 'You have already been told in the *Philebus*', the interlocutor should already know what Socrates' position is; but his question

at 506 B, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποτερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φησ εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν; ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα, indicates complete ignorance. Thus again Zeller's argument proves too much.

that the argument of the *Philebus* is recapitulated by the *republic*.

For myself, I do not admit that *republic* 505 B ff and the *Philebus* occupy the same field. It is true that both take their departure from the contemporary controversy: but the *republic* accepts and discusses the ordinary presentment of it, and then, without any recognition of the issues discussed in the *Philebus*, passes to the theory of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, whereas the *Philebus* does not discuss the ordinary presentment of the controversy, and, in dealing with its own distinct and carefully distinguished issues, leaves the theory of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* wholly out of account. Thus the two expositions are mutually exclusive. Nor can I allow, either that the words 'Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸδε γε οἴσθα bear, together with their obvious meaning, the secondary significance which Zeller attributes to them, or that the *Philebus*, so far as it is concerned with the contemporary controversy as modified, is in its criticisms more exact and complete than the *republic*. There is therefore in my judgment nothing, so far, to warrant Zeller's canon.

But (4) according to Zeller, *the silence of the Philebus—especially at 28 D ff—in regard to the theory of the Good presented in the republic, is a further proof of the republic's posteriority.*

If the *republic* was earlier than the *Philebus*, it is, thinks Zeller, strange that in the latter Plato makes no use of the theory of the Good propounded in the former, and in particular that at 28 D, where the existence of a rational cause akin to the human reason is demonstrated, he does not identify this cause with the idea of Good. If, he continues, Plato had not yet handled the theory of the absolute Good, so that any reference to it here would have entailed a long exposition, his silence is easily intelligible: it is by no means intelligible, if all that was necessary was a brief reference to a previous statement¹.

¹ "Auch das aber wäre in diesem Fall befremdend, dass der *Philebus* von den in der Republik ausgesprochenen Bestimmungen über das

Gute für die Lösung seiner Aufgabe gar keinen Gebrauch macht, und sich 28 D ff. mit dem Nachweis einer vernünftigen Ursache begnügt, welcher

Again, I think, Zeller overlooks the difference between the stand-points of the texts compared. The discussions contained in *republic* 506 D ff and in the *Philebus*, though they both of them arise out of the contemporary controversy, are distinct, the subject of the one being the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* and that of the other the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*. In the *republic* indeed the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* is supposed to be attainable by man, so that the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* is the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*: but in the *Philebus* Plato carefully discriminates the Self Good and the Human Good, and studiously confines himself to the investigation of the latter. Thus, whereas in the antecedent debate *Philebus* and Socrates have argued the claims of *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις* respectively to be the Good, Socrates at 11 D stipulates that the subject of the discussion with Protarchus shall be their respective claims to be the Human Good: at 19 C Protarchus in his recapitulation is careful to observe the distinction between the two issues: at 22 C, where *Philebus* taunts Socrates with the defeat of his claimant, Socrates distinguishes the human reason (which is not the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*) from the divine reason (which may still be the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*), and hints that he will hereafter have something to say in behalf of the *θεῖος νοῦς*: at 33 B the life of God, in which intelligence is not supplemented by pleasure, is incidentally distinguished from the life of man, who finds his *ἀγαθόν* in intelligence and pleasure combined: and, though the theory of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* may well be one of the *λειπόμενα* to which Protarchus invites Socrates' attention at the end of the dialogue, it is, down to the last page, the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*, as opposed to the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, which is the subject of the

die menschliche Vernunft verwandt sei, davon aber, dass diese Ursache das Gute (oder die Idee des Guten) sei, kein Wort sagt. Man begreift diese Zurückhaltung, wenn Plato die Frage nach dem absolut Guten noch nirgends berührt hatte, und durch ihre Anregung genöthigt worden wäre, seine Untersuchung über das, was für die Menschen das höchste Gut ist, durch

eine längere Erörterung derselben zu unterbrechen; weit unerklärlicher ist sie, wenn er nur in der Kürze an das früher gesagte zu erinnern brauchte. Auch von dieser Seite bestätigt sich daher unser Ergebniss, dass der *Philebus* der *Republik* nicht nachfolgte, sondern ihr vorangiegt." *Sitzungsberichte*, p. 220 (24). For the antecedent context, see p. 69.

conversation. Now if, as appears, throughout the *Philebus* the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, though incidentally referred to, is deliberately left out of account in the principal argument, Plato's neglect of the theory of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* contained in the sixth and seventh books of the *republic* is at once explained. But in any case I demur to Zeller's implied axiom, that if Plato has written anything anywhere on a given subject, he must of necessity on returning to that subject refer to his former pronouncement.

§ 2 *The theory of true and false pleasures.*

Zeller's second proof is stated (*Ph. d. Gr.* II i 548) thus: "Nicht minder beweisend ist aber auch das Verhältniss zwischen Rep. IX, 583 B ff. und den Erörterungen des *Philebus* über die Lust. Wie vollkommen beide bis in's einzelne zusammentreffen, zeigt die Vergleichung von

Rep. 583 D f.	584 D f.	584 A.	584 B.	584 E.	585 A.	585 B.
Phil. 43 D. E.		44 C.	51 B—E.	42 B.	31 E. 34 E—35 E.	52 A. B.

In allen diesen Stellen wird aber das, was im *Philebus* ausführlicher begründet ist, in der *Rep.* nur kürzer berührt, während einige Gedanken, die jenem in dieser Form fremd sind, hier 584 D—585 A. 585 A (*ὠδὲ γούν, εἶπον* u. s. w.)—E. 586 A—C eingehender ausgeführt werden. Wie daher die *Republik* X, 608 c ff. die Erörterungen des *Phädo* theils voraussetzt theils ergänzt (vgl. S. 700, 1, 3 Aufl.), so hier die des *Philebus*: der eine wie der andere geht ihr voran."

Thus, according to Zeller, the two statements about pleasure, or, more exactly, about true and false pleasures, are, down to their details, in complete agreement, those matters which in the *Philebus* are dealt with in detail being however in the *republic* only lightly touched, while certain considerations, which in their present form are foreign to the *Philebus*, are in the *republic* 584 D—586 C more fully stated.

At this point a brief summary of the whole of the passage in the *republic* may be of use.

- 583 B No pleasure is true or pure except that of the *φρόνιμος*. Pleasure and pain being opposites, there is a neutral state of rest intermediate
- CD between them, and this neutral state is accounted, sometimes pleasurable, sometimes painful, according as it follows pain or pleasure. Now pleasure and pain are motions, and the
- 584 A neutral state is rest. Hence, when it is accounted pleasurable or painful, this is mere semblance or illusion due to contrast. There are however
- B pleasures which are not mere cessations of pain: e.g. pleasures of smell, which have no antecedent
- C or consequent pains. Hence cessation of pain is not pure pleasure, nor cessation of pleasure pure pain. Those so called pleasures of body which are greatest are cessations of pain: pleasures and pains of anticipation are cessations likewise.
- DE Now we distinguish in nature *ἄνω*, *κάτω*, *μέσον*: and one who does not know the true *ἄνω* may suppose himself to have reached it, when he has ascended only to the *μέσον*.
- E—585 A Similarly, false pleasure is an illusion which occurs when a process from the intermediate state to pain is followed by a process from pain to the intermediate state.
- 585 A—586 C But replenishment is both of soul and of body: and knowledge, true opinion, and virtue, with which soul is concerned, are more real than the food of the body, and soul itself is more real than body itself. Hence the pleasures of intelligence are more real than those of eating and the like. In fact, these last are mixed states of pleasure and pain, mere shadows of true pleasure.

The passage here summarized may be conveniently divided into two parts, of which the former, 583 B—584 C, contains two-fifths of the whole, the latter, 584 D—586 C, three-fifths. The former is in *almost* complete accord with corresponding parts of

the *Philebus*. Both dialogues recognize the existence, not merely of pleasure and pain, which are motions, but also of a neutral state. Both use the fact that this neutral state is sometimes accounted pleasurable, to prove that there is such a thing as the semblance of pleasure. Both disclaim the theory that all pleasure is cessation of pain. Both reckon amongst true or pure pleasures the pleasures of smell and the pleasures of learning. Both regard those pleasures of body which are most intense as illusory or mixed pleasures.

There is however one detail in which this earlier part of the passage in the *republic* is at variance with the *Philebus*. In the *republic*¹, the neutral condition is distinguished from pleasure and pain on the ground that, whereas pleasure and pain are motions, the neutral condition is a state of rest: but in the *Philebus*², 42 D—43 C, denying that there is such a thing as a state of rest, Socrates retracts a former statement that changes *per se* produce pleasures and pains, and affirms that changes which are considerable, and no others, are productive of pains and pleasures. If then, as Zeller affirms, the *republic* was subsequent to the *Philebus*, we shall have to suppose that the retraction explicitly made in the *Philebus* was itself retracted in the *republic*; and, inasmuch as the *Timaeus*³, which is confessedly later than the *republic*, agrees with the *Philebus*, that the *republic's* retraction of the retraction in the *Philebus* was itself subsequently retracted.

But, while the teaching of the earlier part of the passage in the *republic* is, with this one notable exception, in general accord with that of the *Philebus*, the teaching of the latter part of the passage is not at all so. And the discrepancy is important: for

¹ Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησις τις ἀμφοτέρω ἔστων· ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτων ἐφάνη ἄρτι; Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀναίρων; 583 E.

² ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, τότε λέγεις, ὡς αἰετι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῶν ξυμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοὶ φασιν· αἰετὸ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ

κάτω βεῖ. 43 A. Σ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῶν εἶρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται. Π. Τί μὴν; Σ. Ὡδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον. Π. Πῶς; Σ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῶν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων. 43 B.

³ See below, p. 78.

it is here, if anywhere, that the distinction between true and illusory pleasures is explained. According to the *republic*¹, true pleasure is when soul, which is more truly existent, is replenished with more truly existent food; illusory pleasure is when body, which is less truly existent, having experienced depletion, is replenished with less truly existent food. In the one case, the subject ascends from the μέσον to the true ἄνω; in the other, having previously descended from the μέσον to the κάτω, the subject ascends from the κάτω to the μέσον, and, ignorantly mistaking the μέσον for the ἄνω, finds herein an unreal, illusory, gratification. In the *Philebus* the difference between true and false pleasure is otherwise conceived. True pleasures, we are told at 51 B², are the pleasures of beautiful colours, the pleasures of form, the pleasures of most smells and sounds, and, generally, the pleasures which result when depletions are imperceptible and painless, and replenishments perceptible and pleasurable. Now we read at 43 B³ that, whereas great changes produce pain and pleasure, slight changes produce neither. Thus, according to the *Philebus*, when a depletion which takes place gradually, and therefore is painless, is followed by a replenishment which is not gradual and therefore is pleasurable, the pleasure of the replenishment is a true pleasure: whereas, when a depletion which is not gradual, and therefore is painful, is followed by a replenishment which is not gradual, and therefore is pleasurable, the pleasure of the replenishment is a false pleasure.

¹ Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδῦ ἐστὶ, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρας χαίρειν ἂν ποιῶ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἥττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἥττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἥττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι. Ἀναγκαῖα ταῦτα, ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις δὲ καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις αἰετὸν ἔχοντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξύ φέρονται τε καὶ ταύτη πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώ-

ποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίον τε καὶ καθαρὰς ἡδονῆς ἐγείσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην, κτλ. 585 D ff. But see the whole passage.

² Π. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνες, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν; Σ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθητοῦς ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδέϊας [καθαρὰς λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν. 51 B.

³ See above, p. 75.

That the two definitions are discrepant, is, I think, sufficiently obvious: but the discrepancy appears to have been overlooked, and it may therefore be well that I should emphasize it. Let us suppose that what is called in the *republic* *κένωσις τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἕξεως* has taken place little by little, and that *πλήρωσις* not similarly gradual has ensued. On the one hand, in the language of the *republic*, the resultant pleasure is 'illusory,' because the body which is replenished and the food which replenishes it are *ἦπτον ὄντα*, and consequently the subject, while in his ignorance of *φρόνησις* and *ἀρετή* he imagines himself to have reached the true *ἄνω*, has not risen above the *μεταξύ*. On the other hand, in the language of the *Philebus*, the resultant pleasure is 'true,' because by hypothesis the *κένωσις* is gradual and therefore painless, while the *πλήρωσις*, which is not gradual, causes pleasure.

If then the doctrines of the two dialogues are distinct, it is obvious to inquire whether either of the two expositions bears on the face of it, either in form or in matter, evidence of posteriority. For myself, I think I find such evidence in the *Philebus*. For, when I compare the two expositions in respect of their form, I note, (1) that, whereas in the *republic* Socrates ascribes the distinction between true and illusory pleasure to *τῶν σοφῶν τις*, in the *Philebus*, 36 E *θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους αἰεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἂ νῦν δὴ προυθέμεθα ἀπορήματα*, he speaks of his personal interest in the question as nothing new; (2) that, whereas in the *republic* the distinction between 'considerable change' and 'inconsiderable change' is unknown, in the *Philebus*, 43 BC *Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἶρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται κτλ*, it is introduced as an amendment of a previous doctrine; and (3) that an apologetic tone, of which there is no trace in *republic* 583 B ff, is manifest throughout the *Philebus*. And when I compare the two passages in respect of their matter, I remark that, while the doctrine of the *republic* is inexactly conceived and loosely expressed, in the *Philebus* the terms 'true' and 'false,' though certainly not very happily chosen, bear perfectly definite meanings. All these considerations seem to me to point to the posteriority of the *Philebus*.

Others however have seen these matters in a different light, and accordingly I am glad that there is another way of determining the priority and the posteriority of the two expositions.

In *Timaeus* 64 c we read as follows : τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπιὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ ἡρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως. τὸ δὲ μετ' εὐπειθείας γιγνόμενον ἅπαν αἰσθητὸν μὲν ὅ τι μάλιστα, λύπης δὲ καὶ ἡδονῆς οὐ μετέχον, οἷον τὰ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτὴν παθήματα, ἢ δὴ σῶμα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐρρήθη καθ' ἡμέραν ξυμφνὲς ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι. ταύτη γὰρ τομαὶ μὲν καὶ καύσεις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα πάσχει λύπας οὐκ ἐμποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ ἡδονὰς πάλιν ἐπὶ ταῦτον ἀπιούσης εἶδος, μέγιστα δὲ αἰσθήσεις καὶ σαφέσταται καθότι τ' ἂν πάθη καὶ ὅσων ἂν αὐτὴ πη προσβαλοῦσα ἐφάπτηται· βία γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν οὐκ ἔνι τῇ διακρίσει τε αὐτῆς καὶ συγκρίσει. τὰ δ' ἐκ μειζόνων μερῶν σώματα μόγις εἴκοντα τῷ δρῶντι, διαδιδόντα δὲ εἰς ὄλον τὰς κινήσεις, ἡδονὰς ἴσχει καὶ λύπας, ἀλλοτριούμενα μὲν λύπας, καθιστάμενα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἡδονὰς. ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἴληφε, τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἀθρόας καὶ κατὰ μέγала, κενώσεως μὲν ἀναίσθητα, πληρώσεως δὲ αἰσθητικὰ γιγνόμενα, λύπας μὲν οὐ παρέχει τῷ θνητῷ τῆς ψυχῆς, μεγίστας δὲ ἡδονὰς· ἔστι δὲ ἔνδηλα περὶ τῆς εὐωδίας. ὅσα δὲ ἀπαλλοτριοῦνται μὲν ἀθρόα, κατὰ σμικρὰ δὲ μόγις τε εἰς ταῦτὸ πάλιν ἑαυτοῖς καθίσταται, τούναντίον τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πάντα ἀποδίδωσι· ταῦτα δ' αὖ περὶ τὰς καύσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γιγνόμενά ἐστι κατάδηλα.

Thus, according to the *Timaeus*, wholesale departure from the natural condition is pain : wholesale return to the natural condition is pleasure : processes which are inconsiderable are neither pleasurable nor painful : the greatest pleasure is when depletion which is gradual is followed by replenishment which is wholesale. Now this doctrine differs fundamentally from that of the *republic*, inasmuch as the distinction, here all-important, between the process which is κατὰ σμικρὸν and the process which is ἀθρόα, is in the *republic* wholly unknown. But the statement of the *Timaeus* is in exact accord with that of

the *Philebus*. In both dialogues, pain is the wholesale departure from natural condition, pleasure the wholesale return to it, and in both dialogues a preference is given to the pleasure which is produced by wholesale replenishment consequent upon gradual depletion. And the agreement extends to the language in which the common doctrine is expressed. The terms *διάκρισις*, *παρὰ φύσιν*, *κένωσις*, *πλήρωσις*, *εἰς φύσιν ἀπιέναι*, are found in both places: *καθιστάμενα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν* in the one has its analogue in *εἰς ταῦτόν ἀπιόντων* in the other: *ἀποχώρησις* in the one is answered by *ἀναχώρησις* in the other. In one respect only the two terminologies differ: the pleasure which is produced by wholesale replenishment consequent upon gradual depletion, whereas in the *Philebus* it is called the 'truest' or 'purest' of pleasures, but not the 'greatest,' in the *Timæus* is styled the 'greatest' of pleasures. That is to say, the unsatisfactory use of the words *ἀληθής* and *ψευδής*, which has been a rock of offence to many readers of the *Philebus* and a stone of stumbling to some, is in the *Timæus* quietly abandoned: but the thing signified, that which in the *Philebus* was styled true pleasure, remains and keeps its old precedence.

Thus, (1) the *Philebus* has a theory of pleasure and pain, and a distinction between 'true' and 'false' pleasure; (2) the *republic* has a theory of pleasure and pain, and a distinction between 'true' and 'illusory' pleasure, but the theory and the distinction are not those which are presented in the *Philebus*; (3) the *Timæus* has a theory of pleasure and pain, and a distinction between certain pleasures which are styled 'greatest' and the rest, and the theory and the distinction are identical with the theory and the distinction presented in the *Philebus*.

If then, as Zeller conceives, the *Philebus* preceded the *republic*, while the *republic* without question preceded the *Timæus*, we are to suppose that Plato propounded a theory in the *Philebus*, retracted it in the *republic*, and returned to it in the *Timæus*: or rather, inasmuch as the *Philebus* mentions a previous theory resembling that of the *republic*, that Plato somewhere or other propounded a theory resembling that of the *republic*, that he abandoned it in the *Philebus*, that he returned to it in the *republic*, and that in the *Timæus* he

abandoned it again in favour of a theory identical with that of the *Philebus*. And it is noteworthy, that on this hypothesis, whereas in the *Philebus* Plato calls attention to his change of position, in the *republic* when he supersedes the theory of the *Philebus*, and in the *Timaeus* when he reverts to it, he has not one word of apology. Can anyone accept such a scheme of development? Can anyone believe that, if Plato's thought had undergone these changes, he would have neglected to mark their sequence, or to apologize for their rapidity and variety?

On the other hand, I find no difficulty in supposing that Plato, having propounded in the *republic* a loosely conceived theory of true and illusory pleasure, next discussed the antithesis and interpreted it anew in the *Philebus*, and afterwards, in the *Timaeus*, while he retained the doctrine of the *Philebus*, dropped its vexatious nomenclature. In this hypothesis I find nothing complicated, nothing strained. Rather it is the obvious and natural interpretation of clear and determinate facts.

What then is the reasoning upon which Zeller rests his adverse conclusion? Holding (1) that the two dialogues are in complete and particular agreement, and (2) that, though certain considerations, in their present shape foreign to the *Philebus*, are in the *republic* more fully stated than the rest, the exposition of the *Philebus* is in general fuller than that of the *republic*, he infers (3) that the *republic* reviews the *Philebus*, rather than the *Philebus* the *republic*.

Having already argued that the doctrines of the two dialogues differ materially, and that the theory of true and illusory pleasure advanced in 584 D—586 C is peculiar to the *republic*, I need say no more either about the first of these three propositions or about the qualification added to the second. But it is proper that I should inquire whether the unquestioned fact that the exposition of the *Philebus* is in general fuller than that of the *republic*, warrants Zeller's conclusion that the *republic* is certainly posterior to the *Philebus*.

For my own part, I cannot admit that the fuller of two expositions is necessarily the earlier. When a writer has occasion to justify what has been called in question, or to amend

what no longer satisfies him, his second statement may well be more detailed than its predecessor¹. And the *Philebus*, as I conceive it, at once justifies and amends. It justifies, in so far as it recognizes a distinction between true pleasure and illusory pleasure: indeed at 36 E Socrates expressly alleges his old interest in the difficulties raised by Protarchus in respect of this distinction as an excuse for the length of the investigation. It amends, for in it the whole doctrine of true and false pleasures rests upon the theory of great and small changes offered as a novelty at 43 C. Thus the greater detail of the *Philebus* does not necessarily imply that it is a first statement, and accordingly in no way warrants Zeller's canon².

¹ When Zeller writes "während einige Gedanken die jenem in dieser Form fremd sind, hier...eingehender ausgeführt werden," he virtually admits that the more detailed statement is not necessarily the earlier.

² It remains for me to say a few words about Zeller's equation of certain passages in the two dialogues. (1) *republic* 583 D f, 584 D f = *Philebus* 43 D E. While the argument of 583 D is substantially equivalent to that of 43 D E, the view taken of the neutral condition in 583 E is the view which is rejected in 42 D—43 C, and the theory of true and false pleasures propounded in 584 D f differs essentially from that which is suggested in 42 D—43 C and 51 A B. (2) 584 A = 44 C. These passages are closely connected with 583 D f and 43 D E respectively, so that the remarks above made apply here also. (3) 584 B = 51 B—E. While the recognition of true or pure pleasures in contradistinction to apparent pleasures is common to the two passages, the definition of true or pure pleasure given at 51 B is inconsistent with 584 D f. (4) 584 E = 42 B. If these passages have a

superficial resemblance, the difference between the underlying doctrines becomes apparent at 42 C ff. (5) 585 A = 31 E, 34 E—35 E. In regard to the *κένωσις* and *πλήρωσις* of hunger and thirst, eating and drinking, these passages agree; but only because the underlying doctrines do not come to the surface. (6) 585 B = 52 A B. In both passages the pleasures of intelligence rank as true or pure pleasures; but the distinction drawn in the *Philebus* between true pleasure and false pleasure does not appear in the *republic*, nor does the distinction drawn in the *republic* between true pleasure and illusory pleasure appear in the *Philebus*. In short, the two dialogues agree in recognizing a distinction between pleasures which are true and pleasures which are illusory or false, and in assigning to the one class pleasures of intelligence and certain pleasures of smell, and to the other class pleasures of appetite: but the distinction between true and false pleasures and the underlying theory of pleasure in the one dialogue differ from the distinction and the underlying theory in the other dialogue.

It will be seen that in both his proofs Zeller pursues the same line of argument. In regard to the controversy about the Good, and again in regard to the theory of true and false pleasures, he holds that the two expositions, the exposition in the *Philebus* and the exposition in the *republic*, on the one hand, represent the same doctrine and thus are identical in matter, and on the other hand, differ in form, the exposition in the *Philebus* being fuller than that in the *republic*. Whence, on the ground that, the matter of two expositions being identical, greater fulness of treatment is a certain sign of priority, he concludes that the *republic* is posterior to the *Philebus*. In reply I have argued, both in regard to the controversy about the Good and in regard to the theory of true and false pleasures, that the two expositions, the exposition in the *republic* and the exposition in the *Philebus*, differ in their matter, and that, in view of this difference, Zeller's argument from their form, that is to say, from the greater fulness of the *Philebus*, falls to the ground. But further, I have tried to show that the difference in the matter of the two expositions indicates the posteriority of the *Philebus*: inasmuch as, (1) the *Philebus* takes for granted a previous discussion, such as that contained in the *republic*, of the contemporary controversy about the Good; and (2) the doctrine of the *republic* disagrees, and the doctrine of the *Philebus* agrees, with that of the confessedly later *Timæus*. In fact, I hold that a comparison of the passages cited by Zeller in proof of the priority of the *Philebus*, establishes its posteriority.

I have no love of controversy, and it is with extreme reluctance that I criticize the argument of a scholar for whom I entertain a profound respect. But Zeller's chronological canon, if allowed, would bar the road which, in my judgment, the study of Platonism should take, and τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθεῖς οὐχ ὄσιον προδιδόναι.

HENRY JACKSON.

10 September, 1896.

PASSAGES IN THE *POETAE LYRICI*.

IN the well-known lines of *Tyrtæus* quoted by Lycurgus and beginning *τεθναμέναι γὰρ καλόν* (10 in Bergk) lines 7—10 describe the condition of the craven who wanders into exile rather than fight stoutly for his home :

ἐχθρὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῖσι μετέσσειται, οὓς κεν ἴκηται
 χρησιμοσύνη τ' εἰκὼν καὶ στυγερῇ πενήνῃ,
 αἰσχύνει τε γένος, κατὰ δ' ἀγλαὸν εἶδος ἐλέγχει,
 πᾶσα δ' ἀτιμὴ καὶ κακότης ἔπεται.

What business has *μετέσσειται* the future following upon a present (*ἔστ' ἀνιηρότατον*) and accompanied by other presents, *αἰσχύνει, ἐλέγχει, ἔπεται*? We might turn *αἰσχύνει* and *ἐλέγχει* into futures, but *ἔπεται* is unmanageable. If *μετέσσειται* is wrong, as it certainly seems to be, perhaps we might put *μετέρχεται* in its place. Cf. *Od.* 1. 134 *ὑπερφιάλοισι μετελθών* : 6. 222 *κούρησιν εὐπλοκάμοισι μετελθών*.

Though Bergk keeps the two lines at the end of this piece, *ἀλλά τις...δακῶν*, it is plain that they are entirely out of place and spoil the ending. I do not know whether it has ever been suggested to transfer them to the very beginning, so that they should precede *τεθναμέναι γὰρ καλόν*. If omitted by accident, they might probably enough be appended by the transcriber at the end.

In the ninth line of the poem following in Bergk ('*Ἄλλ' Ἡρακλῆος κ.τ.λ.*) *καὶ τῶν φευγόντων τε διωκόντων τ' ἐγένεσθε* would seem a probable reading: and in line 17

ἀργαλέον γὰρ ὕπισθε μετάφρενον ἔστι δαΐζειν
 ἀνδρὸς φεύγοντος δηΐφ ἐν πολέμῳ,

where ἀργαλέον makes nonsense and Bergk's own ῥιγαλέον is not very plausible, perhaps ἀσφαλέως...ἔστι δαΐζειν may be suggested.

In 5. 4 ἀμφ' αὐτὴν δ' ἐμάχοντ' I should prefer ἀμφ' αὐτῇ: the confusion is a very common one. The MSS. of Strabo seem to have ἄμφω τῷδ'. Pausanias, who quotes ἀμφ' αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ., gives also (4. 16. 6) the Messenian distich τὸ καὶ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἔτι ἀδόμενον,

ἔς τε μέσον πεδίων Στενυκλήριον ἔς τ' ὄρος ἄκρον
εἶπετ' Ἀριστομένης τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις.

If the author or the people who sang it had any ear, the second verse ran

τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἶπετ' Ἀριστομένης,

the subject being kept to the end as in the distich on the heroes of Thermopylae,

μυριάσιν ποτὲ τῆδε τριακοσίαις ἐμάχοντο
ἐκ Πελοποννάσου χιλιάδες τέτορες.

Accuracy apart, suppose Simonides had written χιλιάδες τέτορες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων!

There need be no hesitation about altering the order of words when so well-known a line as κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι appears also in the form κ. τ. κ. πειθόμενοι νομίμοις (Bergk, Simonides 92).

There is a quatrain too relating to an incident of the Messenian wars, and quoted by Pausanias 4. 22. 7 (Bergk, *Carm. Pop.* 28 gives it in his note on the last), which must, I think, be faulty, though Polybius 4. 33 has it in the same form:

πάντως ὁ χρόνος ἦυρε δίκην ἀδίκῳ βασιλῆϊ,
ἦυρε δὲ Μεσσήνης σὺν Διὶ τὸν προδότην
ῥηιδίως· χαλεπὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

The repetition of ἦυρε in a really different sense is so awkward that we may reasonably alter it in the second line to εἶλε. Cf. Soph. *El.* 528 ἡ γὰρ δίκη νιν εἶλεν and many other passages. There would of course be no objection to ὁ χρόνος

ἡῦρε τὸν προδότην in itself (cf. Soph. *O. T.* 1213 ἐφηῦρέ σ' ἄκουθ' ὁ πάνθ' ὀρώων χρόνος and Solon 4. 29): it is its combination with ἡῦρε δίκην which makes it questionable.

Mimnermus (2 Bergk) declares that when once a man has passed his prime, it is better to die than to live:

πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν θυμῷ κακὰ γίγνεται· ἄλλοτε οἶκος
 τρυχοῦται, πενίης δ' ἔργ' ὀδυνηρὰ πέλει·
 ἄλλος δ' αὖ παίδων ἐπιδεύεται, ὧντε μάλιστα
 ἰμείρων κατὰ γῆς ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδην·
 ἄλλος νοῦσον ἔχει θυμοφθόρον.

But these are bodily or external things, objective evils, which cannot be said ἐν θυμῷ γίγνεσθαι. They cause pain to the mind, but they are not evils which take place in the mind. The true reading may perhaps be found in a line of Solon (4. 23) ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά, where δήμῳ means, not the common people in particular, but the whole community. So *Mimnermus* probably said πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν δήμῳ κακὰ γίγνεται. Perhaps too he said ἄλλον νοῦσος ἔχει θυμοφθόρος: but νόσον ἔχειν is a legitimate though more prosaic expression.

In the fourteenth fragment he praises a hero:

οὐ γὰρ τις κείνου δηίων ἔτ' ἀμεινότερος φῶς
 ἔσκειν ἐποίχεσθαι φυλόπιδος κρατερῆς
 ἔργον, ὅτ' αὐγῆσιν φέρετ' ὠκέος ἡελίοιο.

It has been thought that he praised him for being as swift as the rays of the sun, and the text has been supplemented or altered accordingly (ἡελίοιο εἵκελος, φέρετ' εἵκελος ἡελίοιο, ὅτ' ἴσ' αὐγῆς φέρετ' ὠκέος ἡελίοιο). But the comparison is not a very natural one, and it would make perhaps too much of swiftness. Οὐ γὰρ τις...ἀμεινότερος φῶς covers a good deal more. I think *Ahrens* was on a better track when he at one time altered φέρετ' to θέρετ', but I should be inclined to prefer τρέφετ'. The words will then be only a periphrasis for 'while he lived.' This is commonly expressed, no doubt, by 'seeing the sun,' but the sun nourishes all that is on the earth (*Aesch. Ag.* 633 τοῦ τρέφοντος ἡλίου χθονὸς φύσιν), and therefore the expression is natural enough. It must be allowed that ὠκέος is then an inappropriate epithet. It seems however a questionable

epithet for the sun in any case, for even on the ordinary interpretation it is not the sun but the sunlight which is swift. Schneidewin's ὀξέος is therefore perhaps right: cf. *Iliad* 17. 371 πέπτατο δ' αὐγὴ Ἡελίου ὀξεία. In Soph. *Trach.* 109 δείμα τρέφουσαν has since Casaubon often been read for δείμα φέρουσαν, and Blaydes is probably right in reading τρέφοντι for φέροντι in Soph. *O. T.* 863 εἴ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι μοῖρα τὰν εὔσεπτον ἀγνείαν κ.τ.λ.

Theognidea 95:

τοιούτος τοι ἑταῖρος ἀνὴρ φίλος οὔτι μάλ' ἐσθλός,
ὅς κ' εἶπη γλώσση λῶα, φρονῆ δ' ἕτερα.

Λῶα, besides its doubtful form, does not seem a very proper word here. I conjecture λεία 'smooth things.' Cf. 852 ὅς τὸν ἑταῖρον μαλθακὰ κωτίλλων ἐξαπατᾶν ἐθέλει and 365 γλώσση δὲ τὸ μείλιχον αἰὲν ἐπέσθω: Aesch. *P. V.* 647 παρηγόρουν λείοισι μύθοις: Plut. *Moralia* 874B τὴν βλασφημίαν αὐτοῦ (Herodotus) καὶ κακολογίαν λείοις καὶ ἀπαλοῖς σχήμασιν ὑποδεδυκνίαν.

In the couplet (151—2)

"Ἔβριν, Κύρνε, θεὸς πρῶτον κακὸν ὄπασεν ἀνδρί,
οὐ μέλλει χῶρην μηδεμίαν θέμεναι,

perhaps we should restore ὄρην οὐ μέλλει. If the words got out of order, ὄρην would be corrected to χῶρην. A similar change has been suggested in 1066 τούτων οὐδέν τοι ἄλλ' ἐπιτερπνότερον (οὐδέν τοι τούτων), and seems pretty certain: and in 831 πίστει χρήματ' ὄλεσσα, ἀπιστίη δ' ἐσάωσα I should suggest πίστει ὄλεσσα χρήματ'.

Line 424

πολλάκι γὰρ τὸ κακὸν κατακείμενον ἔνδον ἄμεινον,
ἐσθλὸν δ' ἐξελθὸν λώιον ἢ τὸ κακόν

is pronounced by Bergk 'versus corruptus. Poeta videtur dixisse: *bonum, quod divulgatum, plus nocuit quam malum.*' That however would be a monstrously untrue meaning. I suggest ἐσθλὸν δ' ἐξελθὸν λώιον ἢ κάκιον, 'does more good than harm.' Κακόν was written by mistake and an article then

put in to eke out the verse. Cf. Hippocr. *Epid.* 3. 4 ἦν δὲ ταῦτα φοβερώτερα ἢ κακίω, 'more alarming than serious.'

475 foll. The author tells us how much wine he has drunk:

αὐτὰρ ἐγώ—μέτρον γὰρ ἔχω μεληδέος οἴνου—
 ὕπνου λυσικάκου μνήσομαι οἴκαδ' ἰών,
 ἦξω δ' ὡς οἶνος χαριέστατος ἀνδρὶ πεπόσθαι·
 οὔτε τι γὰρ νήφω, οὔτε λίην μεθύω.

But Athenaeus 428 D in his quotation has ἦκω, and that is right. ἦκειν is used of being, or having come to be, in a certain condition. This is familiar to everyone in the phrases εὖ ἦκειν, καλῶς ἦκειν τινός, &c.: but we find it also in cases where its meaning is not always recognised. Thus Soph. *O. T.* 1519 θεοῖς γ' ἔχθιστος ἦκω: *O. C.* 1177 ἔχθιστον, ὄναξ, φθέγμα τοῦθ' ἦκει πατρί: *ib.* 1266 καὶ μαρτυρῶ κάκιστος ἀνθρώπων τροφαῖς ταῖς σαῖσιν ἦκειν (see Jebb). In Theognis ὡς οἶνος κ.τ.λ. shows that this is the meaning: he is just in the state which (to use Hamlet's word) is the most gracious.

1007 foll.

ξυλὸν δ' ἀνθρώποις ὑποθήσομαι, ὄφρα τις ἦβης
 ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχων καὶ φρεσὶν ἐσθλὰ νοῆ,
 τῶν αὐτοῦ κτεάνων εὖ πασχέμεν.

Who ever used a genitive in this way after εὖ πάσχειν? According to Liddell and Scott Pindar did, for he wrote (*Nem.* 1. 44) οὐκ ἔραμαι πολλὸν ἐν μεγάρῳ πλοῦτον κατακρύψαις ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐόντων εὖ τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι φίλου ἐξαρκέων. But there ἐόντων is a genitive absolute, 'if' or 'when' I have the money (χρημάτων understood from πλοῦτος perhaps: cf. *Ar. Plut.* 503 ὄντες πλουτοῦσι πονηροί, | ἀδίκως αὐτὰ ξυλλεξάμενοι). How then are we to deal with Theognis? The answer is obvious. We are to write κ twice instead of once and read τῶν αὐτοῦ κ κτεάνων εὖ πασχέμεν.

MSS. of Theognis show just the same error in other places. In 577 ῥήμιον ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ θεῖναι κακὸν ἢ κ κακοῦ ἐσθλόν the κ or ἐκ is omitted by one MS., and in 431 ὅστις σῶφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα κακ κακοῦ ἐσθλόν many have καὶ κακοῦ or καὶ κακόν.

In the 13th poem or fragment of *Solon* I have three or four changes to propose. (a) He says

10. *πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ
ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος εἰς κορυφήν·
ὄν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται.*

Πειθόμενος in 12 should I think be *πειθομένοις*. Cf. 4. 11 *πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθομένοι* and *Theogn.* 380 *ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθομένων*. Indeed it is not easy to see how wealth could be said *ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθεσθαι*. For one dative depending on another, *ἔργμασι* on *πειθομένοις*, cf. 4. 22 *ἄστν | τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις τοῖς ἀδικούσι φίλαις*, where I would make no greater change than to read *ἀδίκουσι* as in 4. 34.

(β) In 18 foll. he draws a simile from the wind which, after laying the fields waste,

*δηώσας καλὰ ἔργα, θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν ἰκάνει
οὐρανόν, αἰθρίην δ' αὖθις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν·
λάμπει δ' ἠελίοιο μένος κατὰ πύονα γαῖαν
καλόν, ἀτὰρ νεφέων οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν.*

Ἰδεῖν cannot be right at the end of both pentameters. It is not however of much use to suggest a specific alteration, as we cannot say which *ἰδεῖν* is wrong. *Ἄνω* might do in either place, or *ἔθηκε βροτοῖς* in the first.

(γ) A little further on (43) he is speaking of the pursuit of wealth:

*ὁ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλᾶται
ἐν νησίῳ, χρῆζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν,
ἰχθυόεντ', ἀνέμοισι φορεύμενος ἀργαλέοισιν.*

Scholars should have seen that, as the text stands, the epithet *ἰχθυόεντα* could not follow its substantive *πόντον* at so great a distance. There is only one thing which would render that possible, namely that *ἰχθυόεντα* should not stand alone, but be fortified by the addition of one or more further epithets applied to *πόντον*. When we have got as far as this, it is easy

to see that we should read *φορεύμενον*, not *φορεύμενος*. But can the sea be said *φορεῖσθαι*? Simonides of Amorgos thought so, for he wrote (7. 40) *πολλάκις δὲ μαίνεται | βαρυκτύποισι κύμασιν φορουμένη (θάλασσα)*.

(δ) In 65—6:

*πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
ἦ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου,*

is there not some awkwardness in *σχήσειν* (= *τελευτήσειν*) referring to the man, while *ἀρχεσθαι* refers to the business? The same subject should be said to begin and end, not the man to begin and the business to end. Buchholz actually understands *χρήμα* as the subject of *μέλλει σχήσειν*. But Solon wrote *ἀρχόμενος*.

There is an error in the poem on the ten ages of man (Bergk 27). Dividing our life into ten periods of seven years, Solon says of the sixth,

τῇ δ' ἕκτῃ περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός,

but this is no more true of the years from 35 to 42 than of those preceding. In them too a man's mind is being formed and moulded. What is true ἤδη of the sixth age is that the mind then is, not is being, formed: *κατήρτυται*, not *καταρτύεται*. So Plato, as though to show us how to restore Solon's verse, says (*Laws* 808 D) *παῖς ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν οὐπω κατηρτυμένην*. It is no objection to this change that according to Solon a man is at his best, *νοῦν καὶ γλωῶσαν*, from 42 to 56. *Κατήρτυται* does not necessarily mean quite his best, only fully formed.

Mr Platt has anticipated me in changing the incongruous *κεν* of 33. 5 (*ἦθελον γὰρ κεν κρατήσας*) to *ἄν*.

Some readers must have asked why *Archilochus* (54 Bergk) should speak of a cloud standing straight or straight up (*ὄρθόν*) about a headland as a sign of bad weather:

*βαθὺς γὰρ ἤδη κύμασιν τaráσσειται
πόντος, ἀμφὶ δ' ἄκρα Γυρέων ὄρθον ἴσταται νέφος,
σῆμα χειμῶνος.*

As applied to a cloud under these circumstances, *ὄρθόν*

seems devoid of meaning. The poet must have written *νωθρόν*, dull heavy clouds.

A more trifling error in the text of Archilochus is :

68 μάχης δὲ τῆς σῆς, ὥστε διψέων πιεῖν,
ὡς ἐρέω.

Διψέων to Archilochus would almost certainly be a disyllable, as *ἐρέω* is. Read perhaps *ἐμπιεῖν*, if the scansion is admissible, or some such expression as *ἀνὴρ διψέων, διψέων τις*.

Simonides of Amorgos in his first fragment paints a gloomy picture of human life. We live without knowledge of the future, like so many animals. Ἐλπίς δὲ πάντας κἀπιπειθείη τρέφει ἄπρηκτον ὀρμαίνοντας : we go on blindly trusting and struggling and failing. Our schemes are cut short by age and illness and death, perhaps by suicide.

Οὔτω κακῶν ἅπ' οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ μυρίαί
βροτοῖσι κῆρες κἀνεπίφραστοι δύαι
καὶ πῆματ' ἐστίν· εἰ δ' ἐμοὶ πιθοίαιτο,
οὐκ ἂν κακῶν ἐρῶμεν οὐδ' ἐπ' ἄλγεσιν
κακοῖς ἔχοντες θυμὸν αἰκίζοίμεθα.

Κακοῖς and *ἔχοντες* have been called in question, but no one seems to have doubted *αἰκίζοίμεθα*, though Ahrens and Nauck were perhaps on the way towards doing so when they conjectured *έκόντες*. Yet *αἰκίζοίμεθα* is by no means a proper word. Shakespeare can say 'As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods. They kill us for their sport.' But would any Greek of *Simonides*' time have said that men *αἰκίζονται* by heaven? It must be by heaven, if at all, for no other meaning can be got out of the passive verb. What is wanted is something that repeats the point of *κακῶν ἐρῶμεν*. The poet is complaining of men's folly in clinging to life and making an ado about things, as though anything mattered. The things on which we set our hearts are only vanity and vexation of spirit. We know this, if we would only consent to look facts in the face; but we dissemble, we make believe that the things of this world can certainly be had and are worth having. Now this absurd make-believe, this affected ignorance of ours, can be very well

expressed in Greek by a word differing from *αικιζόμεθα* in one letter only, namely *ἀκκιζόμεθα*. So Plato says in *Gorgias* 497 A *οἶσθα ἀλλ' ἀκκίζει*. So Cicero writes to Atticus (II. 19. 5) *certi sumus perisse omnia: quid enim ἀκκιζόμεθα tamdiu?* Reading *ἀκκιζόμεθα*, we need not, I think, seek to alter the rest of the verse, unless we think *κακοῖς* weak after *κακῶς*. "Ἐχοντες θυμὸν is probably used in the sense of 'setting our hearts upon' a thing: cf. *θυμός ἐστι* with an infinitive. Anything like *ἔδοντες θυμόν* (Meineke *Fragm. Com. Graec.* 4. 717) is seen to be unnecessary and indeed inappropriate.

Simonides' meaning is perfectly expressed in the fine lines of Dryden (*Aurengzebe* IV. 1):

When I consider life, 'tis all a cheat;
 Yet, fool'd with hope, men favour the deceit,
 Trust on, and think tomorrow will repay:
 Tomorrow's falsar than the former day.

* * * * *

I'm tir'd with waiting for this chimick gold,
 Which fools us young, and beggars us when old.

A minute change should be made in the second quotation which Athenaeus 37 A makes from *Panyasis*:

*οἶνος θνητοῖσι θεῶν πάρα δῶρου ἄριστον,
 ἀγλαός, ᾧ πᾶσαι μὲν ἐφαρμόζουσιν αἰοδαί, κ.τ.λ.*

Read *ἀγλαόν*, remembering Homer's *ἀγλαὰ δῶρα*, and observing in Athenaeus' first quotation just before:

*οἶνος γὰρ πυρὶ ἴσον ἐπιχθονίοισιν ὄνειρα,
 ἐσθλόν, ἀλεξίκακον, κ.τ.λ.*

I come to two of the epigrams ascribed to *Plato*. It is remarkable that a very obvious blunder has not been detected in the epigram on Archeanassa, which Bergk numbers 30. It occurs in nearly the same form in Athenaeus and in Diogenes Laertius, and Bergk writes it thus:

Ἀρχεάνασσαν ἔχω τὴν ἐκ Κολοφῶνος ἐταίρην,
 ἧς καὶ ἐπὶ ῥυτίδων πικρὸς ἔπεστιν ἔρωσ.
 ἃ δειλοὶ νεότητος ἀπαντήσαντες ἐκείνης
 πρωτοπλόου, δι' ὄσης ἤλθετε πυρκαϊῆς.

Two things lead us to suspect *ἀπανθήσαντες*: first the construction, for *ἀπαντᾶν* does not take a genitive, secondly the comparative weakness and colourlessness of the word. As soon as our suspicion is aroused, we see of course that the author of the lines wrote *ἀπανθήσαντες* 'culled the flower.' After thinking of this, I found it most conclusively confirmed by the other and quite different form in which the third line appears in the Anthology (7. 217):

ἄ νέον ἥβης ἄνθος ἀποδρέψαντες ἐρασταί.

Ἀπανθεῖν seems not to occur elsewhere except in the neuter sense of 'ceasing to flower,' 'fading,' and *ἀπανθίζω* is 'to pluck a flower': but the word may very well have been used in the sense we want. It is not likely the poet wrote *ἀπανθίσσαντες*.

But, it will be said, what a dreadful mixture of metaphors! a flower, a first voyage and a conflagration, all in a couplet. Can any one have written so badly? As it happens, *πρωτοπλόου* is the reading in Diogenes and, so far as I can gather, a marginal reading in the Anthology, while the first hand in the Anthology gives *πρωτοβόλου*, and Athenaeus *πρωτοπόρου*. Now that we have got *ἀπανθήσαντες*, there is no difficulty in seeing that *πρωτοβόλου* is the right word. Another epigram in the Anthology (5. 124), ascribed to Philodemus, speaks of *βότρυς ὁ παρθενίους πρωτοβολῶν χάριτας*, and *πρωτοβολεῖν* of 'budding' is also quoted from the Septuagint. Thus *ἀπανθήσαντες* and *πρωτοβόλου* confirm one another. It is a pleasure to save the unknown author from the discredit of mixing three metaphors together, but I fear we must still allow that he mixed two. The water and fire of the common reading, *ὄντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρίν*, were however more offensive.

There is another epigram ascribed to Plato, about which I wish to say a word, though not to offer any emendation. It is the well-known couplet on Aristophanes, of which Bergk says *dignum praeconium non minus eo qui laudatur quam qui edixit*, showing that he, like some others, still believes this epigram to be Plato's, while giving up many of the rest:

Αἱ Χάριτες τέμενός τι λαβεῖν ὅπερ οὐχὶ πεσεῖται
ζητοῦσαι ψυχὴν ἠῆρον Ἀριστοφάνους.

Short as it is, it contains one thing, if not two, which points to a late origin. First *τέμενος πεσεῖται* is a dubious phrase. A *τέμενος* is not a building; it is only a piece of land: and it cannot, properly speaking, fall down. On the other hand Pindar, Herodotus, and possibly other writers, apply to it words which connote the erecting of something. Pindar has (*Pyth.* 4. 204) *ἀγρὸν Ποσειδάωνος ἔσσαντ' εἰναλίῳ τέμενος*. Herodotus writes (2. 178) *τὸ μὲν νῦν μέγιστον αὐτῶν τέμενος... αἴδε πόλεις εἰσὶ αἱ ἰδρυμέναι κοινῇ*. If a *τέμενος* could be spoken of as set up, it might perhaps also be spoken of as falling down, though to me the expression seems somewhat strange. I am under the impression that in late Greek *τέμενος* is sometimes treated as convertible with the Latin *templum* and used of a temple, but of this I cannot now find an instance.

But what certainly admits of no defence is the relative pronoun *ὅπερ* in connexion with *τέμενός τι*. "*Ὅσπερ* is the most definite and precise of relatives, meaning *just the person who or thing which*; and therefore its very nature forbids its being connected in this way with the indefinite *τις*. *Ἐκείνο* (or *αὐτὸ*) *τὸ τέμενος ὅπερ* would be right enough; in poetry we could have without pronoun or article *τέμενος ὅπερ*: but *τέμενός τι ὅπερ* is a monstrosity¹. Now in late Greek the not very subtle distinction between *ὅς ὅστις ὅσπερ* was missed, and we frequently find *ὅσπερ* or *ὅστις* where no Attic writer of a good age would have used it. In this epigram a good writer must have said *ὅ* or *ὅ τι οὐχὶ πεσεῖται*, using the common idiom by which *ὅς* or *ὅστις* (not *ὅσπερ*) with a future has a sense like that of the Latin *qui* final with a subjunctive. I have pointed out elsewhere that in Ar. *Eq.* 1385 and Xen. *Hiero* 7. 11 *ὅσπερ* should be corrected to *ὅστις*: that correction cannot be made here, because there would then be an inadmissible hiatus in the verse. The inevitable conclusion is that the epigram belongs to

¹ Such a use as that in Dem. 22 (Androtion) 36 *οὐδ' ἔστιν ἀπάσης τὸ πρᾶγμα τῆς βουλῆς, ἀλλὰ τινῶν, ὅπερ εἰσὶν αἱ τῶν κακῶν*, and again ib. 38 *Φίλιππος καὶ Ἀντιγένης καὶ ὁ ἀντιγραφεὺς καὶ τινὲς ἄλλοι ὅπερ κ.τ.λ.*, is es-

entially different. There *τινὲς* means certain specific persons, not some persons or other. The Graces were not seeking for a certain *τέμενος*, already known to them, which would never fall.

times much later than Plato, unless indeed the form in which it appears is wrong. Curiously enough in an anonymous life of Plato (Westermann p. 391) we find not ὅπερ οὐχὶ πεσεῖται ζητούσαι but ὅπερ ἤθελον εὐρεῖν διζόμεναι. But this preserves the ὅπερ, while the ἤθελον εὐρεῖν is very feeble with λαβεῖν διζόμεναι, and the form διζόμεναι is late. It should be noticed that all our evidence for the epigram is very late. It does not appear in the Anthology.

In the verses addressed to Demetrius Poliorcetes (Athen. 6. 253 D: given in Bergk 3. 674), beginning

ὡς οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν θεῶν καὶ φίλτατοι
τῇ πόλει πάρεισιν·
ἐνταῦθα (γὰρ Δήμητρα καὶ) Δημήτριον
ἄμα παρῆγ' ὁ καιρός,

παρῆγ' is Porson's emendation for παρῆν. But, as the perfect tense is needed, read παρῆχ'. Thus in some places the intransitive πέπραγα still lingers where the transitive πέπραχα is required: e.g. Ar. Nic. Eth. 10. 8. 1179 A 11 πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλιστα, and Poet. 11. 3. 1452 A 36 εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν.

In the graceful and pleasing *Anacreontea* there are many things yet waiting to be put right. I will attempt a few of them, following Bergk's numeration.

7. 11 ὡς οὖν ἔτ' εὐδία ἔστιν,
καὶ πῖνε καὶ κύβευε
καὶ σπένδε τῷ Λυαίῳ,
μὴ νοῦσος ἦν τις ἔλθη
λέγη σε μὴ δεῖ πίνειν.

Μηδὲ πίνειν and μὴ πιεῖν δεῖν may be dismissed as unsuccessful ways of dealing with the last line. Probably οὐ δεῖ, λέγη, σε πίνειν is what the author wrote. The order of words got turned into λέγη σε οὐ δεῖ πίνειν, and then οὐ was altered to μὴ to avoid the hiatus. In 27 A 11 ὁ δ' Ἐρωσ, τόδ' ἔστιν, εἶπεν might easily have become ὁ δ' Ἐρωσ εἶπεν, τόδ' ἔστιν.

15. 33. After the description of the image:

ἀπέχει· βλέπω γὰρ αὐτήν.
τάχα, κηρέ, καὶ λαλήσεις.

As the use of ἀπέχει for 'enough' is somewhat doubtful, it may be worth while to suggest ἀπόχρη.

28. 7. δοκέω δ' ἔγωγε πολλοῖς
 ἐν Ἔρωσί με πλακέντα
 διολισθάνειν μὲν ἄλλους,
 ἐνὶ τῷδε συνδεθῆναι.

The correction ἐνὶ τῷδε δ' ἐνδεθῆναι suggests itself at once. Ἔν and σύν are often confused. [I now see that Bergk suggests this in his 4th edition.]

31. 9. When little Eros knocks at his door by night, the poet is made by the MS. to say

 τίς, ἔφην, θύρας ἀράσσει ;
 κατά μεν σχίζεις ὄνειρους.

What he did say, I suspect, was κατά μεν σκεδᾶς ὄνειρους, using κατασκεδαννύναι not in the sense in which we know it, but only as a stronger form of σκεδαννύναι. Cf. σκεδάσαι θέλω μερίμνας at the end of the poem preceding. In any case a long syllable in the fourth place of the verse cannot well be right, and therefore σχίσεις, σχίσας are read.

32. 8. The cicala is addressed

 σὺ δὲ φιλία γεωργῶν,
 ἀπὸ μηδενός τι βλάπτων·
10 σὺ δὲ τίμιος βοτοῖσιν,
 θέρεος γλυκὺς προφήτης.

Bergk thinks 8 and 9 a later addition, but this leaves the difficulty of 8 untouched. Rose (in the Teubner text, 1876) reads φίλτατος γεωργῶν, which is not very easy to understand. I accept however φίλτατος (φιλία fort. pro φιλτα, φιλτ. cf. Bast p. 790, says Rose) and change γεωργῶν to γεωργῶ. φίλτατος γεωργῶ is then parallel to τίμιος βοτοῖσιν.

33. 13. When Eros has been stung by a bee,

 εἰ τὸ κέντρον
 πονεῖ τὸ τᾶς μελίττας,
15 πόσον δοκεῖς πονοῦσιν,
 Ἔρωτος, ὄσους σὺ βάλλεις ;

The transitive use of *πονεί* in 14 is no doubt a mistake. It is well known that copyists sometimes introduce a wrong word, because it occurs somewhere in the context, not necessarily *before* the place into which it is obtruded (cf. on Solon 13. 18 above). *Πονεί* is thus due to the *πονοῦσιν* of 15. The original word in such a case need not resemble the word obtruded, and therefore it is often impossible to say with certainty what it was. Here it may have been *λυπεῖ* or *δάκνει*. Aeschylus uses *χρίει* of the gadfly's sting. The only parallel quoted for the transitive use of *πονεί* is Pind. *Pyth.* 4. 151.

34. 4. *ἴν', ἂν θανεῖν ἐπέλθῃ,*
 λάβῃ τι καὶ παρέλθῃ.

Can *θανεῖν* be used thus for *θάνατος*? The poet says he would store up wealth, if wealth were of any avail, that death might take a bribe and pass him by. I believe *ἂν θανεῖν ἐπέλθῃ* could only mean 'if it comes into my head to die,' but still more impossible is it to regard *θανεῖν* as the subject of *λάβῃ* and *παρέλθῃ*. *Dying* may happen to a man, but *dying* can't take a bribe and leave him: only *death* can do that. Read *θάνατος*.

As death must come, he goes on,

ἐμοὶ γένοιτο πίνειν,
πιόντι δ' οἶνον ἠδὺν
ἐμοῖς φίλοις συνεῖναι.

It would seem therefore that he wishes to drink in private, and after drinking (*πιόντι*) to join his friends as gentlemen in England join the ladies. We shall get his real wishes better, if we read *πίνοντι*.

35. 11. *Ἐθέλοντα δὲ φιλήσαι*
 φύγον ἐξ ὕπνου με πάντες.

Δῆ for *δέ* is hardly suitable. Read *ἐκφιλήσαι*. Cf. Anthol. 12. 250. 3 *ὃν περιπλεχθεὶς ἐξεφίλων.*

36. 9. (Bacchus)

δι' ὃν ἀμπαίεται λύπη.

Ἄμπαύεται has every appearance of being right, but it will not scan unless followed by a long vowel or diphthong to make its last syllable short. Perhaps therefore λύπη is a mistake for ἄλγος. A scholium on Aesch. *P. V.* 198 gives λύπη as an explanation of ἄλγος.

39. 6. χυπό τὰ πέταλα δύναι
 ἀπαλὴν παῖδα κατέχων.

The nominative κατέχων is too irregular to be tolerated. I suspect the poet wrote κατέχονθ' ἀπαλὴν παῖδα. The order was changed and then the case altered. If I am not mistaken, the order of the words is wrong also in the first line of the poem, and for *τι καλὸν ἐστι βαδίζειν* we should read *ἔστι τι καλὸν βαδίζειν*. We must not begin with the enclitic *τι*.

48. 27. τὸ θανεῖν γὰρ μετὰ πάντων.

'Death is in company with all men' or 'things' makes no sense. Barnes *μετὰ πάντα* (Rose). But *μετά* and *κατά* are liable to get interchanged and *κατὰ πάντων* gives excellent sense. Death applies to all (Isocrates 8. 35 *ταῦτ' εἰ μὴ κατὰ πάντων οὕτως εἴθισται συμβαίνειν*) or is a sentence pronounced on all.

50. He calls on his slave to drench and stupefy him with wine:

12 βραχὺ μὴ ζῶντα καλύπτεις·
ὁ θανὼν οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆι.

I cannot translate line 12 at all, though I should know what it meant if we had *ταχὺ μὴ ζῶντα καλύψεις*. But a less change would be *βραχὺ...καλύπτειν*. The dead want nothing but a shroud.

58. 9. The swan of Cayster is unmetrically described as *ποικίλον πτεροῖσι μέλπων | ἀνέμου σύναυλος ἤχη*. Perhaps *ποικίλον* should be *πυκινόν* or *πυκινοῖς*.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

ON A FRAGMENT OF SOLON.

IN the edition of the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* by Sandys, the opening verses of the iambic fragment of Solon quoted in chapter 12 (lines 28 ff.) stand thus (pp. 44 f.):—

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον
 δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
 συμμαρτυρ[οί]η ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου
 μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνω[ν Ὀλυ]μπίων
 ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε
 [ὄ]ρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆ πεπηγότα[ς],
 [πρόσθ]εν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.

As Dr Sandys mentions in his critical note (p. 44), and in his commentary on the passage, the reading of the second verse as interrogative (with *τί* instead of *τι*, and a note of interrogation after *ἐπαυσάμην*) is in accordance with a suggestion of mine (made in 1891). I take the meaning (as he does) to be:—‘But, as to the ends for which I brought the people together (formed the popular party), why did I desist before I had attained those ends?’

Commenting on this reading and this interpretation in the last number of the *Journal of Philology* (vol. xxiv., no. 48, pp. 249—251), Mr J. A. Platt, Professor of Greek in University College, London, declares:—‘The sentence is gross and palpable nonsense, as well as bad grammar.’

This is a pretty trenchant and confident pronouncement. There is a special reason why it seems incumbent on me to offer some reply. A reader of Professor Platt’s strictures, who had not the edition of Dr Sandys before him, would naturally

suppose that Dr Sandys alone was responsible for this enormity; since the Professor makes no reference to my responsibility for it, although that fact is twice stated on the page (p. 44) with which he is dealing. In one place, indeed (p. 250), he speaks of Dr Sandys having 'acquiesced in such a rendering'; but then an editor might be said to 'acquiesce' in a view to which his own reflections had led him, as well as in a view suggested by some one else: hence the phrase is ambiguous. I should be sorry to think that I had been the cause of intruding so grievous a blot (if such it be) into the standard English edition of the *Πολιτεία*. And therefore I propose to examine the grounds on which Professor Platt founds his judgment.

I. I will take first the charge of 'bad grammar.' Referring to τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα in the first verse of the fragment, Prof. Platt says (p. 249) that, if τῶν meant *which*, 'it would have to follow the demonstrative' (τούτων in v. 2). In a Note on 'The Article as a Relative,' at the end of his paper (p. 261), he quotes Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, § 262, where it is observed that in Homeric usage, when the article is a relative, it normally 'follows the noun to which it refers.' But, in contrast with the positive tone which he adopts on pp. 249 f. ('τῶν... would have to follow,'... 'τῶν must be demonstrative'), Prof. Platt is constrained to admit, in his Note (p. 261), that 'there seem to be a few exceptions.' Let us now look at some of these exceptions.

(i) *Iliad* 1. 125 f.:

ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολίων ἐξεπράθομεν, τὰ δέδασται,
λαοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐπέοικε παλίλλογα ταύτ' ἐπαγείρειν.

(ii) *Od.* 4. 349 f. (=17. 140 f.):

ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν μοι ἔειπε γέρων ἄλιος νημερτής,
τῶν οὐδέν τοι ἐγὼ κρύψω ἔπος οὐδ' ἐπικεύσω.

These are the only Homeric exceptions. Mr Monro (*H. G.* § 262) suggests that in both places the original reading was ἀλλά θ' ἂ μὲν: Prof. Platt says, however (p. 261), 'I confess to differing from him with regard to ἀλλά θ' ἂ μὲν': and in his

own text of the *Iliad* (Cambridge University Press, 1894), and of the *Odyssey* (1892), he retains ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν. For these two exceptions, then, at any rate, we have no less an authority than his own. As, however, he has not given any reasons for rejecting the emendation ἀλλά θ' ἂ μὲν, I may perhaps give mine. The Homeric ἀλλά τε occurs under two conditions: (a) where τε is 'gnomic,'—i.e. has its distinctively Homeric force (as distinguished from its ordinary copulative use) of marking a statement as general, or a characteristic as permanent; e.g. *Il.* 2. 753 f.,

οὐδ' ὃ γε Πηνεῖῳ συμμίσγεται ἀργυροδίην,
ἀλλά τέ μιν καθύπερθεν ἐπιρρέει ἡύτ' ἔλαιον:

(b)¹ where another τε precedes, and the τε after ἀλλά marks that the clauses are correlative; e.g. *Il.* 1. 81 f.:

εἵπερ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ,
ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον ὄφρα τελέσῃ.

But the first of these uses does not apply to *Il.* 1. 125 f. or *Od.* 4. 349 f., because the statements are particular, not general; and the second does not apply, because the τε would be single.

(iii) Theognis 255 f.:

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον· λῶστος δ' ὑγιαίνειν
πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ, τὸ τυχεῖν.

Here τὸ seems to be the acc. governed by τυχεῖν, rather than the definite article (in nom.) with it: cp. Soph. fr. 824. 3 καὶ τὰ καὶ τὰ τυγχάνων ('meeting with this fortune, and with that'—with good and evil,—where, as the context shows, Nauck ought not to have adopted the conjecture καὶ τὰ χαρτά). Cp. also Theognis 398 τολμᾶν χρὴ τά τε καὶ τὰ φέρειν. 'But' (says Prof. Platt, p. 261) 'the reading is in the highest degree uncertain.' Is it? ἐρᾷ τὸ is confirmed by the best MS., A, which has ἐρᾶτο: it gives good grammar and good sense; there is no intelligible variant; and the emendations (so far as I know)

¹ Monro (*H. G.* § 332) does not distinguish this second case from the first; but (as Leaf observes on *Il.* 10. 224—226) the 'gnomic' τε is not used

in pairs, though some passages in which a doubled τε marks correlation happen to be gnomic in character.

which have been suggested are, to say the least, improbable (*έρωτο* Bekker and Meineke: *ἔραιτο* Bergk formerly).

(iv) Theognis 383—386:

ἔμπης δ' ὄλβον ἔχουσι ἀπήμονα· τοὶ δ' ἀπὸ δειλῶν
 ἔργων ἴσχονται θυμόν, ὅμως πενήν
 μητέρ' ἀμηχανίης ἔλαβον, τὰ δίκαια φιλεῦντες,
 ἦ τ' ἀνδρῶν παράγει θυμόν ἐς ἀμπλακίην.

Here *τοὶ* is relative. But it becomes demonstrative if we accept A's reading, *ἴσχοντες*. Prof. Platt, noting that Ahrens approves *ἴσχοντες*, pronounces that it is 'certainly right.' Notwithstanding this *ipse dixit*, I venture to think that *ἴσχονται* is both intrinsically better, and more probable here, for these reasons. (a) The use of the middle *ἴσχονται* (with *ἀπό τινος* and *acc.*) is confirmed by the use of *ἀπέχομαι* (midd.) with *acc.*, where the meaning is that one refrains one's own hands from something; e.g. *Od.* 22. 316 *κακῶν ἀποχείρας ἔχεσθαι*: *Plat. Symp.* 213 D *τῶ χεῖρε μόγις ἀπέχεται*. (b) The adoption of *ἴσχοντες* in a concessive sense ('while, or though, they keep') makes it awkward, or rather intolerable, to have a second participle, in the same sense, just afterwards. Ahrens, seeing this, proposed to change *φιλεῦντες* in verse 3 into *φιλεύντων* (to agree with *ἀνδρῶν* in v. 4): a fact which Prof. Platt does not mention.

(v) Theognis 583 f.:

ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προβέβηκεν, ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι
 ἀργά· τὰ δ' ἐξοπίσω, τῶν φυλακῆ μελέτω.

This need not detain us, as Prof. Platt admits that it 'seems a genuine reading.' He further concedes that Herodotus 'has the idiom often enough,' and quotes *Her.* 6. 19, *τὰ δὲ τοῖσι Μιλησίοισι οὐ παρεούσι ἔχρησε, ἔχει ὧδε*: but suggests that some 'hyper-Ionic editor' may have corrupted the historian's text.

I am content to rely on the five examples adduced above,—two from Homer, and three from Theognis. In all these the article is used as a relative, and the relative clause *precedes* the clause containing the principal verb. In the last two passages

(Theognis 383—386, and 583 f.), the demonstrative pronoun, which should have answered to the relative, is left to be understood. Now, when the clause with the article used as a relative stands before the principal clause, it is conducive to clearness that a demonstrative pronoun should follow in the latter clause; since such a pronoun serves to mark the relative sense of the article in the first clause. If, then, Greek writers could place the clause with article-relative first, even when no demonstrative pronoun followed, there is the less reason to doubt that they could so place that clause, when the construction was made clearer by the addition of a demonstrative pronoun. The examples which omit the demonstrative supply an argument *a fortiori*. In the verses of Solon the demonstrative is not the article (as τὰ in *Il.* 1. 125, τῶν in *Od.* 4. 350, and probably τὸ in Theognis 256), but τοῦτων. Prof. Platt suggests (p. 261), though diffidently ('it may be my own fancy'), that this circumstance tells *against* the view that τῶν in the preceding verse of Solon is a relative. I should have thought that, if it makes any difference, the difference is rather in favour of that view; for τοῦτων is slightly more emphatic than τῶν, and any addition to the stress on the demonstrative pronoun tends to make it more, and not less, clear that the article in the first clause is used as a relative. On pp. 249 f. Prof. Platt treats an article-relative preceding the demonstrative as *impossible*, and therefore condemns my interpretation as involving 'bad grammar.' On p. 262, however, he describes it as merely 'a very dubious idiom,' which the available evidence does not warrant our 'importing...into Solon.' That it is a comparatively rare idiom, may readily be granted: there is an obvious reason why it should be so; viz., that the use of the article as a demonstrative was more frequent and familiar than its use as a relative; and that, consequently, when the clause with article used as relative came first, the hearer might take the article to be the demonstrative, unless its relative sense was made clear by the subsequent context. But, in these verses of Solon, and in the five other examples quoted above, the context does make this clear. Three of the five examples (*Il.* 1. 125 f., *Od.* 4. 349 f., and Theognis 583 f.) are allowed as genuine by Prof. Platt him-

self. I submit, then, that the idiom, though infrequent, cannot fairly be described as 'dubious'; much less can it be regarded as establishing a charge of 'bad grammar.'

But Prof. Platt has a further objection. He contends that, after τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα, we require a clause with δέ: p. 250, 'μὲν must have an antithesis': p. 249 'Solon uses μὲν often enough, and always provides it with a proper antithetical clause.' The answer is that the μὲν in τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα has, indeed, an antithesis, but one which is mentally supplied, not expressed:— 'with regard to the ends [as conceived by my critics] for which I formed the popular party,'—in contradistinction to the actual results, falling short of those supposed ends, with which Solon had remained content. This use of μὲν without an answering δέ, when the implied antithesis can easily be understood, is of course very common. The examples may be roughly classified according to the nature of the word which μὲν follows: here are a few. (1) After a relative pronoun,—as in this verse of Solon. *Od.* 4. 349 τὰ μὲν μοι ἔειπε, 'as to what Proteus told me' (Menelaus has no further source of knowledge). *Plat. Gorg.* 465 D ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ φημι ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας (other definitions might be given by other persons). (2) After personal pronouns: *Il.* 5. 893 τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ σπουδῇ δάμνημ' ἐπέεσσι (the other goddesses are more docile than Hera). *Soph. Ant.* 65 ἐγὼ μὲν, 634 σοὶ μὲν, 681 ἡμῖν μὲν. (3) After nouns: *Soph. Ph.* 159 οἶκον μὲν ὀργῆς (but not the inmate): *Tr.* 6 πατὴρ μὲν ἐν δόμοισιν (not to speak yet of her later life): *Xen. An.* 1. 2. 1 τὴν μὲν πρόφασιν ἐποιεῖτο (though his real purpose was different). (4) After adverbs: *πρῶτον μὲν*, *Thuc.* 2. 74 § 2, *Xen. An.* 1. 9. 7: *πρότερον μὲν*, *Thuc.* 7. 55. 1. (5) After conjunctions: *Thuc.* 1. 10. 1 καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν (as to that fact—whatever else may be said). (6) After verbs: *Soph. Ant.* 1336 ὧν ἐρῶ μὲν (my desires at least—whatever may be in store for me): *O. C.* 1370 εἰσορᾶ μὲν: 1677 ἔστιν μὲν εἰκάσαι: *Ph.* 882 ἀλλ' ἤδομαι μὲν. In all these examples μὲν is used without a following δέ, and the antithesis is to be gathered from the context.

I have now examined Prof. Platt's accusation of 'bad grammar' in respect to the relative τῶν, and of solecism in

respect to μέν without δέ: and I think that I may claim to have disproved his assertions.

II. I next turn to his allegation that the passage of Solon, as explained by Dr Sandys and me, is 'gross and palpable nonsense.' Prof. Platt has missed the whole drift of this passage through inattention to the context. In the preceding chapter of the Πολιτεία (c. 11, p. 42 of Sandys), the author describes the expectations which prevailed in Attica at the time when Solon entered upon his reforms. (1) The δῆμος, the popular party, expected that he would not merely relieve their present misery, but proceed to a redistribution of property: ἄετο πάντ' ἀνάδαστα ποιήσειν. These are the people, eager for spoils, of whom Solon speaks in a trochaic fragment (c. 12 of the Πολιτεία):—

οὐ δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσιν ἦλθον, ἐλπίδ' εἶχον ἀφνεάν,
κάδόκουν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὄλβον εὐρήσειν μέγαν.

(2) The men of rank and wealth (οἱ γνώριμοι) expected, on the contrary, that the changes, if any, which he made would be of a very slight character: ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν ἢ μικρὸν παραλλάξειν. Solon disappointed both parties. He did less than the people expected,—for he did not plunder the rich. He did more than the rich expected,—for he cancelled all existing debts, and by that and other measures relieved the people. In the two verses now under discussion, Solon is quoting the question asked, after his legislation, by the malcontents among the popular party, who complained that he had not gone far enough. *They* had conceived that the aims with which he formed the popular party included a redistribution of property. 'Why,' they asked, 'did Solon desist before he had attained those ends for which he united us in common action?' Elsewhere, in citing another criticism upon his conduct, Solon gives it dramatically in the words of the critics:—οὐκ ἔφν Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνὴρ (fr. 33). Here, however, in quoting his censors, he has chosen to use the first person,—an equally natural, but more colloquial and lively mode of speech:—'Why did I desist?' instead of, 'Why did Solon desist?'—

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον
 δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;

But this has led Prof. Platt into the error of assuming that these 'ends' of which Solon stopped short are the ends at which he had really aimed; whereas they are merely the ends at which the δῆμος supposed him to be aiming. Now Solon did attain the ends which he himself had in view. He says so, and states what they were, in the following verses, *ξυμμαρ- τυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.*: where *ταῦτα* has a general sense ('as to this question'), and does not refer to the particular objects denoted by *τούτων* in v. 2. Starting from his erroneous premiss, Prof. Platt infers that Solon speaks of himself as having stopped short of things which he had attained; and therefore, says our critic, the interpretation accepted by Dr Sandys is 'gross and palpable nonsense'. I venture to hold, on the contrary, that I have shown it to be reasonable and sound.

Prof. Platt himself proposes to read:

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον
 δῆμον, τέλους δὲ πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην.

He renders this:—'For certain definite reasons, I gathered the people together, and yet ceased from my labours before I had reached the goal.' The 'goal' he takes to be the tyranny. But the context here (*ξυνήγαγον δῆμον*) indicates a reference to his incomplete fulfilment of the popular hopes, rather than to his abstinence from self-aggrandizement: and this view is confirmed by the following verses, which describe such benefits as he had actually conferred on the people. As to Prof. Platt's alteration of the text, transcriptional probability (to use Hort's phrase) is wholly absent from *τέλους δὲ* as an emendation of the words *τι τούτων*. Nothing is needed but to read *τί* instead of *τι*.

R. C. JEBB.

ON THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY ODYSSEUS IN OD. XXI.

MR A. PLATT, in his article on "The Slaying of the Suitors," after quoting Prof. Jebb, finds a difficulty in the place occupied by Odysseus, or rather in the way in which he became there posted. He says, "The question is how and when did he get there? The suitors were at the other end, by the *λαῖνος οὐδός*, where they were trying to make the bow more pliant by the aid of the fire. Now it is assumed that Odysseus shot the arrow through the axe-heads from *that* end. If then he afterwards shot the suitors from the other end, he must have gone down the whole length of the hall first, without Homer's saying a word about it."

He controverts the assumption "that Odysseus shot the arrow through the axe-heads from that (other) end," and I agree entirely with him in so doing. But the difficulty which he raises turns on another assumption, equally, I think, erroneous, viz. that there was only one *λαῖνος οὐδός* opening upon the *μέγαρον*, and that at the other or upper end, *i.e.* the further end from the main entrance.

When at ρ. 30 Telemachus returns to his own palace he crosses the *λαῖνος οὐδός*. This does not bring him into the *θάλαμος*, for Penelope comes *ἐκ θαλάμοιο* to greet him. Further, the work at which he finds Eurykleia engaged, with the other handmaids about her, *κῶεα καστορνῦσα θρόνοις ἐν δαιδαλέοισι*, vv. 31—4, is evidently in the *μέγαρον* itself, similar to that in v. 149 foll. which Eurykleia is there directing; cf. especially 150—1, *ἐν δὲ θρόνοις εὐποιήτοισι τάπητας βάλλετε πορ-*

φυρέους. She is preparing the hall for the expected presence of the company, 155—6. The *λάϊνος οὐδὸς* of ρ. 30 is therefore that of the main entrance to the *μέγαρον*.

Of course the difficulty in perceiving this arises from the same threshold being described as *μέλιμος* in ρ. 339—40, where Odysseus, disguised, takes his seat *ἐπὶ μελίμου οὐδοῦ ἔντοσθε θυράων*, and the poet adds, *κλινάμενος σταθμῶ κυπαρισσίνῳ*, evidently at the principal entrance. By supposing a wooden superimposed on a stone *οὐδὸς* the difficulty is avoided. And this I believe to be the explanation of the phrase *ἀκρότατον παρ' οὐδὸν* in χ. 127, as meaning the "topmost" or wooden threshold, although it is possible that *ἀκρότατον* may mean the "extreme," *i.e.* in horizontal extension. But again, the expression, *ἄλτο δ' ἐπὶ μέγαν οὐδὸν*, χ. 2, of Odysseus when about to begin his work of death, suggests some such more considerable eminence as this superimposition would yield; and obviously such an eminence, where the victims aimed at are all on the flat, would give the archer a distinct advantage in picking his man. Compare also the phrase *ἄλτο θύραζε* of Philoetius, φ. 388. I suppose the *λάϊνος* to have had a further extension than the *μέλιμος οὐδὸς* in the nature of a step. It is possible that the one at the entrance to the *θάλαμος* may have been similarly double; cf. ψ. 88, *ὑπέρβη λάϊνον οὐδόν*, of Penelope coming in to the interview of recognition, and φ. 43, *οὐδὸν δὲ δρύϊνον προσεβήσατο*, of the same going to fetch the bow, although I rather incline to think these were distinct. Another reason for the presence of a wooden block resting on the stone may have been the greater facility of fixing the wooden door-posts; see φ. 45 *ἐν δὲ σταθμοὺς ἄρσε*, where these seem regarded as an appendage of the threshold described as *δρύϊνος*. Thus, as above cited, Odysseus, seated as a beggar on the latter, there *μέλιμος*, leans against the *σταθμῶ κυπαρισσίνῳ*, with his feet perhaps on the stone step below. From the mention of a *λάϊνος οὐδὸς* at Eumaeus' hut in π. 41, we may assume that to have been the normal material, whether a wooden one were added or not, for the principal entrance at any rate to a dwelling of prince or of peasant; and we nowhere find *ὑπέρβη...οὐδὸν* used of any other material. It is

evidently also from I. 404—5 the principal plinth and the one regarded as characteristic. There we read,

οὐδ' ὅσα λαῖνος οὐδὸς ἀφήτορος ἐντὸς ἔέργει
Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος, Πυθοῖ ἐνι πετρηέσση.

It is only when some one actually sits on it that the μέλινος plinth comes into notice. The δρύϊνος, already referred to, is of an interior door, and may have been wooden *only*.

Therefore when in *v.* 257—8 we read,

Τηλέμαχος δ' Ὀδυσῆα καθίδρνε, κέρδεα νωμῶν,
ἐντος εὔσταθέος μεγάρου, παρὰ λαῖνον οὐδόν,

there is no need to think any other than the principal entrance and its threshold intended. It is of course possible that a wooden material may have entered, in some other form of which we are ignorant, into the structure or decoration of the οὐδός, and not in that of a solid block, as above. Thus χρύσεος appears sometimes to mean gold-plated or the like only, as the "shield" of Θ. 193, and the "coffin" of Ω. 795.

Having premised thus much, I cannot think that the suitors, greasing the bow before the fire, would have been "by the λαῖνος οὐδός," at whichever end of the μέγαρον we conceive it situated. They would no doubt be close to the ἐσχάρη, which was near the upper (or further from the αὐλή) end of the μέγαρον, where Melanthius would have kindled the fire, φ. 181—5; but there is nothing to suggest any οὐδός close by. I may here refer to the Appendix F 2 (19) in my edition of the Odyssey, vol. I. p. cxxxiii., and the plan, Fig. 1, illustrating it. This was published many years ago, but I think represents Homeric conceptions with substantial correctness¹. This question of the position of the suitors is, however, only important, as bearing on that of Odysseus in shooting.

It is noteworthy that when Telemachus has pitched the axes φ. 120 foll., he goes to the threshold, takes his station there, and makes his incomplete essay on the bow, 124, which he leaves resting against the *σανίδεσσιν*, 137. These I take

¹ The number of θάλαμοι added is probably in excess, but is meant to represent possibilities of extension only.

to be either the planks of the door itself or some skirting-boards of the wall close by, probably the former, from the mention of the *κοράνη*, "door-handle," in 138. Antinoüs then calls on the suitors to try their strength in succession, following the order in which the cup-bearer waited on them, 141—2. The first turn is accordingly that of Leiodes, who sat *μυχόιτατος αἰεὶ*, i.e. closest to the *μυχός* at the further end from the entrance. He repeats the station of Telemachus and his action on relinquishing the bow, 149, 164, cf. 124, 137. All this is *before* the fire is lit to supple the bow. Whether the further efforts to bend it take place near the fire or at the threshold, is not clear. Their failure is briefly dismissed in 184—5. Where was Odysseus all this time? No doubt, where Telemachus had first placed him at *v.* 257—9; and that the *λαῖνος οὐδός*, there named, was that of the main entrance, as suggested above, is further confirmed by Odysseus going out after the faithful hinds, *φ.* 188—90, which such a position would obviously facilitate. He reenters and resumes his seat, 243, to find Eurymachus still vainly coaxing the obdurate bow, until Antinoüs postpones further effort and the revel is resumed, 245—73. He then proposes his own permission to try, 275 foll. Eumæus acting on the implied consent of Telemachus, and knowing now who the seeming beggar really was, is carrying the bow towards him, presumably therefore from near the *ἔσχαρη* to the main threshold; is arrested by the outcries of the suitors; but, reprimanded by Telemachus, resumes his errand, and *φέρων ἀνὰ δῶμα*, hands the bow to Odysseus, 378—9. The expression *ἀνὰ δῶμα* can hardly mean anything else than "along the palace," cf. *A.* 570, *ᾤχθησαν δ' ἀνὰ δῶμα Διὸς θεοὶ*, and the expression *ἀνὰ πτολέμοιο γεφύρας*, *Θ.* 378 *et al.* The next action of Eumæus in "calling out Eurykleia and addressing her," need cause no difficulty. It recurs from *τ.* 15, where Telemachus uses it. It is only in the actions of very leading personages that we expect to find all their movements recorded, as Mr Platt indeed contends. Nor do we precisely know where Eurykleia at the moment was, although presumably in the *θάλαμος* of *β.* 337—48. Odysseus then, after examining the bow, shoots *αὐτόθεν ἐκ δίφροιο καθή-*

μενος, φ. 420, *i.e.* from his seat near the main threshold, which indeed, except to slip out from it and disclose himself to the faithful hinds, he has not quitted since ν. 258. Thus it is possible to give a full, instead of, as Mr Platt thinks, an empty, sense to ἔνθεν περ ἀνέστη.

Perhaps I may here suggest, by the way, that Milton's "from the centre thrice to the utmost pole," refers to the Ptolemaean, not the Copernican system, and that the author in *Paradise Lost* seems sometimes to hover betwixt the two. The former will give any latitude, I think, which the passage may require. As regards κέρδεα νομῶν (rare), which Mr Platt finds difficult, one may compare ν. 255, of Odysseus, αἰὲν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόον πολυκερδέα νομῶν, where it evidently describes his characteristic, that of mental alertness in seizing the situation and adapting himself to circumstances, as in Horace's "Omnis Aristippum decuit status et color et res." It is presumed at σ. 216 that Telemachus ought to inherit it, and thus it is equivalent to "showing himself his father's son."

That he ought better to have known what was due to a guest and to himself, is the gist of Penelope's rebuke in σ. 215—22. That he *did* know better when he was a young boy, is merely her motherly way of putting it. Thus in ν. 257 the phrase means merely, suiting his guest's position to the circumstances. Telemachus puts his guest, just, but only just, within the circle of hospitality, so as not to obtrude him needlessly as an offensive or suspicious presence. At the same time he thus enables him to command the exit and chief communication with the ἀνλή and the town, as also of course that by the λαύρη with the rear. Telemachus cannot of course foresee the development; but, by the phrase κέρδεα νομῶν, the poet probably means us to infer that he was amply justified by the sequel. In fact Odysseus dominates the situation by his place there; which at the same time gives him a ground for politely requesting a test-shot of honour and prowess, and thus getting hold of his masterful weapon.

I will only add two remarks: (1) that assuming the Odyssey to have taken its form in and through oral tradition, and to have been recited in separate rhapsodies, it would follow that

parts not included in the same recitation would not be rigorously adapted to one another, and that minor discrepancies of this sort would not be wholly removed when the work was united in writing; and (2) that the latter part of the Odyssey contains many passages which suggest an alteration of treatment on the part of, probably, the original poet. The subject is too long to be considered here, and I may perhaps be allowed to refer again to my own note on *v.* 190—1, and to Appendix G 2 in my edition, vol. II. p. xi., where it is discussed.

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THE SITE OF THE BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENE.

A RECENT paper in the *Journal of Philology* championed at length the traditional theory of the site of the battle of Lake Trasimene—the theory of the Tuoro site—rejected by Dr Arnold. The writer of that paper still more recently in the “*Classical Review*” has re-asserted this view. A recent personal examination of the claimant sites has left me with such grave doubts as to the correctness of the above view that perhaps I may be excused for venturing tentatively to reopen the controversy. Προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν χάρις οὐ μέλλω λέγειν.

In this paper therefore I propose

- A. To suggest what seem to be the chief difficulties which attach to the Tuoro (or Sanguineto) site.
- B. To consider any proposed solutions of these difficulties.
- C. To ask whether an alternative site is more possible.

For purposes of reference throughout I must refer to the Map of the Northern shore of the lake in No. 47 of the “*Journal of Philology*.”

A. Difficulties in the Tuoro Site.

(1) Polybius (III. 83. 1) distinctly says there was a passage into the Αὐλών—a “στενὴ πάροδος παρὰ τὴν παρῳρειαν.” Livy (22. 4. 1) agrees: the “via” into the “paulo latior campus” is “perangusta.”

But as the country exists today, there is no kind of a “πάροδος,” of a “via perangusta,” into the Tuoro valley.

The road whether from Terontola or Borghetto strikes over the hill-ridge which runs out into the Lake (Point "A" on the above map), and thus down over the brow into the Tuoro valley. The railway tunnels. The waters of the lake wash the base of Point A.

This is the first difficulty, viz.: absence of any Πάροδος.

(2) The *Αὐλὸν* Difficulty:

The traveller today faring due Eastwards towards Passignano passes through no place which could be called an *Αὐλὸν*. So far as Tuoro he has on his right the lake, on his left the Sanguineto valley running up into the hills. On passing Tuoro, he finds on his right the lake, on his left the hills, now nearer the road.

In Polybius, an *Αὐλὸν* is always a valley with hills on *both* sides. Of this nature e.g. is the *αὐλὸν ἐπίπεδος* in the middle of Leontini (VII. 6. 1—3): the Marsyas *αὐλὸν* between Libanus and Antilibanus (v. 45. 8—9). It is true that when he calls the Rhone valley an *αὐλὸν* (III. 47. 3) he describes it as bounded—on the S. side by the Alps—but on the N. *not* by another hill range, but by a Celtic tribe. This however is obviously no denial of the existence of such another range of hills, which as obviously exists as a matter of fact.

Again, Livy (28. 33. 2) translates Polybius' *αὐλῶνά τινα* (XI. 32. 1) by "campus ante montibus circa saeptus."

Therefore when Polybius is describing the *αὐλὸν* at Trasimene and says it is surrounded on three sides by mountains with the Lake behind it (III. 83. 1) he is perfectly self-consistent. And it also becomes clear that the Roman army en route for Passignano could march *through* no such *αὐλὸν* at all. For none such exists.

(3) The Lake-Camp Difficulty.

Polybius directly asserts (III. 83. 7) that Flaminius, the night before the battle, encamped on the lake—*πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ λίμνῃ*. The next day he advanced by the side of the lake, *παρὰ τὴν λίμνην*—into the valley—*εἰς τὸν ὑποκειμένον αὐλῶνα*. Livy tells exactly the same story. When Flaminius, the evening of the day before, had arrived *at* the lake—"quum pervenisset ad lacum"—then on the next day—"angustiis

superatis"—he deployed his troops "in patentiorem campum" (22. 4. 4).

But the road from Cortona runs direct viâ Terontola to reach the lake for the first time just East of Point A. It does not make a long and surely unnecessary détour round by Borghetto. If the ancient road ran as does the modern, the Roman army first reached the lake at the mouth of the Sanguineto valley. There they encamped—to march on next morning and find the "angustiae" to surpass beyond Tuoro—and apparently in the defile by Passignano.

These are the three difficulties attaching to the proposed Tuoro site. If unresolved they seem to me serious enough to justify at least a search along the North and East banks of the lake to see whether or no there be any preferable alternative.

B. Proposed Solution of these Difficulties.

The very statement of the difficulties themselves suggests a certain amount of uncertainty attaching inevitably to the whole problem. All three more or less depend for their validity on one and the same proposition. This proposition is of course that the country in 217 B.C. in its natural features was identical with the country as it appears now to the traveller. And further it must at once be admitted that we have no positive evidence as to the exact course of the ancient road from Cortona to the Perugian valley.

This twofold possibility of uncertainty affects all three difficulties. Thus as to

(1) *If*, since 217 B.C., the lake has advanced at Point A there *may* have existed in that year a narrow passage between that Point and the water.

(2) *If*, in 217 B.C., the road as soon as it touched the lake and rounded (if it did round) Point A—instead of continuing along the lake side as does the modern road to Passignano—had struck up Northwards towards the hills at the head of the Sanguineto valley, there did exist, as Dr Arnold says, an ἀλών through which the Romans could march.

It is true that the one and only obvious course for the old road to take is the one inevitably suggested by the lie of the country, the one followed by the modern road, and the one which alone leads direct to the Perugian valley. But yet it might conceivably be urged that no *prima facie* probability however strong amounts to a historical certainty.

(3) *If*—in 217 B.C.—the road did actually make the *détour* round by Borghetto, the Romans could have pitched their camp on the lake before reaching Point A.

That is, *if* we will reconstruct the country of 217 B.C. so as to create a passage round Point A, and bring the ancient road curving gracefully round in two sweeps, by Borghetto to Point A, and from Point A up North to scale the hills, *if* we indulge in these hypotheses and regard them as justified by the above named general topographical uncertainties, these three objections may be comfortably dismissed.

That my own faculty for topographical imagination will not bear this strain is of course beside the question. But surely one passing remark is here justified. The elements of uncertainty seem so many and so insoluble in themselves (that is unless ever draining or digging come to our aid), that surely any dogmatism on the subject is mere foolishness. As the controversy concerning Hannibal's Passage over the Alps promises to last as long as the Alps themselves, so till Lake Trasimene disappears I am bound to think no investigator is at liberty to cry lo here! or lo there! in the question as to the site of the battle. The whole question seems to me one of greater or less probability with the material at present at our disposal. Not even by aid of the skulls unearthed by Prof. Middleton to the East and *only* to the East of Passignano may we venture to dogmatise. If in this paper I set forth my objections to the Tuoro site, I can but hope to add a little to the arguments from probability in favour of some rival.

But now to return to a somewhat closer consideration of some proposed solutions of these difficulties:

(1) It is argued that though the waters of Lake Trasimene have receded, since B.C. 217, at various points along the North coast owing to the alluvial matter brought down by the half

dozen or so small brooks entering the lake (e.g. at P. del Macerone at the mouth of the Sanguinetto valley—"Point B"), yet that at Point A—and it seems at Point A alone—the lake has advanced and thus hidden the ancient road which ran round that Point. Thus the Πάροδος difficulty is evaded successfully.

But it seems to me at the cost of some violence to the imagination. Point B is some 3000 yards distant from Point A as the crow flies. The brooks between and beyond, though very minute, do bring down alluvial matter and have been doing for the last two thousand years, it is safe to assert. Point B has advanced, it is conceded on all hands, and is evident to any observer, and advanced probably quite half a mile owing to this cause. But this theory asks us to believe, notwithstanding the three foregoing facts, that the lake has advanced at Point A enough to entirely obliterate a former road at its base. And not only this—but it must have advanced with violence. For Point A falls abruptly into the waters of the lake, and, it has been said, "the shore is strewn with pieces of rock which have fallen away from the water-worn cliff." That is, according to this theory, not only has the lake devoured some erstwhile existing low-lying ground between Point A and its greedy waters, but the point itself has been battered even unto retrogression. An earthquake which casts cities to the ground would of course make light of any such feat. But this comfortable *Deus ex machina* is itself not too well attested nor easily received. And in its absence I am bound to confess the probability of such a geological metamorphosis of the land seems to me very small. I had almost rather create eleven buckram men out of two than on the above evidence create a *πάροδος*, a *via perangusta*, round Point A. One thing at least is certain. Polybius and Livy both presuppose this on the site. To appeal to either Polybius or Livy as evidence of the existence of this *πάροδος* round Point A would be the most flagrant "*τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν*" imaginable.

(2) *The Αὐλών Difficulty:*

It has been already remarked that if the Romans marched straight for Passignano they would pass through no *αὐλών* at all en route,

It is also the fact that there is an admirable *αὐλῶν* which runs up Northwards from the lake between Tuoro and the ridge ending in Point A, and down which flows the Sanguineto brook.

It is therefore proposed to make this *Αὐλῶν* serve the problem's need and identify it as the scene of the battle.

Now it is scarcely possible to adopt the hypothesis that the old road Southwards ran Northwards up this valley instead of continuing beside the lake to Passignano. Indeed I am not aware this hypothesis has ever been seriously put forward. Rejecting this therefore, the advocates of the Tuoro site and defenders of the above solution of this difficulty are face to face with this problem: Polybius and Livy both assert the Romans marched through the *Αὐλῶν*. Whereas this *αὐλῶν* lies away to the left of the line of march. This clear difficulty at the outset leads us to look at this proposed identification-solution yet more closely, and the more closely we look the more unsatisfactory it appears.

(a) In the first place it involves a clear mistranslation of Polybius.

According to Polybius, Hannibal on entering the valley saw “*κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀντικρὺ λόφον ἐπικείμενον ἔρυμνὸν καὶ δὺσβατον*” (III. 83. 1). In the next section we are told that Hannibal “*διελθὼν τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην τὸν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας λόφον αὐτὸς κατελάβετο.*” (III. 83. 2.)

Nothing I think can be clearer from the words of the Greek than that the ridge Hannibal occupied is the *λόφον ἔρυμνὸν καὶ δὺσβατον* of § 1. The very familiar use of the definite article in § 2 implies previous mention of the *κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας λόφον*.

Yet advocates of the Tuoro site, such as Nissen and others, believe that Polybius in two consecutive sections and without any word of warning takes up two distinct and opposed photographic points of view. The first bare ridge is identified with that at the head of the Sanguineto valley, i.e. Polybius is looking N. The second is identified with the ridge—at right angles to the former—on which Tuoro stands,—i.e. Polybius is looking E.

But surely it is asking somewhat too much to require us to credit Polybius with such tee-to-tum tendencies.

The confusion which undoubtedly results surely is the consequence of differentiating and making two peaks of what Polybius—I venture to assert—unmistakeably describes as one and the same. We are involved by the advocates of the Tuoro site in a positive mistranslation of Polybius.

(b) Whatever else Polybius may assert about the *αὐλών*, one statement he does make clearly and definitely, viz.: that the Romans were marching *through* it, and were there trapped, being unable to force the exit at the farther end. This can only be the meaning of his expressions “*ὄντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν δίοδον αὐλώνος ἐπιπέδου*”; “*πάροδον ὡς εἰς τὸν αὐλώνα παρὰ τὴν παρῳρειαν*”; “*διελθὼν τὸν αὐλώνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην.*”

Similarly he tells us Hannibal lined the lower slopes of the hills on the right hand side of the *αὐλών* with troops along their length: “*τοὺς δὲ Βαλιαρεῖς...ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐν δεξιᾷ βουνοὺς τῶν παρὰ τὸν αὐλώνα κειμένων ἐπὶ πολὺ παρατείνας ὑπέστειλε.*” (III. 83. 2.)

Now Hannibal can hardly have made this disposition to allow his troops to see the foe marching cheerfully away at right angles to their own line of ambush, but to cause them to fall upon the Romans as these were passing by unsuspecting in the morning mist beside and beneath them. But on the Tuoro-theory the Romans were marching not through but simply across the mouth of the Sanguineto *αὐλών*, and moreover on neither flank had they any mountain-slopes. For on their right flank lay the lake, and on their left the broad level Sanguineto valley.

(c) Passing from this important question of the Direction of the *αὐλών*—the Tuoro-Sanguineto valley does not suit the description of the *αὐλών* in Polybius and Livy in other respects.

“On both sides,” says Polybius, “it has *βουνοὺς ὑψηλοὺς καὶ συνεχεῖς.*”

Now the spur which runs down from the main background of hills to end in the point on which Tuoro lies, though ‘continuous,’ can scarcely be described as ‘lofty.’ It is in fact

a low-lying ridge very inferior in height to the hills of which it is an offshoot.

Tuoro itself is only some 136 feet in height above the main road, and the rise of the ridge hence Northwards is in the proportion of 1 to 25, almost identical proportionally (but not actually) with the rise above Torricella. This in the case of the Tuoro ridge is scarcely steep enough to justify the application of the epithet 'lofty' to the whole spur.

And another question arises as to the breadth of the *αὐλών*. Livy (22. 4. 1) says that the traveller on emerging from the "via perangusta" finds himself in a "paulo latior campus." Now the Tuoro valley is comparatively a broad one. It has been recently described as a "great natural theatre which is enclosed on its E., W. and N. sides by the ridges which circle round from Tuoro to Point A—a valley with a flat alluvial bottom." This is indeed an excellent description of the valley, but I do not think as such it harmonises well with the Livian conception of "a plain a little broader than a very narrow pass."

(d) Polybius (III. 84. 11) says that the Roman vanguard, 6000 in number, forced its way out of the *αὐλών* through those who sought to bar its onward march. This is the only sense which may be attached to the Greek: "ἑξακισχίλιοι δ' ἴσως τῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα τοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον νικήσαντες κ.τ.λ." Where then were the Punic troops stationed through whom these Romans forced a path?

Polybius answers this clearly. Hannibal stationed them "on the hill in front" (III. 83. 2). That is, the Romans in their march had to climb a hill.

But on the theory of the Tuoro site there existed no hill for the Romans to climb. Unless indeed the lake in 217 B.C. reached also the base of the spur on which the village of Tuoro lies, and this has not yet been imagined. Waiving this impossibility, the Roman route to Passignano lay along the level shore of the lake and at the base only of this spur. Champions of the theory have in fact either to endue the Roman van with an unnecessary love of mountain-climbing and make them, like the king of France, go up to the top of a hill to come down

again,—which is improbable. Or they have to extend Hannibal's troops to barricade the low-lying ground between the Tuoro spur and the lake,—which is nowhere suggested in our text, and is by implication rejected. For the Romans in Polybius do climb a hill, find the foe on top, force their way through, climb yet higher above the mist and look thence down upon the scene of massacre. But before reaching Passignano there is no such hill to climb. The Tuoro ridge lies off the line of march.

And if we are requested to revert to the unsatisfactory theory that the ridge in front is the range at the head of the Sanguineto valley, a theory the improbability of which has been already pointed out, Livy may be invoked to aid in its demolition. For if the "hostes super caput" (22. 4. 4) are posted on this range, the "insidiae a tergo" will certainly have been hidden beneath the waters of the lake.

(e) Lastly, this directs our attention from the Roman van to the Roman rear, and presents us with a final perplexity. Polybius (III. 84. 5) speaking of this says—

Οἱ δὲ κατὰ πορείαν μεταξὺ τῆς λίμνης καὶ τῆς παρωρείας (words by themselves surely fatal to the Tuoro theory) ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς συγκλεισθέντες...διεφθείροντο.

Livy (22. 6. 6) makes here a most welcome addition to our information—though indeed it could have been implied from Polybius. But he definitely states it was a "pars magna" of the Roman army which was thus involved in these straits—"ubi locus fugae deest."

Now even if we create the via perangusta round Point A for 217 B.C., it is hardly possible to stretch its narrow confines out to such a length as to allow a "great part" of an army of over 30,000 men to be entrapped and surrounded actually in it—ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς. This new-created road can only have been of very short length, a length quite inadequate for the above feat.

And granting for one moment for argument's sake such Procrustean ability in the genius of the pass, how are we to people the three intervening kilometers of level ground between the pass and the Tuoro spur? This is the picture relentlessly

presented us of the battle by the logic of the Tuoro theory. In the new-created pass, of very few hundred yards in extent, is heaped up a great part of 30,000 (say) Romans struggling with an encircling foe. Nearly three miles away and beyond this the Roman van has turned aside from the road and is climbing the Tuoro spur—to find posted on the top of it the foe they might have avoided by keeping along the lake shore. Between these two divisions on the broad open plain abides a non-existent Roman centre, on the principle τὸ μέσον αἰεὶ ἄμεινον, which is embarrassed by nothing save the noise of battle in the distance. Had this force but existed, it might have quoted Euripides with appreciation, if with too literal an application—

τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ ἕν μέρω σώζει πόλεις
κόσμον φυλάσσουσ'...

Such is perhaps a not altogether illegitimate reductio ad absurdum from the theory of the Tuoro site.

These five difficulties, all included under the main "Αὐλών problem," make me dissatisfied with that theory.

(3) *The Lake-Camp Difficulty:*

This has already been stated. Polybius asserts Flaminius encamped πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ λίμνῃ the night before the battle. Livy marks this stage of affairs by the words "quum pervenisset ad lacum."

If there was no road round Point A the camp must have been at the mouth of the Tuoro valley: the battle must have been E. of Tuoro.

If there were a road round Point A, the only possible solution of this difficulty is to make the camp W. of Point A, and the pass, on the lake shore in the neighbourhood of the modern village of Borghetto.

If this were the case, the old road made somewhat an unnecessary détour. (The ridge ending in Point A is at most only some 120 to 130 feet above the level of the Sanguinetto valley.)

That is, granted the right to give free play to the topographical imagination, this difficulty may be solved, as may the first.

But there appears little justification for this license if we judge from the state of the country to-day and the direction of the modern road towards Perugia from Cortona. And even so, the *Ἀλλών* difficulty seems bound to result in inextricable confusion, and it would scarcely be fair in the interests of a theory to fasten the responsibility for this confusion on either of our authors. That the choice of the Tuoro site must be attended by these perplexities I feel compelled to admit. The conclusion I deduce from this is *not* that Polybius or Livy are confused, but that the choice of this site is to blame: that if any confidence is to be reposed upon our authors, the Tuoro theory must once and for all be abandoned. With Dr Arnold our conclusion is "Sanguineto is clearly *not* the place."

It is however but a poor result—this negative conclusion. But in the previous investigation perhaps some materials have been gained for a few tentative suggestions of a more positive character.

C. *Possibility (?) of an Alternative.*

The ill-success of the Tuoro theory when viewed in the light of the ability of its champions suggests a suspicion of, or rather raises the question of, Method of Enquiry. And a short consideration of this is essential as explanatory of this last part of this paper.

In this Question of the site of the battle of Lake Trasimene there are at least two methods of enquiry.

The first is to gather a general idea of the locality from the authorities: next to visit the ground: to choose an apparently likely site: and then try to see how Polybius and Livy may be made to fit in with it.

Now the Tuoro site is exactly such an apparently likely site and, as has been seen, many attempts have been made to make Polybius and Livy square with it.

But the end of these attempts is confusion. We fall back on the "confused-author" theory in defence. We talk about confused *mêlées* and the like. We shift our Carthaginians like chessmen from place to place as they are required. We set the Romans to climb unnecessary hills. We make the lake

advance and recede so lightly that the Jewish leader of the Exodus might have envied our ability. We discover in our texts a steep hill in front of the Roman column on which Carthaginians are posted: straightway throw it into the cauldron of a theory: and by this mystic historic alchemy it becomes two hills, one a steep hill lying far away on the Roman left which concerns them not a whit; the other a low-lying spur which they do not have to climb. We perform these feats and tread these mazes in the interests of a theory. It is our inexorable taskmaster. It gives us the bricks of proof to make without a straw of probability.

By a second method there is a means of escape from this taskmaster of a Theory-to-be-suited. But it is certainly not devoid of a danger.

Nevertheless this—which I would call the *à priori* Method of Construction—I propose carefully to follow. For of its rival I despair.

That is I propose first to construct from Polybius and from Livy an *à priori* sketch of the field of battle their joint account necessarily presupposes. Equipped with this, it will then be time to visit the shores of the lake and see if anywhere such a scene can be found, corresponding in every particular, or almost every particular, with the *à priori* constructive sketch. If the former correspondence is found, a certain goal is won: if the latter, a probability alone can be our guerdon. If no correspondence can be found, I abandon the problem as insoluble, rather than treat Polybius and Livy as of no reputation.

The method is dangerous and needs care. It is possible our *à priori* construction does not exhaust all the possibilities of the texts. The careful examination of the texts alone can be a safeguard against this danger. But it is time again to set some value on our historians, and follow Mr Grundy's excellent example in not lightly accepting any theory of contradiction between them.

Ἴθι δὴ, ἀκολουθήσον τῆδε, ἐὰν αὐτὸ ἰκανῶς ἐξηγησώμεθα.

What is presupposed by the accounts in Polybius and Livy?

In the description of the battle occurs the great seeming contradiction between Polybius and Livy. Polybius says the Romans were caught in an *αὐλών* with hills on each side, the

foe occupying a ridge in front, and the lake barring retreat behind. In the actual fight however the enemy attacked them on all sides :

Συνεπεχειρείρει πανταχόθεν ἅμα τοῖς πολεμίοις...ἅμα γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον οἱ δ' ἀπ' οὐράς οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πλαγιῶν αὐτοῖς προσέπιπτον. (III. 84. 1. and 3).

Cf. Zonaras VIII. 25. πανταχόθεν ὁμοῦ περιέσχον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι.

This apparent contradiction however is explained by Polybius himself. He says that the Romans had on their rear the Πάροδος in addition to the lake (III. 83. 1), and it was here—ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς—that the Roman rear was assailed, forced into the water, and destroyed, μεταξύ τῆς λίμνης καὶ τῆς παρωρείας (III. 84. 8).


We have also to remember

(1) This Πάροδος must be narrow and of considerable length, because a great part of the Roman army is there enclosed.

(2) The Αὐλών which ensues upon the Passage must have hills on both sides. But the Roman rear had the lake on one side, the slope of the hill on the other. Hence the road on emerging from τὰ στενά must be one striking up away from the lake through the αὐλών.

(3) The Roman van encountered the foe posted on a hill and forcing their way through continued the ascent “εἰς ὑπερδεξιῶν τόπους.” But the actual αὐλών is ἐπίπεδος. Hence at the farther end of the αὐλών the road must rise towards a ridge, in whose immediate neighbourhood must be higher hills still.

From these three Polybian requisites we construct à priori the ground for whose actual existence we are afterwards to search, and somewhat as follows :



Such a construction is necessitated by and harmonises the account of Polybius. Now let us turn to Livy.

Livy has two statements to make, apparently opposed to each other.

In the one (22. 5. 6) he says the Romans had the foe in front and rear, the mountains on one side, the lake on the other :

“Deinde ubi in omnes partes nequicquam impetus capti et ab lateribus montes ac lacus, a fronte et ab tergo hostium acies claudebat etc.”

In the other (22. 4. 7) he says the Romans were attacked on both flanks as well as in front :

“In frontem lateraque pugnari coeptum est.”

By the aid however of the above Polybian construction these two apparently contradictory statements

(1) The enemy were on front and rear: the lake and hills on their flanks :

(2) The attack was first made on both flanks and in front : become intelligible. The Roman van marching through the *αὐλών* finds the foe on the intercepting ridge crossed by the road in front, and has on both flanks the lateral hills of the *αὐλών* lined with the enemy's troops. Here of course the attack, as Livy says, began (2). The Roman rear, still engaged in the pass which the foe had closed behind them, finds on their one side the lake, on their other the slopes of the hills, behind the foe, and in front is the foe again barring the way to their vanguard (1).

Such a sketch as the above seems alone able to reconcile Livy and Polybius each with himself and each with the other.

“The Romans were attacked on all sides”: yet “on the Roman rear lay the lake.” “The attack was made on both sides as well as in front”: yet “On the Roman right flank lay the lake.” These various statements can be harmonised by thinking of the Roman agmen as in not only the *αὐλών* but also in the *πάροδος*, as Polybius and Livy both say; by understanding that while the *πάροδος* must have run parallel with the lake, yet the *αὐλών* must have branched away from it, and the road gone climbing at its farther end.

To reiterate finally the essential points of the construction, viewed à priori from the accounts of our historians. We require:

(1) A long narrow pass with hills on one side and the lake on the other.

(2) The road from Cortona to reach the lake-side and continue along it for some distance before entering this pass.

(3) The pass itself to lead into a level but not very broad *αὐλὼν* with hills on either side, i.e. the road must turn away from the lake.

(4) At the end of this level *αὐλὼν* there is to be a steep and bare crest which the road climbs.

(5) Above the road when it has reached this crest is to be yet higher ground.

This then is our à priori construction from Polybius and Livy of a ground to be hereafter discovered in situ if it be possible. No single point in it can be omitted without fastening on one or other or both historians a charge of confusion and inconsistency.

Now finally to the goal of our labours, the actual shores of Lake Trasimene! Perugia, if not success, will receive and refresh us at the end of our quest.

We climb the hill from Terontola and drop down over the ridge which ends in Point A to the mouth of the Sanguineto *αὐλὼν*. This is a veritable *αὐλὼν*, this broad valley running up into the hills on our left, and therefore tempting. But it does not suit any single point of our construction. We have studied its claims at length and been forced to reject them. Here we can find no rest, and sadly we pass by Tuoro, lying on the low ridge to the left.

We walk forward some six kilometers between olive groves with the green corn ripening beneath. On our right lies ever the lake: on our left the hills, now, two thirds of our way to Passignano, approaching by a low spur to narrow the valley, thereafter again receding, though not to so great a distance as before, yet to about a mile away. There is no hope yet, no *πάροδος*, no *αὐλὼν*, no climbing road! At the end of our sixth kilometer from Tuoro we see the hills lying now in front

of us. A steep spur runs down to the lake. On its end and round its base clings the little fishing village of Passignano. And here we enter for the first time a veritable *πάροδος*. For some 500 yards the road finds barely room for itself between the cliff of the mountain spur and the lake. At first there were village houses on our right, their gardens reaching down to the waters of the lake, and the fishing craft moored at the garden ends. But now even these are gone, and the lake washes the very base of the raised parapet of the road. On our left lies the railway, now tunnelling, now emerging. Above that rises the cliff.

Soon the valley broadens again, but yet by very little. It retains its pass-like nature. For the next two kilometers beyond the village it is very narrow indeed. The hills are far nearer the lake and their slopes steeper than was the case before we reached Passignano. These two kilometers ended, the valley widens to a breadth of half to three-quarters of a mile, and so continues for about one mile. Then suddenly it narrows again, till little more, it seems, than a hundred yards are left between lake and mountain. For the next two kilometers the mountains are steeper still and nearer the lake. In front appears the tiny hamlet Torricella.

But before we reach the hamlet, our road splits into two. One branch goes straightway climbing up the hill leaving the lake behind. The other takes us through the village, and then it too turns from the lake and climbs, till at the top of the rise it joins its brother, and they make one road again. By one or other of these roads we must fare onwards. For no road runs now beside the lake beyond Torricella, and the railway tunnels deeply through the intervening ridge into the Magione basin.

We climb by either road to a height of 1155 feet, or 315 feet above the level of the lake. The lower road climbs some 1200 yards in length to meet its confrère on the top. And here first the traveller from Perugia and Magione northwards catches sight of the waters of Lake Trasimene.

Now, as we are standing on this ridge, on our left rise hills 1410 feet high where nearest the road. On our right

rise others in height 1315 feet, crowned by the castellated village of Montecolognola. On either side our road is here narrowly girt by these hills. But it plunges through and down. If we follow its course we leave Lake Trasimene and our problem finally behind us. We must rest on its top and consider.

We have by now searched the entire Northern shore of the lake. We have felt bound to reject the "Tuoro-site." With what then are we left save with the stretch of country between Passignano and Montecolognola? At least this site has some advantages of which its Tuoro rival is hopelessly devoid:

(1) There is a clear and a long *πάροδος* into it. The pass by Passignano, itself some 500 yards in length, even after it widens out a little, yet continues of so confined a character that it may justly also continue to bear the name of *τὰ στενά*, of *via perangusta*.

Here then are seven kilometers of road, room enough for a magna pars of the Roman army, with the lake on the right all the way, the hills on the left, and, behind, the very narrow outlet by Passignano, so easily and swiftly closed.

(2) No longer need we be dependent on problematic gyrations of the ancient road. Whether Flaminius came over the hill from Terontola or round Point A by a now submerged road, in either case he can reach the lake the evening before, i.e. encamp at the mouth of the Sanguineto valley, and next day march along beside the lake till he enters the *angustiae* at Passignano.

(3) Either just before or just beyond Torricella, the road leaves the lake-side and climbs. At the top it reaches a ridge flanked with higher hills on either side, and plunges over the ridge.

A force then stationed on the summit of the ridge would effectually block the way. The Romans who are climbing have now the lake behind them: in front the foe-clad ridge: on either side the hill-ridges, the one stretching out on the right to end in the lake at Monte del lago: the other running up N.E. towards the higher mountains in the background.

Here then we have some notable points of our *à priori* construction: a long pass beside the lake; a ridge to be climbed by striking up away from the lake; *τόποι ὑπερδέξιοι* above this.

(4) Never again were the Romans in a more desperate position than if trapped in this space. In the broad open valley by Tuoro, where there was ample room for military formation, they surely might have made a more successful fight of it against inferior numbers. But here indeed was a place "*ubi locus fugae deest.*" They were here bound to march and fight in column. They were charged by an enemy rushing down from the hills immediately above them and thus retaining all the impetus of a rush downhill. Whereas in the Tuoro valley the Roman long extended flank could not have been attacked by the foe till these had marched for some distance over level ground. If they were "rushed" here, the Carthaginians developed a puzzling, indeed a Marathonian, soundness of wind and speed of limb. But here between Passignano and Montecognola the Romans could be rushed, and the whole spirit of the scene as described by our historians may be realised in this long narrow valley bounded by lake and hill, where the Roman rear is hemmed between lake and mountain, the Roman van driven down backwards from mountain to lake. Even here three hours is not excessive for the resistance of over 30,000 Romans. In the Tuoro valley surely it is too little.

(5) And lastly—our solitary bit of spade and mattock evidence—there are those bones dug up, as Mr Tilley has recorded, by Prof. Middleton on this very Passignano-Montecognola site, and only on this site.

But alas! one fact refuses to be hid. On this site there is no satisfactory *αὐλὸν ἐπίπεδος*. Nay, as we have defined the Polybian *αὐλὸν*, there is no kind of *αὐλὸν ἐπίπεδος* at all. There is indeed a small *αὐλὸν*, for if Polybius can find an *αὐλὸν* in the middle of Leontini perhaps we may be allowed to discover one between the top of the ridge and Torricella. But this most certainly is not *ἐπίπεδος*. And the top of the ridge itself, though a saddle between the hills, yet to call it by the high sounding title of *αὐλὸν ἐπίπεδος*—

The simple fact is there is *no* *Ἀλῶν ἐπίπεδος* between Terontola and Magione *through* which the Romans could pass. The Magione-Basin site, proposed by Mr Tilley, itself does not exhibit such an *Ἀλῶν* with a road at its bottom. The road is high up on one hill-side. And this site is for every other reason manifestly impossible, as Mr Grundy well shows. In fact it satisfies not a single one of the five points we have noted as essentials for the site to be discovered.

Putting this on one side, we are left with but two claimants :

(1) The Tuoro site, which has resulted in the difficulties proposed in the earlier part of this paper.

(2) The Passignano-Montecolognola site, which satisfies all the essentials but one. For it has no *Ἀλῶν ἐπίπεδος*.

Hence the conclusion seems to be, any dogmatism on the subject is unjustified.

But if it comes to a balancing of probabilities, or, if it rather so please, of improbabilities, I cannot believe the Romans were caught in the Sanguineto valley; and, with hesitation it is true, but because of a very distinct preference, I must record my belief that the Battle of Lake Trasimene was fought in the defiles between Passignano and Montecolognola.

But though in motive the historian may escape the old reproach brought against Timaeus, and go searching honestly for the lost site of a great battle; yet, till some archaeologist abandon Greece or Asia Minor to dig for history's sake upon the shores of Lake Trasimene, our travelling beside the Italian lake is but likely to prove *οὐκ ὠφέλεια ἀλλὰ τέρψις*.

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ἱερός, ἱερός, ἱρός.

As upon so many other Homeric difficulties, so upon *ἱερός*, *ἱερός* fresh light has been thrown by W. Schulze in his *Quaestiones Epicae*, pp. 207—216. He shows that in the two great epics *ī* appears only in (1) *ἱερά* (11 times in the meaning "victims") and (2) *ἱερόν* (7 times) and *ἱεροῦ* (once); and that since any word of three short syllables ending in a vowel may stand for a dactyl in the hexameter, as *οὔνομα* (*ῶνομα*) *οὔρεα* (*ῶρεα*), provided it be not elided, *ἱερά* which is never elided is an instance of mere metrical lengthening, whereas the forms of the second group cannot be referred to legitimate metrical treatment of *ἱερός*. But when, relying on this and on his observation that *ἱερός* never indubitably means "sacred," he proceeds to construct a bewildering number of similar forms from different roots, viz. (1) **ἰ(σ)αρός* connected with Sab. *aisos* "prayer," "offering," (2) *ιαρός* or *ιερός* = Sk. *ἱsirá-*, (3) **εἰερος* from **εἰ(σ)ερος* from the same root as (2), and (4) *ἱερός* from a substantive **ἰσᾶ* < *ἰ-ἰσᾶ* formed by reduplication either from the same root as (2) and (3) but with transitive meaning ("setting, maintaining in activity"), or from *√is* "desire," then indeed his treatment of these forms is hardly convincing, and excuses a fresh attempt to deal with his material.

§ 1. There is indeed no real basis for the assertion that, inasmuch as, *ἱερά* being set aside as showing *ī* metri causá, *ἱερός* never indubitably means "sacred," while *ἱερός* means both "sacred" and "strong," difference of meaning goes with difference of quantity. For it so happens that the forms in which *ἱερ-* could be got into the hexameter do not occur at

all in the meaning "victim" or "sacred," even if we accept as certain all the instances given by Giseke apud Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.*, and Schulze put together, excepting only *ἱερά* ($\bar{\iota}$ 11 times metri causâ, $\bar{\iota}$ only κ 445) and *ἱερή—ῶ*, once each, in which last two $\bar{\iota}$ is at least the more obvious scansion to choose: the remaining forms are *ἱερήν—άς—ούς—οἴσω—οἴς*, and once—*οἶο*, from all of which we learn nothing as to the possibility of a form *ἱερός* with meaning "sacred" in Homer. Moreover the substantive *ἱερόν* which always means "sacrum" always shows $\bar{\iota}$ where it can, viz. in *ἱερά* beside which we have only *ἱεροῖσω* thrice; but the adjective shows this meaning according to Giseke only 18 times in 6 phrases (6 different nouns) as against 46 instances of the other use in 12 types of phrase (27 different nouns). No wonder then that the very few instances of *ἱερόν* (7 times in 3 phrases) and *ἱεροῦ* (once) do not show a sure case of the rarer meaning "sacred." But at least Schulze has established the fact that *ἱερά* is a legitimate substitute for a dactyl, whereas *ἱερόν—οῦ* are not, and need a special explanation.

§ 2. In the search for this our starting point must be the circumstance that, unlike *ἱερά* which is placed indifferently in the line (ϵ 102 1st foot, δ 473 2nd foot, α 61 5th foot as always, i.e. 4 times, in the Iliad) *ἱερόν—οῦ* are confined to the fifth foot, which points to a common origin or model for all these instances. Further the same notion "strength of things conceived as active" is common to all the four phrases in question: (a) *ἀέξετο ἱερόν ἡμαρ* refers to the period when the day waxes strong, (b) with *κνέφας ἱερόν* compare *νύξ θοή*, as to (c) *ἱερόν ἰχθύν* Π 407 Patroclus having driven his spear through a warrior in a chariot drags him forward as a fisherman with hook and line draws *ἰ. ἰ.*, and *ἱερόν* suggests the strength and the plunging of the fish, lastly in the case of (d) *ἀλφίτου ἱεροῦ ἀκτῆν* (put in a drink prepared for the aged Nestor and the wounded Machaon) the strengthening ingredient is called strong, cf. *marcentia pocula*. The common model for all these phrases may have been a line ending in such a compound as *ἱεροφώνων* (if this be right, Σ 505, for *ἡεροφώνων*) where $\bar{\iota}$ is legitimate metri causâ, for illegitimate extensions of such

metrical lengthening do occur, e.g. *ἀνέρος*—*ες*—*ας* on the model of *ἀνέρα*—*ι*—*ε*, cf. Schulze *Qu. Ep.* p. 461. Or again in various instances both *ι* and *ῑ*, *υ* and *ῡ* appear in the weak form of the same root, e.g. *ἱμάς*, *ἔφυν* but *φύσις*. Now in Sanskrit we hear of *īṣira*- "fire" (the word has not been found in the literature), which might be a bye form of *īṣirá*- which is occasionally applied to Agni in Rig-Veda, vide Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik*, p. 98. The Sanskrit *īṣira*- derives support from Greek *ἱερόν*, and there is also a resemblance between the Indian meaning of *īṣira*- and the Greek use of *ἱερόν* in *ἱ. ἦμαρ*, a phrase which seems to show more vitality than the others with *ἱερόν*—*οὔ*, and may indeed have served as their model. Two of them occur each once, *ι. ἰχθύν* Π 407, *ἀλφίτου ι. Α* 631; *κνέφας ι.* does occur 3 times, but Α 209 merely reports the words of Zeus Α 194, and P 455, again a speech of Zeus, repeats in the same words the same intention on the same day of giving glory to Hector and the Trojans. But the line containing *ι. ἦμαρ* occurs in three distinct passages, © 66, Α 84, ι 56.

Either of these explanations is preferable to referring *ἱερός* to a special formation or to invoking the influence of *ἱρός*, for **ἱερόφωνοι* and the like would be generally at the end of the line and so influence the fifth foot, and again metrical convenience may have preserved the bye form *ἱερός* = *īṣira*- after the bucolic caesura in some such phrase as *ἱερόν ἦμαρ*, but it is hard to see why *ἱρός* should affect the fifth foot only, and as to the hypothesis of there being another word of quite different formation but of like meaning with *ἱερός*, *entia non multiplicanda*.

§ 3. In point of meaning the instances of *ἱερός*, *ἱρός* may be grouped under three heads: A. "strong" as epithet of things capable of motion or activity, B. "strong" as epithet of immoveable things, C. "sacred." The substantives *ἱερά*, *ἱρόν* show only the third meaning; A. "strong," "swift," "active" corresponds to Sk. *īṣirá*-. We may arrange the instances as follows:

A. Only the trisyllabic form occurs. Beside *ι. ἦμαρ*, *κνέφας*, *ἰχθύν* and *ἀλφίτου ἱεροῦ* already mentioned, we have

φυλάκων *ἰ.* τέλος K 56, *ἰ.* πυλαώρους Ω 681, Ἀργείων *ἰ.* στρατός ω 81, cf. *ἰσιρά-* as epithet of Indra, of *ásurasya vīrás* (the *Ādityās*, heroes of Asura) and of *spáras* "watchers"; *ἰ.* ἰς Τηλεμάχοιο (7 instances), *ἰ.* μένος Ἀλκινόοιο (7 instances), Ἀντινόοιο (once)—with which compare κρατερὸν μένος Ἀκτορίδαο Π 189 (Schulze, l. l. p. 211) and *ἰσιρά-* epithet of *δάκσα* "strength." These phrases bring us to *ἰ.* ῥόον Ἀλφειοῖο Δ 726, which in turn is like κ 351

ἐκ θ' ἱερῶν ποταμῶν, οἳ τ' εἰς ἄλαδε προρέουσιν.

The swiftness of the rivers suggests that Circe's ἀμφίπολοι who spring from them are also quick and active; cf. *ἰσιρά-* epithet of *ράγας*, the milk streaming from the *áditi*, the heavenly cow. Again with *ἰ.* ἐνὶ διφρῶ P 464 cf. *ἰσιρά-* used of horses (Schulze). There remains *ἰ.* ἐλαίης ν 372, cf. *ἰσιρά-* epithet of *bhūmi*—"the earth," and *svadhā*—"the world." The reference is to the vital strength and the beauty of the olive, cf. ἐλαίαι τηλεθώσαι η 116, λ 590, and ἔρνος ἐριθηλὲς ἐλαίης P 53 (ώραῖον γράφων τὸν Εὐφορβον ἐλαίαν παρέλαβε, δένδρον εὐειδὲς καὶ τῷ ἀεθαλεῖ τὸ κάλλος διαφύλαττον Schol. B): so understood, the word has much more descriptive value than if it meant "sacred." There is no tittle of evidence that the tree or its cultivation was newly imported.

B. (i) Fortified cities: Ἴλιος ἱρή (also gen. and acc., in all 24 instances) and, with the trisyllabic form, Τροίης *ἰ.* κρήδεμνα, Τρώων, Κικόνων *ἰ.* πτολίεθρον, Ἴλιον εἰς *ἰ.*, *ἰ.* πρὸς τείχεα Θήβης (in Boeotia), Θήβην *ἰ.* πόλιν Ἡετίωνος, Ἀθηναίων *ἰ.*, ἱερῆς εἰς ἄστυ Ζελείης (bis), Πύλου *ἰ.*, Ὀρχηστόν θ' *ἰ.*

(ii) Natural fastnesses, rocky islands, and abrupt cliffs: Σούνιον ἱρόν (Σ. falls on three sides perpendicularly 200 feet to the sea), and, with the trisyllabic form, *ἰ.* Εὐβοίης ('E. has a lofty mountain chain rising in one part 7266 feet above the sea, and a dangerous rocky coast towards the Aegean), Ἐχινάων *ἰ.* (allusion to meaning of name 'E., "διὰ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ ὄξύ," Steph. Byz.), Περγάμῳ εἰν *ἰ.*, and *ἰ.* ἀνὰ βήσσας (reference to the steep sides of the dells).

(iii) Things strongly built, especially if of stone; only trisyllabic form occurs, three phrases

Σ 504 εἴατ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις, ἱερῶ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ,

cf. Agora of the Phaeacians ζ 267, ῥυτοῖσιν λάεσσι κατωρυχέεσσ' ἀραρυῖα.

κ 445, 426, 554, ἰ. πρὸς δώματα (ἐν δώμασι) Κίρκης,

cf. κ 210 τετυγμένα δώματα Κίρκης ξεστοῖσιν λάεσσι.

E 499 ὡς δ' ἄνεμος ἄχνας φορέει ἱεράς κατ' ἀλφάς,

because a threshing floor has a hard unyielding surface produced by rolling or pounding, or is paved with stone, vide *Dict. Ant.* I. 64^a: both order and rhythm forbid us to join ἰ. with ἄχνας as Schulze proposes *l. l.* p. 523.

The context does not favour the meaning "sacred" in any of the passages here assigned to B, except

B 506 Ὀρχηστον θ' ἱερὸν Ποσιδήιον ἀγλαὸν ἄλσος,

and E 446 Περγάμῳ εἰν ἱερῇ ὄθι οἱ νηὸς γε τέτυκτο.

Distinctly against it is A 366 Θήβην ἱερὴν πόλιν Ἑλιώσος. With ἰ. ἀνὰ βήσσας one might be tempted to compare "divinos lacus" *Aen.* 3, 442; but the idea "haunted" does not seem to be Homeric. The meaning proposed is very appropriate in the case of Σούνιον ἰ. (γ 278 ἀλλ' ὅτε Σ. ἰ. ἀφικόμεθ' ἀκρὸν Ἀθηνέων), for the high headland would be an important landmark. Similarly the mariner sailing across the Aegean from Lesbos to Geraestum (γ 177) would mark the cliffs ἰ. Εὐβοίης sooner than the temples.

C. In the substantival use we have ἱερά—οῖσιν, ἱρά—ῶν, and once, in the Doloneia ν. 571, ἱρόν. The singular of the substantive may also appear in ζ 322 ἄλσος | ἱρόν Ἀθηναίης and ν 104 (= ν 348) ἀντρον | ἱρόν νυμφάων. The remaining instance of the dissyllabic form is Π 658 Διὸς ἱρά τάλαντα, the meaning of which is not clear, "holy, inviolable will," or perhaps "firm decision," cf. the classical *μεγάλη ῥοπή*. From the trisyllabic form come ἰ. ἐκατόμβην—ας, 10 instances. Then ἰ. κατὰ βωμούς, θεῶν ἰ. ἐπὶ βωμοῖς, B 305, γ 273: the scene described in B seems to exclude the meaning *ἐύδητος*, for the altars are probably mere temporary structures. The meaning "sacred" may also appear in *ἱεροῖο δόμοιο* Z 89 (*νηὸς* of

Athene, cf. Περγάμῳ εἰν ἰ., κ.τ.λ. quoted above), and σή θ' ἰερὴ κεφαλὴ in the oath of Here O 39, in both of which the meaning "strong" is possible.

The numbers of the examples according to this division are

- A. ἰερός 30 ἰρός—
 B. „ 20 „ 25 (i.e. Σούνιον ἰρόν once, and Ἴλιος ἰρή).
 C. α. Substantive ἰερά 14 ἰρόν 11
 β. Adj. ἰερός 14 ἰρός 4

§ 4. The connecting link between the meanings "strong" and "sacred" may be the phrase ἰερά ῥέζειν (ἔρδειν). These verbs are properly intransitive, inasmuch as they occur without objects both in the religious (ῥέζειν only) and ordinary (ῥ. and ἐ.) use, and apart from the religious use govern only their cognate ἔργον, and neuter pronouns and adjectives, for in the combination ῥέζειν τινά τι, or in ψ 56 κακῶς μιν ἔρεζον, the personal accusative depends on ῥέζειν plus τὶ or κακῶς, cf. Monro *H. G.* p. 134. Accordingly ῥέζειν θεῶ means originally "to act in the service of a god," and ῥ. θ. ἰερά means "to act strenuously in his service." Then by a natural specialisation "to serve a god" means "to sacrifice," or "make an offering," whence ῥέζειν with or without ἰερά means "to sacrifice," and ἰερά "victims" or "offering," "that which is devoted to a god," "sacred things." With this meaning it could as a substantive be itself qualified by an adjective (ἰερά καλά), and again from the substantive ἰερόν the meaning "sacred" was extended to the adjective ἰερός, perhaps first in combination with such words as ἐκατόμβη; it may however have originally entered into combination with this particular word in the meaning "strong," *id quod τεληέσσας ἐ*. In accordance with this theory the religious meaning, so indubitable in the substantive (whence already in Homer the derivatives ἰερεὺς—εὐείν—ἥμιον), is in the adjective seldom clear beyond dispute; and further as a substantive the trisyllabic form occurs only in the plural and 9 times out of 14 with ῥέζειν, ἔρδειν: however it takes an epithet, καλά, except in A 147, α 61, γ 5, ε 102. Yet ἰρόν appears as a substantive in the singular once, or perhaps four times, K 571, and ζ 322, ν 104 = 348, and is only thrice used with

ρέζειν, ἔρδειν out of 11, or perhaps 14 instances of the substantive¹. Note that the plural is used of a single victim (ἱρώων) ι 553.

This hypothesis would be more plausible if it appeared that, apart from the phrase in question, ἱερός had the "occasional" meaning "active in the service of, or on behalf of others," and from the inscriptions handled by Maass *Ind. Forsch.* i. p. 157 seq. (who is here followed however only in part) it seems that such was the case and that ἱερός was used as a substantive meaning "agent," "official," "servant" of gods and men. In *CIG* II. 2953 b 35 Θεόδωρος ὁ αὐτοῦ (a person previously mentioned) ἱερός has paid monies into a temple treasury; *ib.* 3394 b τὸ μνημεῖόν ἐστιν Ἰκίου Ἰκίου τοῦ Εὐημέρου ἱεροῦ Σμυρμαίων κ.τ.λ.; and *ib.* 2339 b in Addendis (an inscription of Roman times) we read ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ | ἐπὶ ναυάρχου | Ἀπολλωνίδου τοῦ | Ἀγγελῶ Πρωτίωνος καὶ | γραμματέως Δάμωνος | ἱεροῦ Πυθίωνος | ἱατροῦ Ἱέρακος | φίλων Μόσχου κ.τ.λ. Here the division of the lines and the spacing of the words, as shown in Boeckh, make it probable that ἱεροῦ Πυθίωνος is parallel to ἱατροῦ Ἱέρακος and to φίλων Μόσχου κ.τ.λ., i.e. that Pythion was ἱερός, and Hierax physician to this club in Tenos rather than that, as Maass thinks, the captain was Apollonides the ἄγγελος of Protion (he compares *CIG* II. 2476 a ἄγγελος Κρατεροῦ etc.) and the secretary Damon the ἱερός of Pythion. As to the service of the gods, we find in the Heraeum at Samos ὁ ἱερός τῆς θεοῦ Πελύσιος (C. Curtius, *Inscripfien und Studien zur Geschichte von Samos*, p. 11) and at Andania in Messenia ἱεροί and ἱεραί charged with seeing ὅπως γίνηται τὰ κατὰ τὰν τελετὰν θεοπρεπῶς καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ δικαίου (Cauer² 47). An exact parallel, which makes it unnecessary to adopt any less simple explanation, is furnished by the corresponding formation from $\sqrt{\nu\bar{i}}$ which like \sqrt{i} is used to denote strength resulting in activity. (F)ἱρις is messenger of the gods, and among men Ἀρναῖος was nicknamed (F)ἱρος

σ 7, οὐνεκ' ἀπαγγέλλεσκε κιῶν, ὅτε πού τις ἀνώγοι.

¹ As ἱρός is used only when ῖ is wanted in arsis, it would be dangerous to find here traces of difference in usage due possibly to difference of origin.

The same meaning is implied in the quotation from Hippias apud Athen. 259 A in which we hear of three oligarchs, †'Ορυττης καὶ Ἴπος καὶ †'Εχαρος οἱ ἐκαλοῦντο (were so nicknamed) διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς θεραπέας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιφανῶν πρόκυνες (ita Lobeck) καὶ κόλακες, cf. the contemptuous use of "lackey." And it is worth notice that of the two groups of Homeric phrases in which *ιέρως* is used of persons, viz. (1) *ἰ. ἰς Τηλεμάχοιο, ἰ. μένος Ἀλκινόοιο, Ἀντινόοιο* and (2) *φυλάκων ἰ. τέλος, ἰ. πυλαώρους, Ἀργείων ἰ. στρατός*, in the second, where the word is more directly an epithet of the persons themselves, the application is to inferiors and subordinates, to sentries, warders, and to the army (chiefs and men) paying the last honours to Achilles.

The difference between the *ιεροί* in the service of the god and the *ιερεῖς* appears from the Andania Inscription: von den Priestern (*ιερεῖς*) scharf geschieden charakterisieren sie sich als Tempelbeamte für den Aussendienst (Maass *l. l.* p. 158). *ιερεῖς* is derived from *ιέρως* by way of *ιέρων* victim, and the meaning of the further derivatives *ιερεύειν, ιερήιον* (rarely, if ever, in the meaning "to sacrifice," "victim," generally "to kill for food," "animals so used," vide P. Stengel, *Homerisches*, *Fleckeisens Jahrbücher* 1885, p. 102) suggests that the slaughtering of the victim according to the rules of the ritual was the chief concern of the *ιερεῖς*.

§ 5. A further difficulty is the explanation of the disyllabic form *ίρος*. It is true that no decisive phonetic objection can be made to deriving it from **ἰσρός* or, by contraction, from **ἰ(σ)αρός*. We have no example of Aeolic treatment of medial -σρ-, and are not bound to suppose that it was treated like -σμ-, -σν-, -σλ-, for e.g. in Attic -λξ- gives -λλ- (*ἀγγέλλω*), but yet *φαίνω* is from **φανῖω*, vide Schulze *l. l.* p. 210 n. On the possibility of contraction from *ιέρως* perhaps through **ἰρός* with assimilation of unaccented -ε- to the initial syllable, vide Hoffmann *Gr. Diall.* II. p. 392. But against *ίρος, ιέρως* being different forms of the same word is the fact that the same dialect, Ionic, has both, for *ίρος* occurs on inscriptions as well as in the literature, vide Smyth, *Ionic*, p. 270.

§ 6. Darbishire refers *ίρος* to √νῖ, and there is much in

favour of this. Beside the resemblance already indicated between *ιέρως* and Ἰρις Ἰρος (on the retraction of the accent in proper names in *-ρος* cf. Chandler, *Gk. Accentuation* §§ 311, 313, 404), Attic *ιέρ-αξ* (cf. *νέ-αξ*) = Hom. Ἰρηξ = *βείρακες* *ιέρακες* Hesych. (*ει* for *ι*), and *Ἰίρακες* is restored with some probability Epich., 45 Ahrens (*ἕες τε Ἰίρακές τε*) for *ιέρακες* where a kind of fish is meant, cf. *κόραξ*. The absence of *ϕ* in Lesbian and Homer (hiatus only *ι* 553 *ἐμπάζετο ἰρῶν*) is not an insuperable difficulty. It appears (cf. Hoffmann, *Gr. Diall.* II. 392) that the word does not occur in the Lesbian literature, and that on early inscriptions it appears once only (No. 139, Hoffmann), and that no other early inscription shows a word which might have presented initial *ϕ*. As to Homer the main difficulty is the appearance of traces of *ϕ* in Ἰρος, Ἰρις, but not in *ιρός*, for no stress can be laid on the one instance of hiatus. But there is no reason for supposing that in the relatively late period of dactylic poetry in which our two epics were produced *ϕ* was a living sound in Ἰρις or Ἰρος. Before Ἰρις hiatus appear only in the formulae *ὠκέα Ἰρις* (19 times), *ὠρτο δὲ Ἰρις* (3 times, Ἰ. in 3rd foot) and *βάσκ' ἴθι, Ἰρι* (4 times, Ἰ. in 2nd foot): these are all the instances of Ἰρις in the middle of the verse except Ψ 201, Ω 117 (*ϕ* possible but unnecessary, cf. Knös *de Digammo*, p. 126) and E 353, 365, Ψ 198 (*ϕ* excluded, but correction plausible in last instance). Consequently outside of the fixed formulae there is much more evidence for Ἰρις than for *Ἰίρις; but it is only when words are freely used outside of the traditional combinations that we can form any opinion as to the persistence of their initial *ϕ* into the Homeric period. As to Ἰρος, we need not suppose that *ἄ(ϕ)ιρος* was coined by the author of σ 73

ἢ τάχα Ἰρος ἄριος ἐπίσπαστον κακὸν ἔξει

“soon shall ‘Swift’ be swift no more and suffer evil
of his own bringing.”

The hiatus in σ 334 *τάχα Ἰρῶν* (Ἰ. in 3rd foot) may have been suggested by σ 73 *ἢ τάχα Ἰρος ἄριος*, where the hiatus before Ἰρος in 2nd foot does not necessarily indicate the loss of a consonant, cf. Knös *l. l.* p. 47. Apart from these lines we can get on quite well with Ἰρος, for if we introduce *ϕ* in σ 56 (*μη*)

τις ἐπ' Ἴρω ἦρα φέρων) we get for our pains the improbable combination of a rare rhythm and a rare phrase, \mathfrak{F} lengthening a short syllable in thesis, and ἦρα φέρειν used without ἐπί as happens, once only, Ξ 132. The occasional hiatus before the proper name Ἴρος may also have been influenced by the ὠκία Ἴρις &c. of the Iliad, but these formulae containing Ἴρις would not be so likely to affect the adjective \mathfrak{F} ίρος, separated as it was from the proper noun by accent. Again ἱρηξ never requires \mathfrak{F} and five times excludes it, and indeed the words from $\sqrt{\nu\bar{i}}$ show in general lax treatment of \mathfrak{F} , cf. Windisch, *Curt. Stud.* II. 214 (hiatus before ἵεμαι nearly confined to fixed combinations), and Knös, *l. l.* pp. 127 seq. The combination Ἴλιος ἱρή would, like the absence of \mathfrak{F} from the names Ἑλένη, Ἐκάβη, suggest that the story of the Trojan war was not treated in epic poetry till towards the end of the epic period: that Ἴλιος shows traces of \mathfrak{F} may be due to the influence of older epics about other Trojan legends.

§ 7. The disappearance of \mathfrak{F} is however a difficulty, which is reinforced by the difficulty of explaining the aspirate of $\acute{\iota}\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$, $\acute{\iota}\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$. In the *Reliquiae*, p. 41, Darbishire denies that the initial aspirate of $\acute{\iota}\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ can be due to transference of the medial aspirate of * $\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$, for there is no phonetic reason for such transference, all the examples may be explained otherwise, and we ought to find the aspirate similarly transferred in $\acute{\iota}\acute{o}\varsigma$ beside Sk. $\acute{\iota}\acute{s}u-$. If this be true we must derive the aspirate of $\acute{\iota}\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ from $\acute{\iota}\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$, not *vice versá*. But Darbishire's own solution $\mathfrak{F}\acute{\iota}\rho\acute{o}\varsigma > \acute{\iota}\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ is faulty, because the derivatives of $\sqrt{\nu\bar{i}}$ show regularly the smooth breathing, Ἴρος, Ἴρις, ἱρηξ, ἴς, ἵμιον. The only exception is * $\mathfrak{F}\acute{\iota}\epsilon\mu\alpha\iota$ which has been confused with ἵεμαι; for the vacillation of the MSS. (cf. La Roche, *Odyssea*, Prolegomena, p. xxxiv.) shows that the true forms are (\mathfrak{F})ἵεμαι and ἵεμαι: and to the influence of ἵεμαι we must ascribe the error of the MSS., *Hom. H.* 26, 18 and Hes. *Theog.* 830 ὄπ' $\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\iota$, cf. Γ 152 ὄπα... $\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\nu$ DL *($\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota$ A), which there is no reason to separate from ὄπα ἦκεν Ξ 151¹. Consequently

¹ μ 192 ὡς φάσαν $\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\iota$ ὄπα κάλλιμον seems to show a form of $\acute{\iota}\eta\mu\iota$ influenced by the quantity of (\mathfrak{F})ἵεμενος &c.; simi-

larly ἵενται Δ 77 and χ 304 (fly, move rapidly) seems to show the scansion of ἵεμαι but the meaning of ἵεμαι.

the supposition of Darbishire that **φιρός* passed into *ιρός* as *φέσπερος* to *ἔσπερος* is exceedingly improbable. If *ιρός* is for **φιρός*, and if **θηερός* could not give **ηιερός*, then either we must suppose that the aspirate of *ιερός*, which was probably panhellenic (Hoffmann, *Gr. Diall.* I. 198), was due to the influence of some other word, perhaps of *ιε-μεν* &c. (where the aspirate may be due to *ἦκα* &c.), and that *ιερός* then affected **ιρός*; or else we must seek a different derivation of *ιρός* which should account for its aspirate, and we must suppose that *ιρός* then changed **ιερός*.

These considerations may recommend a derivation from **σι-ρός* ($\sqrt{\text{si}}$ in *ἱμάς*). With *Ἰλιος ἰρή* "wall-bound Ilios" we could then compare *αἶμασία* "wall of loose stones" (cf. L. and S., and Prellwitz *Et. Wb.* s.v.). Compare also the city name *Ἰρή* I 150 (oxytone according to Aristarchus, breathing uncertain) and *Ἰρος* a city in Thessaly, Lycophron v. 905 (cf. Steph. Byz.), and we may connect the expression in the Idalium-inscription Cauer² 472 vv. 8 and 31 i-to-i-ro-ni (*τῶ Ἰδα(μ)πριζάτα, τῶ Ἰδαλιέϊ*). Meister, following Deecke-Siegismunde, gives *ἰ(ν) τω(ι) ἰρωνι* and translates "in dem Stadtgebiet"; the meaning is appropriate, but his derivation from Semitic *ir* "city" improbable, because the only authority for this word in Phœnician seems to be an inscription of doubtful reading, *Corp. inscr. Sem.* 113, I. 2 (v. H. Lewy, *Ind. Forsch.* I. p. 511). We cannot derive this word from $\sqrt{\text{vi}}$ (so Darbishire) because this inscription does not omit initial *ϕ*. Rather *(*σ*)*ἰρων* from *(*σ*)*ἰρός*¹; cf. the substantival use of *τρήρων* implied in *πολυ-τρήρων* "abounding in doves" (L. and S.), and again Sk. *sī-man-* which means inter alia "border-line," and "land within the borders of a village."

For the religious meaning cf. Sk. *ῥτί-*, "a fixed time, especially for sacrifice," from the root which appears in *ἀραρίσκω* and means "to make fast," "fit in": is Latin *rītus* from this root? Cf. the analysis of *v-ī-tis*, Brugmann *Gr.* II. 1146. But the notion of fitting, adapting, involved originally in this root may

¹ Perhaps *ἶρις* "rainbow" was originally "cord", cf. *ἱμάς* (P 547 *ἶριν*... *τανύσση*). If so then *ἶρις* is for **ἶρις* <

σιρις by confusion with **ἶρις* < *ἶρις*, and *σιρος* : *σιρις* = *ἶρος* : *ἶρις*.

have helped this development, cf. Grassmann, *Wb. z. R.-V.* A better parallel is English *fast* = Arm. *hast* (I. E. *pas-* or *pəs-*, Brugmann, *Gr.* II. 214): is this root also in Lat. *pono*, *postus*? In the Germanic languages the word has a double meaning, (1) "firmly fixed" and (2) "abstinence from food as a religious observance or ceremonial expression of grief," and the denominative (Brugmann, *Gr.* II. 1131) Gothic *fastan* means (1) "to hold fast" and (2) "to keep, observe," of which the sense "to fast" was originally a specific application, vide Murray's Dictionary, s. vv. *fast* pp. 86^c and 89^a. The parallel use in medieval Latin of *observare* = "to fast" is in favour of this origin of the religious meaning rather than that suggested as an alternative by Kluge, *Et. Wb. d. deutschen Spr.* s. v. *fasten*) "an sich halten, sich in Bezug auf Essen und Trinken Fesseln anlegen." The meaning "swift" is a secondary development from adverbial uses. In the same way we might suppose that **σῖρός* meant (1) "fast" in the sense of "they found the country fast with woods, bogges, and paces trenched" (quoted in Murray), cf. *fastness* = *fortress*, and (2) "ceremonially or religiously fixed and appointed." The second meaning nearly coincides with the meaning "sacred" developed by **ι(σ)αρός* whence confusion of the two, *ίρός* and **ιέρós*, and extension of the aspirate giving *ιέρós*. If this be so, then the meaning *B.* "strong" as applied to immovable things is not a development from *A.* but is originally proper only to *ίρός*.

On the variation between *ιέρós*, *ιαρός* cf. Brugmann, *Gr.* II. p. 174.

Note 1. If the genitive be genuine in *ἀλφίτου ιεροῦ ἀκτῆν* Δ 631 it is a strong proof of the feeling that this scansion was to be confined to the fifth foot, for the natural order would be *ιεροῦ ἀλφίτου*, especially as *ιέρós* generally precedes its noun. But the variant *ιερόν* mentioned by Eustathius is more probable both because only this form elsewhere shows this peculiar scansion, and because of the probability of *ἀλφίτου ιερόν ἀκτῆν* being the model of the Hesiodic *Δημήτερος ἰ. ἄ.*; for the gender compare *δεινός ἀήτη(ς)* O 626, if this be genuine. As to the Homeric *Δημήτερος ἀκτῆν* it is worth notice that in Φ 76 the mention of the goddess has a special propriety

because it there implies the sanctity of the tie formed by eating a man's bread, and Lycaon is pleading for mercy on the strength of this; but at N 322, in a book which is shown to be badly interpolated by the frequent mention of the *θώρηξ*, the phrase is merely a heavy periphrasis for "bread."

Note 2. Except in the phrase *κνέφας ἱερόν*, *κνέφας* has no epithet and always precedes immediately some form of *ἐλλθεῖν* (*κνέφαος σ* 370 is of course an exception); and one may reasonably suppose that *ιερόν*, which is rather weak and pointless in this phrase, was simply taken from the phrase *ἀέξετο ἱερόν ἡμαρ* in order to fill out to the dimensions of a line the words *δῦναί τ' ἥελιον καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἐλλθεῖν*. These are taken from

ἡμος δ' ἥελιος κατέδου καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἦλθε (A 475 and 6 times in the *Odyssey*),

ὡς ἔφατ', ἥελιος δ' ἄρ' ἔδου κ. ἐ. κ. ἦ. (γ 329, ε 225),

and *μὴ πρὶν ἐπ' ἥελιον δῦναι κ. ἐ. κ. ἐλλθεῖν* (B 413).

It is odd that Schulze should especially rely on this phrase for the meaning "desired" which he suggests for *κνέφας* *ι.*, *ι.* *ἡμαρ*, and *ἀλφίτου* *ι. ι. ι.* p. 215, for the context in which it occurs in *Λ* is distinctly unfavourable. At least in *Λ* 194 = 209 the declaration of Zeus that he will give glory to Hector till nightfall is meant to encourage him, and it would be singularly inappropriate in a message to him to call night "wished for," when it was to be the limit of his triumph. In the event night is brought on miraculously *Σ* 239 in the interest of the Greeks.

Note 3. Nauck proposes to improve the line

ὄφρα μὲν ἡὼς ἦν Ἄ καὶ ἀέξετο ἱερόν ἡμαρ

by reading *...ἦεν, ἀέξετο θ' ι. ἦ.* (vide Nauck, *Odyssea*, ι 56).

Unfortunately we have a probable copy of the phrase which by its structure and rhythm defends the *ἦν* and the *καὶ*, viz.

ρ 606 *ἦδη γὰρ Ἄ καὶ ἐπήλυθε δειέλον ἡμαρ.*

δειέλον (i.e. *δέελον*) *ἡμαρ*, the afternoon when the sun is failing, corresponds to *ιερόν ἡμαρ*, the morning when he waxes strong, and has copied the apparent metrical licence of *ιερόν* in the same foot. In the first foot *δειέλος* (sc. *ἥελιος*) Φ 232 is legitimate enough, cf. *ἴομεν* in that position (vide Schulze, *Qu. Ep.* p. 376), and again *δειελήσας* ρ 599 i.e. *δέελήσας* is likewise legitimate. Contracted the word

occurs with the first syllable in arsis Φ 111 δέιλη (sc. ἡμέρα). One may refer the word to the root of δέ(ϝ)ω, for accent cf. εἴκελος, and for the contraction shown in δέιλη from *δεφέλη cf. ἦρι from *ἦερι, *āms-er-i (Brugmann, *Gr.* II. 358) and δοῦναι. The same word is probably disguised in δειλός, the change of accent in which may be due to the influence either of the numerous adjectives in -λός (cf. Chandler, *Greek Accentuation* § 389) or of δεινός (in which however -ει- is an original diphthong, δφεισ-νός, cf. Prellwitz, *Et. Wb.* s.v. δέος) in the post-homeric period when the derivatives δέιλαιος δειλία conveyed the idea of cowardly. The Homeric use of the word does not suggest any connection with √δφει-; in the one passage quoted for the meaning "cowardly" N 278 (ἐνθ' ὃ τε δειλὸς ἀνήρ, ὅς τ' ἄλκιμος ἐξεφαάνθη) δειλός, to which in the next verse κακοῦ corresponds, means "wretched," "worthless." The Homeric use corresponds in many ways to English "poor" in its derivative meanings, and the derivation from *δέφελος seems quite suitable. For the scansion in E 574 τὼ μὲν ἄρα δειλῶ, cf. ξ 411 τὰς μὲν ἄρα (ϝ)ἔρξαν and Υ 434 οἴδα ὃ ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἐσθλός, and in the same foot even O 478 ὧς φάθ', ὃ δὲ τόξον. The scansion would be still easier to excuse, if the uncontracted form ought to be restored.

This however is at least doubtful. δοῦναι shows that contraction of vowels originally separated by ϝ was possible in the Homeric period¹, and the circumstance that of the 39 instances of δειλός, 36 have the first syllable in thesis and the remaining 3 (N 278, Φ 464, θ 351) occur in passages otherwise doubtful, becomes less convincing when the instances are analysed. 31 instances fall to the 4 types ἄ δειλ' &c. (14), ἐγὼ δειλῆ &c. (7), δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι (6), and Πατροκλήος δειλοῖο (4). These expressions do not enable us to form any judgment as to the probability of contraction. Apart from these combinations 4 lines show δει- in thesis (A 293, E 574, Ψ 223, ι 65), 2 show it in arsis (N 278 and Φ 464), and 1 both in arsis and thesis (θ 351). So viewed the argument from the position of δειλός is not conclusive. Moreover we have always to bear in mind that even the position of words in Homer is regulated to a great extent by traditions formed at a much earlier period, and the habit of placing the last syllable in arsis would influence the practice of poets in whose own day the contracted form was possible or even customary. And the uncontracted form might very well have been preserved in the group δείελον ἦμαρ δείελος δειελήσας (i.e. δέελον

¹ Cf. Hoffmann, *Gr. Diall.* I. p. 194 on Cyprian παῖς παιδός &c.

ἦμαρ &c.) although it had disappeared from the word in its more ordinary application. It is all a question of what combinations had been handed down to the late epic period which is called Homeric.

Similarly in considering the circumstance that κοῖλος is only once with first syllable in arsis, as against 57 instances in which it is in thesis, we must also consider that 38 instances fall to the type of phrase κοίλης ἐπὶ νηός, κοίλης ἐνὶ νηυσί: then we have the type κοῖλον δόρυ, λόχον, σπέος following penthemimeral caesura (6 instances), and κοίλης ἔντοσθε μεσόδμης, φαρέτρης, χαράδρης (4 instances). When we consider the attraction exerted by these phrases with the first syllable in thesis, it is not surprising that we find it only once in arsis (χ 385).

Note 4. In the hexameter fragment of Alcman, 26 (Bergk), εἶαρος ὄρνις is no doubt to be explained "strong" "swift", for a genitive would require a governing word such as we have in Sappho 39 ἦρος ἄγγελος ἡμερόφωνος ἀήδων. Probably Alcman used the Doric form ἱαρός, cf. μελιγάρνες v. 1, and Schol. *Arist. Av.* 251, cited by Bergk; hence corruption to εἶαρος, perhaps through εἶαρος with εἰ = ἰ.

C. M. MULVANY.

CATULLIANA.

CARMEN 45. ll. 8, 9.

Hoc ut dixit Amor sinistra ut ante
dextram sternuit approbationem.

“ut ante,” says Munro, “has probably come from 17, and may have displaced something quite different such as ‘sinister ipse’ or ‘manu sinistra,’ but my suggestion ‘sinister astans’ gives the sense that is required.” That v. 8 is corrupt I agree, but I do not think the change proposed is convincing; v. 8 should correspond with v. 17 word for word until we come to the word in v. 8 which *ut ante* replaces in v. 17. I am convinced that the word we want is *amanti*, which echoes naturally enough the *amo* and *amare* of v. 3, and it is obvious that *sinistra amanti* might easily be changed to *sinistra ut ante*. I therefore read

Hoc ut dixit, Amor sinistra amanti
dextram sternuit approbationem.

When he said this, love on the lover's left sneezed approval towards the right.

CARMEN 47.

Porci et Socration, duae sinistrae
Pisonis, scabies famesque mundi:
vos Veraniolo meo et Fabullo
verpus praeposuit Priapus ille?
vos convivia lauta sumptuose
de die facitis, mei sodales
quaerunt in trivio vocationes.

The only difficulty here is *mundi*, which gives no intelligible sense. The first time I read this poem, it occurred to me that *munda* must be right, and I noted the passage from Martial (III. 58) which seemed to me to prove it. I see now that I was anticipated by Reise in this suggestion. I can only add, as at least an interesting coincidence, that in Martial as in the present passage Priapus occurs in the next line but one:

At tu sub urbe possides famem mundam
et turre ab alta prospicis meras laurus
furem Priapo non timente securus,

and that the first line of Martial's poem

Baiana nostri villa, Basse, Faustini
non otiosis ordinata myrtetis

recalls, and is intended to recall, the

Furi villula nostra non ad Austri flatus opposita est
of Catullus.

The estate is a 'trim starveling' like the two parasites.

CARMEN 52.

Quid est Catulle? quid moraris emori?
sella in curuli struma Nonius sedet,
per consulatum perjerat Vatinius:
quid est Catulle? quid moraris emori?

Poem 53 deals with Calvus and his attacks on Vatinius: poem 52 is the contribution of Catullus to the same cause. All is clear except the second line. Who is Nonius, and what is he doing here, weakening the force of the poet's indignation, which we should expect to be concentrated on Vatinius? And there is more than this: Vatinius we know had a tumour on the neck which exposed him to Cicero's offensive personalities: *struma* therefore at once suggests Vatinius: but apparently in our poem has no reference to him: a certain Nonius has also aroused the poet's wrath and suffers from the same personal deformity.

'It is not easy,' says Professor Ellis, 'to see why Catullus should have ascribed to Nonius the well-known deformity of Vatinius: such a side-stroke, to use an expression of Vatinius' own, must have seemed as flat at the time as it is unintelligible now.'

I entirely agree with Professor Ellis, and I am therefore unable to believe that Catullus wrote Nonius, in spite of Pliny's express assertion that 'ab Antonio proscriptus est Nonius senator, filius strumae Nonii ejus quem Catullus poeta in sella curuli visum indigne tulit.' I believe Catullus wrote struma Adonius, 'Adonis with a wen,' meaning Vatinius, whose name he keeps back, though no one would mistake the allusion, until he gives it with terrible force at the end of the next line. How Nonius came to be substituted for Adonius soon after the poem was written I cannot say: probably the a of Adonius was absorbed by the a of struma, and then Donius was changed to Nonius; but it is conceivable that, if copies were multiplied by dictation, the mistake might arise from indistinct reading: it is certainly most unlikely that there should have been two politicians at Rome in the same year who both suffered from the same personal deformity, a tumour on the neck. And no one, I think, will deny that the poem thus corrected becomes the reverse of flat and unintelligible. I should translate

How now Catullus? die and end despair:
 A blotched Adonis holds the curule chair,
 By office dreamed Vatinius swears the lie.
 How now Catullus? end despair and die.

CARMEN 64. l. 350.

Illius egregias virtutes claraque facta
 saepe fatebuntur gnatorum in funere matres
 cum incivium canos solvent a vertice crines
 putridaque infirmis variabunt pectora palmis.

For incivium in cinerem has been suggested, but is not convincing: incultum (Reise) seems to me far better but in-

volves further changes, *cano* and *crinem*. I suggest *incassum* and compare *Carmen* 101, ll. 3, 4.

Ut te postremo donarem munere mortis
et mutam nequiquam alloquerer cinerem.

CARMEN 66.

Hi dii ven ibi vario ne solum in lumine caeli
ex Ariadneis aurea temporibus
fixa corona foret.

I agree with *Reise*, *Der Anfang des Verses wird ein Epitheton zu caeli enthalten*, and suggest *hic dii*, but the passage is perhaps corrupt beyond the possibility of restoration.

CARMEN 68 B. ll. 39—52.

Quam jejuna piū desideret ara cruorem
doctast amisso *Laudamia viro*,
conjugis ante coacta novi dimittere collum
quam veniens una atque altera rursus hiems
noctibus in longis avidum saturasset amorem,
posset ut abrupto vivere conjugio,
quod scibant *Parcae* non longo tempore abesse,
si miles muros isset ad *Iliacos*:
nam tum *Helenae* raptu primores *Argivorum*
cooperat ad sese *Troja* ciere viros,
Troja, nefas, commune sepulchrum *Asiae Europaeque*,
Troja virum et virtutum omnium acerba cinis,
quaene etiam nostro letum miserabile fratri
attulit.

This is how *Dr Postgate* prints the passage.

The chief difficulty is in the last line but one, where the MSS. read *que vetet id*. *Quaene etiam* seems to me to have little to recommend it, nor can I accept from *Professor Ellis* *quae veter id fatum miserabile*. I propose to read *qua valet*, *id* and write the whole passage with some changes of punctuation as follows:

posset ut abrupto vivere conjugio,
 quod scibant Parcae non longo tempore abesse
 si miles muros isset ad Iliacos:
 nam tum Helenae raptu primores Argivorum
 coeperat ad sese Troja ciere viros.
 Troja (nefas) commune sepulchrum Asiae Europaeque
 Troja virum et virtutum omnium acerba cinis,
 qua valet, id nostro letum miserabile fratri
 attulit.

Troy to-day as aforetime is powerful for evil and not for good, for death and not for life. As in old days she proved herself the sepulchre of heroes and heroic deeds, so once more she has shown that gift for destruction which is her special characteristic (qua valet).

CARMEN 68 B. ll. 77, 78.

Sed tuus altus amor barathro fuit altior illo
 qui tuum domitum ferre jugum docuit.

Dr Postgate and Professor Palmer read qui tamen indomitam. I propose qui te tum domitam, 'then (at last) subdued.'

HUGH MACNAGHTEN.

HORACE *Odes* iv. 8.

I AM tempted by the paper of Mr Stanley in the last number of this Journal (p. 165) to add a few words on the well-worn subject of this ode. In the point with which Mr Stanley concludes, I am inclined to agree with him: his ultimate purpose is to revive (for it is not actually new) an interpretation which I believe really to represent what was meant by the fashioner of the text as we have it.

Non incisa notis marmora publicis,
Per quae spiritus et vita redit bonis
Post mortem ducibus, non celeres fugae
Reiectaeque retrorsum Hannibalis minae,
Non incendia Karthaginis impiae
Eius, qui domita nomen ab Africa
Lucratus rediit, clarius indicant
Laudes, quam Calabriae Pierides; neque
Si chartae sileant quod bene feceris
Mercedem tuleris.

Does the author here identify and confuse the Scipio who was celebrated by Ennius with the Scipio who burnt Carthage—the *Major* with the *Minor*? He unquestionably appears to do so; but did he in his own mind? Mr Stanley says no, and defends very pertinently what is called by Orelli¹ the 'speciosa explicatio' of Jahn. We are not meant to construe together, as of course we do at first sight, *eius* and *laudes*, 'the praises of *him* who' etc.: *eius* is a subjective, not an objective, genitive, and is to be taken not with *laudes* but with *incendia*. We should translate, says Mr Stanley, thus: "Not by marble

¹ Excursus on the Ode in his edition.

graven etc., not by the repeated rout of a Hannibal etc., not by the burning of cruel Carthage *by one* that returned from conquered Africa, his only gain a name, are glorious deeds more manifestly set forth than by the poems of an Ennius." The reference is not to the career of any one Scipio, but to the successive triumphs of Rome over Carthage, which are all together contrasted, as means to glory, with literary memorials, represented typically by Ennius; and thus the alleged confusion disappears. Orelli calls the proposed construction harsh, and it certainly seems to be so; but he allows it to be fair, and this in the circumstances is enough. Nothing but the severance of *eius* from *laudes* will clear the writer, before the bar of common sense, from the historical blunder with which he is charged; it is enough to read, in Orelli or elsewhere, the attempts which have been made to find some other way. Any man may write a harsh sentence, but that any literary Roman should identify the two Africanis is scarcely conceivable; and the choice therefore may be made without hesitation. And we should observe, that this choice is independent of the question, whether the poem is the pure work of Horace; indeed if we suppose that it is, the reasons for following Jahn and Mr Stanley are weaker than if the writer be unknown; for of Horace perhaps, if ever of any man, it might be said that he was less likely, in his lyrics at least and when he wrote the *Fourth Book*, to pass over an uncouth paragraph than even a violent anachronism. Nor does it matter whether the passage, as it stands, be by one author, or the product of interpolation. By some one it was made what it is; and that some one, we must probably suppose, intended his not unexceptionable phrase to be taken as suggested by Jahn and Mr Stanley.

Mr Stanley therefore seems to undervalue the case for his interpretation, when he bases it on a preliminary attempt to show (especially as against me) that the passage is by Horace, and that it is not interpolated. He had no need to prove this, and nothing to gain by it; and as to my observations in particular, he could not have proposed to answer them as he does, if I had made sufficiently clear to him what I meant. The misapprehension between us is of so common a kind and

so productive of controversy wasted, that some use may be served by setting it right.

No sort of argument, as was remarked by that acute observer of opinion, E. A. Poe¹, is so frequently misapprehended as the *collective*; although in a broad and simple case nothing is plainer. Let the question be, whether during a certain month a certain man was resident in London. That once in the month he was seen at Aberdeen affects the question not in the least; it is insignificant. But if he was seen there on ten days, it would be serious, and if on twenty, conclusive: he was not resident in London. The argument which I adduced to prove, and which does prove, that the passage, with which we are dealing, is not by the same author as the rest of the ode, is an argument of this sort. The reply proceeds like one, who in the case just supposed, should still contend for the residence in London by pointing out that the man, though there resident, might very well have been in Aberdeen on that Monday, or that Wednesday, or that Saturday, and so on through the whole twenty appearances. Certainly he might; but what then?

Non celeres fugae
reiectaeque retrorsum Hannibalis minae,
non incendia Carthaginis impiae
eius, qui domita nomen ab Africa
lucratus rediit, clarius indicant
laudes, quam Calabrae Pierides: neque
si chartae, etc.

Here *within five lines* are six phenomena. Four are metrical; for the nature of these I refer to my previous paper². Similar phenomena occur, as all will be aware and as my statement showed, in all parts of the *Odes*. But they are from the first exceptional; they become on the average more and more rare in the progress of the original work; and in the supplementary Fourth Book they become so rare that five lines taken at

¹ See *The Mystery of Marie Roget*, a work more instructive in the practical conditions of reasoning than many

formal chapters in logic.

² Vol. xvii. p. 143.

random will frequently exhibit not one such phenomenon, and it is hard to find five lines which exhibit two. We have also *within the same limit* two linguistic phenomena (the use of the pronoun *is*, and of the perfect *rediit* with the open vowel), both of such a kind that, without attempting a numerical measurement which would require a somewhat precarious definition of 'similar' phenomena, we may safely call them exceptional in the *Odes* to a high degree. Now the poem in question, iv. 8, does not, except just at this place, exhibit any such cluster of exceptional phenomena. It contains indeed not one comparable phenomenon either of metre¹ or language, and is in these respects just like any other part of Book iv.

This (neglecting some superfluties) is the case in brief. It proves conclusively, as I thought and still think, that the poem is interpolated, and interpolated at this point. The bulk of it, whether by Horace or not, is by some one whose knowledge or instinct led him to imitate exactly, in these respects at least, the work of Horace, and in particular that of the *Fourth Book*; part of it, which must include the five verses and cannot extend much beyond them, is by some one who did not.

As to *rediit* in particular, since further explanation seems to be asked for, I will add here a few words to show why its appearance, in a lyric purporting to come from Horace, is a noticeable and highly exceptional thing. In the *Odes*, as in all other Latin, verbs in *-i-* are of course abundant. *Ire* alone supplies about 60 examples, and there is a long list besides. In general, the various tenses and parts of these verbs are used with the same freedom as the corresponding tenses of other verbs, but with a certain exception: forms containing *-ivi-* or *-ii-* are almost unknown. The perfect tense, which would produce those syllables, occurs in verbs of other types incessantly; among the verbs in *-i-* hardly ever. *Munivit* is found in *Carm. Saec.* 43, *mollivit* (with a slight doubt on the reading) in

¹ I say not one of metre, because the collision of vowels between *vv.* 24—25 *Romuli?* | *Ereptum* is not in strictness comparable to that between

vv. 17—18. The full stop makes a broad difference in the case, and an examination of Horace will shew that he was sensitive to that difference.

3. 23. 19; *petiisse* in 3. 14. 2 is perhaps unique of its kind; and it is worth notice that this last occurs in what purports to be a quotation,

Herculis ritu modo dictus, o plebs,
 'morte venalem petiisse laurum,'
 Caesar Hispana repetit penates
 victor ab ora,

so that very probably not Horace, but some author whose premature lamentations he cites and gently mocks, is responsible here for the use of *petii*. Now this state of things must have some explanation, and the explanation is obvious. It is manifest, and quite natural, that the poet was disinclined to admit either of the two forms into verse pretending to an extremely high finish. That in *-ivi-* has a sound somewhat cumbrous, partly no doubt because of the familiar contraction, but partly for reasons intrinsic; while *-ii-*, with its collision of similar vowels, is, for musical purposes, less acceptable still. In work on so small a scale as the *Odes* it was not very hard to dispense with any such perfects, and normally Horace, as a lyricist, has chosen to do so. In a colloquial style such punctilio would have been out of place, and accordingly *abii* (*Sat.* 1. 1. 108) *impediit* (*Sat.* 1. 6. 28) *subiit* (*Sat.* 1. 9. 21) etc. appear, together with innumerable things absent from the lyrics, to assure us, if need were, that the author has acted on principle. Of course such rules will be sometimes broken, either upon special occasion or simply from the natural imperfection of things; and it would be ridiculous to impeach the genuineness of a passage, of the stanza *Herculis ritu*, etc. for instance, because it contains such a form as *petiisse*. But the phenomenon in a lyric of Horace is exceptional, very highly exceptional, a thing like the use (if it did occur¹) of the pronoun *is*; and therefore we properly set *rediit* by the side of *eius* in the foregoing list. (And I will take this occasion to add paren-

¹ The only example is 3. 17—20, where few or none believe the text to be sound. But I would remark, in view of what is said hereafter as to interpolations in the *Odes*, that to

assume interpolation of the stanza is unnecessary and scarcely probable. There is no sufficient cause for it. But the words *eius atque* are corrupt: I should accept *aestuetae*.

thetically, that a fastidious composer, in lyric or any other style, whatever he might think of *redit*, would not often choose to put in the same sentence *redit* and *redit*, two parts of the same verb, without any connexion of thought to justify the echo of sound. Let the *Odes* be searched for another instance.) The feeling which led Horace, in lyrics, to avoid perfect-forms containing the syllables *-ii-* was the same which made him prefer *imperi* to *imperii*. Indeed it is probable that, if the material of his language had made it convenient, he would have been pleased enough to exclude such a collision of sounds altogether, refusing *imperiiis* as well as *imperii*: but purism has its necessary limits. Even as it is, in those parts of his work, which best combine spirit with severity, the six first odes of Book III. for example, he does restrict the employment of such forms in a way surprising if we consider the conditions. However let us proceed with our present concern. The case being as I have here summarily stated it, let us see the answer.

The answer of Mr Stanley is this. He takes, as peculiarly or solely relevant to the question (and let it be assumed that so far he is right), the odes which are written, like our iv. 8, in *monostich* verse of uniform lines. And he then shows—what? That these poems exhibit metrical and other phenomena, resembling those of the passage disputed, *in the proportion of cent. per cent. to the total number of verses?* Or that here and there in them, at all events, there are passages which exhibit such a proportion? Or that they exhibit a much higher proportion than the rest of the *Odes*? Not at all; but simply that they contain many such phenomena. Certainly they do. They contain them in much about the proportion that was to be expected. As Mr Stanley gives no reckoning, I cannot be sure how many instances he would make: there is room, though not much, for some divergence of individual judgments as to instances admissible; and it is necessary, if we make the field so narrow, that our scrutiny should be very exact¹. However

¹ For instance, in *Odes* i. 1 we may count, as parallels to the short final syllable in iv. 8, 20—21 *nequē* | *si*, perhaps v. 1 *regibus* | *O* and certainly v. 34 *Polyhymniā* | *Lesboum*. But *verticē*, at the end of the poem, we

it does not appear that in the principle of counting I should differ materially from Mr Stanley; and of comparable phenomena in metre, within the prescribed area, excluding of course the disputed bit of iv. 8, I count some 15; to be quite safe, we will say 25. The number of verses is 112, and the proportion therefore of licences to verses would be about 1 in 5. It is not 4 in 5, and that is the thing that we want. When we find in the monostich odes, or anywhere in the odes, a passage containing *within five lines* four deflexions from severity of metre, one of them almost unique in its kind, *and also* such a thing as the use of *is* (that is to say, of a word which common Latin employs in every other sentence, but in dignified poetry the Augustans almost proscribe), *and also* a construction so obscure that ninety-nine readers in a hundred do and must misunderstand it, *and also* sundry other exceptional things—then we shall have done something to show that the ode iv. 8 may be all by one hand, and all by the hand of Horace, though, to complete our proof, we should still have to find our passage in the Fourth Book. But without such a passage we shall not prove it.

As to the question whether the monostich odes, and these alone, afford the relevant evidence, I will only say that it seems a strong thing to make this quality, though doubtless not immaterial to the purpose, absolutely over-ride all other affinities and connexions. It seems strong to say that in estimating the metre of a passage in iv. 8, we must take no notice of iv. 1, though actually published along with iv. 8, because it is written in couplets; and that on the other hand we are bound to consider III. 30, because it is written in uniform verses, although it was separated from iv. 8 by an interval of many years, and although the very first lines in it

exegi monumentum aere perennius,
regalique situ pyramidum altius,
quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens...

must not count, nor *maré*, with a full stop after it, in v. 14, and scarcely *honoribus* in v. 8, with a strong stop. The pauses following make material difference. In taking the survey of

the whole *Odes*, it was safe to ignore these minutiae, of course on both sides of the account. And, as is implied above, they make no difference in the end.

with their bold and frequent elisions, stamp themselves as belonging distinctly to the work which Horace composed before the great interval, and not to that work, metrically as well as otherwise different, which he composed after it. Surely the truth is that both odes, and all the odes, furnish evidence relevant, though differently relevant, to the question to be decided; and the proper course is to consider them all. This however does not matter; by narrowing the field in this way or that way we shall not alter the result. We shall easily prove what Mr Stanley proves, and what for an observant reader scarcely needs to be proved; we shall easily prove that, for example, the occurrence in Horace of such a metrical variation as

non incendia *Carthaginis* impiae

is not impossible, nor even improbable: *or again* that the appearance of the pronoun *is* in a lyric by Horace is not impossible nor (properly and scientifically speaking) improbable. What we shall not prove is, that in genuine work of Horace two phenomena so highly *exceptional* as these could occur *within two successive lines*, and closely surrounded by other phenomena also *exceptional*. This is not merely improbable, it is incredible and (in common parlance) impossible, just as it is incredible and impossible that five children should be produced at a single birth. The truth of this proposition is not affected by showing that a birth of two is an exception not very uncommon, and a birth of three an exception not unknown.

But there is another matter respecting which (as well as on the proper interpretation of the passage as we find it) I agree with Mr Stanley, and if I seemed to say otherwise, would correct myself. It is no reason, for supposing the poem interpolated, that the number of its verses is not divisible by four, although all the other odes be so divisible, including many written in distich verse or monostich. From this fact in itself, as Mr Stanley says, we can draw no inference whatever. We can make use of it only if we first prove *otherwise* that the poem is interpolated. Then indeed we can use it, reasonably and with some confidence, to determine *a priori* the length of the interpolation which we are to look for; the number of

verses interpolated is probably $4n + 2$. 'Meineke's Canon' is good for this, and for nothing more; and this is all that I should have said, or meant to say.


And we are agreed, up to a certain point, about another and independent question. The text, as it would remain without the six verses which I proposed to reject, presents, as Mr Stanley thinks and shows, a turn of phrase extremely unusual, and (from its excessive brevity) only just intelligible. What Mr Stanley seems to infer from this is that here at all events we have not found the original text. What I should infer is that we almost certainly have found it. The circumstances, under which the *Odes* were published and preserved, were such, that the insertion and retention of a spurious passage is *almost* inconceivable. To account for it we want something like necessity. If anywhere it has occurred, the original text must have been such that, at a time close to the poet's own age, it may have appeared, to the general body of readers, unintelligible and unquestionably incomplete. That our process here brings us to such a text, a puzzling text, obviously suggesting a lacuna, and yet just explicable otherwise, is the strongest possible reason for thinking that we have been on the right road. The nature of the case in this respect is aptly illustrated by the paper which happens to follow that of Mr Stanley, Mr Macnaghten's upon Sophocles *Antigone* 904 foll. All have wished to believe that there was an interpolation here. Mr Macnaghten now supplies this desire with a practicable ground, by showing how *the offence can be removed, so as to leave a passage manifestly liable to misunderstanding and apparently calling for a supplement*. This, in such a text as that of Sophocles—and with infinitely more reason the same may be said of Horace—is an essential part of the case for supposing an interpolation; and it is a thing so unlikely to occur by mere accident, that it goes far in itself, if found, to establish the fact. That Horace once in a way should have supplied an example of his own remark 'brevis esse laboro: obscurus fio', that once in a way he should have left too much to the punctuating and intoning intelligence of his readers, is no wonder. In the most uniform of writers exceptions occur.

I see that in the new *Corpus Poetarum* the editor of Horace, Dr Gow, seems inclined to the opinion that no part of the ode IV. 8 is by Horace. That may be true; though, I confess, I should be surprised at the fidelity to Horatian language and metre of the writer who produced the bulk of it, and cannot well understand how (unless his work was actually fathered by the poet) it obtained and held its place in the book. But whether any part is by Horace or not, the poem is not all by the same hand. A piece, widely different from the rest in respect of Horatian quality, has been inserted somewhere about the place that we have been regarding. This much I hold to be certain. Neither therefore could I accept, as a complete solution, the proposal since made by Dr Gow in his separate commentary on the *Odes*, to treat as spurious a large portion of the poem. The writer, who composed the six verses in question, did not add much more. We may say of him, as Faulconbridge said of old Sir Robert, that 'We know his handiwork'.

A. W. VERRALL.

ON THE *SALINON* OF ARCHIMEDES.

IN the editions of Archimedes there appears a Latin translation of a collection of lemmas under the title *Liber assumptorum*, which has reached us through the Arabic, the Greek original having been lost. It is clear that the book cannot have been written by Archimedes in its present form because his name is twice quoted in it; but the best authorities are agreed that some three propositions in it are probably of Archimedean origin. Of these Prop. 14 deals with the area enclosed between four semicircles drawn, as in the diagram appended, with diameters in one straight line; the two small



semicircles on the upper side of the common diameter are equal. The enunciation of the proposition ends with the words "et est figura quam uocat Archimedes Salinon".

The following explanations have been given of the meaning of this term.

1. Cantor (*Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, vol. I, 1880) derives it tentatively from $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ = "Das Schwanken des hohen Meeres", his idea being apparently that it is a "wave-line". But the resemblance of the curve to the shape of a wave of the sea is not very perfect, and even then the termination *-ινον* would need some explanation.

2. Heiberg (*Archimedes*, vol. II, p. 443) speaks of *Salinon* as “uerbum sine dubio ab Arabibus deprauatum” and conjectures that the true word may be σέλινον, “parsley” (“ex similitudine frondis apii”). Whatever may be said of the supposed resemblance, the idea that the word was incorrectly reproduced by the Arabians certainly receives no support from the other analogous case in the same collection of lemmas. Prop. 4 investigates the area of another figure bounded by three semicircles “quam uocat Archimedes Arbelon”; and for the correctness of this name we have the independent testimony of Pappus, who gives (p. 208, ed. Hultsch) what he calls an ἀρχαία πρότασις about the same figure, describing the space included by the semicircles as χωρίου, ὃ δὲ καλοῦσιν ἄρβηλον (i.e. a “shoemaker’s knife”).

3. Dr Gow (*A Short History of Greek Mathematics*, p. 232) suggests that σάλινον perhaps means a “sieve”, comparing σάλαξ. This guess is however not supported by any evidence.

I believe the true explanation to be that σάλινον is simply a Graecised form of the Latin *salinum*, “salt-cellar”. This explanation has two obvious advantages at the outset, viz. that (1) it does not require the alteration of any letter in the word, and (2) the resemblance of the lower curve made up of the three semicircles to an ordinary type of salt-cellar is reasonably close.

In order to establish the probability of my hypothesis it is only necessary to prove

(1) that the *salinum* was a recognised part of the domestic apparatus of an ordinary household in Italy during a certain period, and

(2) that other Latin terms were similarly adopted in the Sicilian dialect of Greek.

On the first point I cannot do better than quote part of the article *Salinum* in the *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities* (third edition, 1891). “All who were raised above poverty had one of silver which descended from father to son (Hor. *Carm.* II. 16, 13; Liv. XXVI. 36), and was accompanied by a silver *patella*, which was used together with the salt-cellar in the domestic sacrifices (Pers. III. 24, 25). These two articles

of silver were alone compatible with the simplicity of Roman manners in the early times of the Republic (Plin. *H. N.* xxxiii. § 153; Val. Max. iv. 4, § 3). The salt-cellar was no doubt placed in the middle of the table, to which it communicated a sacred character, from the offering of the *mola salsa* to the Lares. In shape the *salinum* was probably in most cases a round shallow bowl”.

On the second point equally conclusive evidence appears to be at hand in the first volume of Mommsen's *History of Rome*. Thus (a) in the chapter on Agriculture, Trade and Commerce Mommsen says (Eng. tr. of 1894, p. 259), “As the local Dorico-Chalcidian designation of silver coin νόμος, and the Sicilian measure ήμίνα, were transferred with the same meaning to Latium as *nummus* and *hemina*, so conversely the Italian designations of weight, *libra*, *triens*, *quadrans*, *sextans*, *uncia*, which arose in Latium for the measurement of the copper which was used by weight instead of money, had found their way into the common speech of Sicily in the third century of the city under the corrupt and hybrid forms, λίτρα, τριᾶς, τετρᾶς, ἕξᾶς, οὐγκία.” Similarly in the following chapter (p. 266) ξέστης is mentioned as a corruption of *sextarius*. (b) Again, in the chapter on Law and Justice (p. 200–1) the reappearance of the Latin word *mutuum*, signifying a form of loan, as μοῖτον in Sicilian Greek, and of *carcer* as κάρκαρον, is noted as an important testimony to the frequency of the dealings of Latin traders in the island. (c) The first-named chapter gives (p. 254) other instances of the admission of Latin words into Sicilian Greek; thus *patina*, a dish, became πατάνη, and *arvina*, lard, ἀρβίνη. These last cases are as exact a parallel for the supposed adoption of *salinum* in the form σάλινον as could be desired.

If, as I believe, this explanation of σάλινον is correct, it may well be that we actually have in the proposition referred to and the appended diagram an indication of the normal shape of the *salinum* at the time when the name was applied to the figure.

T. L. HEATH.

EARLY CITATIONS FROM THE BOOK OF ENOCH.

A COMPLETE list of the citations from or allusions to the Ethiopic Book of Enoch in ancient writers is still a desideratum. It is the purpose of the present essay to make some slight contribution towards the supplying of this want. I confine myself, with one or two exceptions, to Christian patristic writers of the early centuries. In this paper E denotes the Ethiopic text of the Book as edited by Mr Charles (I quote uniformly from his translation), ϵ the Greek text underlying it, γ the Gizeh Greek, σ the Greek fragments preserved by Georgius Syncellus. What I have to say may conveniently be divided into two parts. In the first place I shall collect together those passages which appear to be capable of use as witnesses to the text of the Book current in early times. My object here is to show that the present text varies considerably from that which was current in the first two or three centuries of our era; and I therefore as a rule omit passages which do not testify to a text differing from all extant manuscript authorities. I shall then proceed to inquire what information can be gained from these and other allusions to our Book as to its history in the Christian Church, and the views which were held as to its authenticity and inspiration.

I.

First, then, as to citations or allusions which help to fix the text. In most cases we shall I believe find either (α) that a text is implied differing from that of any extant Greek or Ethiopic MS of our Book, or (β) that the words quoted are not contained in the present text of the Book at all.

The earliest direct citation from our Book is the famous one in Jude 14, 15. The same passage (*En.* i. 9) is quoted at length, though without express reference to the work from which it is taken, by the anonymous author of the treatise *Ad Novatianum*, falsely attributed to St Cyprian, in the year 255 A.D. (Hartel's *Cyprian* III. p. 67)¹.

Both writers used a text which varied considerably from that found in the extant manuscripts. This will be readily shown by printing in parallel columns the passage as it is given in E, γ , St Jude (Tischendorf) and the treatise *Ad Novatianum*. Readings in which one or other of the two last-named authorities differs from both E and γ are emphasized.

E	γ	Jud. 14, 15	<i>Ad Novat.</i> p. 67
And lo! He comes with ten thousands of (His) holy ones to execute judgment upon them, and He will destroy the ungodly, and will convict all flesh of all that	ὅτι ἐρχεται σὺν τοῖς μυριάσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι κρίσιν κατὰ πάντων καὶ ἀπολέσει πάντας τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς καὶ (ἐ)λέγξει πᾶσαν σάρκα περὶ πάντων ἔργων τῆς ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν ὧν ἠσέβησαν καὶ σκληρῶν ὧν ἐλάλησαν λόγων καὶ περὶ πάντων ὧν κατεδάλησαν κατ' αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἀσεβεῖς.	ἰδοὺ ἦλθεν Κύριος ἐν ἀγλαῖς μυριάσιν αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι κρίσιν κατὰ πάντων καὶ ἐλέγξει πάντας τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς αὐτῶν ² Ἄ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἔργων ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν ὧν ἠσέβησαν καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν σκληρῶν λόγων ³ ὧν ἐλάλησαν	ecce uenit cum multis milibus nuntiorum (? ἀγγέλους) suorum facere iudicium de omnibus et perdere (ἀπολέσαι) omnes impios et arguere (ἐλέγξει) omnem carnem de omnibus factis impiorum quae fecerunt impie et de omnibus uerbis impiis quae de Deo locuti sunt peccatores. Ἄ
the sinners and ungodly have wrought and ungodly committed against Him.		κατ' αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἀσεβεῖς.	

In estimating the importance of the variations here exhibited, account must be taken of the strong probability that in the course of centuries the text of Enoch would be gradually assimilated to that of St Jude's Epistle in this passage. In this way we may account for the fact that the eighth century

¹ That the latter citation is from the Book of Enoch and not from St Jude is shown by Zahn, *Geschichte des N. T. Kanons* ii. p. 798 sqq. Compare also

Zahn, *Forschungen* v. p. 158.

² Westcott and Hort omit αὐτῶν.

³ Westcott and Hort omit λόγων.

text of our Book (γ) agrees more closely with St Jude than that preserved in the Ethiopic version (4th or 5th cent.).

No other Canonical writer refers directly to the Book of Enoch, nor do the allusions (if any) to this work in the N.T. give us help in determining the text. We turn therefore to writings outside the Canon. Not the least important of these, both on account of its early date (before A.D. 70) and on account of the large number of references contained in it to our Book, is the *Book of Jubilees*. I take the passages which are critically helpful in their order, making use of Mr Charles' translation in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* Nos. 21, 24, 26.

(1) iv. 15 'And he called his name Jared; for in his days the angels of the Lord descended upon the earth, those who are named the Watchers, *that they should instruct the children of men, and that they should do judgment and uprightness on the earth.*' This seems clearly to refer to *En.* vi. 6 (cvi. 13). But if so the words in italics¹ imply either that the narrative was supplemented from other sources, or more probably that the writer's text of *En.* vi. differed considerably from that which we now have. Compare the statement (v. 6, quoted below) that God sent the Watchers to the earth.

(2) iv. 22. 'They (the Watchers) *had begun to unite themselves, so as to be defiled, with the daughters of men.*' The context of these words alludes to the narrative of *En.* xii.² The words themselves, however, appear to be taken from *En.* vii. 1, where we have the following variations:

γ . ἤρξαντο εἰσπορεύεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὰς καὶ μαινεσθαι ἐν αὐταῖς.

σ . ἤρξαντο μαινεσθαι ἐν αὐταῖς.

ϵ . ἤρξαντο εἰσπορεύεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὰς καὶ ἐμίγησαν αὐταῖς.

The Book of Jubilees omits εἰσπ. π. αὐτάς³ (as σ) and

¹ It is remarkable that similar accounts of the cause of the descent of the Watchers are given, in passages founded on the Book of Enoch, in *Clem. Hom.* viii. 13, *Commodianus Instruct.* i. 3, *Lactant. Instit.* iii. 15.

All these passages will be quoted hereafter.

² Or perhaps xxxii. See below p. 185.

³ A phrase which may have crept in from *Gen.* vi. 4.

combines the readings of $\gamma \epsilon$, thus: ἤρξαντο μίγνυσθαι ταῖς θύγατ. τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦ μιανθῆναι ἐν αὐταῖς (cf. *En.* x. 11)¹.

(3) v. 2. 'And unrighteousness increased on the earth and all flesh corrupted its way, alike men and cattle and *beasts and birds and everything that walks on the earth*—all of them corrupted their ways and their orders, and they began to devour each other, and unrighteousness increased on the earth' &c. This is an expansion of Gen. vi. 12, 5 with the help of *En.* vii. 5, 4, x. 9 &c. A various reading, however, is implied in vii. 5—'beasts and birds' for 'birds and beasts'—if not a greater difference of text. This becomes still clearer when we compare another passage which undoubtedly quotes vii. 5, viz. *Jub.* vii. 24, 'And after these *they sinned*² *against the beasts and birds and all that walks and moves on the earth.*'

(4) v. 6. 'And against the angels *whom He had sent upon the earth*, He was exceeding wroth, so that He overthrew them wholly *out of all their dominion.*' Both the italicized phrases seem to imply a longer text of the Book than we now possess. The former has been already referred to; the latter will be discussed presently.

(5) vii. 22. 'And they (the Watchers) begat sons the Naphidim, *and they were all unlike*, and they devoured one another: and *the giants slew the Naphil, and the Naphil slew the Eljo, and the Eljo mankind*, and one man another.' This confused passage is plainly founded on *En.* vii. 2—5, but with large additions. It agrees most closely with the text of σ , though it by no means exactly tallies with it. σ informs us that the women bore three races ($\gammaένη$), 'first great giants; and the giants begat Naphelim and to the Naphelim were born Elioud.' If (which is not proved) *En.* lxxxvi. 4, lxxxviii. 2 were contemporary with vii. 2—5 and by the same author, the remark of Hilgenfeld and others, that these passages imply a threefold division of the giants, would have great weight against the text of $\gamma \epsilon$. However in this case I prefer to suppose that $\gamma \epsilon$ give

¹ This reading seems also to be implied in *Clem. Hom.* viii. 13, to be quoted lower down. Note the words

μίξιν and μισμοῖς.

² Mr Charles notes that his text is here 'restored from *En.* vii. 5.'

the earlier form of text, the glosses of σ and *Jub.* being drawn from, possibly, a common source.

(6) viii. 3. 'He found a writing...it contained the teaching of the Watchers whereby they had founded the astrology (Dillmann: 'saw the chariots') of the sun and moon and stars in all the signs of heaven.' According to Dillmann's reading the 'chariots of the sun' &c. may be explained by *En.* lxxii. 5. But if Mr Charles' conjectural emendation be accepted, we have a pretty clear allusion to *En.* viii. 3, where the various authorities give us the following readings:

E. 'Baraq'al [taught] the astrologers, Kokabel the signs, and Temel taught astrology, and Asradel the course of the moon.'

γ. 'Ρακιήλ [ἐδίδαξεν] ἀστρολογίας, Χωχχικήλ τὰ σημειωτικά, Σα(θι)ήλ ἀστεροσκοπίαν, Σεριή(λ) σεληνοναγίας (σεληνωγιάς Charles).

σ. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος ἐδίδαξεν ἀστρολογίαν, ὁ δὲ ὄγδοος ἐδίδαξεν ἀεροσκοπίαν. ὁ δὲ τρίτος ἐδίδαξε τὰ σημεῖα τῆς γῆς. ὁ δὲ ἕβδομος ἐδίδαξε τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ ἡλίου. ὁ δὲ εἰκοστὸς ἐδίδαξε τὰ σημεῖα τῆς σελήνης.

If this is the passage referred to, it will be seen that the *Book of Jubilees* implies a text different from all the three authorities, but having some resemblance to all. It approaches perhaps most closely to σ^1 .

No other purely Jewish writing seems to give us assistance in fixing the text of our Book. We come therefore in the next place to a Judaic work of perhaps earlier date, with Christian interpolations, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. This

¹ Two verses in the *Book of Jubilees* at first view appear to refer expressly to passages in the Book of Enoch, not found in the current texts. They are vii. 37, 38 ('And in the fifth year make ye the release.....For thus did Enoch...command his son, and Methuselah his son Lamech, and Lamech commanded me'), and xxi. 10 ('And eat its meat on that day...and let nothing be left over for the third day;

for it is not acceptable...and all who eat thereof will bring sin upon themselves; for thus I have found it written in the books of my forefathers, and in the words of Enoch, and in the words of Noah'). I hesitate however to press these passages, for the writer seems to refer rather to a supposed oral tradition, than to any writing which passed under the name of Enoch.

work contains no less than nine express references to the Book, or Books, or Writing, or Words of Enoch, no one of which contains the *ipsissima verba* of any passage in the Book as at present extant. It would be rash, however, to conclude that all these allude to passages which existed in a longer text, current in the time of the writer of the *Testaments*. And that for several reasons.

In the first place it is certain (though the fact does not seem to have been generally observed by editors of the Book of Enoch) that in at least one of these places the citation is made, not from Enoch at all, but from the O.T. in the Septuagint version. At *Zeb.* 3, we find, by way of introduction to a quotation of Deut. xxv. 9, the words Διὰ τοῦτο ἐν γραφῇ νόμου Ἐνώχ γέγραπται. Plainly either the original writer or a scribe wrote νόμου Ἐνώχ for νόμου Μωυσέως. Probably the former supposition is correct: for the writer would have been dull indeed if he had made one of Jacob's sons to mention the Law of Moses! But however this may be, it is clear that what has happened in one case may have happened in others. Any one of the eight remaining citations from 'Enoch' may be in truth an extract from some writing having no connexion whatever with that patriarch.

But again, supposing (which will be granted) that some of them are from the Book of Enoch, it is evident that the author of the *Testaments* must have doctored his citations very considerably; or at the least he must have applied to them a very peculiar method of exegesis. For in almost all the cases mentioned the writer professes to find in *Enoch* a prediction of the future doings or fortunes of some *one* of the *tribes* of Israel. Now there is at present (with the exception of lxxxix. 12 sqq.) no mention of the *tribes* of Israel in the Book of Enoch either in its Ethiopic or in its Slavonic form, and it seems utterly impossible to imagine that in any earlier form of the text any such mention of distinct tribes existed. The citations therefore must be very free, or rather very much garbled—so much so perhaps as in some cases to be quite unrecognizable. I think therefore that we are not justified in the inference that the writer of the *Testaments* quotes from an earlier recension of the

Book of Enoch passages not found in the present text, so long as passages can be found bearing even the faintest resemblance to the supposed extract.

For this reason I am disposed to treat as sufficiently satisfied by our present text of the Book some allusions which might otherwise have been regarded as more than doubtful. Thus probably *Sim.* 5 = *En.* x. 9, 12a¹; *Lev.* 10 = *En.* lxxxix. 50 (so Dillmann and Charles); *Lev.* 16 = *En.* x. 12, combined with xv. 8—xvi. 1 (but about this I confess I am very doubtful); *Jud.* 18 = *En.* lxxxix. 53 sqq. (see below); *Dan.* 5 (? read *αὐτῶν* for *ὑμῶν*) = *En.* liv. 6². *Lev.* 14 may be intended as a general reference, giving the drift of the teaching in numerous passages, such, for example, as lxxxix. 53 sqq. On the other hand *Naph.* 4 and *Benj.* 9 are more probably to be traced to *Slav. En.* xxxiv. 2, as Mr Charles has shown³.

It will be seen that, while I am content to regard all these references (with the single exception of *Zeb.* 3) as being accounted for by our present text of Enoch (Ethiopic or Slavonic), the allusion is in most cases so unsatisfactory that we cannot hope to make much use of it in our attempts to solve the problem whether that text is absolutely correct. One of the passages, however, does give us some help. It is *Jud.* 18. First of all let us satisfy ourselves that we have referred it to its true source. This we shall most easily do by writing it out,

¹ This I think more likely to be the passage referred to than *Slav. En.* xxxiv., on account of the mention of the destruction of the evil workers in battle: *πόλεμον Κυρίου πολεμήσει, καὶ νικήσει πᾶσαν παρεμβολὴν ὑμῶν*. On the other hand the two forms (A and B) of *Slav. En.* xxxiv. differ from each other, and have scarcely any resemblance to *Test. Sim.* 5.

² Charles (p. 37 sq.) says that *En.* lxxi. 15 is the passage directly referred to in *Test. Dan.* 5. It is perhaps quoted lower down in the section (*βοῶν ὑμῶν εἰρήνην*), but no part of *En.* lxxi. 15 bears any similarity whatever to what the writer asserts that he 'read in the

Book of Enoch.' In Mr Charles' *Book of the Secrets of Enoch* the direct reference is said to be to *Slav. En.* xviii. 3 (a verse which is omitted in ms. B). But there is nothing there to correspond to *πνευμάτων τῆς πλάνης*. The sin of the Watchers is that they 'rejected the Lord.' In *Eth. En.* liv. 6 they are said to have 'led astray those who dwell on the earth.'

³ It should be observed that the parallel between these passages of the *Testaments* and that cited from *Slav. En.* appears only in the form of the latter given in ms. A, from which B differs widely.

with what we take to be the corresponding passage of Enoch. A glance at the words printed in thick type in *Jud.* 18, and those italicized in Enoch, will make it pretty clear that there is between the two passages a resemblance not only in idea but in phraseology.

Jud. 18 "Ὅτι καίγε ἀνέγνων ἐν βίβλοις Ἐνώχ τοῦ δικαίου, ὅσα κακὰ ποιήσετε ἐπ' ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις. φυλάξασθε οὖν, τέκνα μου, ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τῆς φιλαργυρίας... ὅτι ταῦτα ἀφιστᾶ νόμου Θεοῦ, καὶ τυφλοὶ τὸ διαβούλιον τῆς ψυχῆς... καὶ προφήτη λαλοῦντι οὐχ ὑπακούει... Δύο γὰρ πάθη ἐναντία τῶν ἐντολῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ δουλεύων Θεῷ Θεοῦ ὑπακούειν οὐ δύναται ὅτι ἐτύφλωσαν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὡς ἐν νυκτὶ πορεύεται.

Enoch lxxxix. 53 sq. 'And many other sheep [i.e. prophets] he sent to those sheep... they forsook the house of the Lord... they fell away entirely and their eyes were blinded.'

We may take it then that *Jud.* 18 is an application of *En.* lxxxix. 53 sq. Now it so happens that another writer has made a free quotation from 'the Scripture,' which has been generally agreed to be taken from the immediate context of this passage. In the *Epistle of Barnabas* xvi. 5 we find the words λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή· καὶ ἔσται ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν ἡμερῶν, καὶ παραδώσει κύριος τὰ πρόβατα τῆς νομῆς καὶ τὴν μάνδραν καὶ τὸν πύργον αὐτῶν εἰς καταφθοράν.

This Gebhardt and Harnack (*Pat. Ap. Fasc. I. Part II. Ed. II. p. 70*), after Hilgenfeld, regard as a citation from *En.* lxxxix. 56, 66, 67. They have indeed some hesitation in doing so owing to the absence of the words καὶ ἔσται ἐπ' ἐσχ. τῶν ἡμερῶν. Now if we turn back to *Test. Jud.* 18 we find there also nearly the same words at the beginning of the citation, ἐπ' ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις. The conclusion seems irresistible that somewhere in *En.* lxxxix. 53—56 the words 'in the last days' occurred, though they have disappeared from the text now in our hands.

This is our sole result from express references to the Book of Enoch in the *Testaments*. Nor do we gain much more from the few remaining allusions. They are, so far as they have been observed, three in number. The words (*Dan.* 5) βοῶν ὑμῖν εἰρήνην, if they are taken from *En.* lxxi. 15, support E there,

and in fact (if they are not an independent rendering of the original) enable us to recover a few words of ϵ . *Naphth.* 3 recalls several passages of Enoch, but does not contribute to fix their text. And finally *Reub.* 5 refers to *En.* vi. 1, 2, viii. 1, &c., but inaccurately, inasmuch as the ornaments of the women are made the source of attraction to the angels, while our Book represents them as communicated to the women by them¹. This can scarcely be accounted for by mere difference of text. The same passage it may be observed seems to refer more definitely to *En.* xix. 2 (ὅτι πᾶσα γυνή δολιευομένη ἐν τούτοις εἰς κόλασιν τοῦ αἰῶνος τετήρηται, where perhaps it agrees with E rather than with γ), and to lxxxvi. 3 (μετεσχηματίζοντο εἰς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐν τῇ συνοσίᾳ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτῶν συνεφαίνοντο αὐταῖς = 'they became bulls among those cattle')².

Leaving now the Judæo-Christian *Testaments* we pass naturally to examine, still with the same object in view, the quotations or allusions found in early Christian writings.

In the *Epistle of Barnabas* iv. 3 the words 'as Enoch saith' are followed by a sentence which is not even a free quotation of anything in our Book. See Lods, *Le Livre d'Hénoch*, p. xliv.

Our next witness shall be the *Apocalypse of Peter*. In the early part of the extant fragment of that work (v. 3) the writer has occasion to describe the appearance of two 'righteous brethren that had departed from the world,' and had re-appeared to the twelve disciples. The passage runs as follows³:

καὶ εὐχομένων ἡμῶν ἄφνω φαίνονται δύο ἄνδρες ἐστῶτες ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ Κυρίου πρὸς ἔω, (a) οἷς οὐκ ἐδυνήθημεν ἀντιβλέψαι. (b) ἐξήρχετο γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως αὐτῶν ἀκτίν ὡς ἡλίου, καὶ φωτινὸν ἦν αὐτῶν ὄλον τὸ ἔνδυμα, ὁποῖον οὐδέποτε ὀφθαλμὸς ἀνθρώπου εἶδεν, οὐδὲ στόμα δύναται ἐξηγήσασθαι ἢ καρδία ἐκφράσαι τὴν δόξαν ἣν ἐνεδέδυντο, (c) καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῆς προσόψεως αὐτῶν... (d) τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα αὐτῶν ἦν λευκότερα πάσης χιόνος καὶ ἐρυθρότερα παντὸς ῥόδου... οὐ δύναμαι ἐξηγήσασθαι τὸ κάλλος αὐτῶν. (e) ἢ τε γὰρ κόμη

¹ See however below, p. 207.

² Cf. *Clem. Hom.* viii. 13, quoted below.

³ Robinson and James, *The Gospel according to Peter and the Revelation of Peter*, p. 89.

αὐτῶν οὐλη ἦν καὶ ἀνθηρὰ καὶ ἐπιπρέπουσα αὐτῶν τῷ τε προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ὄμοις, κ.τ.έ.

There can be no doubt that this passage is founded on two nearly identical verses of *En.* cvi. I give them (vv. 2, 10) as they are found in the Ethiopic, marking the several clauses with letters corresponding to those which I have inserted in the extract from the *Apocalypse*.

‘And (d) his body (v. 10 the colour of his body) was white as (v. 10 is whiter than) snow and red as (v. 10 redder than) a blooming rose, and (e) the hair of his head (v. 2 adds ‘and his long locks’) was white as (v. 10 is whiter than white) wool, and (c) his eyes beautiful (v. 10 [b] his eyes are like the rays of the sun). And when he opened his eyes he lighted up the whole house (v. 2 adds ‘like the sun, and the whole house was very full of light’).’

Now this chapter is generally regarded as a late interpolation, taken by the final editor of the Book of Enoch—naturally, of course, with some alterations and adaptations—from an independent writing which we may call the Noachic Work. The question therefore arises, Did the author of the *Apocalypse* base his description on the Book of Enoch as we have it, or on the chapter as it stood in its original form in the Noachic Work? I think we must decide in favour of the former supposition on the following grounds. The passage in the *Apocalypse* is in the main founded on the verses which I have transcribed, but it is also influenced by at least one other sentence of the Book of Enoch, which we have no reason to believe was connected with the Noachic book. The phrase ‘whiter than any snow’ (λευκότερα πάσης χιόνος) it will be observed is not identical with that of *En.* cvi. 2, 10. But exactly the same expression is found in *En.* xiv. 19, 20: ‘Underneath the throne came forth rivers of flaming fire and I could not look upon it (οὐκ ἐδυνάσθην ἰδεῖν, cf. *Apoc. Pet.* 3 οὐκ ἐδυνήθημεν ἀντιβλέψαι)...His raiment (τὸ περιβόλαιον αὐτοῦ) was as the appearance of the sun, more resplendent (cf. *Apoc. Pet.* 3 φωτινὸν ἦν αὐτῶν ὅλον τὸ ἔνδυμα) and whiter than any snow (λευκότερον πάσης χιόνος).’ It is abundantly evident that the writer has used *En.* xiv. 19—21, consciously or un-

consciously, as well as the verses with which we are immediately concerned. But this is not his only debt to the Book of Enoch. Verse 4 of the fragment asks the question 'And where are all the righteous, or of what sort is the world wherein they are'? The answer is given in verse 5: and as we read it we cannot but be struck with the numerous expressions which recall the descriptions of Paradise and similar passages in the Book of Enoch. The earth blooms with unfading flowers bearing a blessed fruit: and so strong was their perfume¹ that it was borne even to us from thence. So in *En.* xxiv. 3, xxv. 4 sqq., the throne is encircled with fragrant trees; and among them is a tree such as Enoch had never smelt; it has a fragrance beyond all fragrance; its leaves and blooms and wood wither not for ever: its fruit is beautiful, and by its fruit life will be given to the elect. Then, as to those who dwell therein, they are encircled with angels, and with one voice they praise the Lord God, rejoicing in that place; just as in *Enoch* lxi. 10—12 all the host of heaven above, and the angels, and the elect who dwell in the garden of life, raise one voice and bless and glorify the Lord of Spirits with one voice². The description of the dwelling of the righteous is followed (v. 6 sqq.) by that of the place of torment. The righteous were seen in bright array, as in *En.* cviii. 12 they are clad in shining light, while those who are being punished have their raiment dark (cf. *En.* lxii. 10, 15, 16). They are punished by 'tormenting angels' (cf. *En.* liii. 3; lvi. 1; lxii. 11; lxiii. 1; lxvi. 1), and the instrument of torture is fire (*En.* x. 13, xc. 24, xcvi. 3, sqq., cviii. 5, sqq.). Prominent among them are those who blaspheme (cf. *En.* xxvii. 2, cviii. 6) the way of righteousness (cf. *En.* xci. 18, xciv. 1, &c.), and the wealthy who trusted in their wealth (cf. *En.* xcvi. 8, &c.).

Some of the coincidences here noted may not amount to conclusive proof of borrowing. But on the whole they point to knowledge of the Book of Enoch. We may conclude therefore that the writer had before him this Book, and not the Noachic Work. What evidence then does the description in

¹ So James. The Greek however is
 τοσοῦτον δὲ ἦν τὸ ἄνθος.

² The phrase 'one voice' is three
 times repeated.

Apoc. Pet. 3 yield as to the text of the Book of Enoch which the writer had before him? In order to answer this question we must invoke the aid of another document. Dr James discovered about four years ago in the British Museum a manuscript containing what has been regarded as a Latin translation of *En.* cvi. 1—18¹. This Latin fragment (which we shall call λ) however differs considerably from the Ethiopic text, and in a manner that cannot be accounted for by mere accident of transcription. In particular, it speaks of Enoch uniformly in the third person, while in the Ethiopic Enoch himself is the narrator (vv. 1, 8, 13). Again, vv. 13 b, 14, 17 (originally consecutive as Mr Charles thinks) are absent from the Latin, and they are evidently interpolated in the Ethiopic. The phrase of v. 13 a 'The Lord will do a new thing in the earth,' while a very suitable introduction to the prediction of the deluge (v. 15), has no meaning with reference to the verses which in the present text actually follow it: and these verses contain an account of the fall of the Watchers plainly founded on *En.* vi. sqq., constituting the only allusion to that event in the chapter², and introducing an element quite foreign to the simple and consistent narrative preserved in the Latin. For these and other reasons, which cannot be given here, I incline to the opinion that Dr James' Latin is rendered, not from our Book, but from the Noachic Work³.

We now proceed to transcribe the Latin of vv. 2, 10, lettering the clauses as has been already done in the passages extracted from the *Apocalypse* and the Ethiopic Enoch.

'(b) cui oculi sunt sicut radi solis (e) capilli (v. 2 *adds* autem) eius candidiores (v. 2 *adds* in) septies niue (d) corpori⁴ autem eius (a) nemo hominum potest intueri.'

Let us compare *Apoc. Pet.* 3 with *Enoch* cvi. 2, 10 (which

¹ Printed in Appendix E of Mr Charles' *Book of Enoch*, and more correctly by Dr James, *Apocrypha Anecdota*, p. 148.

² Except perhaps 'the children of the angels of heaven' (v. 5), which is absent from the Latin.

³ See further below p. 225, note 1.

⁴ I suppose we should read 'corpus,' and that after 'eius' the words 'est candidius niue' have fallen out. 'Corpori autem eius' will thus be the remnant of clause (d), and I have therefore marked it with that letter. But the point is immaterial.

we denote by E) and this text (λ). The two former passages we have already given in full.

First, we remark in the *Apocalypse* the description of the hair as curling &c. upon their face *and shoulders*. This is doubtless based on the 'long locks' mentioned in E only (v. 2). The Ethiopic reading is thus verified, and λ is proved to have omitted a clause contained in its archetype.

Once more. We see five expressions in the *Apocalypse*, marked severally *abcde*, which are found in the following order in E and λ —E (v. 2): *dec*; E (v. 10): *deb*; λ (vv. 2, 10): *bed a*. Mr Charles (p. 373) regards the phrase *c* in v. 2 as a corrupt reading of the Ethiopic for *b*, and quotes *Apoc. Pet.* in favour of this opinion. Both *b* and *c* however occur in *Apoc. Pet.*¹, and this very fact vindicates the text of E. λ has improperly assimilated the text of v. 2 to that of v. 10, and so omits *c* altogether.

But, on the other hand, the same reasoning convicts E of error in omitting clause *a* in both verses. It occurs in both in λ : in one or other, if not in both, it must be correct since it is found in *Apoc. Pet.* It is not to be thought of that in both this authority² and λ it came from xiv. 19; though it is quite true that its presence in the genuine text of the passage before us may have suggested the earlier verse to the mind of the writer of the *Apocalypse*, and so contributed to bring about the colouring which his words have undoubtedly received from it.

The main result then of our argument has been to show that our text of the Book of Enoch has omitted (either in v. 2 or v. 10 or both) some such words as 'no man could look upon him,' which stood in the chapter as read by the author of the *Apocalypse of Peter*.

¹ Which in both cases alike reads 'countenance' ($\delta\psi\iota\varsigma$) for 'eyes'—a variation easily explained on the supposition of a Semitic original of the Book of Enoch. It suggests however the question, at present unanswerable, Did the writer of the *Apocalypse* read Enoch in the version represented by $\epsilon\gamma\sigma$ or in another translation? Com-

pare the next foot-note.

² The Greek of clause *a* in *Apoc. Pet.* differs from that of *En.* xiv. 19 (γ), though equivalent in meaning. And there is of course no evidence that the writer of the Noachic Work was even acquainted with the first section of our Book.

Justin Martyr¹ and Athenagoras² appear to quote from the Book of Enoch, but they do not expressly mention it as their authority. If they drew from it alone, their text must have been very different from ours in the first section. It is possible, however, that they combine passages from different writings³. One fact however must not be left without notice. Both these writers prefix to their mention of the fall of the angels a passage about the office of angels in the government of the world. No such passage occurs *in this connexion*⁴ in our Book of Enoch. In this introductory passage Athenagoras has further a statement of the free-will of the angels. After this preface both writers allude to the fall of the angels, the subsequent birth of the giants, and the maleficent influence of the demons. It is not a little remarkable that Tertullian, in a passage of his *Apology* (c. 22)⁵ closely resembling those of Justin and Athenagoras, uses these words, 'Sed quomodo de angelis quibusdam *sua sponte*

¹ *Apol.* ii. 5 ὁ θεός...τὴν μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν πρόνοιαν ἀγγέλοις, οὓς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἔταξε, παρέδωκεν· οἱ δὲ ἀγγελοὶ, παραβάντες τὴνδε τὴν τάξιν, γυναικῶν μίξεσιν ἠτήθησαν, καὶ παῖδας ἐτέκνωσαν, οἱ εἰσὶν οἱ λεγόμενοι δαίμονες· καὶ προσέτι λοιπὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος ἑαυτοῖς ἐδόλωσαν· τὰ μὲν διὰ μαγικῶν γραφῶν, τὰ δὲ διὰ φόβων καὶ τιμωριῶν ἐπέφερον, τὰ δὲ διὰ διδαχῆς θυμάτων καὶ θυμιαμάτων, καὶ σπονδῶν, ὧν ἐνδεεῖς γεγόνασι, μετὰ τὸ πάθειν ἐπιθυμιῶν δουλωθῆναι καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπους, φόνους, πολέμους, μοιχείας, ἀκολασίας, καὶ πᾶσαν κακίαν ἔσπειραν.

² *Legatio* 24 sqq. τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων σύστασις τῷ θεῷ ἐπὶ προνοίᾳ γέγονε τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διακεκοσμημένοις, ἵνα τὴν μὲν παντελικὴν καὶ γενικὴν ὁ θεὸς τῶν ὄλων πρόνοιαν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους, οἱ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ταχθέντες ἀγγελοὶ ὡς δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, αὐθαίρετον καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν ἐχόντων... καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἐν ὁμοίῳ καθέστηκεν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι αὐθαίρετοι δὴ,

οἱοὶ γεγόνασι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔμειναν, ἐφ' οἷς αὐτοὺς ἐποίησεν καὶ διέταξεν ὁ θεός· οἱ δὲ ἐνύβρισαν καὶ τῇ τῆς οὐσίας ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ...ἐκείνοι μὲν, εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν πεσόντες παρθένων, καὶ ἥττους σαρκὸς εὐρέθεντες· οὗτος δὲ, ἀμελήσας καὶ πονηρὸς περὶ τὴν τῶν πεπιστευμένων γενόμενος διοίκησιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν περὶ τὰς παρθένους ἐχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι ἐγεννήθησαν γίγαντες...οὗτοι τοίνυν οἱ ἀγγελοὶ οἱ ἐκπεσόντες τῶν οὐρανῶν, περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ἔχοντες καὶ τὴν γῆν, οὐκέτι εἰς τὰ ὑπερουράνια ὑπερκύψαι δυνάμενοι· καὶ αἱ τῶν γιγάντων ψυχαὶ, οἱ περὶ τὸν κόσμον εἰσὶ πλανώμενοι δαίμονες...καὶ οἱ μὲν περὶ τὰ εἰδῶλα αὐτοὺς ἔλκοντες, οἱ δαίμονες εἰσὶν οἱ προειρημένοι, κ.τ.ε.

³ Indeed this seems to be implied by the statement of Athenagoras (24) that his statements were founded upon what had already been said by the prophets—ἀ τοῖς προφήταις (plural) ἐκπεφώνηται.

⁴ Something similar is implied in *En.* lx. 15—21, cf. *Jub.* ii. 2.

⁵ Migne i. 405.

corruptis corruptior gens daemonum evaserit...apud litteras sanctas ordine cognoscitur.' Here again we have the allusion to the free-will of the Watchers preceding the mention of their fall. And finally St Jude (v. 6) where he alludes to the fall of the angels, though he does not mention specially their freedom, does refer to their previous office of authority and rule. The angels, he says, 'kept not their own *principality* (τὴν ἐαυτῶν ἀρχήν¹), but left their proper habitation.' Shall we be wrong in inferring that in the copies of Enoch known to Justin, Athenagoras, Tertullian and St Jude, chap. vi. (which in our text begins so abruptly) was introduced by a statement of the office and of the freedom of angelic beings²?

However this may be, it is quite certain that in other respects Tertullian's Book of Enoch differed in its text from ours. Let us take, for example, the well-known passage from the *De Cultu Feminarum* I. 2³. 'Nam et illi qui ea constituerunt, damnati in poenam mortis deputantur, illi scilicet angeli, qui ad filias hominum de coelo ruerunt, ut haec quoque ignominia feminae accedat. Nam cum et materias quasdam bene occultas et artes plerasque non bene revelatas saeculo multo magis imperito prodidissent, siquidem et metallorum opera nudaverant et herbarum ingenia traduxerant et incantationum vires divulgaverant et omnem curiositatem usque ad stellarum interpretationem designaverant, proprie et quasi peculiariter feminis instrumentum istud muliebris gloriae contulerunt, lumina lapillorum, quibus monilia variantur, et circulos ex auro, quibus brachia arctantur, et medicamenta ex fuco, quibus lanae colorantur, et illum ipsum nigrum pulverem, quo oculorum exordia

¹ This word is used in a similar connexion by Athenagoras *Leg.* 24, v. sup.

² This inference is confirmed by passages in other writers which will be quoted below. It may be well to bring the references together in a footnote. The free-will of the angels is mentioned in connexion with their fall in *The Book of the Laws of Countries*, Lactantius *Instit.* ii. 14, Tatian, *Ad Graec.* 7, *Acts of Disputation of Arche-*

laus and Manes 32, and, we may add, *Apoc. Bar.* lvi. 10 sqq. ('Etiam angelis fuit periculum. Adhuc enim illo tempore quo creatus fuit, erat eis libertas; et descenderunt ex eis et commisti sunt cum mulieribus,' &c.). Their former office is more or less distinctly referred to in Papias *ap. Andreas* Caes. in *Apoc.* c. 34 *Serm.* 12, *Clementine Hom.* viii. 13, *Clem. Recog.* iv. 26.

³ Migne i. 1305.

producuntur.' He is here citing *En.* vii. 1, viii. 1, in which we have the list of the forbidden things made known by the Watchers to their wives. Among these he mentions necklaces (monilia)¹, found in neither E nor γ . He speaks also of dye for wool (lanae)², which is not given in our text, and he has 'brilliant stones' (lumina lapillorum: so in the parallel passage *De Cult. Fem.* ii. 10 lapidum illustrium), where E gives us 'the most costly and choicest stones,' and γ λίθους ἐκλεκτούς. All this might be set down to free rendering, or *memoriter* citation, were it not that in two instances Tertullian receives support from Cyprian. He refers (*De Hab. Virg.* 14, Hartel i. p. 197; see below p. 213), though without expressly naming his authority, to the same passage of Enoch, and for the same purpose, as Tertullian. He quotes independently, and probably directly from the Greek³, for the list which he gives of the arts revealed by the angels differs both by excess and defect from that of the earlier writer. The Latin renderings of the Greek are not in most cases those of Tertullian, and in one word he follows a different reading⁴. Yet he agrees with Tertullian in adding bracelets (monilia)⁵ to the list in our text, and in saying that the Watchers taught the women 'tinguere et colorare lanas.'

A more serious discrepancy between our text and that of Tertullian is revealed by the same passage from the *De Cultu Fem.* He is labouring (cap. 3) to meet the objection to the genuineness of our Book that Enoch's writings must have perished in the flood.

He argues that the teaching of Enoch was handed down orally through Methuselah to Noah. He proves that this was so by the curious reasoning that if Noah had not inherited the teaching of Enoch, he would have written something of his

¹ Possibly however the words 'quibus monilia variantur' are a gloss, due to Tertullian himself.

² There is a various reading *genae*. Cf. also for the reading 'dye for wool' Commodianus *Inst.* i. 3, *Clem. Hom.* viii. 14, *Book of Adam and Eve* ii. 20, quoted below.

³ There is no difficulty in this sup-

position, see *Dict. Christ. Biog.* i. p. 751.

⁴ His 'pretiosa grana...gravia, etsi non suo pondere, mercium tamen quantitate' are doubtless the 'most costly stones' of E.

⁵ 'Nec distinctis auro lapillis aut margaritis contexta serie et numerosa conpage digestis monilia instituit.'

own¹. Such at least appears to be his meaning. If so, it is implied that Tertullian knew of no writings by him esteemed as genuine productions of Noah's pen. But passages claiming Noachic authorship are found in our text of the Book of Enoch, viz. lx. (see v. 8) and lxx—lxxix. 25. These passages must therefore have been absent from Tertullian's copy².

Tertullian quotes *verbatim* no more than two verses of our Book. They are cited in a passage of the *De Idololatria* (cap. 4)³, which I now transcribe.

'Antecesserat Enoch praedicens omnia elementa, omnem mundi censum, quae caelo, quae mari, quae terra continentur, in idololatrian versuros daemones et spiritus desertorum angelorum, ut pro deo adversus deum consecrarentur...Denique idem Enoch simul et cultores idoli et fabricatores in comminatione praedamnat: Et rursus iuro uobis peccatores, quod in diem *sanguinis perditionis iustitia* parata est, *qui seruitis lapidibus*, et *qui imagines facitis aureas et argenteas et ligneas et lapideas et fictiles et seruitis phantasmatis et daemones et spiritibus infernis* et omnibus erroribus non secundum scientiam nullum ab iis *invenietis* auxilium.' The last sentence is obviously a citation of *En.* xcix. 6, 7: 'Again I swear to you sinners that *sin* is prepared for a day of *unceasing bloodshed*. *And they will worship stones*, and *others will make graven images of gold and silver and wood and clay*, and *others will worship impure spirits and demons* and all kinds of superstitions not according to knowledge, *notwithstanding* no manner of help *will be found* in them.' I have italicized the words in which Tertullian's text differs from ours, and considering the length of the passage their number is sufficiently remarkable⁴. Some of the variants

¹ 'Igitur sine dubio potuit Noe in praedicationis delegatione successisse, vel quia et alias non tacuisset tam de dei conservatoris sui dispositione quam de ipsa domus suae gloria.'

² It may be remarked that Tertullian seems (like σ) to have read consecutively *En.* vii. 1 and viii. 1.

³ Reifferscheid and Wissowa i. p. 33. After 'Et rursus' the editors place a colon, and make the quotation begin

with 'iuro.' But this seems to be an error.

⁴ See, for a discussion of the bearing of this passage on the value of the Ethiopic text, Lods, p. xlii. sq. M. Lods concludes his investigation with the remark that this passage, the most favourable to E of all patristic citations, does not bear unreserved testimony to its text.

may be due to free rendering, but a sufficient balance remains to convince us that ϵ must have differed largely from Tertullian's Greek.

What part of our Book Tertullian refers to in the opening sentence of this extract is not quite clear. Most probably, it would seem, to xix. 1. No other passage suits his language so well. But if this verse was the passage of Enoch to which he alludes, his text of it must have varied from ours. Let us observe that he identifies the 'demons' of this verse with the 'spirits' of the fallen angels. Herein he differs from modern commentators (e.g. Charles and Lods), but has with him apparently the unanimous testimony of the earliest writers who quote the passage. Whether this difference between ancient and modern expositors involves a difference of text or is a mere matter of exegesis, I will not undertake to say. But it is not easy to imagine how Tertullian could have regarded his account of the prediction of Enoch as a fair representation of the passage as it stands in E. There is nothing in our text about all the elements being consecrated instead of God against God. Either Tertullian's text of xix. 1 was very unlike ours, or he was quoting a passage not in our Book of Enoch at all. The remark equally applies to another citation in the same treatise (*De Idol.* 15)¹, in which I have no doubt he had the same passage of Enoch in view as here. It runs thus: 'Et utique scimus, licet nomina inania atque conficta sint, cum tamen in superstitionem deducuntur, rapere ad se daemonia et omnem spiritum inmundum per *consecrationis obligamentum* (cf. *consecrarentur* above).....Haec igitur ab initio praevidens Spiritus Sanctus etiam *ostia in superstitionem ventura* (note this fresh variation: there is nothing in our text of the Book of Enoch to support it) praececinit per antiquissimum propheten Enoch.'

With this passage our survey of the citations of Tertullian, so far as our present purpose is concerned, may cease.

Tertullian's elder contemporary, Clement of Alexandria, is the writer who next claims our attention. In *Eclog. Proph.* 2

¹ Reifferscheid and Wissowa i. p. 48.

(Migne, *Pat. Graec.* ix. 700) he assigns to Enoch a saying which is nowhere found in our Book—καὶ εἶδον τὰς ὕλας πάσας. Origen quotes the same sentence, in a passage of which only the Latin version is extant (*Princ.* iv. 35), in the form 'Universas materias perspexi'; and he states expressly that the words come from the *Book* of Enoch. The words have been regarded by Dillmann as taken from *En.* xix. 3. Against this is the fact that Clement seems to make God the speaker, not Enoch. In fact he takes the sentence as equivalent to the sentiment of the Song of the Three Holy Children (*Dan.* iii. 55), εὐλογημένος εἰ ὁ ἐπιβλέπων ἀβύσσους καθήμενος ἐπὶ χερουβίμ, explaining that ἀβυσσοὶ and ὕλαι are interchangeable. But, indeed, apart from this consideration we have only to write down the newly-recovered Greek of *En.* xix. 3, to see how utterly dissimilar it is to the words of Clement—κἀγὼ Ἐνώχ ἴδον...τὰ πέρατα πάντων. The passage therefore must be added to the list of extracts from the Book of Enoch not found in our present text.

Another citation from the Book of Enoch occurs in the same work of Clement (*Eclog. Proph.* 53, Migne ix. 723), in which we find the statement, Ἦδη δὲ καὶ Ἐνώχ φησιν, τοὺς παραβάντας ἀγγέλους διδάξαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀστρονομίαν καὶ μαντικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. It is natural to infer that the words ἀστρονομία and μαντικὴ occurred in the list of the arts mentioned in *En.* vii. 1, viii. 1, 3 in Clement's copy, though they are not found in our text. But too much stress must not be laid upon this argument, for Clement is quite possibly quoting from memory and with freedom.

One other allusion by the same writer remains to be mentioned. In *Strom.* v. 1, referring no doubt to *En.* xvi. 3, he declares that the Watchers made known to the women the unutterable things, κρυπτόντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀγγέλων, μάλλον δὲ τηρούντων εἰς τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου παρουσίαν. Ε and γ differ considerably in this place, but neither contains anything which might have served as a basis for the last clause. Here again we perhaps have a sentence of the Book of Enoch known to Clement, but not in our text.

We may now turn to the Gnostic work, *Pistis Sophia*, com-

posed in Egypt in the third century¹. In this extraordinary book the patriarch Enoch is twice mentioned, and each time in such a way as to imply that he was an inspired writer. In the first of the two passages referred to² Jesus is represented (Schwartz, p. 245 sq.) as speaking of certain 'mysteria tenuia,' and as contrasting them with the 'magna mysteria' which He is about to reveal, and which are to supersede the former. With reference to the 'tenuia mysteria,' He speaks thus: 'Invenietis ea in secundo libro Ieû, quae scripsit Enoch, quum loquerer cum eo ex arbore cognitionis et ex arbore vitae in παραδείσω Adami.' Words such as these give at least *prima facie* probability to the supposition that the writer was acquainted with some book or books ascribed to the patriarch Enoch which were held in considerable esteem. Moreover, the fact that Enoch is represented as having been in 'the Paradise of Adam' reminds us of passages in both the books of Enoch now extant (*Eth. En.* xxxii., *Slav. En.* viii.). But this passage does not stand alone. Thus at p. 25 mention is made of μυστήρια 'quae portarant desuper ἄγγελοι peccatores [παράβαινοντες], quorum (μυστηρίων) sunt μαγία'—an unmistakable allusion to *En.* vi. sqq. Two pages further on allusion is again made to the μυστήρια 'quae docuerunt ἄγγελοι παραβάντες ad perficienda sua facinora mala et ἄνομα in μυστηρίω συε μαγίας.' These words can scarcely fail to recall *En.* xvi. 3. And let us observe that in the sentences now cited the *Pistis Sophia* definitely parts company with the Slavonic Book. There is no mention in its parallel passage (xviii. 1 sqq.) of magic as taught by the Watchers. It is scarcely necessary to cite less evident allusions to our Book: but the words 'intuebitur in ἕλην omnem ad audiendum gemitum victorum' (p. 65), may perhaps remind us of the words cited by Clement of Alexandria and Origen, but no longer in the text as now extant. The conclusion towards which the passages just quoted clearly tend,

¹ C. Schmidt, *Gnostische Schriften in Koptischer Sprache* (Gebhardt and Harnack's *Texte u. Untersuchungen* viii. Bd.) p. 597 sq.

given by Schmidt (*op. cit.* p. 342 sq.) differs from that of Schwartz, but not in such a way as to disturb our reasoning.

² The translation of these passages

that our Book was in the hands of the writer of the *Pistis Sophia*, is confirmed by the second passage in that work in which Enoch's name occurs. A popular objection to the authenticity of the Book of Enoch, as Tertullian implies (*De Cult. Fem.* i. 3), was the supposition that if such a work had really existed in the time of the Patriarch it must have perished in the great catastrophe of the deluge. It was only natural that a writer who asked his readers to believe that another work of Enoch had been preserved should endeavour to meet, by anticipation, a similar difficulty. Here is the account of the matter given by the author of *Pistis Sophia* (p. 354): 'μυστήρια, quae in libro Ieû quae curavi (sc. Iesus), ut Enoch scriberet in παραδείσῳ, quum loquerer cum eo ex arbore cognitionis et ex arbore vitae, et quae curavi, ut poneret in πέτρα Ararad, et posui καλαπατανρωθ, ἄρχοντα, ...custodientem libros Ieû de κατακλυσμῶ, et ne quisquam ἀρχόντων φθόνησας iis perdat eos, quos dabo vobis, ubi jam dixero vobis emanationem universi.' But now the question arises, what are the Books of Ieû to which the writer refers? If we had no evidence beyond that supplied by the text of the *Pistis Sophia* it would be tempting and plausible to guess that they are the Book of Enoch itself. But a decisive and final answer to our question has been given by Dr Carl Schmidt, who has published from a Bodleian Papyrus two Coptic treatises, evidently belonging to the same cycle of teaching as the *Pistis Sophia*, the first of which claims to contain the λόγος κατὰ μυστήριον of Jeû and answers exactly to the description of the two books of Jeû given in the later work. But let us examine more closely the passages in which these books are spoken of. In both the mysteries contained in them are said to have been revealed to Enoch in the Paradise of Adam; in both they are said to have been written by him there when Jesus spoke to him out of the trees of Life and of Knowledge; in both these statements are made in terms almost identical; and in both he refers to a myth with which he clearly supposes his readers to be acquainted. Whence were they derived? In the Books of Jeû edited by Dr Schmidt there is no hint of such an origin of the mysteries with which they deal, they are set in quite a different framework. We turn

back then once more to the Book of Enoch in the hope that it may furnish an answer to our inquiry. That Jesus spoke with Enoch may be regarded as only another way of saying that he was inspired (cf. pp. 65, 72, 93, &c.): but why out of the trees of Knowledge and of Life? There is nothing certainly in the Book of Enoch which appears to indicate such a source of inspiration. But let us remember that the first section of the Book has all the appearance of being fragmentary. We can scarcely doubt, and indeed tangible proof has been already given, that whole chapters which once stood in the text are no longer there. Now in the thirty-second chapter Enoch is brought to paradise. As the Gizeh text has it, 'καὶ ἔλθὼν πρὸς τὸν παράδισον τῆς δικαιοσύνης' καὶ ἴδον μακρόθεν τῶν δένδρων τούτων δένδρα πλείονα καὶ μεγάλα· δύω μὲν ἐκεῖ μεγάλα σφόδρα καλὰ καὶ ἔνδοξα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, καὶ τὸ δένδρον τῆς φρονήσεως.' Then follows more about this tree, but no word of any other, in spite of the word 'δύω' in the third of the sentences just extracted. The text in the Ethiopic differs, and in some parts is undoubtedly corrupt. It involves therefore no very violent hypothesis to suppose that there is a hiatus, and that the true reading is 'δύω...[τὸ δένδρον τῆς ζωῆς] καὶ τὸ δένδρον τῆς φρονήσεως,' followed by a description of the tree of life. If this be admitted there is no difficulty in supposing that the text had also an account of a revelation to Enoch on this occasion¹, and that this is the passage which the author of *Pistis Sophia* had in view when he spoke of the Books of Ieû². It may therefore be regarded as at least possible that the story of Enoch receiving inspiration from the trees of Life and of Knowledge was an expansion of *En.* xxxii., and ultimately founded upon it.

If our argument has been sound the *Pistis Sophia* has enabled us to discover another place in which the text of our

¹ This may perhaps be implied also in *Jub.* iv. 23, 'And he was taken from amongst the children of men, and we conducted him into the Garden of Eden in majesty and honour, and behold there he writes down the condemnation and judgement of the world, and all the

wickedness of the children of men.'

² It is worth while to mention, by way of illustration, *Slav. En.* viii. 3 'the tree of life, in that place, on which God rests, when He comes into Paradise.' See also the passages referred to by Mr Charles *ad loc.*

Book is incorrectly represented in the manuscripts. And that we have not reasoned altogether incorrectly appears to be proved by two passages from the *Zohar* which had been cited by Archbishop Laurence¹, and the bearing of which on the text of *En.* xxxii. was perceived by M. Lods². I transcribe them from his work :

‘Sanctus et Benedictus sustulit eum (Enochum) ex mundo, ut ipsi serviret...*Ex eo inde tempore liber tradebatur, qui Enoch dictus est.* In hora qua Deus eum sustulit, ostendebat ei omnia repositoria suprema, ostendebat ei arborem vitae medio in horto, folia eius atque ramos. Videmus haec omnia in eius libro.’

And again: ‘In Enochi libro narratur, Sanctum et Benedictum, cum ascendere eum jusserit et omnia ei superiorum atque inferiorum regnorum repositoria ostenderit, monstrasse quoque *arborem vitae et arborem de qua Adamus praeceptum recepit* et monstrasse ei Adami domicilium in horto Eden.’

Let us now briefly sum up the results to which our survey of the early citations from the Book of Enoch have led us. We find the following passages quoted or alluded to by authors of the first two or three centuries of the Christian era in such a way as to imply that their text differed from that given us by any manuscript now known, of either the Greek or the Ethiopic version.

Enoch cited in

- i. 9 Jud. 14, 15, *Ad Novat.* 16.
- vi. 6 *Book of Jubilees* iv. 15, v. 6.
- vii. 1 *Book of Jubilees* iv. 22.
- vii. 1, viii. 1 Tert. *De Cult. Fem.* i. 2, ii. 10. Cyp. *De Hab. Virg.* 14. Clem. Alex. *Ecl. Proph.* liii.
- vii. 2—5 *Book of Jubilees* vii. 22.
- vii. 5 *Book of Jubilees* v. 2, vii. 24.
- viii. 3 *Book of Jubilees* viii. 3.
- xvi. 3 Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 1.
- xix. 1 (?) Tert. *De Idol.* 4, 15.

¹ Laurence, *The Book of Enoch the Prophet* p. xxix.

² Lods, *Le Livre d'Hénoch* p. 195 sq.

Enoch cited in

xxxii	<i>Pistis Sophia</i> 245, 354, &c.
lx. lxx.—lxix. 25	Tert. <i>De Cult. Fem.</i> i. 3.
lxxxix. 53 sqq.	<i>Test. Jud.</i> 18. <i>Ep. Barn.</i> xvi. 5.
xcix. 6, 7	Tert. <i>De Idol.</i> 4.
cvi. 2, 10	<i>Apoc. Pet.</i> 3.
?	<i>Ep. Barn.</i> iv. 3.
?	<i>Book of Jubilees</i> v. 6. <i>Jud.</i> 6. <i>Just. M.</i> <i>Apol.</i> ii. 5. <i>Athen. Legatio</i> 24 sqq. Tert. <i>Apol.</i> 22.
?	Clem. Alex. <i>Eclog. Proph.</i> 2. Origen, <i>Princ.</i> iv. 35.

It must be noted that of the seventeen passages just mentioned not less than ten, probably more, fall within the first thirty-two chapters. Thus even in them, where our materials are more abundant than in any other part of the book, we are far from possessing the earliest form of the text.

Perhaps it may not be amiss to conclude this portion of the present paper with an instance within the limits of the Book of Enoch itself, showing the great importance of the evidence in textual matters supplied by early quotations and allusions. The fourth section of our Book is probably by a different writer from the first. If so, it is a later composition by one who was well acquainted with the first section and follows it closely. Now, in lxxxviii. seq. we have his account of the events subsequent to the fall of the Watchers. In lxxviii. 1 we are told that 'one of those four who had come forth before (i.e. one of the Archangels)...seized that first star (i.e. Azazel) which had fallen from the heaven, and bound it' &c. This without doubt summarizes x. 4—8. Next (v. 2) 'one of them drew his sword and gave it to those elephants and camels and asses (i.e. the giants): then they began to smite each other' &c., a clear reference to x. 9 sqq. Then (v. 3) 'one of those four...cast (them) down from heaven, and they gathered and took all the great stars...and bound them' &c., alluding to x. 11—13. And finally (lxxxix. 1) 'one of those four went to that white bull (i.e. Noah) and instructed him in a secret' &c., which

corresponds to x. 1—3. The two passages x. 1—13, and lxxxviii., lxxxix. 1 tally exactly¹, and the latter is plainly based on the former. But, be it observed, if the two pieces (x. 1—3 and x. 11) which are regarded by Mr Charles² as interpolations, be omitted, the correspondence at once vanishes, only two of the four archangels having any specific mission to fulfil. Nothing can be clearer than that, if these passages are interpolated, they must have been already introduced into the text when the author of the fourth section wrote. And if the latter of the two be admitted to have belonged to the original text of the first section, very little reason remains for rejecting the other passages of the 'Semiaza cycle' vi. 3—8, viii. 1—3, ix. 7, however we may deal with the fact that some of them³ seem, as at present read, to conflict with other parts of the section.

II.

It now becomes our task to endeavour to discover what can be ascertained as to the use of the Book of Enoch in the Christian Church, and the degree of authority which was accorded to it by Ecclesiastical writers. We must pass in review all the Christian works of the early centuries in which, so far as we are aware, allusions are made to our Book. In order however to be of any real value this survey must be conducted systematically, and the method which we propose to follow is mainly geographical, rather than chronological. We will examine shortly the literature of each of the great

¹ Except indeed in the order of events. That which is mentioned first in chap. x. is put last in chap. lxxxix., evidently in order to bring it into connexion with the narrative of the flood (lxxxix. 2—9).

² Mr Charles (p. 60) professes to follow Dillmann (Art. Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments, in Herzog's *R. E.* xii. 352) with reference to the Semiaza group of passages. But Dillmann is more cautious: 'Ausser c. 39, 1. 2^a; 54, 7—55, 2. c. 60. 65, 1—69, 25 gehören zu diesen (noachischen)

Fragmenten *wahrscheinlich* auch c. 6, 3—8; 8, 1—3; 9, 7 und *teilweise* 10, 1 [not, be it observed, the two following verses], 11.'

³ For viii. 1 (as read in E and γ) is quite consistent with what is elsewhere said as to Azazel. σ is plainly glossed. It is worthy of note that according to Mr Charles no mention is made of Azazel in the genuine text till ix. 6. He is there named incidentally in such a way as to imply previous reference to his evil deeds.

regions into which the primitive Church was divided, and try to discover what the tradition of each has to tell us about the Book of Enoch¹.

1. *The East*. By this somewhat vague term I mean to denote the Christianity of Asia generally, and of the portions of Europe lying east of Italy.

In deference to the opinion of those critics² who have regarded it as an Ebionite work of about A.D. 100, I may here in the first place mention the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. The writer of that work, as we have already seen (p. 168 sqq.), frequently cites the Book of Enoch. But while evidently regarding the book as in some degree authoritative, the laxity of his quotations shows plainly that, like the author of the Book of Jubilees, he supposed himself not to be debarred from considerable liberty in his use of it. Later investigations however appear to show that the *Testaments* are a Jewish book with Christian interpolations³.

Another Ebionite work, of much later date indeed, but probably belonging to the region with which we are now dealing⁴, has a noteworthy allusion to our Book, of which we have already spoken (above p. 166 sqq.), and which it may be convenient now to quote at full length. It is found in the *Clementine Homilies* viii. 12 sqq.⁵ and runs as follows:

Τῶν γὰρ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐνοικοῦντων⁶ πνευμάτων, οἱ τὴν κατωτάτῳ χώρῳ κατοικοῦντες ἄγγελοι, ἀχθῆσθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν

¹ Lists of passages in Patristic writers in which *Enoch* is referred to may be found in Fabricius (*Cod. Pseud. V. T. i. p. 160 sqq.*), Schürer (*The Jewish People* Div. ii. vol. iii. p. 70sqq.), Charles (*Book of Enoch* p. 38 sqq.). None of these lists is complete, and I do not profess to do more than add one or two references to those already given. Nevertheless I believe the main conclusions at which I arrive are not likely to be disturbed by the discovery of further allusions to our Book.

² See Sinker's *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, pp. 16—34. *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* iv. 865 sqq.

³ See Schnapp, *Die Test. der zwölf*

Pat., Halle, 1884, Dr M. Gaster in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, vol. xvi. p. 33 sqq. and especially Mr F. C. Conybeare in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, vol. v. p. 375 sqq. All the passages in which the Book of Enoch is referred to in the *Testaments* appear to be found in the Armenian version. Some of them however may be early Christian interpolations. The book is not alluded to in Gaster's Hebrew *Test. Napht.*

⁴ *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* i. p. 577.

⁵ Cotelier, *Apostolic Fathers* (Amsterdam, 1724) i. p. 683 sqq.

⁶ Cotelier has ἐκοκοῦντων.

ἀνθρώπων εἰς θεὸν ἀχαριστία, αἰτοῦνται εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐλθεῖν βίον, ἵνα ὄντως ἄνθρωποι γενόμενοι, ἐπὶ πολιτεία πλείονι, τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀχαριστήσαντας ἐλέγξαντες, αὐτόθι τῇ κατ' ἀξίαν ἕκαστον ὑποβάλωσι τιμωρία. ὅποτε οὖν αἰτήσαντες ἔλαβον¹, πρὸς πᾶσαν ἑαυτοὺς μετέβαλον φύσιν, ἅτε θειωδεστέρας ὄντες οὐσίας, καὶ ῥαδίως πρὸς πάντα μετατρέπεσθαι δυνάμενοι. καὶ ἐγένοντο λίθος τίμιος², κ.τ.έ.

Πλὴν ὅτε ταῦτα γενόμενοι, τοὺς διαρπάσαντας αὐτοὺς πλεονέκτας ἤλεγξαν, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετέβαλον³, ἵνα ὁσίως πολιτευσάμενοι, καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι δείξαντες⁴, τοὺς ἀχαρίστους εὐθύνας ὑποβάλωσιν· ἐπειδὴ ὄντως τὰ πάντα ἄνθρωποι ἐγίνοντο, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔσχον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὑπὸ ταύτης κρατούμενοι, εἰς γυναικῶν μίξιν ὄλισθον⁵. αἷς συμπλακέντες, καὶ μiasmῶ παγέντες, καὶ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως παντελῶς κενωθέντες⁶, τὰ ἐκ πυρὸς τραπέντα μέλη⁷, εἰς τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῶν τὴν ἰδίας φύσεως ἀμίαντον μετασυγκρῖναι οὐκ ἐξίσχυσαν. τῷ γὰρ βάρει τῷ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας εἰς σάρκα, τελευτήσαντος αὐτῶν πυρὸς, τὴν ἀσεβοῦσαν ὤδευσαν ὁδὸν κάτω. σαρκὸς γὰρ αὐτοὶ δεσμοῖς πεπεδημένοι κατέχονται, καὶ ἰσχυρῶς δέδενται⁸. οὐ ἔνεκεν εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνελθεῖν οὐκέτι ἐδυνήθησαν⁹.

¹ This agrees with the Book of Jubilees; see above, p. 166.

² Can this be an allusion to xix. 1 (πολύμορφα γενόμενα)?

³ Cf. *En.* lxxxvi. 3.

⁴ Cf. *Book of Jubilees*, iv. 15 (above, p. 166).

⁵ *En.* vi. 1, 2, vii. 1: see above, p. 166 sq.

⁶ Cf. above, p. 178.

⁷ Cf. *Slav. En.* xxix. 1, 3.

⁸ *En.* x. 4, xiii. 1, xiv. 5. It may perhaps be thought somewhat forced to connect the words of the Homily with these passages. But that at the time when the Clementines were written it would have appeared natural to many to interpret the bonds of the angels as human bodies will be clear from a sentence or two of Methodius of Tyre, the opponent of Origen. He

is contending (*De Resurr.* 2 sq., Migne *Pat. Graec.* xviii. 268) against some who denied the resurrection of the body. ἀποπον δὲ κάκεινο προφανῶς, τὸ οἰεσθαι τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῇ εἰς αἰῶνας διαγωγῇ μὴ συνέσεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ, διὰ τὸ δεσμὸν αὐτὸ καὶ πέδας εἶναι...λελυμένοι γὰρ ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξελεγχθέντος τοῦ λόγου ἐν ᾧ δεσμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ὠρίζοντο εἶναι τὴν σάρκα. And so again Photius *Bibl.* 234 (Bekker, p. 293). Ἐνεγνώσθη τοῦ ἁγίου Μεθοδίου ἐπισκόπου καὶ μάρτυρος, ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ἀναστάσεως λόγου, οὗ ἡ ἐκλογή τὰ ὑποκείμενα λέγει. ὅτι οὐ δεσμὸν φησι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὡς Ἄριγένης φέτο...ὅτι Ἄριγένης δεσμὸν τὸ σῶμα ἔλεγε δεδῶσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ τὴν παράβασιν, πρὶν δὲ ἀσώματον αὐτὴν βιοτεῖναι.

⁹ *En.* xiv. 5.

Μετὰ γὰρ συνουσίαν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγίνοντο ἀπαιτηθέντες, καὶ παρασχεῖν μηκέτι δυνηθέντες, διὰ τὸ ἄλλο τι μετὰ μiasμόν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι μὴ δύνασθαι, ἀρέσκειν τε ταῖς ἐρωμέναις βουλόμενοι, ἀνθ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς τῆς γῆς μυελοὺς ὑπέδειξαν. λέγω δὲ τὰ ἐκ μετάλλων ἄνθη¹, χρυσόν, χαλκόν, ἄργυρον², σίδηρον, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, σὺν τοῖς τιμιωτάτοις³ ἄπασι⁴ λίθοις. σὺν τούτοις δὲ τοῖς μαγευθεῖσιν λίθοις καὶ τὰς τέχνας τῶν πρὸς ἕκαστα πραγμάτων⁵ παρέδωσαν⁶, καὶ μαγείας ὑπέδειξαν, καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ἐδίδαξαν⁷, δυνάμεις τε ῥιζῶν⁸, καὶ ὅσα ποτὲ ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐννοίας εὑρεθῆναι ἀδύνατον· ἔτι δὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων χύσιν⁹, τὰς τε τῶν ἐσθήτων ποικίλας βαφάς⁹. καὶ πάνθ' ἀπλῶς ὅσαπερ πρὸς κόσμου καὶ τέρψεώς ἐστι γυναικῶν⁹, τῶν ἐν σαρκὶ δεθέντων δαιμόνων ἐστὶν εὐρήματα.

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς νόθου μίξεως αὐτῶν, ἄνθρωποι ἐγένοντο νόθοι, πολλῶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων¹⁰ κατὰ κορυφὴν μείζους, οὓς μετὰ τοῦτο γίγαντας ὠνόμασαν, οὐ δρακοντόποδες ὄντες, καὶ πρὸς θεὸν πόλεμον ἀράμενοι, ὡς οἱ βλάσφημοὶ τῶν ἐλλήνων ἄδουσιν μῦθοι· ἀλλὰ θηριώδεις τὸν τρόπον· καὶ μείζους μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ μεγέθη, ἐπεὶ περ ἐξ ἀγγέλων ἐγένοντο· ἀγγέλων δὲ ἐλάττους, ἐπεὶ περ ἐκ γυναικῶν γεγέννητο... πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πλησμονὴν τὸν κόσμον οὐκ ἔχοντες αὐτάρκη¹¹.....

Οἱ δὲ σὺν αὐτοῖς ἄνθρωποι τὸ ὅμοιον τότε πρῶτον ποιεῖν ἐξήλωσαν, οὕτως εἴτε ἀγαθοὶ εἴτε κακοὶ οὐκ ἐγεννώμεθα, ἀλλὰ γινόμεθα· καὶ ἐθισθέντες δυσάποσπάστως ἔχομεν¹². τῶν δὲ ἀλόγων ζώων τότε ἐπιλιπόντων, οἱ νόθοι ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων σαρκῶν ἐγεύσαντο¹³. οὐκέτι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦν μακρὰν τὴν ἰδίαν διαφθεῖραι σάρκα, πρότερον ἐν ἑτέραις μορφαῖς αὐτοῖς (1. αὐτῆς) γευσαμένοις.....

Ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ τῶν τεθνεώτων γιγάντων ψυχαὶ, τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν μείζους ἦσαν, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τοῖς σώμασι ὑπερέχουσαι, ὡς καινὸν γένος, καινῶ καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι προσηγορεύ-

¹ *En.* viii. 1 (σγ).

² *En.* viii. 1 (σ).

³ *En.* viii. 1 (E).

⁴ *En.* viii. 1 (γ).

⁵ *En.* viii. 1 καὶ τὴν ἐργασίαν αὐτῶν.

⁶ Cotelier reads παρέδωσαν.

⁷ *En.* viii. 3.

⁸ *En.* vii. 1 (Eγ), viii. 3.

⁹ *En.* viii. 1.

¹⁰ *En.* vii. 2 (Eγ).

¹¹ *En.* vii. 3 (Eγ).

¹² Cf. above, p. 178.

¹³ *En.* vii. 4.

θησαν¹. οἷς ἐπιλοίποις τῷ κόσμῳ ὡς δεῖ βιοῦν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ δι' ἀγγέλους νόμος ὠρίσθη. ὄντες γὰρ νόθοι τῷ γένει ἐκ πυρὸς ἀγγέλων καὶ αἵματος γυναικῶν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἰδίου τινὸς γένους ἐπιθυμεῖν μέλλοντες, δικαίῳ τινὶ προελήφθησαν νόμῳ. ἐξέπémφθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄγγελός τις, τὴν αὐτοῦ βουλήν μνηύων, καὶ λέγων,

Τάδε δοκεῖ τῷ παντεπόπτῃ θεῷ, μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων ὑμᾶς κυριεύειν, μηδὲ παρενοχλεῖν μηδενί, εἰ μὴ τις ἐκὼν ἑαυτὸν ὑμῖν καταδουλώσῃ, προσκυνῶν ὑμᾶς, καὶ θύων, καὶ σπένδων², κ.τ.έ.

In the above extract I have omitted some sentences which do not seem to be derived from our Book. But what remains must certainly be regarded as in the main based on Enoch vi, vii, viii, xix.

It is interesting to compare with this the much shorter, but apparently parallel passage in the *Recognitions* (iv. 26, 27, Cotelier i. p. 543):

‘Nunc ergo, quoniam nondum intelligitis quanta vos ignorantiae caligo circumstet, interim vobis volo exponere, unde colendi idola exordium mundo huic datum sit.....Angeli quidam, relicto proprii ordinis cursu³, hominum favere vitiis coepere, et libidini eorum quodammodo indignum praeberere ministerium; quo illorum opera, suis magis voluptatibus morem gererent: quique, ne sponte inclinati viderentur ad indigna ministeria, docuerunt homines, quod daemones artibus quibusdam obedire mortalibus, id est, magicis invocationibus⁴ possent; ac velut ex fornace quadam et officina malitiae totum mundum, subtracto pietatis lumine, impietatis fumo repleverunt⁵.

Pro his et aliis nonnullis caussis diluvium mundo introductum est⁶, sicut jam in aliis dictum est et dicemus’ &c.

A glance through the two passages will suffice to convince us that the latter is not a mere abridgement of the former. At the same time it bears to it a manifest relation, and it appears clear that both depend ultimately on the narrative in the Book of Enoch. It seems certain that in the document

¹ *En.* xv. 8.

² *En.* xix. 1.

³ See above, p. 178.

⁴ *En.* vii. 1, viii. 3.

⁵ *En.* viii. 2.

⁶ *En.* x. 2, cvi. 13—15, &c.

which was the basis both of the *Recognitions* and of the *Homilies* there was a passage founded directly on Enoch, the more heterodox portions of which were omitted by the writer of the former work, while perhaps some additions were made in the latter. Thus we may assume that the writer of the original document was acquainted with our Book. That the writer who brought the *Recognitions* to their present form had no independent knowledge of it may perhaps be inferred from what he says in an earlier part of his book, where he treats of the flood in a different connexion¹. He there closely follows the account of Gen. vi. and interprets the angels as being 'righteous men who had lived the life of angels,' i.e., as we may suppose, the Sethites. The opening words of iv. 27, 'For these *and some other causes*, a flood was brought upon the world, *as we have said already* and shall say again,' seem to refer to this passage with some consciousness that it is not altogether consistent with the later exposition. It has no parallel, as it seems, in the *Homilies*², and may therefore be due to the writer of the *Recognitions* himself.

The first half of the third century⁴ supplies us with yet another allusion in a heretical writing to our Book. We refer to the Syriac *Book of the Laws of Countries* (Cureton, *Spicilegium Syriacum*, p. 3, sq.) written probably by a disciple of Bardesanes of Edessa, in which we find it stated

¹ *Clem. Recog.* i. 29 (Cot. i. 499): 'Igitur consummatis omnibus quae in coelo et in terris sunt, atque in aquis, multiplicato etiam hominum genere; octava generatione, homines justi qui Angelorum vixerant vitam, illecti pulcritudine mulierum, ad promiscuos et illicitos concubitus declinaverunt: et inde jam indiscrete et contra ordinem cuncta agentes, statum rerum humanarum et divinitus traditum vitae ordinem permutarunt; ita ut omnes homines, vel persuasione vel vi peccare in creatorem suum cogerent Deum. Ex nona generatione nascuntur Gigantes, illi qui a saeculo nominantur: *non δρακοντόποδες ut*

Graecorum fabulae ferunt; sed immensis corporibus editi, quorum adhuc, ad indicium, in nonnullis locis ossa immensae magnitudinis ostenduntur. Sed adversum hos justa Dei providentia diluvium mundo introduxit; ut orbis quidem terrarum ab eorum contagione dilueretur; omnis vero locus ab impiorum nece verteretur in pelagus.'

² Compare *Book of Adam and Eve*, below p. 206.

³ Except indeed the sentence printed in italics in note 1. See *Hom.* viii. 16 above, p. 191.

⁴ *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* i. 256 sq.

that man has been given freedom in order that he may be co-partner with angels, who are likewise possessed of personal freedom. 'For we are sure that, if the angels likewise had not been possessed of personal freedom, they would not have consorted with¹ the daughters of men and sinned and fallen from their places.' The last clause might perhaps have been founded directly on Gen. vi. But the immediately preceding reference to the free-will of the angels² is noteworthy and seems to prove that the writer borrowed from Enoch.

Before passing to orthodox writers we must refer to the probably heretical³ Apocalypse of Peter, of whose indebtedness to our Book we have already (p. 172 sqq.) given proof.

The Apocalypse of Peter probably belongs to the early part of the 2nd century⁴. Later on in the century we find our Book used by Justin Martyr and Athenagoras. The former of these writers spent a considerable part of his life at Rome; but as he embraced Christianity in Samaria and lived some time at Ephesus, he may be taken as representing the Eastern Church. The latter seems to have been an Athenian, though probably he had some connexion with the Alexandrian Church as well⁵. It is unnecessary to quote again the passages in their writings founded upon our Book⁶. For our present purpose it is sufficient to note the fact that they do refer to it.

An obscure fragment of Papias preserved by Andrew of Caesarea⁷ may here be transcribed. It is capable of explanation as based on a fuller text of the Book of Enoch than that which we now possess.

Παπίας δὲ οὕτως ἐπὶ λέξεως. ἐνίοις δὲ αὐτῶν, δηλαδὴ τῶν πάλαι θείων ἀγγέλων, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν γῆν διακοσμήσεως ἔδωκεν ἄρχειν, καὶ καλῶς ἄρχειν παρηγγύησε⁸. καὶ ἐξῆς φησὶν· εἰς οὐδὲν δὲ συνέβη τελευτῆσαι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν.

¹ אאא משהאדא Cf. Matt. i. 18, Rom. ix. 10 (Psh.). The words in Gen. vi. 4 (Psh.) differ—

א...אלא

² See above, p. 178.

³ Cf. Robinson and James, *Gospel and Revelation of Peter*, p. 81, note.

⁴ It appears to be mentioned in the Muratorian Canon; but see Zahn, *N. T. Kanon* ii. 105—110.

⁵ *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* i. p. 204.

⁶ See above, p. 177.

⁷ Routh's *Reliquiae* i. p. 14.

⁸ See above, p. 178. The reader cannot fail to notice the resemblance

It is unfortunate that Andrew gives us no hint of the context.

This is perhaps the best place to remark that the very early Gnostic *Acts of Thomas* (chap. 32)¹ contain what is possibly an allusion to the Book of Enoch in the words of the Dragon:

ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἄνωθεν κάτω ῥίψας² καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν γυναικῶν αὐτοὺς καταδήσας, ἵνα γηγενεῖς παῖδες ἐξ αὐτῶν γένωνται καὶ τὸ θέλημά μου ἐν αὐτοῖς διαπράξωμαι³.

It next falls to our lot to interrogate the great work of Irenaeus *Against Heresies*, composed between 182 and 188 A.D. One reference to the Book of Enoch by this writer has been frequently cited. 'Enoch,' he says (iv. 27. 2, Harvey ii. p. 190), 'sine circumcissione placens Deo cum esset homo Dei legatione ad angelos fungebatur, et translatus est, et conservatur usque nunc testis justi judicii Dei, quoniam angeli quidem transgressi deciderunt in terram in iudicium; homo autem placens, translatus est in salutem.'

The words in italics seem to imply, indeed, that the angels transgressed *before* they came to the earth. But Irenaeus by his desire to construct an antithesis is probably misled into a slight inaccuracy of statement. On the whole we can scarcely

between this scrap from Papias and portions of the passage quoted from Athenagoras, above, p. 177.

¹ Tischendorf, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*, p. 218.

² Cf. *Acts of the Disputation of Archelaus* 32, below, p. 197 ('a dracone afflicti'), Lact. *Inst.* ii. 15, below p. 214.

³ We may here mention that a passage has been cited from Tatian, the pupil of Justin, in which our Book has been supposed to be referred to. I hesitate to mention it in the text, as the allusion to the Book of Enoch is doubtful. Tatian (*Ad Graecos* 7, 8) mentions imitators of the devil who became a host of demons even as he had become a demon, and of whose apostasy men were the material (*ὑπόθεσις*). This may be founded on

the myth of the fallen Watchers preserved in Enoch. But the supposition is rendered less probable by the fact that Tatian goes on to say that the demons showed men a plan of the stars and introduced Fate: to which statement our Book gives no support. It is certainly remarkable, however, that in the immediately preceding context he had expatiated on the free-will of angels and men (cap. 7). There is nothing else, so far as I am aware, in the extant writings of Tatian which could be construed as referring to the Book of Enoch, if we may perhaps except such phrases as 'the day of consummation' (*Ad Graec.* 17; cf. *En.* xvi. 1, γσ) applied to the final judgment, and 'demons...cast down from heaven' (*ib.* 20).

avoid believing that we have here a reference to *En.* xii. xiii., in which is described the Mission of the patriarch to the fallen Watchers, and to the account of their transgression (vi. sqq.) and condemnation (x.). It might be doubted whether Irenaeus quoted at first hand. But any hesitation on this point is removed by one or two other allusions to our Book, which I now proceed to enumerate.

Adv. Heres. i. 2 (Harvey i. p. 90 sq.). Πνεῦμα ἅγιον, τὸ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν κεκηρυχὸς...κρίσιν δικαίαν ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι ποιησῆται (sc. Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν)· τὰ μὲν πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας, καὶ ἀγγέλους [τοὺς] παραβεβηκότας, καὶ ἐν ἀποστασίᾳ γεγονότας, καὶ τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς, καὶ ἀδίκους, καὶ ἀνόμους, καὶ βλασφήμους τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς τὸ αἰώνιον πῦρ πέμψῃ. See *Enoch* x. 13, 14, &c.

Adv. Haer. i. 4 (i. p. 95) τῇ τῶν παραβεβηκότων ἀγγέλων ἀποστασίᾳ.

Adv. Haer. iv. 58. 4 (ii. p. 279). 'Et temporibus Noe juste diluvium inducens, uti exstingueret pessimum genus eorum qui tunc erant hominum, qui jam fructificare Deo non poterant, cum angeli transgressores commixti fuissent eis.' See *Enoch* vii. 1. 'Commixti fuissent,'—not, be it observed, the phrase of Gen. vi. 4.

Adv. Haer. v. 28. 2 (ii. p. 402). 'Et non est mirandum, si daemioniis et apostaticis spiritibus ministrantibus ei, per eos faciat signa, in quibus seducat habitantes super terram.' Cf. *En.* xv. 3 &c.

We may also compare iv. 59 (ii. p. 285). 'Posuit autem in homine potestatem electionis, quemadmodum et in angelis: (etenim angeli rationabiles:) uti hi quidem qui obedissent juste bonum sint possidentes....Qui autem non obedierunt...meritam poenam percipient.' And iv. 61 (p. 289) 'Sed oportebat, inquit, eum neque angelos tales fecisse, ut possent transgredi,...quoniam rationabiles et examinatores et judiciales facti sunt.' See above, p. 178.

Irenaeus himself does not, so far as I can discover, elsewhere use language which distinctly recalls our Book. But he quotes (*Adv. Haer.* i. 8. 17, Harvey i. p. 155) from a certain 'divine elder and preacher of the truth' some lines which seem

to be clearly founded on *Enoch* vii. 1, viii. 1, &c. Who this elder was does not appear, but as he wrote in Greek it is not improbable that he belonged to the region with the literature of which we are now dealing. His words are

Εἰδωλοποιε̄, Μάρκε, καὶ τερατοσκόπε,
 Ἄστρολογικῆς ἔμπειρε καὶ μαγικῆς τέχνης,
 Δὶ ὧν κρατύνεις τῆς πλάνης τὰ διδάγματα,
 Σημεῖα δεικνὺς τοῖς ὑπὸ σου πλανωμένοις,
 Ἀποστατικῆς δυνάμεως ἐγχειρήματα,
 Ἄ σοι χορηγεῖ σὸς πατὴρ Σατᾶν αἰεὶ¹
 Δὶ ἀγγελικῆς δυνάμεως Ἄζαζήλ ποιεῖν
 Ἐχων σε πρόδρομον ἀντιθέου πανουργίας.

Passing over two centuries we come to Epiphanius, who possibly alludes to our Book when he says (*Haeres.* i. 4, Dindorf i. p. 282):

νῦν δὲ ἐν χρόνοις τοῦ Ἰάρεδ καὶ ἐπέκεινα φαρμακεία, μαγεία, ἀσέλγεια, μοιχεία καὶ ἀδικία.

It is not easy to fix the date of the *Acts* of the Disputation of Archelaus with Manes in their present form, and their genuineness has been disputed. But as Archelaus was bishop of Carchar in Mesopotamia we may here extract a sentence or two, in which knowledge of the Book of Enoch seems to be implied. In chapter 32 (*Routh's Reliquiae* iv. p. 211) we find the following:

‘Deus enim omnia, quae fecit, bona valde fecit, liberi arbitrii sensum unicuique dedit, qua ratione etiam legem iudicii posuit. Peccare nostrum est, ut autem non peccemus, Dei donum est, ex eo quod in nostro sit arbitrio constitutum peccare, vel non peccare.... Et certe qui voluerint, observant mandata, qui vero contempserint, et in perversum declinaverint, sine dubio legem iudicii ferent. Ex hoc etiam Angelorum quidam, mandato Dei non subditi, voluntati eius restiterunt, et aliquis quidem de caelo, tanquam fulgur ignis, cecidit super terram, alii vero in felicitate hominum filiabus *admixti*, a dracone afflicti, ignis aeterni poenam suscipere meruerunt.’

¹ So the line is emended by Harvey, and so also it is read in Epiphanius, *Haer.* xxxiv. 11 (Dindorf ii. 233).

The last portion of this passage might perhaps have been derived from Scripture (though 'admixti' points rather to *En.* vii. 1 (E) than to Gen. vi. 2, 4), and it is certainly not based solely upon our book in its present form. But the preceding allusion to free-will, a reference to which, as we have already seen¹, probably existed in early copies of the Book of Enoch immediately before the narrative of the Watchers, makes it likely that this work is the source of the passage. Compare also *En.* lxxxvi. 1.

The Narrative of Joseph of Arimathea, the date and place of which are not settled², is a violently anti-Jewish work. Thus, to take but one instance, the penitent thief alone—all other descendants of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Moses being excluded—dwells in Paradise. It was scarcely therefore to be expected that we should come across a reference to the Book of Enoch. But I find it difficult to dismiss the thought that we have in the words of the penitent thief (iii. 3, Tisch. p. 465) a reminiscence of our Book.

Ὁ δὲ ἐκ δεξιῶν ληστής, ᾧ ὄνομα Δημᾶς, ἰδὼν τὴν θεϊκὴν χάριν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, οὕτως ἐβόα Οἰδᾶ σε, Ἰησοῦ Χριστέ, ὅτι υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ εἶ. Χριστόν σε ὁρῶ ὑπὸ μυρίων μυριάδων ἀγγέλων προσκυνούμενον. συγχώρησόν μοι τὰς ἀμαρτίας μου ἃς ἔπραξα· μὴ ἐν ἐξετάσει μου ποιήσεις τὰ ἄστρα ἐλθεῖν κατ' ἐμοῦ ἢ τὴν σελήνην, ὅταν μέλλῃς κρίναι πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὅτι ἐν νυκτὶ ἔπραττον τὰς κακὰς μου βουλάς· μὴ κινήσεις τὸν ἥλιον τὸν νῦν σκοτιζόμενον διὰ σὲ εἰπεῖν τὰ κακὰ τῆς καρδίας μου· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀφέσεως ἀμαρτιῶν δῶρον δύναμαί σοι παρασχέιν.

Compare this with the following passage from Enoch (c. 10, 12), occurring in the description of the 'day of judgment,' in which (v. 4 sq.) the Most High *will arise to execute great judgment amongst sinners,* attended by *the angels.*

'And now know ye that *the angels* will seek out your deeds in heaven *from the sun and from the moon and from the stars* in reference to your sins. And now *give presents* to the rain that it be not withheld from descending upon you.' Possibly

¹ Above, p. 178.

² See Tischendorf, *De Evangeliorum Apocryphorum Origine et Usu*, 1851;

and for the text Tischendorf, *Evangelia Apocrypha* 2nd ed. Lipsiae, 1876.

the saying of the thief is derived from an older document which borrowed directly from Ps.-Enoch.

The supposition that the passage just quoted is founded, not directly on Enoch, but on some other document which borrowed from it seems to be confirmed by the following¹ which I extract from the *Apocalypse of Paul*. It will be observed that it resembles the *Narrative of Joseph* in some phrases which have no parallel in *Enoch* (notice especially *οἱ ἄγγελοι ἔρχονται πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσκυνῆσαι αὐτῷ*), while on the other hand some of the coincidences with Enoch have disappeared. There is nothing about the giving of presents: the sun, moon, stars and sea are as much instruments of punishment as witnesses, and their testimony against sinners is given *daily*.

πολλάκις γὰρ ὁ μέγας φωστήρ ὁ ἥλιος προσῆλθεν τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγων· κύριε ὁ θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ, ἕως τίνος ἀνέχεσαι ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἁμαρτίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; κέλευσον μοι, καὶ καταφλέξω αὐτούς. καὶ ἐγένετο φωνὴ πρὸς αὐτόν· ἡ μακροθυμία μου πάντων τούτων ἀνέχεται, ὅπως μετανοήσωσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐλεύσονται πρὸς με καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὺς κρινῶ. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ τὰ ἄστρα προσῆλθον τῷ κυρίῳ λέγοντες· κύριε ὁ θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ, ἡμῖν δέδωκας τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῆς νυκτός, καὶ οὐκέτι στέγομεν τὰς κλοπὰς...κέλευσον ἡμῖν, καὶ ποιήσωμεν εἰς αὐτοὺς τέρατα...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ θάλασσα ἐβόησεν...διὰ ταῦτα πάντα εὐλογεῖτε τὸν θεὸν ἀκαταπαύστως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον δύνοντος τοῦ ἡλίου. ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ τῇ ὥρᾳ πάντες οἱ ἄγγελοι ἔρχονται πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσκυνῆσαι αὐτῷ, καὶ προσάγουσιν τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐκάστου ὃ τι ἔπραξεν ἀπὸ πρῶτῃ ἕως ἐσπέρας...

And lastly it may be mentioned that in the *Apocalypse of Moses* (5th cent.) there is a singular agreement with the first section of the Ethiopic Book of Enoch as to the number and names of the chief angels. God speaks to Michael, Gabriel, Uriel and Raphael (cf. *En.* ix. 1, Eth. text as emended, Charles, p. 333—in the Greek text the order is different), and these prepare Adam's body for burial; while seven angels (cf. *En.* xx.

¹ *Apocalypsis Pauli*, 4 sqq. (Tisch. *Apocal. Apocr.* p. 36). Dr James kindly drew my attention to the resemblance

between this passage and that quoted from the *Narratio*.

Greek) bury him¹. This scarcely indicates direct literary connexion: but it is a coincidence worthy of mention².

Of the testimonies now adduced, two (Athenag. *Legatio* 24, Iren. i. 2. 1) refer to the Book as written by a prophet, one speaks of it as the 'Scripture (*γραφή*) of Enoch' (*Test. Sim.* 5, *Levi* 14, *Naph.* 4): all, except perhaps the Apocalypse of Peter, accept the narrative related in it as historically correct. But they give us no further hint as to the degree of authority which they ascribe to it. That it was widely known among Christians of the East at this time appears probable from Celsus, whose reference to it will be more conveniently discussed in connexion with Origen, in the next section.

Besides those which have been mentioned, references to the Book of Enoch are rare in Eastern literature, especially in later centuries. Anatolius (ap. Eus. *H. E.* vii. 32. 19, cf. *En.* lxxii. 6—8) refers to it, but only as a writing held in repute among the Jews. In the Apostolic Constitutions it is condemned along with apocryphal books of Moses, Adam, Isaiah, David, Elijah and the three Patriarchs. Chrysostom does not seem to have known it. For if he had, he would certainly have mentioned it in *Hom.* xxii. *in Gen.* vi. 62. But it still continued to be copied at Jerusalem³, for it is mentioned in the middle of the ninth century in the Stichometry of Nicephorus⁴. It can scarcely however have been widely read at that period. Otherwise Syncellus would hardly have taken the trouble to transcribe four long extracts from it. Syncellus himself was evidently familiar with the work, as he more than once alludes to it.

¹ Cap. 40, Tischendorf, *Apocal. Apocr.* p. 21.

² It is curious to find a similar coincidence with the 8th or 9th century Irish ms. Harl. 7653, where a list of seven angels is given, whose names are all found in the Book of Enoch, and with one exception are those of the seven angels of *En.* xx. (γ^2). The exception is Azael (substituted for *Σαριήλ* or Saraqael). See F. E. Warren

The Antiphony of Bangor, London, 1895, ii. p. 85. Mr Warren (p. 91) observed the coincidence of six of the names with those of Enoch, but for Heremiel refers only to 4 *Esd.* iv. 36 (Bensly's text).

³ Compare James' Lecture on the *Apocalypse of Peter*, p. 46.

⁴ See also the passage quoted from Gregory Barhebraeus below, p. 206 note.

2. *Alexandria, Egypt, &c.* The Epistle of Barnabas, which was probably written by an Alexandrian Christian¹, supplies us with two references to the Book of Enoch (see above, pp. 171, 172), in one of which it is described as Scripture (ἡ γραφή).

Among later writers it will cause no surprise to find some quotations from the Book of Enoch in Clement of Alexandria². The passages have been given above (p. 181 sq.)³. None of them helps us to determine his view of the authority of the Book, though he clearly regards it as having been written by the patriarch whose name it bears.

Origen is our next important witness to the esteem in which the Book of Enoch was held in Alexandria. Origen quotes our Book several times, but his most remarkable reference to it is found in his treatise *Contra Celsum* v. 52 sqq. (Delarue i. p. 617). Celsus had argued that Christ could not be regarded as the only Angel who had come to men,

ἐλθεῖν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλους λέγουσι πολλάκις, καὶ ὁμοῦ γε ἐξήκοντα ἢ ἑβδομήκοντα· ὡς δὴ γενέσθαι κακοῦς, καὶ κολάζεσθαι δεσμοῖς ὑποβληθέντας ἐν γῆ· ὅθεν καὶ τὰς θερμὰς πηγὰς εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνων δάκρυα⁴.

Celsus does not tell us whence he derived this notion. Origen however is doubtless correct when he conjectures that the ultimate source of the myth was the Book of Enoch (see *En.* vi. 5, 6, x. 4 sqq. &c.), the contents of which he says his opponent did not understand, 'for he does not appear to have read the passages in question⁵.' This is very probable. Celsus

¹ Salmon, *Int. to N. T.* 4th ed. p. 571 sq.

² See Salmon *op. cit.* p. 177, note.

³ In addition to the passages there cited compare his comment on the 'wandering stars' of S. Jude 13 (*Adumbrationes*: Bunsen, *Analecta Ante-Nicaena* i. p. 332, Migne *Pat. Graec.* ix. 733). 'Sidera errantia, hoc est, errantes et apostatas significat: ex hujusmodi stellis sunt, qui angelorum cecidere de sedibus, quibus propter apostasiam caligo tenebrarum reservatur in sempiternum. Prophetavit autem de his

septimus, inquit, ab Adam Enoch. His verbis prophetiam comprobat.' Also *Paed.* ii. 9 (Migne viii. 493) ἀγγέλους, οὓς ἐγγρηγόρους καλοῦμεν (but cf. *Dan.* iv. 13, 17, 23), and *Paed.* iii. 2 (Migne viii. 576) δεῖγμά σοι τούτων οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ κάλλος καταλελοιπότες διὰ κάλλος μαραινόμενον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξ οὐρανῶν ἀποπεσόντες χαμαί.

⁴ Has this idea some connexion with *Enoch* lxvii. 5—11?

⁵ ἅπανα οὐδ' αὐτὰ φαίνεται ἀναγνοῦς (*cap.* 54, p. 619).

could hardly have quoted them so inaccurately as he appears to have done if they were before him as he wrote. But it is important to remark that he does not profess to quote from any writing¹. He simply refers to the common belief of Christians—‘λέγουσι.’ The most consistent explanation seems to be that the Christian communities with which Celsus came in contact read the Book of Enoch and accepted as historical the narrative of the fall of the Watchers. From them and not from the Work itself Celsus drew his account of what the Book of Enoch contained. We have therefore in this passage evidence that in the time of Celsus, and in the country where he wrote, Enoch was a popular work among Christians. The time was probably the last quarter of the second century, the place somewhere in the Eastern region to which the last section was devoted².

Origen's reply to the argument of Celsus is two-fold. First (p. 619), ‘the books which bear the name of Enoch do not at all circulate in the Churches as divine’ (ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις οὐ πάνυ φέρεται ὡς θεῖα τὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα τοῦ Ἐνώχ βιβλία); and secondly (p. 620), ‘those who are capable of understanding the meaning of the prophet’ (προφητικοῦ βουλήματος) will perceive that his narrative is to be interpreted allegorically. From this we shall be content for the present to infer that Origen believed the Book of Enoch to have been really written by the patriarch of that name, and that candour compelled him to acknowledge this to an opponent of the Faith.

In more than one place Origen speaks of Enoch as ‘Scripture’ (γραφῆ). Thus *De Princ.* i. 3 (Delarue i. p. 61) ‘Quod autem a Deo universa creata sint...ex multis scripturae assertionibus comprobatur,’ a statement which he supports by quoting from the *Pastor* of Hermas and referring in general terms to the Book of Enoch³. Again (*De Princ.* iv. 35, Delarue

¹ Origen *Cont. Cels.* v. 55 (Delarue i. p. 620) καὶ φέρει (ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐνώχ, οὐχ ὀνομάζων αὐτόν) τὸ, ὅθεν καὶ, κ.τ.έ.

² Not, we may believe, Alexandria. If Celsus had lived there Origen would have known more about him than he did.

³ There is indeed in the present text of our Book no passage to which Origen can be supposed to refer here, and accordingly Mr Charles claims this as an allusion to *Slav. En.* xxiv.—xxx., xlvii. 3, 4. But as the Ethiopic Book is admittedly fragmentary, his

i. p. 193) 'Sed fortasse requiret aliquis, si possumus etiam de scripturis occasionem aliquam intelligentiae huius accipere. Videtur mihi tale aliquid significari in Psalmis...Sed et in libro suo Enoch ita ait: Ambulavi usque ad imperfectum¹,... scriptum namque est in eodem libello, dicente Enoch: Universas materias perspexi².'

So too in his commentary on S. John's Gospel (vi. 25, Delarue iv. p. 142) he appears to regard the Book as 'holy,' but with some hesitation. 'Jordan' he says is akin to 'Jared,' both alike meaning a descent. The latter name is derived from the descent of the angels recorded in the Book of Enoch, 'if it is legitimate to receive it as holy' (ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἐνώχ γέγραπται, εἰ τῷ φίλον παραδέχασθαι ὡς ἅγιον τὸ βιβλίον). His hesitation is still greater in *Hom.* xxviii. in *Num.* 2. He is discussing (Delarue ii. p. 384) the probability that there are different places in the regions of heaven. He bases an argument on the names given by God to the stars (Ps. cxlvii. 4), and then he proceeds, 'De quibus quidem nominibus plurima in libellis qui appellantur Enoch, secreta continentur, et arcana: sed quia libelli ipsi non videntur apud Hebraeos in auctoritate haberi, interim nunc ea quae ibi nominantur, ad exemplum vocare differamus.' It is not quite clear whether the antecedent of 'quibus nominibus' is the names of the stars, or of the heavenly regions. On the former supposition the reference would be satisfied by *Eth. En.* lxxxii. 9 sqq., on the latter by *Slav. En.* xxi. 6, xxii. 1 (A). Most probably Origen alludes to both these passages. For it will be noticed that he speaks of 'libelli Enoch' in the plural.

Glancing back now over these five references to our Book we see that in his earlier life at Alexandria³ he cites Enoch as Scripture, placing it on a level as to authority, now with the *Shepherd* of Hermas, now with the Psalms. Later on, when living at Caesarea, he speaks more guardedly, hesitating to call the book 'holy' and deliberately declining to use it as supplementing a quotation from the Psalms. And finally, in

dogmatic assertion appears somewhat hasty.

¹ *Enoch* xxi. 1.

² See above, p. 182.

³ *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* iv. 103 sq.

the closing years of his life he declares that it is not in the Churches held to be divine, and therefore not of binding force upon Christians. But throughout he accepts it as a genuine production of Enoch's pen. The *De Princ.* may be taken as representing the Alexandrian tradition, the later works the modification of that tradition due to his own free thought.

No orthodox Egyptian writer, so far as I am aware, refers to the Book of Enoch¹ for two centuries after the death of Origen. But that it was known to the writer of the Gnostic work *Pistis Sophia*, and held in high esteem in Egypt in his time, appears to have been proved by the extracts given above, p. 183 sq.

It would seem, judging from the inconsistent statements of M. Berthelot on this subject², that some uncertainty exists as to the date of the Alexandrian philosopher Zosimus Panopolites. He probably, however, compiled the work of which some portions are extant somewhat later than the period to which the *Pistis Sophia* is usually assigned³, and like the author of that work he was perhaps a Gnostic. That he knew the Book of Enoch will be made evident by the following extract from Georgius Syncellus⁴.

¹ Alexander Lycopolites, early in the fourth century, seems not to have accepted the book, for he interprets Gen. vi. 2 as meaning that 'the nutritive powers of the soul descended from heaven to earth.' *De Manich.* 25 (Brinkmann, p. 37), "Α δὲ λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ποιήσεων περὶ τῶν γιγάντων, ἀντικρυσ μῦθος ἐστίν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τούτων διατάττοντες ἐν ἀλληγορίαις τὰ τοιαῦτα προφέρονται, τὸ σεμνὸν τοῦ λόγου ἀποκρίπτοντες τῇ τοῦ μύθου ἰδέᾳ· οἷον ὅταν ἢ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἱστορία φῆ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ταῖς θυγατρᾶσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀφροδισίων συνελθούθηναι μῆξιν, τὰς γὰρ θρησκευτικὰς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ἐπὶ τὰ τῆδε [...] ἢ τοιαύτη προφορὰ τοῦ λόγου σημαίνει. This appears, at least at first sight, inconsistent with the Enochian story. Nevertheless we

must not fail to remember the words of Jerome quoted below, p. 219 note; nor must we forget that possibly Alexander was not a Christian when he wrote (*Dictionary of Christian Biography* i. 86).

² Berthelot, *Collection des Anciens Alchimistes Grecs*, Paris, 1888. Avant-propos, p. vi, Introduction, pp. 82, 201.

³ He is placed in the 4th century or earlier by Kopp (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Chemie*, p. 55, quoted by Professor J. Ferguson in the *Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow*, x. p. 388).

⁴ P. 13, ed. Goar. Little seems to be certainly known of Zosimus beyond what we learn from very brief notices in Suidas and Syncellus.

ἄξιον δὲ καὶ Ζωσίμου τοῦ πανοπολίτου φιλοσόφου χρῆσιν τινὰ παραθέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων αὐτῷ πρὸς Θεοσέβειαν ἐν τῷ ἐννάτῳ τῆς Ἰμοῦθ βίβλω, ἔχουσιν ὧδε. φάσκουσιν αἱ ἱεραὶ γραφαί, ἦτοι βιβλοὶ, ὧ γύναι, ὅτι ἔστι τι δαιμόνων γένος, ὃ χρῆται γυναιξίν. ἐμνημόνευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμῆς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς...τοῦτο οὖν ἔφασαν ἀρχαῖαι καὶ θείαι γραφαί, ὅτι ἄγγελοὶ τινες ἐπεθύμησαν τῶν γυναικῶν¹, καὶ κατελθόντες ἐδίδαξαν αὐτὰς τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα², ὧν χάριν, φασίν, προσκρούσαντες, ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἔμειναν³, ὅτι πάντα τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ μηδὲν ὠφελούντα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐδίδαξαν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους⁴. ἐξ αὐτῶν φάσκουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ γραφαὶ καὶ τοὺς γίγαντας γεγενῆσθαι⁵...καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς.

For this passage I have searched in vain in the edition of the works of Zosimus lately published by M. Berthelot⁶.

It must be remarked that not all in Egypt who knew and read the Book of Enoch treated it as possessing authority. The *Book of Adam and Eve*, of which an English version was published by Dr Malan in 1882, was in the opinion of the translator written in Egypt in the Arabic language. According to Dillmann it belongs to the fifth or sixth century. Its author tells us (ii. 22) that the patriarch Enoch was that 'Enoch to whom many wonders happened, and who also wrote a celebrated book.' This is sufficient to show that a 'Book of Enoch' was well known in Egypt at the time when he wrote. Mr Charles (*Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, p. xviii.) infers, and probably correctly, from four passages⁷ that the writer was acquainted with the Slavonic Book; but it appears no less certain that he knew the Ethiopic work also, though he did not in all respects accept its teaching. A glance at the fourth chapter of his third book will convince us of this. 'Certain wise men of old,' he there says, 'wrote concerning them [the giants] and say in their books, that angels came down from

¹ *En.* vi. 2.

² *En.* vi. 6, vii. 1, viii. 1, 3.

³ *En.* xiv. 5.

⁴ *En.* xvi. 3 (E).

⁵ *En.* vii. 2 etc.

⁶ Berthelot, *op. cit.* Texte Grec, pp. 107—252.

⁷ One of them however (xxix. 4, 5) does not occur in the ms. B. It does not seem quite certain that the other three may not come from the Ethiopic Book. Cf. *Adam and Eve* i. 8 with *En.* lxi. 9—12, and *Adam and Eve* i. 11, 14 with *En.* xxii. 9b.

heaven, and mingled with the daughters of Cain, who bare unto them these giants. But those [wise men] err in what they say....But many men say, that angels came down from heaven, and joined themselves to women, and had children by them. This cannot be true.' Nevertheless he is at considerable pains to bring his own theory of the transaction (the Sethite) as nearly as possible into agreement with the narrative of the Book of Enoch. 'They were children of Seth...that dwelt on the mountain, high up, while they preserved their virginity, their innocence and their glory like angels; and were then called "angels of God." But when they transgressed and mingled with the children of Cain,...ill-informed men said that angels had come down' &c. &c. The story of the transgression of the Sethites had been told at length in Bk. ii. 19 sq. It took place in the days of Jared¹ (which is not mentioned in the Slavonic Book). 'Jared continued to teach his children eighty years; but after that...they began to go down from the Holy Mountain one after another, and to mix with the children of Cain, in foul fellowships.' This was done through the machinations of Genun, who taught the children of Cain to make musical instruments and induced them to commit all kinds of wickedness, and finally 'took iron and with it made weapons of war' (cf. *En.* viii. 1), and sin increased exceedingly on the earth. All this time the children of Seth looked down from the mountain and saw what was done; and at the end of a year, when 'Genun saw that they were being won over to him little by little, Satan entered into him and taught him to make dyeing-stuffs for garments of divers patterns, and made him to understand how to dye crimson and purple, and what not (cf. *En.* viii. 1)...Meanwhile the children of Seth...prayed and praised God, in place of the hosts [of angels] who had fallen; wherefore God had called them "angels²."' But afterwards 'they kept on gathering together...to look upon the

¹ *En.* vi. 6.

² The same statement is made at ii. 11, where Malan quotes a sentence from Gregory Barhebraeus, which is worth copying: 'They dwelt on Mount

Hermon leading a life of purity and abstaining from marriage; wherefore were they called *Watchers and Sons of God*' (*Dyn.* p. 4).

children of Cain...upon their beautiful dresses and ornaments' (cf. *En.* viii. 1)¹; and in the end one hundred of them went down, followed by almost all the rest, and committed abomination with the daughters of Cain. All this was not done without protest. Enoch as well as Jared remonstrated with them, the former saying 'Hear me, O ye sons of Seth, small and great—when ye transgress the commandment of our fathers, and go down from this holy mountain—ye shall not come up hither again for ever' (cf. *En.* xiv. 5). After this long extract it is almost needless to add minor coincidences. But the frequent application of the phrase 'the middle of the earth' to Jerusalem (e.g. ii. 8 (*ter*), 21 (*bis*), iii. 13 (*bis*), 14, iv. 3; cf. *En.* xxvi. 1, xc. 26) may be noted, as well as 'the mansions of the righteous and of the chosen' (ii. 22, cf. *En.* xxxix. 4, 7), and the sweet-smelling trees of Paradise (i. 1, cf. *En.* xxxii. 3).

Though the number of Egyptian writers who cite the Book of Enoch is not great, it is evident that the Book was held in high esteem among the Christians of that country. It actually found its way into the Old Testament Canon in the Abyssinian Church, and in the Ethiopic version of the Holy Scriptures follows the Book of Job. That it was read in Greek in Egypt at least as late as the eighth century is further proved by the recent discovery of the fragment at Ahkmim.

3. *Africa.* Here the Book of Enoch found a skilful and enthusiastic champion in the second century in the person of Tertullian. Tertullian not only, as we have already seen (p. 177 sqq.), quotes from Enoch, but he undertakes to defend its claim to inspiration. The passage *De Cult. Fem.* i. 3 sqq.² is worthy of study. It is the immediate sequel of one which has been already in part transcribed (p. 178), in which he comments on the story of the revelation of the forbidden mysteries by the fallen angels.

'Scio scripturam Enoch, quae hunc ordinem angelis dedit, non recipi a quibusdam, quia nec in armarium judaicum

¹ The ornaments of the women are *Test. Reub.* 5: see above, p. 172.
the temptation of the 'angels,' as in

² Migne i. 1307.

admittitur¹. Opinor, non putaverunt illam ante cataclysmum editam post eum casum orbis omnium rerum abolitorem salvam esse potuisse.'

To this objection he makes answer that Noah must have received the oral tradition of his great-grandfather's teaching². But in any case,

'Perinde potuit abolefactam eam violentia cataclysmi in spiritu rursus reformare, quemadmodum et...omne instrumentum judaicae litteraturae per Esdram constat restauratum. Sed cum Enoch eadem scriptura etiam de domino praedicarit, a nobis quidem nihil omnino rejiciendum est, quod pertinet ad nos. Et legimus omnem scripturam aedificationi habilem divinitus inspirari....Eo accedit, quod Enoch apud Judam apostolum testimonium possidet.'

On this passage one or two remarks must be made. In the first place those to whom Tertullian addressed himself were not likely to be unanimous in receiving the testimony of the Book of Enoch. The very fact that he gives so much space to the argument for its inspiration proves this. And moreover he admits that 'some' did not count it inspired. By a rhetorical writer like Tertullian it is not probable that the objection would have been mentioned at all if these 'certain persons' were not a numerous and influential body. In fact the impression left upon the mind of a reader is that Tertullian was labouring to introduce a book hitherto little known or little valued in the African Church. And this is borne out by the fact that he quotes from a Greek copy³. If the work had been much read in Africa, above all if it had been regarded as inspired, it must have appeared in a Latin translation. But

¹ A consideration to which Origen, be it remembered, attached considerable importance.

² His words will be found above, p. 180 note 1.

³ That Tertullian read the Book of Enoch in Greek is demonstrated by a comparison of *De Cult. Fem.* i. 2, with ii. 10, in both of which he quotes *En.* viii. 1. He evidently translates in

each case from a foreign language, the leading words of the original being represented by different Latin words in the two passages in almost every case. That the original was Greek is proved by the word *καλλιβλέφαρον* which he transliterates in the latter place. It is found in γ as the equivalent of 'the beautifying of the eyelids' of E.

that such a translation existed there is no evidence to show¹. If it existed it certainly was not used by Tertullian.

In the second place it is quite clear from the whole drift of the passage that Enoch was the sole authority known to Tertullian for the revealing of the forbidden arts by the angels. But it is no less clear that for the *descent* of the angels he believed himself to have Scripture warrant quite apart from Enoch. For he proceeds (cap. 4), 'Nulla nunc muliebri pompae nota inusta sit praedamnationis de exitu auctorum, nihil angelis illis imputetur praeter repudium coeli et matrimonium carnis.' This he must have deemed to be implied by the narrative in Genesis and the allusions of St Jude. Wherever therefore we find references in Tertullian to the teaching of new arts by the angels, we may be certain that he refers to our Book, but where he goes no further than the 'repudiation of heaven and carnal marriage' we have no reason to believe that he makes allusion to any writing outside the Canon².

And lastly the passage before us proves that Tertullian believed that as regards inspiration and authority Enoch was absolutely on a level with the Canonical Books³. In this he appears to go further, or at least to speak more emphatically, than any other writer early or late.

In one or two other places Tertullian uses language quite in keeping with this view. Thus in his Apology (cap. 22) he calls the book 'holy Scripture' (*sacrae litterae*), and in *De Idol.* 15 he tells us that the Holy Spirit sang (*praececinit*) through Enoch the Prophet, referring to a prediction which was doubtless contained in our Book in the form in which he read it⁴.

¹ Zahn, indeed (*Geschichte des Neutest. Kanons* ii. 797), regards the passage in Ps.-Cyprian (above, p. 165) as a fragment of a Latin translation of the Book. But this does not appear to be necessary. See below, p. 225 note.

² It therefore serves no very useful purpose to swell the list of Tertullian's references to our Book with such passages as *De Virg. Vel.* 7, *De Orat.* 22 (17), *Cont. Marc.* v. 8, 18, which might

very well have been written if the Book of Enoch had never existed. They are founded directly on Gen. vi. Enoch is not mentioned even where a reference to our Book might have helped Tertullian's arguments.

³ 'Kräftiger konnte man kaum für die kanonische Anerkennung des Henoch-buchs eintreten,' says Zahn, *Geschichte des Neutest. Kanons* i. 122.

⁴ See above, p. 181.

Whether or not Tertullian was the means of introducing the Book of Enoch for the first time to the notice of African Churchmen, it is reasonable to expect that his enthusiastic advocacy would give it a high place in the regard of the more learned theologians of that region. So long of course as it existed only in the Greek language, it was only the more learned who could cite it at first hand. But to them it was well-known, as we have unquestionable evidence to show.

I do not know whether I ought in this place to mention the vision of Perpetua (*Acta SS. Perpet. et Felic.* vii., viii. Robinson, p. 72 sqq.) in which after her prayer she sees the place which had been gloomy now bright¹, and one drawing water from the pool incessantly; and upon its brink was a goblet filled with water; and Dinocrates drew near and began to drink from it. 'Then' she says 'I understood that he was translated from punishment.' Just so in *En.* xxii., when the division of the under-world reserved for the righteous is contrasted with the places where the wicked are punished, it is said that 'there is a spring of water and light above it' (or with the Greek 'where is the light-giving spring of water'). Less striking are the 'house built of light' (xii. p. 80 sq., cf. *En.* xiv. 8 sqq.) and the 'indescribable odour' of Paradise (xiii. p. 82 sq., cf. *En.* xxiv. 3, 4 &c.).

It is with doubt also that I transcribe some words of Minucius Felix. Is he to be taken as representing the African or the Italian Church? Does he quote the Book of Enoch? In reply to the former question I am inclined to choose the African alternative, on account of his use of Tertullian, and the use made of him by Cyprian (*Dict. of Christ. Biog.* i. 740, iii. 922). The latter I must leave to be answered by those who will read, with its context, the following passage from the *Octavius* chap. 26 (Halm ii. p. 38).

'Spiritus sunt insinceri, uagi, a caelesti uigore terrenis labibus et cupiditatibus degrauati. Isti igitur spiritus, posteaquam simplicitatem substantiae suae, onusti et immersi utiis perdi-

¹ These words rest upon the authority of a single Latin ms. and are omitted from Prof. A. Robinson's text.

But the fact which they state is implied by the context.

derunt, ad solacium calamitatis suae non desinunt perditam iam perdere, et deprauati errorem prauitatis infundere, et alienati a Deo inductis prauis religionibus a Deo segregare. Eos spiritus daemones esse poetae sciunt, philosophi disserunt' &c. Compare *En.* xv., xvi. 1, xix. 1 &c.

We must however mention *Five Books against Marcion*, a poetical treatise falsely ascribed to Tertullian, the authorship of which is unknown. It may perhaps be assumed that it is African in origin¹. The following is the summary of the life of Enoch given in Book III. chapter 2 (Migne ii. 1070).

'Huius Enoch, insigne decus, de corpore membrum
A deo digressos populos facinusque sequentes,
Dum furit in terris refugarum turba latronum;
Sacilegum genus ut fugeret crudele gigantum,
Consilio revocabat, in omnibus ipse fidelis.
Ingenti gemitu placuit, meritoque labore
Translatum magno pignus servatur honore.'

This passage appears to be founded on our Book, at least so far as to make Enoch contemporary with the giants of Gen. vi: This is quite compatible with, and is even suggested by, the Book of Enoch, but is at variance with the Scripture narrative.

Somewhat later than Tertullian was Commodianus. He refers to the Book of Enoch in at least two passages.

Let us quote first *Instructiones* i. 3 sqq. (Dombart p. 7).

'Cum Deus omnipotens exornasset mundi naturam,
Visitari uoluit terram ab angelis istam,
Legitima cuius spreuerunt illi dimissi²:
Tanta fuit forma feminarum, quae flecteret illos³.
Ut coinquinati non possunt coelo redire⁴,
Rebelles ex illo contra Deum verba misere⁵.
Altissimus inde sententiam misit in illis⁶;

¹ Oehler however (*Tertullian* ii. 782) ascribes it to Victorinus of Marseilles. If he be indeed the author of the verses, we have here a Gallican witness. But if so, as we shall presently see, the evidence stands alone in Gaul, and it is too slight to be relied upon in such

circumstances.

² See above, p. 166.

³ *En.* vi. 1, 2.

⁴ *En.* xiv. 5.

⁵ *En.* i. 9 (γ), xiii. 2.

⁶ *En.* x. 4 sqq., xii. sqq.

De semine quorum gigantes nati feruntur¹.
 Ab ipsis in terra artis prolatae fuere,
 Et tingere lanas² docuerunt et quaeque geruntur³,
 Mortales et illi mortuos simulacro ponebant⁴.
 Omnipotens autem, quod essent de semine prauo,
 Non censuit illos recipi defunctos e morte.
 Unde modo uagi subuertunt corpora multa⁵:
 Maxime quos hodie colitis et deos oratis⁴.

With these lines we place two from the *Carmen Apologeticum* (1011 sq. p. 181)

‘Stellae cadunt caeli, iudicantur astra nobiscum:
 Turbantur caelicolae⁶, agitur dum saeculi ruina.’

Julius Africanus was, as it appears, a contemporary of Commodianus. Among the extant fragments of his *Chronographia*, preserved by Georgius Syncellus, is found the following⁷.

Πλήθους⁸ ἀνθρώπων γενομένου ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἄγγελοι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ θυγατράσιν ἀνθρώπων συνῆλθον. ἐν ἐνίοις ἀντιγράφοις εὔρον, οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ.

He then expounds this phrase as referring to the Sethites, and proceeds, εἰ δὲ ἐπ’ ἀγγέλων νοοῖτο ἔχειν τούτους, τοὺς περὶ μαγείας καὶ γοητείας, ἔτι⁹ δὲ ἀριθμῶν κινήσεως, τῶν μετεώρων ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὴν γνώσιν παραδεδωκέναι, ἀφ’ ὧν ἐποίησαν τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς γίγαντας, δι’ οὓς τῆς κακίας ἐπιγενομένης, ἔγνω πᾶν ἀφανίσαι ζῶων γένος ὁ θεὸς ἐν κατακλυσμῷ ἄπιστον.

The reference to our Book (vii. 1, viii. 1, 2, 3, x. 1 sq.) is beyond doubt. But the passage is specially interesting as showing that the judicial mind of Julius preserved him from agreeing with the extravagant estimate of that work which had been formed by Tertullian. He distinctly states that he preferred the reading ‘Sons of God,’ and the exegesis by which this was understood of the Sethites, which would directly conflict with Enoch. Julius Africanus therefore, while quoting

¹ *En.* vii. 2.

² Cf. above, p. 179.

³ *En.* viii. 1.

⁴ *En.* xix. 1.

⁵ *En.* xv. 6 sqq.

⁶ *En.* xc. 25 sqq. &c.

⁷ Goar, p. 19 sq.

⁸ πλήθος, Goar.

⁹ ἔρει, Goar.

our Book, and by no means regarding it as worthless, held it to be neither inspired nor authoritative.

About the same time (A.D. 250) flourished Cyprian, who followed his 'Master' Tertullian so far as to quote one passage from Enoch. It is the same passage as that to which Tertullian made reference in *De Cult. Fem.* i. 2, ii. 10, and a similar argument is based upon it; but we have already given reason for believing that Cyprian made his citation direct from the Greek¹. Cyprian wrote (*De Hab. Virg.* 14, Hartel i. p. 197) as follows:

'Neque enim Deus coccineas aut purpureas oues fecit aut herbarum sucis et conchyliis tinguere et colorare lanas docuit nec distinctis auro lapillis aut margaritis contexta serie et numerosa conpage digestis monilia instituit, quibus ceruicem quam fecit absconderet, ut operiatur illud quod Deus in homine formauit et conspiciatur id desuper quod diabolus inuenit. An uulnera inferri auribus Deus uoluit, quibus innocens adhuc infantia et mali saecularis ignara crucietur, ut postea de aurium cicatricibus et cauernis pretiosa grana dependeant, grauia etsi non suo pondere, mercium tamen quantitate? quae omnia peccatores et apostatae angeli suis artibus prodiderunt, quando ad terrena contagia deuoluti a caelesti uigore recesserunt illi et oculos circumducto nigrore fucare et genas mendacio ruboris inficere et mutare adulterinis coloribus crinem et expugnare omnem oris et capitis ueritatem corruptelae suae inpugnatione docuerunt.'

Cyprian evidently believed the story in Enoch vi. sqq. to be historical, though whether he looked upon the book as inspired or possessing authority, he does not inform us.

Yet another contemporary African writer may be cited as a witness. The author of the treatise *Ad Novatianum* quotes *En.* i. 9 in a passage which will be found above, p. 165. He introduces it with the formula 'sicut scriptum est,' which appears to indicate that he placed it on a par with the Canonical Scriptures.

But we must pass on to the next century, in the early part

¹ See above, p. 179.

of which we find Lactantius¹ (*Instit.* ii. 14, Brandt and Laubmann i. p. 162 sqq.) penning the following passage²:

‘Cum ergo numerus hominum coepisset increscere, prouidens Deus ne fraudibus suis diabolus, cui ab initio dederat terrae potestatem, uel corrumperet homines uel disperderet, quod in exordio fecerat, misit angelos ad tutelam cultumque generis humani³: quibus [quia liberum arbitrium erat datum]⁴ praecepit, ante omnia, ne, terrae contagione maculati, substantiae caelestis amitterent dignitatem....Itaque illos cum hominibus commorantes dominator ille terrae fallacissimus consuetudine ipsa paulatim ad uitia pellexit, et mulierum congressibus inquinauit⁵. Tum in caelum ob peccata, quibus se immerserant, non recepti⁶, ceciderunt in terram. Sic eos diabolus ex angelis Dei suos fecit satellites, ac ministros⁷. Qui autem sunt ex his procreati, quia neque angeli, neque homines fuerunt, sed mediam quandam naturam gerentes, non sunt ad inferos recepti, sicut in caelum parentes eorum⁸. Ita duo genera daemonum facta sunt, unum caeleste, alterum terrenum. Hi sunt immundi spiritus, malorum, quae geruntur, auctores, quorum idem diabolus est princeps⁹....Quod idcirco dictum est quoniam custodes eos humano generi Deus miserat: sed et ipsi, cum sint perditores hominum, custodes tamen se uideri uolunt, ut ipsi colantur, et Deus non colatur¹⁰....Magorum quoque ars omnis ac potentia horum adspirationibus constat, a quibus inuocati, uisus hominum praestigiis obcaecantibus fallunt....Hi, ut dico, spiritus contaminati ac perdit per omnem terram uagantur, et in solacium perditionis suae perdendis hominibus operantur¹¹....Hos in suis penetralibus consecrant, his cotidie uina profundunt, et scientes, daemonas

¹ As to his African extraction see *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* iii. p. 613.

² Compare also *Epit. Inst.* 27, 28.

³ See above, p. 166.

⁴ See above, p. 178. The brackets enclose words found in Brandt's ms. B, but not included in his text.

⁵ *En.* vi. vii. &c. from which, however, Lactantius differs in saying that the Watchers were tempted by the

devil. But see lxi. 4 sq., and compare the *Book of Adam and Eve*, above, p. 206, and the passages referred to p. 195 note 2.

⁶ *En.* xiv. 5.

⁷ *En.* liv. 6, cf. *Test. Dan.* 5.

⁸ *En.* xv. 8—11, xvi. 1.

⁹ See note 7 above.

¹⁰ *En.* xix. 1.

¹¹ *En.* xv. 8—11, xvi. 1.

uenerantur, quasi terrestres deos¹, &c. In the next chapter he proceeds, 'quos ideo Trismegistus ἀγγέλους πονηρούς appellat: adeo non ignorauit ex caelestibus deprauatos, terrenos esse coepisse.' And in chap. 16, 'Eorum inuenta sunt astrologia, et haruspicina, et auguratio, et ipsa quae dicuntur oracula, et necromantia, et ars magica²....Hi sunt qui fingere imagines et simulacra docuerunt³; qui, ut hominum mentes a cultu ueri Dei auerterent, effictos mortuorum regum uultus, et ornatos exquisita pulchritudine statui consecrarique fecerunt, et illorum sibi nomina, quasi personas aliquas, induerunt. Sed eos magi...ueris suis nominibus cient, illis caelestibus, quae in litteris sanctis leguntur⁴,' with more to the same effect.

This extract may serve to show the high place given to the narrative of the Book of Enoch in the opinion of the scholarly Lactantius. He seems to describe it as 'Holy Scripture' (litterae sacrae), as Tertullian had done before him. But it must be observed that the narrative of the flood as given in Genesis is completed by Lactantius (c. 13) before he resorts to Enoch. The latter seems therefore to be placed on a somewhat lower level than the Mosaic writings.

The passage just cited does not stand altogether alone. The reader of Lactantius is often reminded of the Book of Enoch by phrases and sentiments which, though we cannot indeed confidently assert that they have been derived from the Jewish Apocryph, must not be altogether passed over. Such for example are his frequent assertions that idol-worship had its origin in the machination of demons who are condemned to everlasting fire (e.g. *Inst.* iv. 14, 27, v. 18, cf. *En.* xix. 1); the prediction that in the last days 'nec terra homini dabit fructum...Luna...meatus extraordinarios peraget...Tunc annus breuiabitur (vii. 16, cf. *En.* lxxx. 2 sqq.); his statement that in the millennium 'qui erunt in corporibus uiui, non morientur, sed per eosdem mille annos infinitam multitudinem generabunt...Terra uero aperiet fecunditatem suam et uberimas fruges sua sponte generabit, rupes montium melle sudabunt, per riuos uina decurrent,' &c. (vii. 24, cf. *En.* x. 17

¹ *En.* xix. 1.

² *En.* vii. 1, viii. 1, 3.

³ Cf. *En.* xix. 1.

⁴ Cf. *En.* vi. 7, 8, lxix.

sqq.¹); the description of the abode of the dead (vii. 7), attributed to Zeno and the prophets, which cannot fail to recall *En.* xxii.; and finally the incidents of the judgement—the slaughter of the wicked by the just when the sword has descended from heaven (vii. 19, cf. *En.* xc. 19, xci. 12), the special judgement of the princes and tyrants (*ib.*, cf. *En.* liv. lxiii. &c.), the judgement being held ‘in the middle of the earth’ (cf. *En.* xc. 26), the whole band of the wicked who ‘shall be burnt for ever in the sight of the angels and righteous’ (vii. 26, cf. *En.* xlvi. 9).

Our latest African witness² shall be Augustine of Hippo. And we shall find that in the century which had elapsed since Lactantius wrote a change had taken place in the view held as to our Book by the leading theologians of Africa. Two passages in the *De Civitate Dei* mention it. They are important, and I therefore give them almost in full.

De Civ. Dei xv. 23. 4 (Migne xli. 470). After arguing that even with the reading ‘angels’ in Gen. vi. the beings so described were really men, he proceeds, ‘Omittamus igitur earum scripturarum fabulas, quae apocryphae nuncupantur, eo quod earum occulta origo non claruit patribus, a quibus usque ad nos auctoritas veracium Scripturarum certissima et notissima successione pervenit. In his autem apocryphis etsi invenitur aliqua veritas, tamen propter multa falsa nulla est canonica auctoritas. Scripsisse quidem nonnulla divina Enoch, illum septimum ab Adam, negare non possumus, cum hoc in Epistola canonica Judas apostolus dicat. Sed non frustra non sunt in eo canone Scripturarum, qui servabatur in templo Hebraei populi succedentium diligentia sacerdotum, nisi quia ob antiquitatem suspectae fidei iudicata sunt, nec utrum haec essent quae ille scripsisset, poterat inveniri, non talibus proferentibus, qui ea per seriem successionis reperirentur rite

¹ But cf. Papias ap. Iren. v. 33. 3.

² An examination of the writings of the later African Fathers would doubtless result in the discovery of some other allusions to our Book which might enable us to trace still further

its history in that region. This examination I have not attempted. The Book of Enoch seems to have influenced a citation of Jud. 14, 15 by Vigilius Tapsensis. See Zahn *Gesch. des Neutest. Kanons* ii. 800.

servasse. Unde illa quae sub ejus nomine proferuntur, et continent istas de gigantibus fabulas, quod non habuerint homines patres, recte a prudentibus judicantur non ipsius esse credenda; sicut multa sub nominibus et aliorum Prophetarum, et recentiora sub nominibus Apostolorum ab haereticis proferuntur, &c.

De Civitate Dei xviii. 38 (Migne xli. 598). After mentioning Noah and Enoch, 'Quorum scripta, ut apud Judaeos et apud nos in auctoritate non essent, nimia fecit antiquitas, propter quam videbantur habenda esse suspecta, ne proferrentur falsa pro veris. Nam et proferuntur quaedam quae ipsorum esse dicantur ab eis qui pro suo sensu passim, quod volunt, credunt. Sed ea castitas canonis non recepit, non quod eorum hominum, qui Deo placuerunt, reprobetur auctoritas, sed quod ista esse non credantur ipsorum.'

These passages leave us no doubt as to Augustine's own opinion. But it should be noted that they also make it quite clear that his opinion was not universally accepted. He argues that as the Book of Enoch is not included in the Canon, the stories related in it are not to be received as having the authority of the patriarch; but in this inference he has the adherence only of 'the wise.' Plainly in Africa, even as late as the fifth century, a considerable number tenaciously clung to their belief in and respect for the Book of Enoch.

So far therefore as we can judge, the history of the Book of Enoch in Africa was this. It was probably introduced into the Church there by Tertullian. At least he was its main champion. He maintained its inspiration and authority. His influence secured for it high esteem until well on in the fourth century. In the fifth Augustine argued against the long prevailing opinions: but, though he doubtless did not stand alone, yet at the time of the publication of his *City of God* his views did not command unanimous assent.

To the general consent of African Church writers in favour of the Book of Enoch there is one apparent exception, to which a few lines must be devoted. Arnobius the master of Lactantius, writing about A.D. 310, has nowhere, so far as I have observed, in his only extant work the slightest allusion to our

Book. Nay more, in some passages of the *Disputations* he appears to contradict its teaching. For example, he argues elaborately (ii. 17 sq.) that the arts of life were gradually evolved by men under the pressure of circumstances, and were not (as the heathen held) heaven-sent. On the whole it seems clear that he did not know, or did not accept, the Book. But this is easily explained. The *Disputations* of Arnobius¹, hitherto an ardent pagan and philosopher, were, it is said, written after he had expressed a desire to be admitted to the Church, but before his baptism. He was therefore ignorant of the books generally received among Christians. He evinces but little knowledge of the New Testament, still less of the Old, while his ignorance of Jewish Literature generally is manifest (ii. 14 *ad fin.*, iii. 12). It is not therefore to be wondered at that he exhibits no respect for or acquaintance with the Book of Enoch. But, for the same reason, he cannot be held in the *Disputations* to represent the opinion of any section of the African Churchmen of his day on such a subject as this.

3. *Italy and Gaul.* I do not know of any very early writer from whose words we can confidently infer that the Book of Enoch was known in Italy. Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus, indeed writes thus in the opening sentences of the remaining fragment of his Discourse against the Greeks²: Καὶ οὗτος μὲν ὁ περὶ δαιμόνων τόπος. Περὶ δὲ "Αιδου, ἐν ᾧ συνέχονται ψυχὰι δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν. 'Ο "Αιδης τόπος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει ἀκατασκεύαστος, χωρίον ὑπόγειον, ἐν ᾧ φῶς κόσμου οὐκ ἐπιλάμπει. Dr James³ believes that the words τόπος ἀκατασκεύαστος are from *Enoch* xxi. 1. If so, Hippolytus, like St Jude and Tertullian, must have used the version represented by the Gizeh Greek. It is certainly remarkable that this phrase should occur, especially following (as it seems) a passage on demons, which may have been founded on *En.* xv. or xix. And the phrase, χωρίον ὑπόγειον, ἐν ᾧ φῶς κόσμου οὐκ ἐπιλάμπει, reminds one of *En.* x. 4, 5. But on the other hand the coincidence of phrase is too slight

¹ *Dict. of Christ. Biog.* i. p. 167 sqq.

³ Robinson and James, *Gospel and*

² Bunsen, *Analecta Ante-Nicaena*, i.

Revelation of Peter, p. 68.

to be relied upon, and in *En.* x. 4, 5, xxi. 1, it is not the abode of the souls of the righteous which is described, but the place where the stars or angels who had transgressed were imprisoned. The place where the souls of the dead dwelt is spoken of in a different chapter (xxii.), and is said to be in 'another place.' It is not expressly called Hades, and the division in which the righteous dwelt was not dark: 'there is a spring of water and light above it' (v. 9). On the whole it seems precarious to infer from this fragment that Hippolytus knew the Book of Enoch. Had the preceding passage 'concerning demons' remained, we might have been able to speak more decidedly.

Setting aside Hippolytus, the first Italian writer to whom we can appeal is Jerome at the end of the fourth century. And his testimony is very striking. He knew the book, but without hesitation stigmatized it as apocryphal. 'Legimus in quodam libro apocrypho,' he says (*Brev. in Psalm.* cxxxii. 3: Migne xxvi. 1293), 'eo tempore quo descendebant filii Dei ad filias hominum, descendisse illos in montem Hermon, et ibi inisse pactum, quomodo venirent ad filias hominum, et sibi eas sociarent.' The allusion is obviously to *En.* vi. 4, 5. But not only did Jerome reject the Book of Enoch. It was rejected by unanimous consent. A heretic is sufficiently discredited when it is shown that his heresy is founded on the Book of Enoch¹. And then as to the quotation in St Jude's Epistle, Augustine in Africa found it necessary to argue that the Book was not necessarily to be believed because it was quoted by an inspired writer. Jerome's argument is the exact converse. He had to defend the Epistle of St Jude against those—and they were

¹ The context of Jerome's words should be quoted. 'Manifestissimus liber est, et inter apocryphos computatur, et veteres interpretes de ipso locuti sunt: nonnulla autem nos diximus: non in auctoritatem, sed in commemorationem...Legi in cujusdam libro, de isto apocrypho suam haeresim confirmantis. Quid enim dicit? Filii, inquit, Dei qui de coelis descendebant, venerunt in Hermon et con-

cupierunt filias hominum. Angeli, inquit, sunt de coelestibus descendentes, et animae quae desideraverunt corpora. Siquidem corpora filiae hominum sunt. Vidistis quomodo Manichaei dogma consurgit?...Longum est nunc contra illos dicere: sed tantummodo judicare volui, de quo volumine quasi per occasionem istius, suum dogma confirmant.'

many—who maintained that because it cited an apocryphal work it should be rejected¹. Those who accepted St Jude's Epistle had, he assumed, only one possible ground on which to take their stand. An inspired writer citing one passage out of a work sets the seal of his authority on the words which he quotes and on no other part of the book from which they are taken. This is *proved* by the fact that St Jude extracts a sentence from the Book of Enoch².

In Italy the Book of Enoch was known and read, at least by Jerome. Further north it was not even to this extent honoured. Hilary had indeed heard something about the descent of the angels on Mount Hermon (vi. 6). But he apologizes for mentioning things 'not contained in the Book of the Law.' He does not dream of regarding the Book of Enoch as authoritative. Indeed it may be doubted whether he had ever seen it. He describes it in language which is at least vague, and he betrays absolute ignorance of the gist of the passage to which he refers. Hermon, he says, means Anathema, and the mountain was so called because, having been the scene of the descent of the angels on so vile a mission, it was henceforth accursed³. Enoch's account is very different. 'They called it Mount Hermon because they had sworn and bound themselves by mutual imprecations upon it.' Hilary, it will be observed,

¹ *De Viris Illust.* iv. (Migne xxiii. 645) 'Et quia de libro Enoch, qui apocryphus est, in ea assumit testimonium, a plerisque rejicitur, tamen auctoritatem vetustate jam et usu meruit et inter sanctas Scripturas computatur.'

² *Comm. in Ep. ad Tit.* i. 12 (Migne xxvi. 608) 'Qui autem putant totum librum debere sequi eum qui libri parte usus sit, videntur mihi et apocryphum Enochi, de quo Apostolus Judas in Epistola sua testimonium posuit, inter ecclesiae scripturas recipere.' He plainly regards his argument as a reductio ad absurdum.

³ *Tract. super Psal.* cxxii. 6 (Zingerle, p. 689). 'Hermon autem mons est in Phoenice, cuius interpretatio anathema

est: quod enim nobis cum Anathema nuncupatur, id Hebraice Hermon dicitur. Fertur autem id, de quo etiam nescio cuius liber extat, quod angeli concupiscentes filias hominum, cum de caelo descenderent, in hunc montem Hermon maxime excelsum conuenerint. Sed haec praetermittamus. Quae enim libro legis non continentur, ea nec nosse debemus: commemorata autem ob id tantum sunt, quia nos de hoc monte Dei per prophetam professio commouebat. Certe hodie gentes montem hunc profana religione uenerantur et interpretationem nominis sui, quod est anathema, ipsa illa impiae superstitionis sede testantur.'

does not even mention the imprecations, on which the whole point of the passage depends.

The Book of Enoch plainly never gained a real footing in Italy or Gaul.

4. *Spain.* The list of Spanish ecclesiastical writers of the early centuries is not a long one. And there is but one of them who can be claimed with any plausibility as evincing knowledge of the Book of Enoch—Priscillian, bishop of Avila. Unfortunately the evidence which his language supplies is somewhat difficult to interpret.

Priscillian had been found fault with for his use of writings outside the Canon. He makes his defence in his treatise *De Fide et de Apocryphis*. The early part of this work, which perhaps contained the names of some of the books to his use of which exception had been taken, is lost, and we are left to conjecture what they may have been from the arguments which he urges in his reply. He reasons that in citing non-canonical books he was but following the example set by inspired writers. In support of this contention he brings together many passages of the Scriptures in which allusion is made to writings which had not been admitted into the Canon, and the first of these is St Jude's reference to the Book of Enoch. Here are his words¹:

‘Uideamus ergo, si apostoli Christi Iesu magistri nostrae conuersationis et uitae extra canonem nil legerunt. Ait Iuda apostolus...‘Prophetauit de his,’ inquit, ‘septimus ab Adam Enoc dicens Ecce uenit.’...Quis est hic Enoc quem in testimonium profetiae apostolus Iudas adsumpsit? An qui profetasset de deo, alium non habebat nisi profetiam huius poneret, quam, si uera dicuntur, canonica ipse ordinatione damnasset? Aut fortassis Enoc profeta esse non meruit quem Paulus in epistula ad Hebreos facta ante translationem testimonium habuisse testatur...De quo si non ambigitur et apostolis creditur quod profeta est, qualiter consultatio potius quam tumultus, consilium quam temeritas, fides quam perfidia dicitur, ubi, dum in ultionem simultatum sententia tenditur, praedicans deum profeta damnatur?’

¹ Schepss, p. 44 sq.

This passage, and especially its last sentence, may be thought to imply that Enoch was one of the books for his study of which Priscillian had been censured. But let us note, in the first place, that it was not necessary for his argument that the actual writings, the reading of which he advocated, should be referred to in Scripture. All he was concerned to prove was that it was an apostolic practice to make citations from non-canonical books. And further, a little lower down he expresses himself in almost identical language about a supposed apocryphal book, the very existence of which appears improbable. After mentioning (p. 48) St Matthew's use of the prediction 'Out of Egypt have I called my son,' which he not unnaturally failed to find in the Old Testament Canon¹, he proceeds:

'Certe damnari liber non potest cuius testimonium canonicae elocutionis fidem complet.'

These words entitle us to infer that Priscillian believed that St Matthew quoted the passage in question from a non-canonical book. They might seem also to lead to the further conclusion that he and his opponents knew some book in which they occurred, if we had not good reason on other grounds to believe that Priscillian was entirely mistaken in his belief in its existence.

We have great hesitation therefore in inferring from Priscillian's language about St Jude's citation that he was aware that a book bearing Enoch's name was in circulation in his own time, or that he had seen it. Our hesitation is increased when, a few pages further on (p. 55), we read the following words, 'Ab omnibus adnuntiatus est dominus, ab omnibus profetatus est Christus, ab Adam, Sed, Noe, Abraham, Isac, Iacob, et a ceteris qui ab initio saeculi profetauerunt.' Is he giving a list of Jewish Apocrypha known to him²? If so the omission of Enoch is significant³.

But whatever inference we may be entitled to make from

¹ See Schepss *ad loc.*

² This supposition receives confirmation from the passage cited below, p. 223, note 2.

³ It is true that Priscillian here al-

ludes to a passage from the Book of Tobit which he had previously quoted (p. 45). But it is worthy of note that he adds to the list of prophets there given the names 'Adam, Sed.'

the comment on the citation in St Jude, it must I think be clear to anyone who will read the entire treatise that Priscillian speaks only for himself. He does not regard himself as in any sense representing the Church in Spain; he scarcely even leads us to believe that there were a considerable number of persons who shared his opinion of the value of non-canonical writings.

And further, even he—supposing him to have known our Book—would have regarded it as immeasurably inferior to the Canonical Scriptures. Of this we have sufficient evidence in the fact that a few verses from the Epistle to the Laodiceans are the only extracts from any Apocryphal book¹ found in his extant writings, scarcely a page of which is without numerous citations from Scripture. But his words are express (p. 46):

‘In quibus tamen omnibus libris² non est metus, si quae ab infelicibus hereticis sunt inserta, delere, et quae profetis uel euangeliiis non inueniuntur consentire respuere.’

And again (p. 56), ‘In quo illud tamen non recuso nec respuo inperitis haec non committenda auribus, ne, quia ab hereticis pleraque falsata sunt, dum praetitulato nomine prophetarum in uerbis sanctorum diuinum opus quaerunt, haereticae falsitatis inruant foueam, dum apostolici sermonis non ad plenum retinent disciplinam.’

In fine our conclusion is this. It is very doubtful whether Priscillian had ever read or heard of our Book of Enoch, and if he had he certainly allowed it no authority at all approaching that of the Canonical Writings. That the Book ever circulated throughout the Spanish Church we have no evidence at all.

Thus all the evidence which we possess goes to show that our Book was read and valued only by Greek-speaking or

¹ Unless indeed we include under that description 4 Esdras.

² The antecedent to these words seems to be supplied by the earlier sentence ‘Quando in canone profetae Noe liber lectus est? quis inter profetas dispositi canonis Abrahæ librum legit? quis quod aliquando Isaac profetasset edocuit? quis profetiam Jacob quod in

canone poneretur audiuit?’ If so, we have apparently an indication that he was acquainted with books ascribed to Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It must not be forgotten, however, that he is here commenting on the passage from Tobit already mentioned (p. 222, note 3). Compare p. 222, note 2.

Oriental Christians, and by a few learned men who were acquainted with the Greek tongue. The only Latin-speaking district in which it was held in high esteem was Africa—and there, so far as we can judge, only by men who may be supposed to have read it in a Greek version. The first African writer who mentions it certainly did so.

It is likely therefore that the Book of Enoch was never (at least in the early centuries) rendered into Latin, and that this may have been the main cause of its unpopularity in the West as compared with the East.

But it may be urged that there is evidence on the other side. It has in fact been argued by Mr Charles (p. 372 sq.) that the manuscript discovered by Dr James in the British Museum, of which we have already spoken (p. 175 sq.), was probably 'drawn directly from at least a larger Latin fragment of Enoch,' and if so, it 'may point to a Latin translation' of the Book¹.

We have already arrived at the conclusion that the manuscript in question is really a fragment, not of Enoch, but of a Noachic Book from which interpolations were introduced into our Book. If this be so, Mr Charles' inference must be modified. The manuscript, if it really is a fragment of a complete work, must be part of a translation of the Noachic work and not of the Book of Enoch.

But to me it appears more reasonable to believe that the translation never included any more than the single passage now recovered.

In the first place, it is one of a collection of treatises or documents bound up in a single volume. Most of these, it would seem, are complete. This in itself makes it probable that in the case under consideration the scribe copied all that lay before him. Again, there is evidence that the translator tried to remove the abruptness of the commencement of the piece. In the Book of Enoch it begins with the mark of time 'after some days.' This was doubtless copied from the original document, for it is meaningless as it now stands. The translator substitutes for it the impossible date 'when Lamech was 350

¹ This is the opinion also of Dr James, *Apocrypha Anecdota*, p. 150.

years old.' The reason is pretty clear. He set himself to render the narrative of the birth of Noah into Latin. But such a narrative, separated from its context, and commencing with the words 'And after many days,' would be singularly unhappy. To give it an air of completeness therefore he inserts a date independent of the Book of which it originally formed part¹.

Whether therefore that book were the Book of Enoch or the Noachic work, it seems to me unlikely that the scribe had before him, or that the translator rendered into Latin, more than the single chapter now in our hands.

In conclusion I desire to express my gratitude to Dr James for much help in the preparation of this paper.

H. J. LAWLOR.

¹ It has been pointed out to me that both our translator (v. 5) and the writer of the treatise *Ad Novatianum* in his quotation of *En.* i. 9 (see above, p. 165) use 'nuntius' as a rendering of ἀγγελος, and this has been urged as supporting the contention that λ and the passage in *Ad Novatianum* are fragments of a Latin translation which included the entire work. The coincidence is the

more remarkable inasmuch as the writer of the treatise uses the word 'angeli' elsewhere (Hartel p. 68). But it would be unsafe to build a theory upon so narrow a foundation. And on the other hand it must be observed that while in *Ad Nov.* we have 'perdere' as the equivalent of ἀπολέσαι, λ gives us 'deleat' in a similar connexion (v. 15).

LUCRETIANA.

I 312—316.

Anulus in digito subter tenuatur habendo,
 stilicidi casus lapidem cauat, uncus aratri
 ferreus occulte decrescit uomer in aruis,
 strataque iam uolgi pedibus detrita uiarum
 saxea conspicimus.

Isidore orig. XX 14 1 quotes from 'uncus' down to 'aruis' and then runs on 'sumitque per detrimenta fulgorem', on which Munro observes 'it is odd if the last words are Isidore's own' and suggests 'sumitque *ipse suum* per detrimenta *nitorem*'. Earlier proposals of the same kind are met by Lachmann with the remark 'iste nitor uomeris hic frustra emicat, cum poeta non describat splendentia, sed quae minuantur attritu'. But Lucretius is always ready to strew our dusty path with flowers of this sort: take II 323—332, where 326 sqq. 'supterque uirum ui | excitur pedibus sonitus clamoreque montes | icti reiectant uoces ad sidera mundi' are meant simply to give delight and have no bearing on the point to be proved, that objects in motion look stationary when seen from a distance. Nor is it any objection to 'detrimenta' that 'detrita' occurs in the next line: that negligence has examples on every page.

I conjecture

sumitque *e sulco* per detrimenta *nitorem*.

e disappears into the preceding letter; *sulco* is omitted by accident and added in the margin; there by two early and frequent errors it is mistaken for *fulgo* and so corrupts *nitorem* to *fulgorem*. I find also external support for this proposal.

Virgil will sometimes imitate two passages of Lucretius in a single passage of his own: thus *georg.* II 478 sq. 'defectus solis uarios lunaeque labores, | unde tremor terris' come from *Lucretius* v 751 'solis item quoque defectus lunaeque latebras' and VI 287 'inde tremor terras' *cet.*: indeed the eight lines 475—482 contain four imitations of Lucretius, two from I 923 sqq. and v 699 sq. beside the two cited above; and again *Aen.* VII 108 'corpora sub ramis deponunt arboris altae' is entirely constructed out of *Lucretius* I 258 'corpora deponunt' and II 30 'sub ramis arboris altae'. Now when Virgil writes at *georg.* I 45 sq. '*depresso incipiat iam tum mihi taurus aratro | ingemere, et sulco attritus splendescere uomer*', he appears to be imitating both *Lucretius* v 208 sq. 'ualido consueta bidenti | *ingemere et terram pressis proscindere aratris*' and I 314 sq. 'decrescit uomer in aruis | sumitque e sulco per detrimenta nitorem'. Further, the three lines *Lucretius* I 312—314 are clearly paraphrased in *Anth. Lat.* Riese 648 (= *Baehrens P. L. M.* IV 118) 9—12, where the vocabulary is borrowed partly from Lucretius and partly from Virgil's imitation: '*decidens scabrum cauat unda tofum, | ferreus uomis tenuatur agris, | splendet adtrito digitos honorans | anulus auro*'.

I 440—446.

Praeterea per se quodcumque erit, aut faciet quid 440
aut aliis fungi debebit agentibus ipsum,
aut erit ut possint in eo res esse gerique:
at facere et fungi sine corpore nulla potest res,
nec praebere locum porro nisi inane uacansque.
ergo, praeter inane et corpora, tertia per se 445
nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui.

Non sequitur: the reasoning breaks down in 443. The fact that 'no thing can do and suffer *without* body, nor any thing furnish room except void' does not clinch the proof that no third thing beside body and void exists: it leaves open, and even suggests, the possibility of a third thing which does and suffers *in conjunction* with body. To preclude that he must say

at facere et fungi, *nise corpora*, nulla potest res

(or *nise corpus*), as he says in the next line '*nisi inane uacansque*' and as he said at 304 '*tangere enim et tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res*': on the other hand III 165 sq. '*quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse uidemus | nec tactum porro sine corpore*' is perfectly correct. Between *corpus* and *corpora* I see nothing to choose: either must be transmuted to *corpore* at the touch of *sine*: 304 favours the singular, 445 the plural. The form *nise* occurs in a contemporary document, the *lex Rubria*, C. I. L. vol. I 205 1 47, and again vol. V 154 8 and 4113 3; and in Lucretius himself it lurks once more under the disguise of *sine* at II 936 '*nec quicquam commutari sine conciliatu*', where Mr Goebel's *nisi* (write *nise*) *conciliatum* is necessary, for the only thing which '*commutatur*' is the '*conciliatus*' itself. This spelling, or else the almost equally well authenticated *nesi*, may have left its traces too in other writers: see for instance Ovid. *fast.* II 671 '*ne quid nisi sidera cernat*' and *trist.* III 3 28 '*tempus agi sine me non nisi triste tibi*', where the best MS in both cases has *sine*; and *her.* XIII 55 sq. '*nec rapere ausurus, nisi se defendere posset, | hospes erat*', where Burmann's *nisi si* appears to be required but should perhaps be *nise si*. Quintilian *inst.* I 7 24 attests *quase* and *sibe* as frequent.

At III 522 for *uti deocui* I should be disposed to write *utei docui*, and *uoluntatei* (*uoluntati* Bockemueller) for *uoluntate id* at II 270.

I 490, 491.

Ferrum candescit in igni
dissiliuntque fero feruenti saxa uapore.

feruentia Marullus and modern editors; but they alter the wrong word. '*feruenti uapore*' is thoroughly Lucretian: at V 339 he has '*torrenti uapore*', and elsewhere '*calidi uaporis*', '*calidis feruoribus*', '*feruidus ardor*', '*calidos aestus*', and even '*sonitu sonanti*'. '*fero uapore*' on the other hand still awaits defence: Ovid, it is true, writes '*ferus ignis*' at *rem.* 267 and elsewhere; but it is one thing to confer this epithet on fire, which has form and colour and motion, and quite another to

confer it on heat, which has none of the three. I have no doubt then that Lucretius wrote

dissiliuntque *fere* feruenti saxa uapore ;

for Virgil imitates this in *georg.* III 363 ‘*æraque dissiliunt uolgo*’: ‘*uolgo*’ and ‘*fere*’ mean just the same thing, see Munro on I 15 (14).

I was about to publish this as my own correction ; but I find that *fere* occurs in more MSS than one, and in editions as early as Avancius and as late as Wakefield, who quotes the same parallel from Virgil. The splendour of Lachmann’s masterpiece has so dimmed the lustre of his predecessors, ‘*stellas exortus ut ætherius sol*’, that few consult them, and emendations which he happened to neglect are neglected by everyone else. I will here take out of its turn a correction which appears under my name in the new *Corpus Poetarum* but which really belongs to Turnebus, is approved by Lambinus, and printed in several of the old editions. At VI 921—929 we have these verses :

principio omnibus ab rebus, quascumque uidemus,
 perpetuo fluere ac mitti spargique necessesit
 corpora quæ feriant oculos uisumque lacessant ;
 perpetuoque fluunt certis ab rebus odores,
 frigus it a fluuiis, calor ab sole, aestus ab undis 925
 æquoris, exesor moerorum, litora propter ;
 nec uarii cessant sonitus manare per auras ;
 denique in os salsi uenit umor sæpe saporis,
 cum mare uersamur propter.

‘*manare*’ in 927 seems to me a most unsuitable word to express the free and unimpeded flight of sound through the air. True, at IV 198, where he is insisting on the extreme tenuity of visual images, he writes ‘*usque adeo textura prædita rara | mittuntur, facile ut quauis penetrare queant se | et quasi permanare per aeris interuallum*’ ; but I think that example is in my favour : he apologises with ‘*quasi*’ for his catachresis of the verb. On the other hand no word is more appropriate than ‘*manare*’ to express the passage of sound through the channel of the ear :

see Rhesus 565 ψόφος | στάζει δι' ὄτων: and comparing the 'feriant oculos' of 923 and the 'in os uenit' of 928 I conjectured, like Turnebus before me, 'manare per *auris*': the two words are confused VI 777, Verg. Aen. III 40, VI 561, Ouid. met. XII 56, and often elsewhere. To this alteration it will be objected that in IV 217—229, where these same verses recur, the MSS again give *auras*. The answer is as follows. First, III 789 recurs at v 133, and in both places the MSS give the false reading *longius* instead of the true reading *longiter*; III 814 recurs at v 359, and in both places the MSS give the false reading *sit* instead of the true reading *fit*. Secondly, the cause of this conspiracy is the same in those two instances as in our own. Lucretius wrote the verse III 789 in book III only and not in book v, where v 128—137 are out of place and whence they are expelled by Messrs Goebel and Brieger; Lucretius wrote the verse v 359 in book v only and not in book III, where III 806—818 are out of place and whence they are expelled by Lachmann: the *longiter* and the *fit* of Lucretius had already been corrupted to *longius* and *sit* when the interpolator copied the verses containing them from one book into another. Just so with our *auris*. Lucretius wrote this verse in book VI only and not in book IV, where IV 217—229 are out of place (though Gellius and Nonius found them there) and whence they are expelled by Messrs Winckelmann and Goebel: *auris* had already been corrupted to *auras* on the day when a scribe who had just written the 'necessesst' of IV 216 unfortunately lost his place, blundered into the middle of book VI, found 'necessesst' there at the end of verse 922, and copied 923—933 into his MS before he discovered his mistake. But he, like Turnebus and me, appears to have stuck at 'manare per *auras*': at any rate in IV 221 *manare* has vanished and its place is taken by *uolitare*.

I 1052—1068.

Illud in his rebus longe fuge credere, Memmi,
 in medium summae quod dicunt omnia niti,
 atque ideo mundi naturam stare sine ullis
 ictibus externis neque quoquam posse resolui

summa atque ima, quod in medium sint omnia nixa
 (ipsum si quicquam posse in se sistere credis),
 et quae pondera sunt sub terris omnia sursum
 nitier in terraque retro requiescere posta ;
 et simili ratione animalia suppa uagari 1061
 ut per aquas quae nunc rerum simulacra uidemus 1060
 contendunt, neque posse e terris in loca caeli
 recidere inferiora magis quam corpora nostra
 sponte sua possint in caeli templa uolare ;
 illi cum uideant solem, nos sidera noctis 1065
 cernere, et alternis nobiscum tempora caeli
 diuidere et noctes parilis agitare diebus.
 sed uanus stolidis haec <error falsa probauit>.

I follow Lachmann's punctuation (except that he includes 1058 sq. in the parenthesis) down to 1059: there, instead of placing a full stop after 'posta' and altering the *et simili* of 1061 into *adsimili*, I transpose 1060 and 1061. The 'et' of 1061 joins the 'contendunt' of 1062 to the 'dicunt' of 1053, and 'contendunt' like 'dicunt' depends on 'quod': the sentence which begins at 1052 does not end till 1067. Translate as follows:

And herein, Memmius, do not at all believe the tale when they say 'that all things press to the centre of the 'sum, and that the reason why the nature of the world 'stands fast without any strokes from outside, and why the 'highest and lowest parts cannot loose asunder in any 'direction, is because all things have always been pressing 'towards the centre' (if you can believe that anything can rest upon itself!), 'and that the heavy bodies which 'are beneath the earth all press upward and repose inverted 'upon it'; and when they contend 'that living creatures 'walk head downwards, just like the images of things we 'actually see in the water, and cannot tumble out of earth 'into the parts of heaven lying below them any more 'than' etc.

Lachmann has explained why 'quod dicunt' in 1053 must not be placed between commas, and why the simile in 1060 is

inappropriate to 1058 sq. Munro, as often happens to him and almost invariably to other Englishmen when they try to controvert Lachmann, has not grasped, far less answered, Lachmann's arguments. He says 'Lach. seems to me only to involve the constr.' The one construction is no more involved than the other; but suppose it were: involution is better than incoherency. He says again 'I think him quite wrong: the simile is exactly the same as IV 418, where also Lach. makes unnecessary changes'. There is no simile at all in IV 418; and even if there were, it does not follow, because a simile occurs in one place, that it is appropriate in another. Here it is inappropriate: reflexions in the water do not press upward and repose upon the earth: Lachmann accordingly rendered it appropriate by placing a full stop after 1059 instead of 1060 and writing *adsimili* in 1061; but the new sentence then begins very abruptly. I have therefore transposed a verse instead. 'simili ratione' of course refers not to what precedes but to what follows: 'simili ratione ut' = 'sic ut': it is probably unnecessary to write *ac*, since you find 'pariter ut' and 'non secus ut' and 'similiter ut si', and Lucretius himself writes 'simile ut' in II 272, though that may be merely in order to avoid using 'ac' before a guttural.

My change of the punctuation, salutary though I think it, is not necessary: anyone who pleases may begin a fresh sentence with 1061 like most editors. Either way there is some breach of continuity. With my punctuation Lucretius should in strictness have written 'nam' for 'sed' at 1068 (*illud fuge credere, quod dicunt...et contendunt..., nam falsi sunt*); but in stating the erroneous assertions he might well forget by 1068 that the sentence began with 'fuge credere' in 1052. The punctuation of the editors makes him forget this as early as 1061 and say 'fuge credere.... Et contendunt' cet.

II 456—463.

Omnia postremo quae puncto tempore cernis
diffugere, ut fumum nebulas flammisque, necessesit
si minus omnibus sunt e leuibus atque rutundis,
at non esse tamen perplexis indupedita,

pungere uti possint corpus penetrareque [saxa] 460
 nec tamen haerere inter se; quodcumque uidemus
 sensibus sedatum, facile ut cognoscere possis
 non e perplexis sed acutis esse elementis.

Mr Hoerschelmann forestalls me in placing these eight verses after 477; and I can neither defend nor emend the *saxa* of 460: on 462 however I have something to say. Creech and Lachmann perceived what the sense requires. Lucretius explains, as to things which you see suffering dispersion in a moment of time (this phrase is used to distinguish them from the fluids mentioned in 451 sqq. and 464 sqq.) such as smoke mist and fire, that if they do not consist of smooth and rounded elements exclusively (as mist possibly does but smoke and fire, with their pungent qualities, evidently do not) yet at any rate they cannot possess tangled elements holding them fast together, if they are to pierce and hurt the body (as fire and smoke do) not in a state of cohesion but through a hundred minute pores. Now arises the question: well then, what quality is it in the elements of smoke and fire which hurts the body? their sharpness, says Lucretius: we have proved that it cannot be their tangled shape, so their sharpness it must be. But this conclusion now lies muffled under the corrupt words 'quodcumque uidemus | *sensibus sedatum*, facile ut cognoscere possis | non e perplexis sed acutis esse elementis', 'so that you can easily tell that whatsoever we see to *have been allayed by the senses* consists not of tangled but of pointed elements'. Munro tries to defend this by referring to 956, where Lucretius says that after a somewhat severe blow the vital motions of the human frame are often able to regain their supremacy 'et ingentis plagae sedare tumultus' 'and to allay the huge disorders caused by the blow'. But in the first place, because the vital motions can be said to allay disorders, it by no means follows that the senses can: the very passage to which Munro refers runs on 'ac paene amissos accendere *sensus*' 'and kindle afresh the almost lost senses', giving the senses a very different and wholly passive part to play. Secondly, it is one matter to talk about allaying 'tumultus' and quite another to talk about allaying something

which consists of pointed elements: at that rate there will be nothing in the world to hinder our saying 'sedare gladium' when we mean 'sedare uolnus'. Faber conjectured 'quod quisque uidemus | *sentibus esse datum*', absurdly enough; but *esse datum* I believe to be right as far as it goes: *esse* is again corrupted to *se* at III 555, and *datum* will mean 'allotted by nature': compare II 680 sq. 'multa uides quibus et color et sapor una | *reddita sunt cum odore*', IV 177 sq. 'quae mobilitas ollis tranantibus auras | *reddita sit*', V 1215 'diuinitus aeterna *donata salute*'. Now then from *sensibus* we have to elicit a dative depending on *datum* and something meaning 'pungency' or the like to define *quodcumque*. That will be

quodcumque uidemus
sentibus esse datum, facile ut cognoscere possis
 non e perplexis sed acutis esse elementis.

'So that you can easily tell that all the prickliness which we find allotted to them consists not of tangled but of pointed elements': that is how fire scorches our skin and smoke makes our eyes smart. The word 'sentus' means much the same as the 'squalidus' and 'asper' of the immediate context: 469 sq. 'scilicet esse globosa tamen cum *squalida* constant, | prouolui simul ut possint et *laedere sensus*. | et quo mixta putes magis *aspera* leuibus esse | principiiis' cet.: Terence eun. 236 has 'uideo *sentum squalidum* aegrum pannis annisque obsitum'. For *ibus* see II 88 'neque quicquam a tergo *ibus* obstet': there it has produced the same corruption as here, and instead of *tergo ibus* the MSS have *tergibus*.

This conjecture I communicated to Munro in 1882.

II 500—503.

Iam tibi barbaricae uestes Meliboeaque fulgens
 purpura Thessalico concharum tecta colore
 aurea pauonum ridenti imbuta lepore
 saecla nouo rerum superata colore iacerent.

The first check is the corrupt *tecta* of 501, which the old editors altered to *tincta*, Oudendorp, with Lachmann and Munro,

to *tacta*, and Winckelmann to *infecta*. The next is the problem how to join verses 501 and 502: Lachmann makes 'aurea', which he explains as 'auro ornata', agree with 'purpura', and changes *imbuta* to *imitata* agreeing also with 'purpura' and governing 'saecla'; Bernays' alterations, which Mr Brieger accepts, are too violent for mention; Munro leaves 502 unaltered (except of course that he and everyone else read *ridenti* for the *rident* of the MSS) but marks a lacuna before it, to be filled with some such line as *et quos ostendunt in solis luce colores*.

Thus Lachmann and Munro alike assume two errors in the text, one in 501 and one elsewhere. But all can be set right by assuming one alone, and that a very simple one. Write *imitata* not for the *imbuta* of 502 but for the *tecta* of 501:

purpura Thessalico concharum *imitata* colore
 aurea pauonum ridenti imbuta lepore
 saecla....

The letters *imi* are the same thing as the preceding *um* which I suppose to have absorbed them, and the residue *tata* is nearly the same thing as *tecta*. The passage means then 'barbaric robes and radiant Meliboean purple, which mimics with its Thessalian dye of shells the golden brood of peacocks steeped in laughing beauty, would be cast aside surpassed by some new colour.' Lachmann shews from Pliny that Tyrian purple, like the plumage of the peacock, changed its hue in different lights. 'aurea' agrees with 'saecla' and means not 'yellow' but 'splendid': with 'aurea pauonum saecla' compare Antiphanes frag. 175 Kock (Athen. XIV p. 655 b, Eustath. 1035 44) τὸ χρυσοῦν...ὀρνίθων γένος, | τοὺς καλλιμόρφους καὶ περιβλέπτους ταῶς.

II 788—794.

Tum porro quae ducit et illicit ut tribuamus
 principiis rerum non numquam causa colores
 occidit, ex albis quoniam non alba creantur, 790
 nec quae nigra cluent de nigris, sed uariis ex.
 quippe etenim multo procliuius exorientur
 candida de nullo quam nigro nata colore
 aut alio quouis qui contra pugnet et obstet.

All the editors begin a new paragraph at 788, and Munro summarises 788—794 as follows: 'we are tempted to give to atoms colour, not knowing how colour otherwise can come: but *we have seen that* white can come from what is not white; and surely white can arise more easily from no colour, than for instance from black: this reason then falls to the ground'. The italicised words impute to Lucretius a false statement: he has *not* shewn that white can come from what is not white: that is what he is now engaged in shewing, as part of the general doctrine that atoms are colourless. Mr Brieger accordingly marks a lacuna before 788 and says 'post 787¹ perierunt uersus, quibus id demonstratum fuit, ad quod in 788 sqq....respicitur'.

Both scholars misapprehend Lucretius' meaning, and misapprehended it must be so long as 788—794 are printed as a paragraph separate from 757—787, of which they are really part. Lucretius is shewing that atoms are colourless, and at 757 he begins to argue as follows. 'On the true hypothesis *a* that atoms are colourless and create colours merely by their arrangements, you can easily explain such phenomena as the changing colour of the sea. But (772 sqq.) on the hypothesis *b* that all the atoms of the sea are of a single colour, say green, you cannot explain how the sea is sometimes white. And again (776 sqq.) on the hypothesis *c* that the atoms of the sea are of different colours, you cannot explain how the sea ever looks wholly green or wholly anything. Moreover (here we come to 788—794), on this hypothesis *c*, the very cause which impels the ordinary man to think that atoms must have colour will lose all its force; for this hypothesis *c* assumes, just like the true hypothesis *a*, that white objects can be formed otherwise than out of white atoms, and black objects otherwise than out of black atoms: nay it goes further, and assumes that white or black

¹ Here and everywhere I substitute Lachmann's number for Mr Brieger's. Munro did a little and Bernays did more to hinder the student from finding his place; but Mr Brieger has quite eclipsed their puny efforts, and the numeration of Lucretius is now as trackless a jungle as that of Aeschylus

or Propertius themselves. Mr Brieger's first victim, I rejoice to see, is Mr Brieger, whose introduction contains more mistakes in figures than I ever yet beheld in the same compass: *they have digged a pit before me, and are fallen into the midst of it themselves.*

objects can be formed from atoms of some colour other than white or black, which is much harder to believe than the true hypothesis *a*; for surely white objects, for instance, can much more easily be formed from colourless atoms than from black atoms or from atoms of any colour unlike to white.' It is clear therefore that 788—794 are an integral part, not merely of the argument which begins at 757, but of that subdivision of it which begins at 776. Munro's summary can be set right by altering *we have seen that into the hypothesis last mentioned presumes that*¹.

III 916—918.

Tamquam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum,
quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torret,
aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei.

torret oblongus (A), *torrat* quadratus (B) and oblongus corr. 'ut in archetypo uideatur fuisse TORRET. uellem tueri *torrat*, si et possem neque tam absurde collocatum esset epitheton. itaque cum nomen substantiuum requiratur, scribendum puto *atque arida* TORRES. id uocabulum est in glossario Cyrilli, ἀπόκαυμα, ustilatio, torres' Lachmann. Mr Brieger in spite of what Lachmann has said reads *torrat* with the oldest editors, though the only scrap of evidence for *torrere* is *attorritur* in the false Apicius; Bernays and Munro adopt *torres*, and Haupt proposes to introduce the same word in the same sense at Manil. IV 419 where the MSS have *terris*. But there is no evidence that *torres* or *torris* can mean anything but a torch. That is what it means in the gloss quoted by Lachmann: ἀπόκαυμα has two senses, (a) *ustilatio* a burn, (b) *torres* a torch: examples of each are given by Mr Karl Hoppe in Woelfflin's Archiv VIII p. 587². I propose therefore to write

quod sitis exurat miseros atque *aridu'* *torror*.

¹ Munro is of course quite right in joining the 'non' of 790 with 'ex albis creantur' and not with 'alba': the following 'nec' would prove this, if the sense did not.

² Mr Hoppe says 'Froehdius in

dissertatione de Nonio Marcello et Verrio Flacco (Berol. 1890) thesi quinta recte in uersu Lucretiano traditam lectionem, quae est *torrat*,'—atqui traditae sunt duae—'tutatus est'. Lest anyone should imagine that Mr Froehde

The lexicons cite *terror* from late Latin only ; but it is evidently to be restored in Ennius ann. 570 (libr. incert. lxx) Muell. = Isid. de nat. rer. 12 'pila uix | sol media complere cohum *terroribu'* caeli | <coepit>', where Baehrens emends *terroribu'*. I may add that at Lucr. VI 237 'quod solis uapor aetatem non posse uidetur | efficere usque adeo *tellens* feruore corusco' the correction *torrens* would be quite as probable as Lambinus' *pollens* and very much more probable than any of the other conjectures.

IV 84—89.

Ergo lintea de summo cum corpore fucum
mittunt, effigias quoque debent mittere tenuis 85
res quaeque, ex summo quoniam iaculantur utraque.
sunt igitur iam formarum uestigia certa
quae uolgo uolitant suptili praedita filo
nec singillatim possunt secreta uideri.

Munro translates 87 sqq. 'there are therefore as now shewn sure *outlines* of shapes, which fly all about possessed of an exquisitely small thickness and cannot when separate be seen one at a time'. But *uestigia* does not mean outlines; so I propose to substitute a word which does: *fastigia*. 'fastigia' are the extremities of any thing, the bounding lines of that which has two dimensions, the bounding superficies of that which has three. Here 'formarum fastigia' are exactly the same things as 'formarum oras' at IV 142. I transcribe part of Lachmann's note on that passage, because it both explains the meaning and exemplifies the use of 'fastigia': 'orae et hic et in uersu 166 sunt extremitates, quae rerum superficiem ac speciem efficiunt...neque aliter Varro de lingua Latina libro VIII p. 392 *De huiusce multiplici natura discriminum*, hoc est discriminum e multiplici declinationum natura prodeuntium, *orae sunt hae*, scilicet extrema et summa, in quae omnia inter se diuersissima exeunt, *cur et quo et quem admodum in loquendo declinata sunt uerba*. nos ad eum modum figurate dicimus *eine*

really has defended *torrat*, I transcribe his defence: 'In Lucretii libri III. v. 917 tradita lectio *torrat* retinenda est.

Cf. Virgil. Aen. 2. 565.' Only this and nothing more.

sache bei den ziffeln fassen, idem Varro de re rustica 1, 6, 2 5 6 et 20, 5 *tria formae fastigia* pro tribus generibus definitis'. The passages in the de re rustica are these: I vi 2 'cum tria genera sint a specie simplicia agrorum, campestre, collinum, montanum,...e quibus tribus *fastigiis* simplicibus' cet., 5 'propter haec tria *fastigia formae* discrimina quaedam fiunt sationum', 6 'haec atque huiusce modi tria *fastigia* agri et ad colendum disperiliter habent momentum', xx 5 'in eo agricolae hoc spectandum, quo *fastigio* sit fundus': in all of them 'fastigium', from meaning the limiting line which marks off a genus, has come to mean the genus itself. With our 'formarum *fastigia*' compare Lucr. III 219 '*extima* membrorum *circumcaesura*' in the same sense of 'outline.'

Once again at v 1255—1261 we read

manabat uenis feruentibus in loca terrae	1255
concaua conueniens argenti riuus et auri,	
aeris item et plumbi. quae cum concreta uidebant	
posterius claro in terra splendere colore,	
tollebant nitido capti leuique lepore	
et simili formata uidebant esse figura	1260
atque lacunarum fuerant uestigia cuique.	

Munro translates the last two lines 'and they would see them to be moulded in a shape the same as the *outline* of the cavities in which each lay': again the same unknown meaning of the word *uestigia*. 'lacunarum uestigia' can only mean 'the imprint of the cavities', which will be a correct name for the configuration received by the molten metal from the cavities into which it ran; but that will not do here, because here this very configuration is said to resemble the 'lacunarum uestigia', and a thing cannot resemble itself. Here too then I should write *fastigia*, which is the Latin for Munro's 'outline', the extremities, the deepest nooks and crannies, of the cavities. It is perhaps from such a use as this that the word comes to mean simply 'depth' in Verg. georg. II 288 'scrobibus quae sint *fastigia*'.

fastigia and *uestigia* are elsewhere confused, and at IV 429 the quadratus exhibits the midway form *festigia*.

IV 1171—1184.

Sed tamen esto iam quanto uis oris honore,
 cui Veneris membris uis omnibus exoriatur:
 nempe aliae quoque sunt; nempe hac sine uiximus ante;
 nempe eadem facit, et scimus facere, omnia turpi,
 et miseram taetris se suffit odoribus ipsa, 1175
 quam famulae longe fugitant furtimque cachinnant.
 at lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe
 floribus et sertis operit postisque superbos
 unguis amaracino et foribus miser oscula figit;
 quem si iam ammissum uenientem offenderit aura 1180
 una modo, causas abeundi quaerat honestas,
 et meditata diu cadat alte sumpta querella,
 stultitiaeque ibi se damnet, tribuisse quod illi
 plus uideat quam mortali concedere par est.

Haec cum Lambinus se haudquaquam intellegere ostendisset, uersum 1175 sic explicare conatus est Creechius 'nempe se foetidam et immundam odoribus suffire cogitur', 1180 autem sic 'quem tamen iam admissum si una modo uel minima res (u. g. foetor) offenderit'; quam interpretationem secuti sunt Wakefieldus et plerique ante Lachmannum. uerum enim uero neque nunc de innunda et fetida siue acosmo sermo est, sed de ea cui Veneris membris uis omnibus exoriatur; neque ullo modo apparet cur furtim cachinnent famulae, nisi forte dominae stultitiam rident, taetros odores pro suauius adhibentis; neque fieri potest ut *aura* u. 1180 aliud sit, aliud u. 1175 *odores*. uere igitur Lachmannus 'uersum (1175) mire peruerterunt interpretes': non uere idem 'hoc dicit, eam sese, postquam cum alio consueuerit, suffimentis purgare, ne amator sentiat'. nam praeterquam quod remanet difficultas in taetris odoribus posita et quod furtiui consciarum cachinni iam plane facti sunt absurdi, miror amatoris sagacitatem, qui una suffimentorum *aura* offensus (si tamen id uoluit Lachmannus) continuo intellegat amicam cum alio consueuisse; miror atque adeo indignor dici plus esse, quam par sit mortali concedere, ut ulla mulier uno amatore contenta sit. nimirum Lachmanno, uiro sanctis-

simo, accidit ut in his uitae postscaeniis parum feliciter uersaretur.

uerba *taetris se suffit odoribus* significant, ut Romana simplicitate loquar, *uissit* siue $\beta\delta\epsilon\lambda$. sic omnia planissima sunt: taetri odores, ancillarum cachinni et fuga, amator aura offensus seque stultitiae damnans qui deam putauerit quam hominem esse ultro appareat. simillima habet uir admodum reuerendus Ionathas Swiftius, ecclesiae cathedralis sancti Patricii apud Dublinenses olim decanus, in ecloga quae *Strephon and Chloe* inscribitur.

V 1262—1268.

Tum penetrabat eos posse haec liquefacta calore
 quamlibet in formam et faciem decurrere rerum
 et prorsum quamuis in acuta ac tenuia posse
 mucronum duci fastigia procudendo, 1265
 ut sibi tela darent, siluasque ut caedere possent
 materiemque dolaret leuare ac radere tigna
 et terebrare etiam ac perfundere perque forare.

In 1266 *darent* and *possent* are Lachmann's necessary emendations for *parent* and *possint*. In the posthumous edition of Munro there is printed a hasty note which would have been better suppressed: 'but perhaps the MSS are right: compare Plaut. Amph. 192 *praemisit ut nuntiem*; and see Ussing there'. If we really mean to credit Lucretius with Plautine syntax (or the Attic dramatists with Homeric syntax) let us do it steadily and methodically, not dodge behind Plautus on one particular occasion when our nerve has deserted us and we are all of a sudden unwilling to suppose that D was mistaken for P and *possent* accommodated to *parent*. In 7000 verses has Lucretius ever again employed this sequence of tenses? do his MSS ever present it when the two forms differ by more than one letter? Moreover Plaut. Amph. 192 (195) and most of Ussing's parallels are here irrelevant, for there the pres. subj. denotes a purpose unfulfilled at the time of speaking: 'me praemisit ut nuntiem' = 'me praemisit ut nuntiarem, quod nondum feci'. And further, I hope to make it seem likely that we have an imperf. subj. in 1267.

1267 has been very variously altered: *dolare et leuia radere* Marullus, *materiem leuare dolare et radere* Lambinus, *dolare secare* or *dolare aequare* Lachmann, who finally writes *domo* for *dolaret*. I adopt Marullus' *dolare et* and propose

materiemque dolare et radere tigna ualerent.

ua-le-rent = *le-ua-reac*. For the corruption of *nt* to *ac* compare the similar corruption of *m* to *ac* at VI 10 and of *ac* to *m* at V 241. The inversion *le-ua-re* for *ua-le-re* is of a sort which I have often illustrated: see for instance this Journal vol. XX p. 42. *leuare ac* could not stand at the end of the line (*dolare et radere tigna leuare ac | et terebrare*), and was therefore transposed with the intention that the verse should run 'materiemque dolare leuare ac radere tigna', a reading which Wakefield did not find too absurd for acceptance.

V 1308—1315.

Temptarunt etiam tauros in moenere belli
 expertique sues saeuos sunt mittere in hostis.
 et ualidos partim prae se misere leones 1310
 cum doctoribus armatis saeuisque magistris
 qui moderarier his possent uinclisque tenere,
 nequiquam. quoniam permixta caede calentes
 turbabant saeui nullo discrimine turmas,
 terrificas capitum quatientes undique cristas. 1315

The lion is furnished by nature with so noble a head of hair ('iubas') that to provide him with 'terrificas cristas' into the bargain is wasteful and ridiculous excess; and if Lucretius intended to describe these early warriors as employing such lenocinia he could hardly mention the lions' crests in this casual way, as if the practice were a matter of course or a fact of common knowledge. Elephants on the other hand did carry 'cristas': Munro quotes Livy xxxvii 40 4 'ingentes ipsi erant: addebant speciem frontalia et *cristae* et tergo impositae tures', to which I would add Amm. Marc. xxv 3 11 'elephanti tardius praecedentes magnitudine corporum *cristarumque* horrore pauorem iumentis incutiebant et uiris', where Haupt's conjecture *stridorumque* is refuted by the parallel of Livy and,

as I think, of Lucretius. For while Faber and Lachmann strike out this verse 1315, which has occurred at II 632 with *numine* for *undique* in the description of the Curetes, I would rather transpose it to stand after 1304 :

inde boues lucas turricto corpore, taetras,
 anguimanus, belli docuerunt uolnera Poeni
 sufferre et magnas Martis turbare cateruas, 1304
 terrificas capitum quatientes undique cristas. 1315

V 1440—1445.

Iam ualidis saepti degebant turribus aeuom 1440
 et diuisa colebatur discretaque tellus,
 iam mare ueliuolis florebat propter odores,
 auxilia ac socios iam pacto foedere habebant,
 carminibus cum res gestas coepere poetae
 tradere. 1445

ueliuolis florebat propter odores in 1442 is plainly corrupt ; but neither Lachmann's *puppibus, et res* nor Munro's *puppibus, urbes* has much likeness to the text, and both incur the objection that 'puppis' = 'nauis' does not seem to be found in any writer older than Catullus. I believe that all tinkering of *propter odores* is labour lost, and that these words come from II 417 'araque Panchaeos exhalat *propter odores*'. It is true that when scribes succumb to these untimely reminiscences there is generally some excuse for them. When at Ouid. met. II 792 most MSS give 'et summa *papauera* carpit' for *cacumina* because of Verg. buc. II 47 'et summa *papauera* carpens'; when at met. XII 103 the best MS gives 'cum sua *terribili* petit *irritamenta malorum*' for *irritamina cornu* because of I 140 'effodiuntur opes *irritamenta malorum*'; when at Prop. II 19 26 some MSS give 'abluit unda *pedes*' for *boues* because of I 20 8 'tinxerit unda *pedes*' or IV 11 16 'implicat unda *pedes*'; when at Eur. Med. 1184 half the MSS give ἡ τάλαιν' ἀπόλλυτο for ἡγείρετο because of 277 ἡ τάλαιν' ἀπόλλυμαι or Hipp. 39 ἡ τάλαιν' ἀπόλλυται or some other example of the phrase,—in all these places the blunder is easy to understand. But why

the copyist of Lucretius should here remember II 417 there is no explaining; so I must cite a parallel.

In culex 401—3 most MSS read as follows:

hic Cilici crocus editus aruo,
laurus item Phoebi decus surgens, hic rhododaphne
liliaque et roris non auia cura marini.

I will take the opportunity of emending 402, which is usually reduced to metre by reading *surgens decus*, an arrangement the scribes were not likely to disturb. Write *decus ingens*: *ingens* becomes *urgens* (Stat. Theb. VI 827 *ingentibus* and *urgentibus* MSS), the *s* of *decus* adheres and makes *surgens* (Stat. Theb. I 357 *gelidas surgens* and *gelidas urgens* MSS). But now to business. Instead of *surgens hic rhododaphne* one of the most important MSS gives *et sua pagina dicit*. These words come from no part of the culex and from no passage which has the slightest resemblance to this: they come from Ouid. fast. III 791 'itur ad Argeos: qui sint, *sua pagina dicit*'. Similarly I say that *propter odores* comes from II 417.

Now Seruius at Verg. Aen. VII 804 quotes from Lucretius the phrase *florebat nauibu' pontus*. He seldom quotes Lucretius accurately, and this extract is no foundation of rock for our conjectures; but it is all we have. And it admits a very easy correction:

iam *marī* ueliuolis florebat nauibu' pontus.

In Lucretius' MSS few errors are commoner than this: from the immediate neighbourhood take 1410 *dulcedine* for *dulcedinī* and 1456 *corde* for *cordī*. 'maris pontus' is πόντος ἄλος Hom. Φ 59: see too Pind. frag. 235 (259) Bergk ἐν πόντου πελάγει. In Verg. Aen. X 377 '*maris magna claudit nos obice pontus*' I take 'maris' with 'pontus' not with 'obice', and I suspect there is a third Latin example at Prop. III 5 11 where the MSS read

nunc maris in tantum uento iactamur, et hostem
quaerimus atque armis nectimus arma noua.

'maris in tantum iactamur' is supposed to mean 'iactamur in tam magnum mare', but that gives no sense, for 'iactamur in mare' can signify neither 'prouehimur in mare' nor 'iactamur

in mari' nor anything else which can be done by the wind: it will simply mean 'we are thrown overboard'. The fact is that 'in tantum' is the same as 'tanto opere', Verg. Aen. vi 876 'in tantum spe tollet auos', and pretty often in the silver age: 'maris' therefore depends on 'uento'. But 'maris uentus' is a phrase to which I have found no better parallels than Ouid. trist. I 8 35 'cunctane in aequoreos abierunt irrita uentos?' (where by the way *aequoreos* though defensible in itself is indefensible in its context and should be amended to *aetherios* or *aerios*, for which alterations compare trist. II 149, fast. I 457, II 458, III 416, ex Pont. III 2 63, met. IV 623, Verg. buc. I 59, Sen. H. f. 928, Stat. Theb. x 139), and Val. Fl. II 12 'flumineo ...uento'. Accordingly I have proposed 'nunc maris in tantum *ponto* iactamur': for this confusion see Lucr. I 276 and VI 624; and with Propertius' picture of the results of avarice compare Lucretius' own, v 1434 sq. 'idque minutatim uitam prouexit in altum | et belli magnos commouit funditus aestus'.

VI 47—49.

Quandoquidem semel insignem conscendere currum

*

uentorum exirtant placentur omnia rursum

*

quae fuerint sint placato conuersa furore.

Thus must this passage be left, with the two lacunas marked by Bernays. Lambinus' *furore* for *fauore* in 49 is obviously right; Bernays' *existant* for *exirtant* may be, and so may Munro's insertion of *ut* after *placentur*. But Lachmann's 'currum | *uentosum et certant plangentia flamina* rursum, | quae fuerint, *sine*, placato' cet. and Munro's '*ex ira ut* placentur, *ut omnia* rursum | quae' cet. and all the other conjectures are refuted by this imitation: Appul. de mundo c. 22 ad fin. 'cum uel inter se *uentorum proelia* ciuntur, uel disiectis nubibus fulminat caelum, et *tempestates inter se serenaе hibernaeque conflagunt*, micant ignes, imbres rumpuntur, et *rursus placatis omnibus amoena laetitia mundi reseratur*': *uentorum proelia* is from Verg. georg. I 318 'omnia *uentorum* concurrere *proelia* uidi'; *tempes-*

tates inter se serenae hibernaeque configunt from Enn. ann. lib. x (Seru. ad Verg. Aen. I 254) 'tempestatesque serenae' and Lucr. VI 373 'configunt hiemes aestatibus acres'; and rursus placatis omnibus from Lucr. VI 48 above 'placentur omnia rursum'. Putting Virgil and Appuleius together one may guess that the 'uentorum' of 48 depends on a vanished 'proelia': Lucretius has 'uentorum paces' at v 1230.

VI 572—574.

Saepius hanc ob rem minitatur terra ruinas
quam facit; inclinatur enim retroque recellit
et recipit prolapsa suas in pondera sedes.

pondera quadratus (B), *pondere* oblongus (A). Lachmann takes the former and explains 'prolapsa (fem. sing.) in pondera' as 'ab omni parte in aequalia pondera (εἰς ἰσορροπίαν) prolapsa', but does not explain how 'prolapsa' 'tumbled over' can possibly denote the return to equilibrium: Munro justly remarks 'falling forward out of its place is the natural force of *prolapsa*: see Forc. and comp. 1006 *primordia ferri | in uacuum prolapsa cadunt coniuncta*.....thus Livy has *rem prope prolapsam restituit: prolapsam eam erexisse; prolapsam imperium retentum ac recuperatum esse*, and the like'. Munro reads *pondere*; to prove against Turnebus that 'pondus' as well as 'pondera' can mean equilibrium, he quotes, amongst several passages where it need not mean equilibrium and several where it cannot, one place in Petronius (136) where it seemingly does; and he translates 'and after tumbling forward recovers in equal poise its fixed position', observing that '*pondus* and *suas sedes* are almost synonymous'. If so, his reading cannot be maintained: against the proposal to construe the other as 'recipit sedes in pondera' he himself very truly says in this Journal vol. III p. 122 and vol. IV p. 121 that it could only mean 'brings back its state of stable equilibrium into its state of stable equilibrium': well then, his own reading means 'recovers its state of stable equilibrium in its state of stable equilibrium'.

The truth is that *pondera* has here its usual meaning and the construction is 'recipit pondera in suas sedes' 'brings back her mass into its original position'. For this delusive collocation

of the preposition before a word which it might govern but does not, compare IV 597 'haec loca per uoces ueniant' (uoces ueniant per loca), VI 863 'multaque sunt ignis prope semina corpus aquai' (semina sunt prope corpus: though here the grammar as well as the sense forbids error), Hor. carm. IV 1 19 sq. 'Albanos prope te lacus | ponet marmoream' (ponet te prope lacus), Tibull. II 5 66 'iactauit fusas et caput ante comas' (iactauit comas ante caput), Prop. III 4 18 'et subter captos arma sedere duces' (duces sedere subter arma), copā 4 'ad cubitum raucos excutiens calamos' (excutiens cubitum ad calamos: strangest of all), Manil. I 245 'nos in nocte sumus somnosque in membra locamus' (locamus membra in somnos), Stat. Theb. v 362 sqq. 'caeruleo grauidam cum Iuppiter imbri | ipsa super nubem ratis armamenta Pelasgae | sistit agens' (sistit nubem super armamenta), Sil. XII 121 'stagna inter celebrem nunc mitia monstrat Auernum' (monstrat Auernum inter stagna), XIV 155 'medios inter fera proelia miscet' (miscet proelia inter medios). Hypermonosyllabic prepositions may be thus treated even in prose: Cic. ad Att. x 8 8 'quos contra me senatus, ne quid res publica detrimenti acciperet, armauit' (contra quos me armauit). Somewhat different are Ouid. her. XVI 198 'cum dis potando nectare miscet aquas' (cum nectare dis potando), XXI 232 'quaeritur a Delphis fata canente deo' (a deo Delphis canente), met. I 231 'in domino dignos euerti tecta penates' (in penates domino dignos). I think it more likely that 'prolapsa' agrees with 'pondera' than with 'terra'.

VI 777—780.

Multa meant inimica per auris, multa per ipsas
 insinuant naris infesta atque aspera tactu,
 nec sunt multa parum tactu uitanda neque autem
 aspectu fugienda saporeque tristia quae sint.

778 'ASPERA TACTV. *Tactus* hoc loco pro odore inepte dicitur, quia statim sequitur *tactu* simpliciter positum proprio sensu. nulla cum specie Lambinus *odore*, Bentleyus *sensu*' Lachmann; and we may now add 'nulla cum specie Brieger

sese'. It is possible, but it is not probable, that the *tactu* of 778 comes from the *tactu* of 779, which is ill-placed for exerting that influence. Lachmann wrote *adactu*, to which Munro justly objects that it implies a violent thrust, as in the 'dentis adactus' of v 1330 which Lachmann cites. Munro reads *iactu*; but that is no better, for the character of 'asperitas' belongs not to the emission of odour from objects but to its inhalation through the nostrils. I therefore propose

multa per ipsas
insinuant naris infesta atque aspera *tractu*.

'harsh to inhale'. The words are not uncommonly confused, as at Ouid. met. x 732 and Sen. Thy. 406: in the MSS of Lucretius compare IV 246 *protudit* for *protrudit* and VI 138 *perfringens* for *perfringens*. For the use, as good a parallel as any is given in the lexicons: Phaedr. III 1 4 'hunc (odorem) postquam totis auida *traxit naribus*', with which compare Hor. carm. IV 1 21 sq. 'illic plurima *naribus* | *duces tura*'. Equally apposite is Luc. VII 412 '*aera pestiferum tractu*' pestilential to breathe, with which contrast Sen. Phoen. 220 'has ego auras ore pestifero traho'. Similarly in Greek Aristotle has *σπᾶν τὸ πνεῦμα, σπᾶν τῆς ὀρυγάνου*, Hippocrates *ἐρύσαι τὴν ὀδμήν*: Lobeck at Soph. Ajax 2 quotes Antipater Sid. XXVII 10 *ἐρύσασθαι μυκτῆρσιν ἀντμήν*. I see that some misunderstand Tac. ann. I 42 fin. 'meque precariam *animam* inter infensos *trahere*': it means not *prolong my life* but *draw my breath*.

VI 962—964.

Principio terram sol excoquit et facit are,
at glaciem dissoluit et altis montibus altas
extractas niues radiis tabescere cogit.

For *niues* Avancius to amend the metre writes *ningues*: this is strongly supported by a parallel which I shall quote anon, and the change, especially in an obsolete word, is easy: to see how it comes about compare I 85 where the *quadratus* has *sanuine* for *sanguine*: *g* is often omitted or inserted at the side of *n*. But '*altas extractas*', as Lachmann says, is not good Latin for '*extractas in altum*': any more than '*ustus decolor*'

at Prop. iv 3 10 is good Latin for 'decolor factus urendo'. Therefore Naugerius further altered *altas* to *alte*; but Lachmann and his followers prefer Marullus' 'extractasque niues' as a slighter change. I should write

et altis montibus *albas*
extractas ningues radiis tabescere cogit;

comparing 735 sqq. 'de *montibus altis* | crescat, ubi in campos *albas* descendere *ningues* | *tabificis* subigit *radiis* sol' and Eur. Hel. 3 Νείλου...ὄς...λευκῆς τακείσης χιόνος ὑγραίνει γύας. For *albus* and *altus* confused see Ouid. met. iv 48.

VI 1179—1182.

Mussabat tacito medicina timore,
quippe patentia cum totiens ardentia morbis
lumina uersarent oculorum expertia somno.
multaque praeterea mortis tum signa dabantur.

1180 'Wakefieldo...placuit inepte iniecta *morborum* mentio, cum paulo ante recte esset *ardentia morbo* 1172' Lachmann; and he writes *ac nuntia mortis*, which is confirmed both by 'multa praeterea mortis signa' in 1182 and by Munro's citations of Ouid. met. v 134 'singultantem animam et uersantem lumina uidit', vi 246 'simul suprema iacentes | lumina uersarunt, animam simul exhalauerunt', vii 579 'lassaque uersantes supremo lumina motu', where this rolling of the eyes is the precursor of death. But it comes nearer to the text to write *praenuntia mortis*. In these MSS *p* and *d* are frequently confounded; and just as they altered *perlabitur* to *deriabitur* at iv 357 and *conplebant* to *condiebant* at vi 1262, so I suppose they here altered *praenuntia* to *draenuntia*, which either by the confusion of *d* and *a* or else by the inversion of the first three letters becomes *ardenuntia*. This last error is so common that I have long desisted from noting the examples I encounter; but the MSS of Lucretius have the following, ii 119 *remouet* for *reuomit*, iii 170 *leti* for *teli*, 305 *uaporis* for *pauoris*, v 208 *dibenti* for *bidenti*, vi 851 *partim* for *raptim*, and with the change of one letter superadded i 177 *orcatu* for *creatur*, vi 892 *praeter* for *praebet*, 916 *perualet* for *peruolat*. *praenuntius* occurs at v 737.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

NOTES ON THE HOMERIC HYMNS BY J. P. D'ORVILLE.

AMONG the D'Orville collection in the Bodleian is a small paper book (MS. D'Orville 216, formerly Auct. x. 1. 6. 27), containing notes in D'Orville's hand upon the Iliad, Odyssey, Batrachomachia, Hymns and minor Homeric works. The book is thus described in the new catalogue by Mr Falconer Madan (who kindly pointed the book out to me): "In Latin &c., on paper; written in the first half of the 18th cent. by J. P. D'Orville: $6\frac{7}{8} \times 4\frac{5}{8}$ in., ii + 281 leaves."

I have thought it worth while to publish the notes on the Hymns; they were written at a curious period in the history of the poems, when strange to say no mss. had been collated since the time of the editio princeps of 1488. It is in fact singular that D'Orville, who travelled in Italy and catalogued libraries where important copies of the Hymns were lying, should have made no collations of them; his collection, it is well known, is full of readings copied from mss. of endless other Greek and Latin authors. He is content however to use and criticise the current edition of Homer, that of Joshua Barnes, published at Cambridge in 1711, and the sumptuously printed 'Miscellanea Graecorum aliquot Scriptorum Carmina cum Versione Latina et Notis' of Michel Maittaire, London, 1722, of which the Hymn to Apollo is part. These two editors he castigates with deserved severity. Other writers that he quotes are Bernard Martini, whose 'Variae Lectiones' appeared at Paris in 1605, Samuel Clarke, who edited Homer on Barnes' model, Lond. 1739-40, and the edition of Giunta.

His notes have a certain if not very great value, his conjectures often anticipate the moderns, and in one case have been

confirmed by the Moscow ms. which was discovered thirty years after his death. The modern study of the Homeric Hymns began with Ruhnken's Epistle to Valckenär, 1749, and Ruhnken at last tapped the real sources by his collation of two of the four Paris mss.

The notes are printed as they stand, and the original spelling and punctuation are preserved; a few notes of no importance—principally versions of words or phrases and references to obsolete books—have been omitted. The brackets here and there in the text are the author's. D'Orville uses various signs to introduce his notes; I have substituted, for clearness' sake, the usual modern abbreviations. I have added a few elucidations below.

f. 238. In | Apollinis | Hymnum |. In hunc hymnum quaedam annotat Mattaire¹ in poematibus graecis ab ipso editis. sed pleraque nullius frugis.

20 νομοὶ ῥῶδῆς βεβλήσθαι. an ἀναβεβλήσθαι, cantantur? nam significationem tribuendi unde habeat, nescio. Mattaire etiam *a* in singularibus insertam vult.

f. 239. 125 ἀθανάτης χείρῃσιν. sic legendum, et sicubi sic aliis in locis sit peccatum. 1. ὀρέξατο. et sic Mattaire conjecerat.

139 ἀνθέων. non satisfacit. procul dubio omnes hae turbæ ex neglecta iteratione vocis Ἦνθεε. Ἦνθεε δ' ὡς ὅτι τὸ ῥίον οὔρεος ἦνθεεν ὕλη.

142 1. ἄλλοτε δ' ἀν' νήσους. ἀνὰ.

148—149 cf. Mattaire.

f. 240. 163 fere idem praedicatur de Apostolis in Actis.

166 versu hoc carere poterimus, mutata una litera. v. Hymn. VIII. 7².

χαίρετε, κ' ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι

vel εὔχομαι reticitur λίσσομαι ὑμᾶς.

Ἄλλ' ἄγε δὴ, λητοῖ [sic legendum] μὲν ἀπολλοῦτ' ἀρτέμιδι ξὺν ὑμᾶς λίσσομαι,

χαίρετε γ' ὑμεῖς [an χ' ὑμεῖς an ὕμμες πᾶσαι] ὦ κούραι. cf. Scal. ad Cirim 228 vel omnino Thucydidis lectio recipienda

¹ So spelled always.

² i.e. IX. 7.

ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, vel ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' [ἰλήκοι μὲν ἀπόλλων ἀρτεμίδι ξὺν]
χαίρετε χ' ὑμεῖς κοῦραι] Apollo enim et Diana κουροτρόφοι;
quamvis et Latona. et huic sententiae favet Horat. 4. od. 6.
40 qui hinc colorem duxit.

hodierna pronunciatione facile mutantur

θίλικι et διλιτι

θ' ἰληκοι et δ' ἠλητοῖ.

f. 241. 190 l. ὑμνείουσι θεῶν. illud ῥα enim hic nullam
vim habet.

192 Mattairii ἀμφιδεεῖς non rejiciendum facile.

211 l. τριόπηγενεῖ. tutius etiam legetur ἄμ' ἐρεχθεῖ.

211 ut πυληγενῆς¹.

217 ἠὲ μαγνήτας si prima corripri possit.

223 vero simile nomen montis latere in voce ζάθεος.

231 locus commentario indigens.

235 ἄγησι jungit cum ἄρματα Mattaire. vellem aliam
auctoritatem afferret quam Lucae vel Joannis. Cf. Scapulam.

251 imo *Europa* non tam late sumitur; quippe pelopon-
nesus etiam erit in *Europa*, et adeoque non separatim nomi-
nandus. ergo saltem graeciae finibus circumscribetur.

298 potest etiam verti, et illi [trophonius et agamedes]
innumeras gentes habitare fecerunt circum templum affabre
factis lapidibus semper celebre futurum. et ἔνασσα et κατέ-
νασσα sic fere usurpantur, prior tamen interpretatio non dis-
plicet.

305 mire hic et versu 354 caecutit Mattaire.

320 stupor Barnesii cum suo repraesentavit. imo *educa-*
*vit*². mox ὡς ὄφελε &c. utinam *gratificata foret*.

f. 243. 355 versus aliquantum suspectus. videtur con-
flatus ex vv. 302, 303.

383 cf. Odyss. N. 152 et aliis in locis.

396 γνάλοις ὑπὸ παρνήσσοιο. Hes. θ. 499.

407 βοεῦσι. ridicule remis³ et contra sensum. non mutare
necesse habebant pedes navis, quia habebant a tergo ferentem
ventum. verte

¹ Opposite.

² Barnes translates καὶ μετὰ ἧσι κασιγνήτῃσι κόμισσεν 'et suis sororibus
praesentavit.'

³ As Barnes.

sed quemadmodum solventes cretâ vela et pedis lora¹ constituerant, sic navigabant. βοεῦσι funibus. quid notius.

f. 244. 439 l. ἀμάθοις ἐγχαρίψατο.

442 σπινθάριγες a σπινθάριξ malim cum phavorino in h. v. et quibusdam lexicis. Henr. Steph. etiam σπινθάριγες meminit ut accidit in his vocibus in ιξ vel ιγξ terminatis. unde non dicit.

493 quod ἀμάρτημα notat Mattaire Natilis Comititis est Phavorini in Δελφίνιος. v. in h. v.

499 vide hic nugantem Mattaire, quasi non aequè regulariter ab ἴημι, ὤμαι, ἦσθε atque a τιθημι, θῶμαι, θῆσθε veniret in subj. aor. 2 medii.

515 ἀγαθὸν cur mutetur? ἀγαθὸς quidquid bonum in omni genere. ἀγαθὴ αὐλητρίς Xenoph. 874 E.

f. 245. 539 l. καὶ ἐμὴν ἰθὺν τὰ μάλιστα. si ταμάλιστα ita poetis usurpetur, δέδεχθε καὶ προφύλαχθε meam legem.

542 quasi Deus loqueretur ad Judaeos.

f. 246. In | Hymnum | Mercurii | .

37 vellem Barnes. suam emendationem² probaret firma-retque.

53 retine κατὰ μέλος. cf. 419.

75 vox πλανοδίας suspecta. cur non πλαγκτοδίας vel πλαγγοδίας.

110 ἄμπνυτο hic est imperf. et ideo corripitur. quando est perfect. producitur.

114 quis suspicetur φύσαν vel φύσσαν legendum³. αὐτμήν flatum impetum.

116 Barnesii elegans ingenium elegantes excudit metaphoras. tu lege

ὑπερβρυχίας, valde mugientes.

quamvis fere ὕ in h. v. producat. sed corripitur ut Il. P. 54. cf. Etym. M. ἀναβέβρυχε. nam ἐριβρυχέω Hesiod. θ. 332 videtur contractionem pati.

¹ Corrected out of 'pedem lori.'

³ Barnes not only prints but explains φύσαν.

² ἀκμή for αἰχμά. A few years later Ruhnken found εχμα.

f. 248. 125 B. versio nunc rem satis explicat¹. at ego sic nihilum intelligo. videtur innuere etiam hodierno die in rupe vestigia coriorum superesse post tantum tempus, tu certe retine πολυχρόνιοι sc. ῥινοί. Sic Philemonis et Baucidos arbores ostendi dicit Ovid. VIII. Met. v. 29.

ταμεθ' ἄσσα vel ταμετ' ἄσσα correptum. vel intelligendum quod vult poeta Mercurium adeo scite secuisse [non secasset ut Barn.] coria ista, ut nunc ῥινοτόμοι secant ea coria quae multum durant; et id quidem quod mirandum post tantum temporis elapsi: at plurale neutrum incommodum, et ταμετο sing. et πεφύασι plur.

127 εἰρύσσατο πίονα ἔργα. Traxit pinguedinem et carnes. quid, malum, sunt pingua opera². pinguius operatur, qui ita interpretatur.

136 μετήορα. non capio. an φωνῆς corruptum. et vox quae caedem significat substituenda³. ut velut recentem mac-tationem occultare. sequentia suadent tale quid.

an ad chelyn respicit quam deposuerat. satis obscure tamen σῆμα νέης φωνῆς. tum quoque μετήορον. at μετήορα adverbii modo usurpet. cf. 506 σήματ' ἐπεὶ κιθαρῆν⁴.

159⁵.

165 al. ὑπεκδείδοικεν. Ed. Cantabrig. fere ὑπέδδεια duplicata Δ⁶.

188 illud δέμοντα hic, et antea δέμων, procul dubio redonandum Barnesio. νέμων non solum qui pascit sed qui colit, curat, procurat. et hoc melius convenit βατοδρόπῳ, ut vocatur v. 191.

f. 250. 238 eadem comparatio Odyss. E. 488.

284 cf. Theocr. I. idyll. 51. ibi Casaub.

303 sternutatio et crepitus inter omina.

305 videtur distinguendum ...ἑώθει

σπάργανον, ἀμφ' ὄμοισιν ἐλιγμένος.

¹ B. says 'Latina versio nunc rem satis explicabit.'

² 'Mercurius gaudium-ferens traxit pingua opera.' J. B.

³ Not till Hermann was φωρῆς thought of, and that at the prompting of the reading of Mosq. v. 385.

⁴ 'an ad chelyn' &c. on the opposite page.

⁵ A sign, but no note, follows this numeral.

⁶ A stroke connects 'Ed. Cantabrig.' with ὑπεκδείδοικεν. Barnes however reads ὑπαιδείδοικεν.

f. 251. 325 unde *εὐμυλίη* rumorem significet nescio: et omnino quid.

1. *εὐνομήη δ' ἔχ' ὄλυμπον*
vel
στωμυλίη δ' ἔχ' ὄλυμπον.

Ovid. Notior in caelo fabula nulla fuit.

posset etiam legi *εὐμελίη*, nisi refragaretur quantitas.

sic tamen solent, *ἀβλάβεια, ἀβλαβίαι* v. 393.

351, 352 in uno horum versuum *τρίβος* videtur legendum.

357 *καὶ διάμησε πῦρ τὸ μὲν ἔνθα τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τὸ ἔνθα.*
et ignem dissipavit ex utraque parte viae v. 140.

f. 252. 361 *ἀνγὰς ὠμάρταζε.* oculos sequebatur, id est, petebat, tegebat manibus.

383 *ἐπιδαίεσθαι ὄρκον.* aliquidne commune habet cum *τάμνει ὄρκια.*

396 cf. Callim. Hymn. in Lavacr. pall. 135.

410 *ταὶ* respicitne *δεσμὰ.* si saltem *τοί* et *ἐστραμμένοι* et *ἀλλήλοισιν* habetur non careret exemplo ut *δεσμοί* intelligerentur. at vide quid sincera via emendatio possit. tu retine *φύοντο* ut *ταὶ* ad *ἄγνον* respicit. a singulari ad plurale usitatus transitus et verte

Sic dixit et manibus circumde vincula fortia viticis.
quae vitices sub pedibus boum subito natae erant.

ibidem, circum circa intextae mutuo.

facile et circum omnes agrestes boves Mercurii consilio subdoli (**f. 253**) vult poeta dicere, has vitices voluntate Mercurii circum pedes boum crevisse, ne fugerent.

411 *ἐμβολάδην.* considerandum.

419 en aliud flagitium. quid enim ter textum corrumpant, ut nobis verba sine sensu obrudant. tu retine *κατὰ μέλος.* contrarium *παρὰ μέλος.* ut *κατ' αἴσαν* et *παρ' αἴσαν, κατὰ γνώμην* et *παρὰ γνώμην.* concinne, rythmice. harmonice, *ἐμμελῶς.*

422 vox *ἐρατὸν* facit inamabilem sonum toties repetita¹. *ἀγαθὸν* forte scripserit ut Hymn. Apoll. 515.

¹ This objection to the close repetition of *ἐρατὴ* and *ἐρατὸν* is now met by the new line (422 in our editions) which the Mosquensis gave us. This

new line and 457 which also is only preserved in M throw D'Orville's numeration slightly out.

429 ἡ λαχε μαιάδος υἷόν. haec mihi potius explicarent, quam frivolas lectiones comminiscendo tempus tererent.

432 non male ὑπωλένιον coniecit Barnes. v. 242 χέλυν ὑπὸ μασχάλη εἶχε. nam v. 388 καὶ τὸ σπάργανον εἶχεν ἐπ' ὠλένη alia res.

f. 254. 457 I. ναὶ μα τόδε κάρνειον.

metathesis literarum usitata. καρδία, κραδία. κάρτερος, κρατερός. κροκόδιλλος, κορκόδιλλος. quamvis quidam κρανιάδας νυμφὰς ap. Theocr. I. 21 ab arbore κρανεία deducant, et adeo hic prior etiam produceretur. sed frustra. at in hac voce hanc literarum transpositionem locum habuisse, vox ista latina cornus monstrat. imo forte recte sch. Theocr. Idyll. 5. 83 hunc κάρνεα et καρνεῖος Ζεὺς deducit, κάρνεα ἑορτὴ ἐστι διὸς καρνεῖα ὀνομαζομένη. παρ' ἑλλησι δὲ τελεῖται διὰ τὸ τὸν δουρεῖον ἵππον ἐξ καρνεῖον εἶναι ξύλου, ubi agnoscit κάρνειος.

f. 255. 468 intellige ὀμφὰς καὶ μαντείας ἐκ διὸς et θεσφάτα παρὰ διός. neutram prepositionem ad verbum δαήμεναι refer, sed ad substantiva. cf. v. 530. quae persuadent δαήμεναι ἐκ διὸς ὀμφῆς retinendum, imo μαντεῖης etiam legendum. ut constructio sit δαήμεναι θέσφατα παρὰ διὸς πάντα ἐκ ὀμφῆς καὶ μαντεῖης διός.

496 I. ἔχειν.

f. 256. 513 cum sint jam amici emollit Apollo locutionem, quemque auguratus erat in ira ἄρχον φηλητῶν κεκλήσεσθαι, jam a jove τιμὴν ἐλέσθαι θήσειν ἔργα ἐπαμοίβια ἀνθρώποις, quod est, κλεπτότατον ἔσεσθαι.

537 πιφάσκειν non ex caesura, ut delirat B. sed ex auctoritate poetica communem habet primam. qua licentia veteres non usi sunt, nisi ex ratione certa et justa quae tamen nos latet, nisi quis πιφφάσκειν pronunciatum fuisse contendat. πιφφάσκειν, πιπθαύσκειν.

550 alatae saepe ex monumentis etruscis videntur.

551 ἄλφιστα an infernales et mortuales res pertineant. cf. Odyss. K. 520.

f. 257. 553 ἀπάνευθε διδάσκαλοι μαντεῖης, ἦν seorsum quae docent illam vaticinatorum partem, quam dum puer circa boves versans exposui, exercui.

f. 258. In | Hymnum | εἰς | Ἄφροδίτην | § IV.

3 colorem hinc duxisse videri potest Lucretius in principio operis divini.

16 χρυσηλάκατος. sagittis aureis. Cf. Il. π. 182, Soph. Trach. 647 sch. χρυσότοξος.

20 πόλις, contrarium dicit Callimachus.

29 v. Clarke ad Iliad. B. 42. si homeri ergo est hic hymnus corrigendus.

τῆ δὲ πατῆρ ^{Zeus} κρονίδης δῶκεν γέρας ἀντὶ γάμοιο v. ad Moschi Europen 50 ubi similiter κρονίδης omissa vox alterum θεεῖη infarciit versui.

f. 259. 54 l. πολυπίδακοι, nam mox v. 68 πολυπίδακα vocat.

55 l. βουκολέεσκε βόας.

58 ex Odyss. θ. 365 quinque hi versus. versus 63 ibi non invenitur, εἰανὸν ἔλαιον non capio.

71 vox πρόκαδες non sana videtur. non enim invenitur προκάς, ἄδος, sed πρόξ, προκάς. quid si ergo audaciori conjectura corrigamus

*Ἄρκοι παρδάλιες, θῶός τε πρόκων ἀκόρητοι. Theocr. Idyll. 1. 115

ὦ λύκοι ὦ θῶες, ὦ ἀν' ὄρεα φωλάδες ἄρκοι.

f. 260. 82 l. ἀδμήτι. tu verte, nondum virum passae. ἀδμήτην. 133.

137 Ovid. 5 Epp. 84.

147 alias scribitur ὀνομάκλυτος voce unica.

184 cur non χλαίνησι καλύψατο.

230 καὶ εὐγενεός τε γενείου. videtur corruptum. l. εὐγέννος.

253 Barn. frustra est in explicando corrupto hoc loco. Martini conjecturam explicatam confirmatamque optarem.

260 θνητοῖς ut alii recte. vel ἀθαναταῖσι legendum. ἔπονται sortem neque plane hominum, neque plane deorum. longum vivunt, at moriuntur, communia quaedam cum hominibus et cum diis habent¹.

262 Clarke ad H. A.

¹ ἔπονται sqq. on the opposite page.

In | Hymnum | VI.¹

4 coma longa et purpureus habitus juvenem indicant cf. Diog. Laert. in pythag. *κομίτην καὶ ἀλουργίδα φοροῦντα.*

18 Ovid. metam. XIV.

pressâque dei gravitate carinâ
aeneadae gaudent

ibi sane legendum

Et pressa dei gravitate carina est.
Æneadae gaudent &c.

an hujus gubernatoris memoriam servat sacerdos Bacchi Zmyrnae in Olympiis adriani triremem, loco gubernatoris, regens. Nonn. Dion. XLVII. 508 *Λαινέην ὀλκάδα.*

26 accipe ut apud Theocr. Idyll. 13. 52

κουφότερ' ὦ παῖδες ποιεῖσθ' ὄπλα· πλευστικὸς οὔρος.

f. 262. 44, 48 impeditior et concisior constructio satis monstrat Homerum non esse auctorem, cujus compositione nihil facilius aut rotundius.

Seneca Oedipo 456. Idaeus prora fremuit leo Tigris puppe sedet gangetica.

et Strabo L. 1 negat Homerum Tyrrhenorum meminisse. sed recentiorum quidem Hesiodum².

κυβερνήτης καὶ ναύαρχος sive *ἄρχοι* ut d. Lucae c. 27 *κυβερνήτης καὶ ναύκληρος* distinguuntur².

56 *ἐγὼ* lege, ut in aliis recte. neque minima, neque majora scit Barn.

f. 263. In Hymn. VII.

1 hic hymnus Homero certe non convenit, si pylum et caetera respicias.

10 *καταστίλβων* scribe et ride ineptias Barnesii.

13 metaphoram ab equo pulcerrime exsequitur. tamen quaesita haec accuratio ab Homeri more remota.

f. 265. In Hymnum XVIII.

3 *δενδρήσση* ut *τιμᾶντα* pro *τιμάοντα* Il. I. 601.

6 *αὐχμήντα* temere, imo inepte ejiciunt. ad barbam re-

¹ i.e. VII. The inclusion of the Hymn to Demeter altered the nume-

ration of the minor hymns by one.

² On the opposite page.

spicit. *αὐχμὸς* autem passim de barba et coma. ad rem Silius XIII. 332 de pane

imoque cadit barba hispida mento

et nihil facilius quam ut hanc lectionem firmemus. si legissent saltem *λαχνήεντα*, hirsutum, quod de suis dorso et similibus usurpatur. Cf. de utraque lectione Od. I 445 et Od. Ω 249. v. 39 vocat *ἡνυγένειον* hispidum.

§. 266. 15 summos calamos ore percurrens. percurrere pollice chordas. Ov. 2 Am. 4. 6.

18 parum concinne *θρήνον ἐπιπροχέουσα χέει*. quae lubens legerem

θρήνον ἐπιπροϊείσα. quae vox homero usitata. Π. Γ. 221 ὄπα *ιέναι*. Hymn. XXVI. 18.

26 *καταμίσγεται*. ut in aliis bene.

34 rursus temere textum conspurcat Barn. *Νύμφη δρύοπος*. erat enim filia dryopos, filii Sperchii fluvii. Cf. Ant. Liberal. c. 32 et Ovid. 9. Met. 332.

In Hymn. XXII.

3 *ἐγκλιδὸν*. seorsim. nihil ineptius. imo se inclinando ut solent se invicem consulentes.

In Hymnum XXIII.

4 v. Horat. Od. I. xxx. 5.

§. 269. In Hymnum XXV.

12 *εἰς ὄρας*. intellige *διονύσια κατ' ἄστυ*, quae vere fiebant, circa quod tempus etiam navigatio incipiebat, *ὄραι*. navigationis tempus. v. ad Theocr. vel *λήναια, ἢ διονύσια κατ' ἄγρους* quae autumno tempore fiebant. de utrisque v. Casaub. ad Theophr. p. 31.

In Hymnum XXVIII.

11 ...*φιλά φρεσὶν ἀλλήλοισιν*.

εἰδότες ἔργματα καλά. νόφ θ' ἔσπεσθε καὶ ἦβη.

habitatis pulcras domos, inter vos bene convenientes, et comitamini bonam mentem et juventutem. Nihil communis formula *εἰδέναι φιλά τινι* at hic additur *εἰδέναι ἔργματα φιλά*¹.

¹ 'Nihil' sq. is on the opposite page.

f. 270. In Hymnum xxx.

14 Non ineleganter legeretur

λεπτουργές. πνοιαι δ' ανέμων ἄτε ἄρσενες ἵπποι.

15 ἔνθα sc. ἐν ἵπποις. v. 9. ἵπποις ἐμβεβαώς.

In Hymnum xxxi.

1 semper ineptit B. ἔσπετε dicite.

f. 271. In Hymnum xxxii.

16 πόνου σφίσιν. forte corrupta verba. l. ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ut Il.

K. 173. sic Theocr. 22. v. 6 de his ipsis.

THOMAS W. ALLEN.

NOTES ON BÜCHELER'S CARMINA EPIGRAPHICA.

391. 5 [CIL. v. 6714].

Corpus quod uixit, facta est uindi leuis umbra.

'In *uindi* quid lateat, non assequor.' Mommsen. (*t*)*umoli* seems a possible suggestion.

417. 12—15 [CIL. v. 5049].

Agmi]nibus iuncti[s q]uae pabula saepe secantes
 Inpa]uidae campis hominum pecudumque [recumbunt]
 Sic pop]ulus fuerat constans, disiunctus [iniquis
 Cedit] quisque sibi timidus.

For *recumbunt* (Büch.) I should prefer *residunt*, a word which would well suit locusts (*locustae* 10). After *disiunctus* I suggest *at idem*.

493. 1 [CIL. vi. 15546].

Non aequos Parcae statuistis stamina uitae.

Possibly *aequo ex* 'fairly.'

11 Deceptus—gravius fatum, sic pressit egestas—

12 Dum uitam tulero, Primus Pistes lugea coniugium.

Büch. explains 'deceptus sum Primus, gravius fuit fatum, sic pressit egestas i. datorum paucitas annorum,' and *lugea* he considers to = *lugeam* for *lugebo*.

It seems simpler to consider *egestas* as meant in its ordinary sense 'poverty,' with which the *gravius fatum* of Piste's death is contrasted as a heavier calamity. If so the words should be written

Deceptus gravius fatum, sic pressit egestas,
 Dum u. t. P. P. l. c.

'Kept in ignorance of a graver misfortune (my wife's death), such was the pressure of poverty (i.e. being too poor to apprehend the graver misfortune of my wife, Piste, dying) I mourn, as long as my life shall last, her loss.' I doubt *lugea(m) = lugebo*: Gruter's suggestion that it is a mistake for *lugeo* seems very probable.

511. 3 sqq. [CIL. VIII. 4681].

feliciter annos

L minus uno gessit, studio set

5 Vsus onoribus ordinis est adque uirum uir

Largus munidator ed sator in gente suorum.

In 5 *ac quinqueuirum uir* is a natural suggestion. The original is *adque uiru u*. It is true that in the heading of the Inscription the man is called II · VIR, but it is no very audacious conjecture to suppose that II has supplanted v.

1059. 1—4 [CIL. XIV. 1808].

Paruolus in gremio comunis forte parentis

Dum ludit, fati conruit inuidia.

Nam trucibus iunctis bubus tunc forte noueli

Ignarum rector propulit orbe rota.

A child playing on the ground is killed by the violent impact of a wheel, seemingly of a plough drawn by two young and sturdy oxen. Büch. explains *noueli* 'indomiti iumentu,' and he makes *rota* nominative with which *rector* agrees, comparing *auctor femina*, &c. This seems to me incredible. As *nouellus* is specially used of young unbroken steers, Colum. VI. 1, 3, I would follow Osann and Meyer in writing *nouellis*; Meyer's *orbe rotae* is a combination natural in itself and, in conjunction with the obvious suggestion of the distich that *rector* is the man who guides the plough, more than plausible.

1105. 9 [CIL. XIV. 316].

Hic sum positus qui semper sine crimine uixi.

Et quem mi dederat cursum Fortuna peregit.

Cuius ossua et cineres hic lapis intus habet.

One would expect *peregi* (cf. 814) and *ossa* (in 824 *ossua* is a dactyl) with *Cuius* monosyllable. Are these the errors of the stone-cutter? If they were, the first v. might be, as written by its composer,

Hic positus qui sum, s. s. c. u.

1121 [CIL. III. 4487].

Felix terra, precor, leuiter super ossa residas
 Matris et et fratris: comprecor ecce soror.
 Pars iacet ipsa mei maior geminatque dolorem:
 Filia matri simul fratre iacent filio.
 Comprecor ut uobis sit pia terra leuis.

For v. 4, which is obviously corrupt, I would offer

Filia matre simul, filia fratre iacent.

'The same daughter lies buried with the mother and brother she survives,' i.e. would gladly have died with them.

1212 [CIL. IX. 3071].

9—11.

Fletibus adsiduis luget mestissima mater
 Quae prior occidere quam naiamira dari
 Igni debuit.

Possibly *quam mea (mia?) moera*. A daughter is speaking, who had survived both her parents. 'My mother ought in the natural course of things to have died before my fate was consigned to the death-fire.' *dari* seems to be *κατὰ σύνεσιν*.

1295 [CIL. VI. 12528].

Coniugium inceptum dulce mihi tecum, Malchio, memento,
 Quae fuerit nobis consociata fides.
 Desin[e] iam flere. fatalis mihi hora manebat,
 Quae coniugio dulci distulit illa tuo.
 Tunc tu talis eris, qualem tua dextera nobis
 Sollicitum praestes, si cepit illa fides.

This inscription was preserved by Sabinus, and the original,

which was in Rome, seems no longer to be traceable. It is strangely corrupted, but not, I believe, desperately. In v. 1, leaving, as is common in these inscriptions, out of metrical consideration the proper name *Malchio*, we have a good hexameter, as Henzen restored it, *Coniugium inceptum mihi tecum dulce, memento*, which is expanded and drawn out in v. 2. In v. 3 Sabinus has recorded *Desino*; but it cannot be right, as there is no real ground for believing in a change of speakers. *fere* I believe to point to a following *qu*: take in therefore from v. 4 *Quae*, and substitute *fatis* for *fatalis*: *mihi* is for *mi*, monosyllable. We now have an adequate reason for the hitherto meaningless *illa*. 'The hour which by fate's appointment was in reserve for me, *that* hour it was which parted me from my sweet consorting with you': in other words, it was the fate-appointed hour which parted us. In vv. 5, 6 I find an encouragement which the deceased wife addresses to her husband: 'live in the happy memory of me: by doing what your fidelity to me makes only right and lawful (*si licitum praestes, si capit illa fides*) you will prove yourself such as your right hand pledged you would be': i.e. *uouit* for *nobis*.

The whole epigram therefore will assume this shape:

Coniugium inceptum mihi tecum dulce memento, Malchio,
 Quae fuerit nobis consociata fides.
 Desine iam flere. Quae fatis mi hora manebat,
 Coniugio dulci distulit illa tuo.
 Tunc tu talis eris, qualem tua dextera uouit,
 Si licitum praestes, si capit illa fides.

1341. 1—3.

Huic sancto loco sepultus cosun siquis cognoscere uellis,
 Triginta et duo circiter celeri cursu perfecti meo.
 Reddere mecattum fuit, iterum sperare quod fui.

Cosun is surely not *quo sum* but *cur (cor) sum*: *mecattum* is, I believe, *me cassum*: 'it was no good (to think of) restoring me, to hope a second time for what I was.' The language is rude, but intelligible.

1383. 5, 6.

In quanta famolis pristantur munera Chr(ist)i:
 Viuit acus uirtus sempe(r) adextra leuat.

I believe that the whole of this is intelligible. *In* is explained by Mommsen as *En*. *Viuit acus* is *Viuida* (Bücheler) *quos*, and *adextra*, as conjectured by Hartel, *ad astra*. Cf. *ad alta leuatus* 885. I do not at all fathom Bücheler's present rejection of his former emendation *viuida*. The corruption is simple, I might almost say, regular.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

SILVAE MANILIANAE APPENDIX.

EMISSA iam e prelo nostra *Silua Maniliana*¹ nonnulla, ut fit, subuenerunt quae eo libentius inclusissem. haec, ne opus quaecumque suo certe fraudaretur fine, quam minimo possint priora interuallo sequentia lucem experiri uoluimus. Manilius in loco pulchro et Lucreti memori saecula hominum prisca rerum caelestium ignara his uersibus depingit.

I 66 sqq.

nam rudis ante illos nullo discrimine uita
in speciem conuersa operum ratione carebat
et stupefacta nouo pendebat lumine mundi,
tum uelut amissis maerens, tum laeta renatis
sideribus, uariosque dies incertaque noctis 70
tempora, nec similis umbras iam sole regresso,
iam propiore suis poterant discernere causis.

corruptelam in ultimis inesse quis est qui non fateatur? pro *poterant* (72) Bentleius *impar* intulit, in quo recte rei palaeographicae rationem desiderat Ellisius; cui tamen ne ipsi quidem satis feliciter res cessit, cum pro *nec* (71) *non* temptaret, orationis compagibus plus iusto solutis. sedem uitii neque ille neque hic deprehendit, quam tria uerba patefacient. sic enim disserit Manilius; qui ne dierum quidem ac noctium uicissitudines perpetuas intellegebant, quo modo illi quibus de causis toto anno

¹ University Press, Cambridge, 1897.

lucis tenebrarumque spatia semper uariarent discernere poterant? quare legendum et interpungendum

sideribus. uariosNE dies incertaque noctis
tempora *et q. s.*

que pro *ne* scriptum est ut fortasse etiam in IV 14 de quo conf. Silu. Manil. p. 33.

II 581 sqq.

idecirco nihil ex semet natura creauit
pectore amicitiae maius nec rarius umquam.
unus erat Pylades, unus qui mallet Orestes
ipse mori; lis una fuit post saecula mortis,
alter quod raperet fatum, non cederet alter. 585
et duo qui potuere sequi uix noxia poenis
optauitque reum sponsor non posse reuerti
sponsoremque reus timuit ne solueret ipsum.

in u. 586 uere, si quid uideo, *uestigia* reponit Bentleius, uere *noxia* ex u. 602 'poenas iam noxia uincit' uenisse dicit. sed de *poenis* minus uere idem iudicauit; per hoc enim stetit ut illud inferretur. *poenis* idem ualet atque *ad poenas* (cf. ib. 547 'lacrimans ornatur uictima *poenae*' et cetera eiusmodi exempla) et ad sequentia spectat¹. quod *tum cum* pro *poenis* idem Bentleius coniecit, mouit eum fortasse oratio uix satis bene inter se cohaerens: cohaerebit certe melius si *HAEC* pro *et* restitues ut sit

HAEC duo qui potuere sequi *uestigia*, poenis
optauitque reum sponsor non posse reuerti *et q. s.*

Bentleius etiam *sponsorem* impugnauit cum Hellenismum Plauto Terentioque (*Eunuch.* III 5 'metuo fratrem | ne intus sit') notum Manilio non concederet; quae neque ipsa satis firma ratio est et uerbi quoque 'timendi' uim ueram praetermittit. nam timeri dicitur subinde de quo timetur; conf. *Ov. Pont.* 2. 7. 35 sqq. 'non igitur uereor quo *te* rear esse *uerendum*

¹ Iacobus de qua somniauit lacuna saltem quid ibi inesset aperire legentibus debuit.

| cuius amor nobis pignora mille dedit; | sed quia res timida
est omnis miser, et quia longo est | tempore laetitiae ianua
clausa meae.' qui locus Propertiani loci I 11. 17—24 aperte
memor Lachmannum refellit illic in uu. 17 sq. 'non quia
perspecta non es mihi cognita fama | sed quod in hac omnis
parte *timetur amor*' *ueretur* corrigentem. subiecerim denique
prius quam a loco abeo in u. 585 'quod raperet—cederet' ita
displicere ut libentius *cum* uel *quom* Manilianum esse cre-
diderim.

III 637 sqq.

parte ex aduersa brumae Capricornus inertis
per minimas cogit luces et maxima noctis
tempora, producitque diem tenebrasque resoluit.

Bentleius recte in u. 637 *brumae—inertis* seruato minus
feliciter *cogit* in *surgit* mutauit. quamuis enim alibi in Manilio
hoc in illud abiisse facile credideris (conf. Silu. Man. p. 10),
tamen hic fortius certe est *cogit* et Maniliano ingenio accom-
modatus. maluerim

SORTEM ex aduerso brumae Capricornus inertis
per minimas cogit luces *et q. s.*

sortem brumae fere idem est ac *brumam*. sortis uocabulum
adamatum Manilio, sed a librariis hic, sicut alibi quoque, ad-
emptum. *ex aduerso* habes etiam in u. 658 'huic ex aduerso
simili cum sorte refulget | Libra¹'.

IV 681 sqq.

quod superest Europa tenet qua prima natantem
fluctibus excepitque Iouem taurumque resoluit
pondere passa suo signi onerique iuuauit.

in hoc loco prima quidem specie adridet *leuauit* e *iuuauit*
extractum similique argutia dictum ut in v 310 'et pariter
iuuenem somnoque ac morte leuauit,' sed probatum nimis
multa immutare te coget. quare melius quod inuenit Iacobus

¹ Cum haec iam scripsissem, cognoui a codice quoque Matritensi, sincero
illo antiquitatis teste, *ex aduerso* illud praebere.

iugari, quod uerbum in v 351, loco infra laudato, Manilius usurpat. *iugari* primum in *iuuari*, mox, cum nimium uicinum esset *resoluit*, in *iuauit* deprauatum est. sed idem Iacobus male *condere* pro *pondere*, pro *oneri Veneri* scripsit. pro illo reponendum *ponere* cum Breitero, *oneri* cum codicibus seruandum. ludit, ut solet, in duplici nominum significatione Manilius. tauriformis deus ponit siue amoris siue amatae pondus: ei quam uehebat, sicut tauro taurus iugo, nuptiis iungitur. lege

ponere passa suos ignis onerique iugari.

v 85 sqq.

nec non alterno desultor sidere dorso
quadrupedum et stabilis poterit defigere plantas
perquos labit equos ludet per terga uolantum.

sic scriptus in Gemblacensi codice extat u. 87: Cusanus et Vossianus primus *per quos uadit*, Vossianus alter et Matritensis *per quo labit* praestant. Bentleius *perque uolabit equos* temptauit quo nihilo melius Ellisius *terque subibit equos*, quamuis idem recte *ludet* contra Bentleianum *ludens*, collatis II 498, IV 220, defenderit. atque in eodem quidem uersu a Bentleio potissimum scriptum fuisse *uolabit—uolantum* erit qui miretur: sed hoc non urgeo; grauiora enim supersunt. alio ducunt uestigia codicum, alio Firmici Materni locus haustus ex nostro, ut Becherto quoque et Ellisio uidebatur. VIII 6 'in huius ortu qui natus fuerit aut erit auriga (71 sqq.), aut equorum domitor (74 sq.), aut qui saltu quadrigas transeat, uel qui in dorso stans equorum mirifica se moderatione sustentet (86), atque apprime uectus equo militares armaturas exerceat (88), hoc astro oriente Salmoneus (91 sqq.) et Bellerophontes (97 sqq.) a priscis auctoribus nati esse narrantur.' ex *perquoslabit* et q. s. opera facili eliciendum

perque SALIBIT equos, ludet per terga uolantum.

iam uides unde illud 'saltu transeat' Firmicus arripuerit. quod ad formam uerbi *salibit* attinet, similia permulta, e.g. *uenibit*, *paribit*, apud priscae Latinitatis auctores inuenies¹, estque

¹ Congessit Neuius Lateinische Formenlehre, tom. II. capitul. 48.

Manilius, quod argumentis demonstrare supersedeo, uetusti sermonis amator. quidni ille *salibit* scripserit cum *lenibunt* etiam Propertius (3. 21. 32)?

in aliis quoque libri quinti locis emendandis eundem Firmicum Maternum ad partes uocabo. ab hoc scriptore et Manilium exprimi aliis ante nos uisum est et ipsi corrupti loci medicinam fauente, nisi fallimur, rei ratione petiuimus (II 888, Silu. Manil. p. 25). nihilo minus haudquaquam dissimulandum est testem illum esse, ut nunc res se habet, haud locupletissimum, ac duas quidem praesertim ob causas. primum quod ad libros quidem ultimos attinet, in iis tantum editionibus extat quae ad huius saeculi curam ac fidem uix satis respondeant; tum Manilium saepenumero relinquit, siue alios, ut fit, reddendo scriptores siue illius ipsius quem sequitur sententia perperam intellecta. cuius rei unum adponam exemplum sed illud illustrissimum. de natorum sub Sagitta ingenio ita Manilius praeiuerat 'dabit—pendentemque suo uolucrum deprendere caelo | *cuspidē uel triplici securum figere piscem*' v 297 sq. ultima si quaeres apud Maternum, de eiusdem stellae uiribus disserentem, sic reficta inuenies: '*tridente uel cuspidē* pisces figat intrepidus' (VIII 12), tamquam *tridens* aliud esset atque *cuspis*, uel *triplex cuspis* aliud ac *tridens*.

praemonitis his iam ad locum uexatissimum accedo qui est de genitis sub Cratere.

v 244 sqq.

nec parce uina recepta

hauriet, e miseris et fructibus ipse fruetur

gaudebitque mero mergetque in pocula mentem.

'Correxerunt' inquit Ellisius '*emiscens emistris emessis*,' nec uerbum ille amplius. quid de iis senserit uir doctus, uides, neque equidem refragor, modo quod ipse inuenit *inuergens* et quod Rossbergius *e murris* in eundem numerum abeant. probabile enim habent nihil. Firmicus sub cratere genitos (8. 10) 'libenter bibere' ait 'uinum sine aquae admistione.' hoc argumentum non modo in uerbis quae sunt *gaudebitque mero*, sed pro suo more in cetero quoque contextu ornasse Manilium

credibile est. quare fortasse reponendum IMMISTIS uel IMMIXTIS. 'uinum immixtum' dixit Ausonius epigr. 20 (18). 12. quam facile *immistis* in *e miseris* abire potuerit ex eis quae in Silua Maniliana pp. 59 sqq. docendi causa conguessimus ipse perspicias.

v 322 sq.

nec non lasciuit amores
in uarios ponitque forum gaudetque Lyaeo
mobilis in saltus et scaenae mollior arte.

hic Manilii uestigia premit Firmicus (VIII 12). de genitis sub Haedo apud utrumque agitur. 'hoc signo oriente quicumque natus fuerit, animo uario consilioque sollicito semper erit, et qui *uariis* cogitationibus implicatus numquam quiete cum securitatis gratia perfruatur (= 'sollertis animos agitataque pectora in usus | effingit *uarios* nec deficientia curis | nec contenta domo' v 315 sqq.). sed tamen lasciuis moribus et praeposteris amorum cupiditatibus obligatus uinoque et epulis deditus (= 'gaudetque Lyaeo'), et qui publicis conuiujs praeferat gratiam, ad saltandum aptus et qui scenicas artes studiosa animositate perdiscat.' hic nequaquam in dubium reuocarem *uarios*, quod per se quidem nihil habet offensionis, nisi Firmicus, qui hoc ipsum uerbum in u. 316 reliquit, hic *praeposteris cupiditatibus*, quod plane aliud est, adhibuisset. idem, cum de Haedorum orientium tutela post Manilium dissereret, haec dixit (VIII 6) 'sunt enim natura petulantes, lasciuis semper cupiditatum ac libidinis uoluptatibus implicati et qui latenter amoris illecebris semper exaestuunt. hi praeterea frequenter libidinibus capti et praeposteri amoris studiis occupati mortem sibi inferre coguntur. erunt etiam ab omni uirtutis officio separati, timidi imbecilles et qui omne pugnarum periculum perhorrescant.' hic, dum crassa Minerua, ut solet, Maniliana exprimit, 'haedis nec tanta petulcis | conueniunt; leuibus gaudent lasciuaque signa | pectora et in lusus †agiles¹ agilemque uigorem | desudant; uario ducunt in amore iuentam. | in uulnus numquam

¹ Bentr. alacres.

uirtus; sed saepe libido | impellit turpisque emitur uel morte uoluptas,' in ultima reddendo 'turpis uoluptatis' notionem sub 'praeposteris amoris studiis' uult intellegi. quocirca suspicetur quis Manilium PRAVOS in u. 323 dedisse. de *p* littera amissa uide sis Silu. Man. p. 60: nam cetera uulgaria.

354 sqq.

ille tenet medicas artes ad membra ferarum
 et non auditos mutarunt tollere morbos.
 hoc est artis opus non expectare gementis
 et sibi non aegros iam dudum credere corpus.

hic adsentio Bentleio *ferorum*, hoc est *equorum*, reponenti coll. Manil. v 77, Verg. *Aen.* 2. 151. equi enim sunt *feri*, *ferae* non sunt. quod pro *corpus* idem in u. 357 intulit, *tales*, non laudo, multo magis Scaligeri inuentum *aegrum*—*corpus*, quod immerito ille uituperat, 'aegrum eo modo bis poni quis patienter ferat?', cum apud Latinos, atque optimae illos quidem notae auctores, uerba interdum etiam durius repetantur. *mutarunt* in *mutarum* Scaliger, quod ceteri adripuerunt, Bentleius in *mutorum* mutauit. sed audi Firmicum VIII 13 'hoc oriente qui natus fuerit aut erit auriga aut equorum nutritor et cultor uel eorum exercitator uel *mulomedicus* uel equitarius.' quare reponendum MVLARVM (uel fortasse MVLORVM). mulorum etiam in superioribus uersibus noster mentionem facit 'mixtosque iugabit | semine quadrupedes.' quantique esset apud Romanos mulorum curatio, uel illud documentum est Vegetium cum *ἰππιατρικὰ* Graeci auctoris redderet, libro 'mulomedicinae' titulum potissimum indidisse. iam illud adnotandum *mutarum* ad litteras quidem facillimum esse, sed sententiae uix satis congruere. cur enim, quod nescit nemo, mutas esse pecudes doceret? quod si pro tacitis, hoc est non gementibus, accipias, loco alieno id quod suo deinceps loco narraturus est poeta narrare cogetur.

J. P. POSTGATE.

TRASIMENE.

IN the last number of the Journal Mr B. W. Henderson has criticised at some length the views which I put forward some two years ago on the subject of the site of the battle of Lake Trasimene, and the conclusions which may be drawn therefrom as to the credibility of the accounts which Polybius and Livy respectively give of it.

The argument of the article appears, stated briefly, to amount to this:

(1) The battle cannot have taken place on the site West of Tuoro, because it displays neither *πάροδος* nor *αύλων ἐπίπεδος*.

(2) A much more probable site lies E. of Passignano where there is a *πάροδος*, but no *αύλων*.

∴ since half a loaf is better than no bread etc.

There is further a digression on method in topographical inquiry.

Before entering upon any of the particular points of the question, there is one defect, as it seems to me, which is apparent throughout the paper. Mr Henderson utterly ignores that human element which must enter largely into any question such as the present. In all questions of topography we must, I think, take into account the fact that men look at a scene with different eyes, and describe it in different words. The difference very often begins from the point of view adopted. One man will base a description on the actual point of view: another will adopt an imaginary point as more convenient for his purpose. But the best description in the world cannot give you more

than a very imperfect picture of any piece of ground, and, for practical purposes of topography, requires correcting by comparison with the ground itself. To adopt Mr Henderson's proposed method (p. 123), viz., to sketch out the ground from a description before visiting it, and to abide by that sketch through thick and thin, i.e. to leave out of calculation all the explanation which the actual sight of the ground must afford, amounts simply to the cherishing of a prejudice at the expense of truth. It presupposes what can never exist,—a perfect word-description, and a perfect comprehension of it.

Again it would, of course, be an exceedingly pleasant thing in such an inquiry if we could arrange all the topographical premisses on the one side of the argument, and the historical conclusions on the other. Under such circumstances the latter would, I admit, be far more convincing: but, in this case, as in some other matters, nature has an unfortunate tendency to mingle cause and effect, which renders such an arrangement impossible, a tendency which is not a little emphasised in the particular class of case before us by the fact that history, owing to the presence of the human factor, is not at any time a scientific description of phenomena, and was eminently not so in the second century B.C.

I am obliged to state this commonplace, because Mr Henderson accuses me of a flagrant begging of the question in appealing to Polybius or Livy as evidence of the existence of a *πάροδος* round Point A (v. Map). On referring to my article I find that the only words which I have used which support this somewhat grave charge are "the next words of Livy etc. would seem to imply that there was some narrow piece of low ground in those days between the lake shore and the extremity of Point A, whatever he may have supposed its nature to be." Previous to this, I must mention, I had already pointed out that the evidence on the spot, wholly apart from the history, would admit the possibility of such ground having existed. It seems to me a perfectly fair argument to say that the topographical possibility is supported by the assertion of the historian. This is a very different thing from founding the possibility on the assertion. Where then is the begging of the

question—"τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν" as Mr Henderson puts it? The quotation of Greek reminds me of another passage which seems peculiarly applicable to Mr Henderson's demands with regard to method—*πεπαιδευμένον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τ' ἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται*. This method makes what seems to me a very unfair demand on any historian who is not writing as a military specialist for the instruction of a military reader, and the unfairness is multiplied many times in the case of an historian to whom maps pretending to the slightest accuracy must have been wholly unknown.

It is very difficult to realise fully the disadvantages under which such an author laboured. Any reader of Horsley's "Roman Britain" can form some notion of it, but I doubt whether it is possible for us to appreciate the difficulties which a writer like Polybius had to face, having no maps worth calling such, if any at all, and lacking altogether that conscious or unconscious power of orientation which the writer of the present day owes largely to familiarity with the points of the compass. Is it strange that such a writer, in describing a piece of ground at a period when scientific accuracy of description and the means of obtaining it were unknown, should have altered his mental point of view in the course of the description and have described the valley between Tuoro and Point A from two different points of view? Such a confusion is only too common in modern descriptions of locality, and it may be unavoidable, where, as in the case of the site of the battle at Trasimene, the author is describing a valley (1) without reference to events, from the most convenient point of view, (2) with reference to a passage of the valley which took a line different from the imaginary line of sight.

Such an explanation does not fit in with the almost super-human precision which Mr Henderson demands, but it is, I venture to think, more in accordance with what common sense would lay down as the canon of test to be applied to an author writing in the days of Polybius.

So much then as to the general question of Mr Henderson's method and demands.

The detail of his destructive criticism is somewhat more difficult to follow.

Mr Henderson considers that the Tuoro site of the battle-field fails in two decisive and one minor respect.

- (1) As regards the *πάροδος*.
- (2) As regards the *αὐλὸν ἐπίπεδος*.
- (3) As regards the position of the Lake camp.

1. *The πάροδος difficulty.*

Mr Henderson (p. 113) says there is no *πάροδος* at the present day, and that, moreover, the modern road strikes over that hill-ridge which runs out into the Lake at Point A.

His argument on the question is in two parts:—

- (1) As to the changes at Point A.
- (2) As to the position of the road.

With regard to Point A he says, in reference to the proposed solution of this difficulty:

"If, since 217 B.C., the lake has advanced at Point A, there may have existed in that year a narrow passage between that point and the water" (p. 114). The italics are Mr Henderson's.

And again (pp. 115, 116):

"It is argued that, though the waters of Lake Trasimene have receded since B.C. 217 at various points along the North coast owing to the alluvial matter brought down by the half dozen or so small brooks entering the lake (e.g. at P. del Macerone at the mouth of the Sanguineto valley—"Point B"), yet that at Point A, and it seems at Point A alone, the lake has advanced, and thus hidden the ancient road which ran round that point. Thus the πάροδος difficulty is evaded successfully.

"But it seems to me at the cost of some violence to the imagination. Point B is some 3000 yards distant from Point A as the crow flies. The brooks between and beyond, though very minute, do bring down alluvial matter and have been doing for the last 2000 years, it is safe to assert. Point B has advanced,

it is conceded on all hands, and is evident to any observer, and advanced probably quite half a mile owing to this cause. But this theory asks us to believe, notwithstanding the three foregoing facts, that the lake has advanced at Point A enough to entirely obliterate a former road at its base. And not only this—but it must have advanced with violence. For Point A falls abruptly into the waters of the lake, and, it has been said, ‘the shore is strewn with pieces of rock which have fallen away from the water-worn cliff.’ That is, according to this theory, not only has the lake devoured some erstwhile existing low-lying ground between Point A and its greedy waters, but the point itself has been battered even unto retrogression. An earthquake which casts cities to the ground would of course make light of such a feat. But this comfortable *Deus ex machinâ* is itself not too well attested nor easily received. And in its absence I am bound to confess the probability of such a geological metamorphosis of the land seems to me very small. I had almost rather create eleven buckram men out of two than on the above evidence create a *πάροδος*, a *via perangusta*, round Point A.”

Such is the argument. I have quoted it at length, because I think that those who are interested in the question, and who have not Mr Henderson’s paper beside them, will not otherwise credit that he has put his name to one or two of the statements contained in it.

Most of the objections which it raises could be refuted by anyone possessed of the most elementary knowledge of physiography, and the whole passage makes it difficult to imagine that Mr Henderson is in earnest.

But suppose we take the passage as serious:

(1) There is, of course, no low ground at the present time round Point A,—no *πάροδος* according to Mr Henderson’s use of the term.

(2) It is generally supposed that the waters of a sea or lake breaking on its shores have a tendency to wear them away and to cause the shore to recede, unless some counteracting cause, such as the deposit of alluvium by a stream, be present.

No such cause is present at Point A. Streams do not usually take a course along the comb of a ridge to a lake or elsewhere.

(3) The exceptional character of Point A among the promontories on the shore of the site, to which Mr Henderson alludes, is, I need hardly say, due to the fact that it is an ordinary ridge abutting on the lake, whereas the others are lacustrine deltas. But the strange thing is that Mr Henderson seems to be perfectly well aware of this fact, and yet writes "yet at Point A—and it seems at Point A alone,—the lake has advanced and thus hidden the ancient road which ran round that point. Thus the *πάροδος* difficulty is evaded successfully."

(4) Waves act on the base of a cliff. The natural result is that there are falls from above, especially in a loose formation (conglomerate, I think) such as that at Point A. Mr Henderson's earthquake or other "*Deus ex machinâ*" is therefore not necessary in order to account for the existence of the blocks at the foot of the cliff.

(5) As far as can be calculated from the contoured Ordnance map of Italy the slope at Point A would, if continued, reach lake level between 90 and 100 yards from the summit of the present cliff.

It is impossible to get accurate data pointing to the amount of wear which could be fairly assumed to have taken place in a given time at any particular point on any particular lake shore. I should like however to give a quotation from Dr H. R. Mill's book on English Lakes (R. G. S. Publication)—"In lakes so narrow and sheltered as those of England, wave action counts for little, although M. Forel has shown in his great treatise on the Lake of Geneva that in a wide expanse of water it has a very marked effect." Trasimene is about 8 miles by 7, and of a more or less rectangular shape. The Lake of Geneva is about the same breadth. It will be seen that it is on the point of breadth that Dr Mill insists. Furthermore Trasimene is infinitely more exposed than Geneva. On no side of it are the hills high enough to form any appreciable shelter from the wind.

Perhaps, after all, Mr Henderson will have to make his

buckram men; for it really seems as if the language he has thought right to use with regard to the suggested possibility of low ground at the foot of Point A 2000 years ago is hardly justified.

As far as I myself am concerned, I have never believed that the existence of such ground is demanded by what is substantial in the history.

I do not believe Livy had ever seen Trasimene, nor do I think that Polybius' *πάροδος* demands any such supposition.

(6) I should like to insert here some evidence taken from Dr Mill's book, and elsewhere, with reference to the rapidity of the formation of lacustrine deltas. If any conclusion can be drawn from it, it is that I have under-estimated, rather than over-estimated, the extent to which the coast line between Tuoro and Point A may have been pushed forward in the last 2000 years. The streams which enter the lake along that shore are small, but are liable to torrential floods, and the lake is unusually shallow. Until I read Dr Mill's book I never wholly realised the rapidity with which nature carries on such work.

(a) Mr Grant Wilson found in 1888 that *the delta at the head of Loch Tay had advanced over $\frac{1}{3}$ of a mile since the Ordnance Survey of the district in 1861* (Scottish Geographical Magazine iv. 251).

(b) In 1894 Dr Mill found by sextant bearings that *the delta at the head of Ulleswater (at Patterdale) was 200 feet further out in the lake than in 1880 when the Ordnance Survey was made.*

This is formed by Goldrill Beck, and it is formed, too, at a deep part of the lake where there is 50 feet of water close in shore. (Mill, Bathymetrical Survey of English Lakes, p. 46.)

(c) *Canton of Zurich.* Dr Edward Brückner has noted the surface changes since the middle of the 17th century, based on a comparison, made at his instigation by Mr H. Walser, of the maps of the present day with an excellent map of the Canton by J. C. Gyger, on the scale of 1:32000, belonging to the year 1667. The chief results ascertained by

the comparison are a great reduction during the period of the area occupied by lakes, many of those existing in 1667 being now extinct, and others contracted in dimensions. *Of the 149 lakes on Gyger's map (most of them, it is true, under 25 acres in extent) 73 have altogether disappeared from various causes. (Petermann's Mitteilungen. Quoted Mag. R. G. S. Dec. 96.)*

It would seem then that the advance of these lacustrine deltas between Tuoro and Point A may have been very considerable since 217 B.C. The alluvial land stretches far up the valley, north of a line drawn from Point A to Tuoro.

The Position of the Road.

On this point Mr Henderson says (p. 112):

"But, as the country exists to-day, there is no kind of a 'πάροδος,' of a 'via perangusta,' into the Tuoro valley. The road whether from Terontola or Borghetto strikes over the hill-ridge which runs out into the Lake (Point 'A' on the above map), and thus down over the brow into the Tuoro valley."

Again on p. 114, in reference to the Lake-camp difficulty, so-called:

"But the road from Cortona runs direct viâ Terontola to reach the lake for the first time just E. of Point A. It does not make a long and surely unnecessary détour round by Borghetto. If the ancient road ran as does the modern, the Roman army first reached the lake at the mouth of the Sanguineto valley. There they encamped, etc."

On p. 115; "It is true that the one and only obvious course for the old road to take is the one inevitably suggested by the lie of the country, the one followed by the modern road, and the one which alone leads direct to the Perugian valley."

In another passage we find in reference to the same question:

"If—in 217 B.C.—the road did actually make the détour round by Borghetto, the Romans could have pitched their

camp on the lake before reaching Point A. That is, *if* we will reconstruct the country of 217 B.C. so as to create a passage round Point A, and bring the ancient road curving gracefully round in two sweeps, by Borghetto to Point A, and from Point A up north to scale the hills, *if* we indulge in these hypotheses and regard them as justified by the above-named general topographical uncertainties, then these objections may be comfortably dismissed. That my own faculty for topographical imagination will not bear this strain is, of course, beside the question. But surely one passing remark is here justified. The elements of uncertainty seem so many and so insoluble in themselves (that is, unless ever draining or digging come to our aid), that surely any dogmatism on the subject is mere foolishness."

The language of the last two sentences is perhaps somewhat strong, even in controversy. But the strange thing is that it is all based on a mistake of Mr Henderson's own.

With (1) the *détour* of the road by Borghetto, and (2) the continuance of it northward up the Sanguinetto Valley, I have nothing to do. I suppose Mr Henderson is criticising some one else.

But of course the real point of Mr Henderson's criticism is that those who hold the views I have expressed in my paper make the road go round the Ridge of Point A, whereas the modern road, which he thinks follows the course of the ancient one, coming "from Terontola or Borghetto strikes over the hill-ridge."

Mr Henderson has apparently relied on his memory, and it has played him false. That is just what the road from Terontola or Borghetto does not do. It avoids the ridge as much as possible consistently with its not being carried through the lake. I append a tracing of the Italian Ordnance map, which will show clearly the nature of the case, and of the mistake.

Mr Henderson would have done well to refer to a copy of it.

He will be able with its aid to distinguish on either side of Point A those "graceful curves" of which he speaks.

It will also be noticed that the road at the present day does not reach the lake for the first time E. of Point A, but

W. of it, therefore the argument with regard to the Lake-camp difficulty is unfounded.

After this it is quite easy to understand that Mr Henderson's faculty for topographical imagination would not stand a further strain. I agree, of course, with the view that this part of the modern road is, in the main, on the line of the ancient one. Even now it goes as widely round Point A as the ground admits. When Point A extended further into the lake it probably took a still further curve lower down the slope, and after rounding the point, bent, as indeed it does at the present day, nearly due N. under the E. slope of the ridge which runs down to Point A, before turning E. towards Tuoro and Passignano. As the hill rises sharply above the line of road, I really do not see why this should not be the *πάροδος* to which Polybius refers. As to the length of the passage, that will best be taken later.

The *αὐλῶν ἐπίπεδος*.

Mr Henderson admits (p. 117) that the valley between Tuoro and Point A is an *αὐλῶν ἐπίπεδος*, but he rejects it, because he says that "Polybius and Livy both assert the Romans marched through the *αὐλών*, whereas this *αὐλῶν* lies away to the left of the line of march."

And again (p. 118):

"Whatever else Polybius may assert about the *αὐλών*, one statement he does make clearly and definitely, viz. that the Romans were marching *through* it," etc.

Now by "through" Mr Henderson plainly understands "from end to end."

In support of this very positively stated view he quotes the following passages:

(a) "ὄντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν δίοδον αὐλῶνος ἐπιπέδου."

(b) "πάροδον ὡς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν παρωρειαν."

(c) "διελθὼν τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην."

He also quotes another passage which refers to the disposition of Hannibal's troops. I do not include that, because I think it will be admitted that Polybius' evidence as to the exact disposition of those troops cannot be placed on the same level as his purely topographical matter, which he could obtain (and did obtain, I believe) by autopsy.

Of these three passages

(a) leaves the matter undecided, for he must have crossed the Tuoro *αὐλών* on his route.

(b) is again quite indecisive.

(c) *διελθὼν*, I suppose, Mr Henderson would tell us must mean "traversing from end to end." It does not seem to demand so strict an interpretation.

Schmidt (*Synonymik der Griechischen Sprache*) classes *διέρχασθαι* absolutely with *διέναι*, and says:

"*διέναι, διέρχασθαι*: ganz allgemein, *auf irgend eine Weise* durch etwas gelangen, durchschreiten, durchwandern."

But again; if the interpretation of *διελθεῖν*, which Mr Henderson would apparently insist upon, be taken, a difficulty immediately arises with regard to the meaning of the words *παρὰ τὴν λίμνην*. The obvious translation seems to be that they traversed the hollow along the lake side, i.e. the mouth of the hollow from side to side, and this accords with Polybius' description (III. 83) of the *αὐλών* as having the lake *κατὰ τὴν ἀπ' οὐράς (πλευράν)*.

The next argument is that this *αὐλών* cannot be Polybius' *αὐλών*, because the *βουνοί* on either side are not *ὑψηλοί*.

To found any argument on the concept which Polybius or anyone else may have of the meaning of the word *ὑψηλός*, seems impossible. The Tuoro ridge rises sharply from the bottom of the valley, and is 122 ft. above the valley at its south point, 243 ft. above it a little north of Tuoro, and 421 ft. above it a little farther north. I cannot help thinking that, had this ridge occurred on a modern battle-field, a military writer of the present day would have described it as a lofty one.

I have already said, and I think it is a reasonable remark, that the details which Polybius gives as to the actual position of the Carthaginian forces on the battle-field cannot be said to carry the same weight as his description of the ground. Nor indeed is this surprising. The description must have been drawn from Roman sources, and the very circumstances of the battle, the mist, the panic rout, and confusion, are not such as to render it probable that any member of the losing side had a very clear idea of the disposition of the troops before the battle took place, or, indeed, of what took place in the battle itself, save in his own immediate neighbourhood. My own view, which will, I think, be shared by those who take into account the circumstances under which the battle was fought, and the possibilities as regards information which lay open to Polybius, is that the description which he gives of the ground is eminently more reliable than the description of the actual fighting. I do not wish it to be supposed that I am arguing for the rejection of the latter. I only wish to point out the patent fact that it is to be placed in a different grade as regards reliability.

Mr Henderson in this part of his article finds his argument on

- (1) An alleged mistranslation made by those he criticises.
- (2) The account given of the body of Roman troops who succeeded in cutting their way through Hannibal's army.
- (3) The number of those caught in the *πάροδος*.

1. The alleged mistranslation :

Polyb. III. 83 is a chapter which for topographical purposes is divisible into two parts :

- (a) the first half, consisting of Polybius' own description of the site of the battle (possibly first hand) ;
- (b) the second half, of his description of the position of Hannibal's troops (second hand, of course).

In (a) the *αὐλῶν ἐπίπεδος* is described as having

- (1) *παρὰ μὲν τὰς εἰς μῆκος πλευρὰς ἑκατέρας βουνούς ὑψηλοῦς καὶ συνεχεῖς.*

(2) *παρὰ δὲ τὰς εἰς πλάτος.*

κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀντικρὺ λόφον ἐπικείμενον ἔρυμνον καὶ δύσβατον,

κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπ' οὐρᾶς λίμνην τελείως στενὴν ἀπολείπουσαν πάροδον ὡς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν παρῶρειαν.

The last passage would seem to absolutely demand an *αὐλῶν* running up at something like right angles to the shore. I cannot see that the language admits of any other supposition. The writer is clearly describing it as viewed from one standing on the lake shore with his back to the lake.

Now let us turn to Polybius' description of Hannibal's passage of the *αὐλῶν*. He speaks of him as *διελθὼν τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην*.

If he went along the lake side, and *παρὰ* can have no other meaning, he crossed the lake end of the *αὐλῶν* from side to side.

Then follows our "mistranslation."

Polybius says: *τὸν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας λόφον αὐτὸς κατελάβετο.*

Now Mr Henderson says that the article *τὸν* here absolutely demands that the *λόφον* with which it goes should be the previously mentioned *λόφος*, which is earlier described as at the head, if we may so call it, of the *αὐλῶν*.

The mistranslation of which I and others are accused consists in identifying this *λόφος* with some other hill than the previously mentioned one.

But is this a mistranslation? Surely Polybius is very express and clear in his differentiation of these two *λόφοι*.

The first he describes as *κατὰ τὴν μὲν ἀντικρὺ*, when you had the lake at your back: *κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπ' οὐρᾶς λίμνην*.

The second he describes as *κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας*, after expressly stating that *πορεία* to be along the lake side, *παρὰ τὴν λίμνην*.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that *βουνός* and *λόφος* are practically interchangeable terms in Polybius, with a leaning in the case of the former towards the "ridge," of the latter towards the "hill."

But surely if Mr Henderson uses so strong a word as "mis-translation" in reference to the interpretation which I have put upon this passage, he should have given us his own view on the subject. I think he will find that any other interpretation than the one given renders the passage wholly incomprehensible, quite apart from any question as to the actual state of the ground at the present day.

Mr Henderson then proceeds to show the futility of the Tuoro theory by quoting Polybius' (*sic*) account of the Roman 6000 who cut their way through (p. 119):

"Polybius (III. 84. 11) says that the Roman vanguard, 6000 in number, forced its way out of the *αὐλῶν* through those who sought to bar its onward march."

"Where then were the Punic troops stationed through whom these Romans forced a path?"

"Polybius answers this clearly. Hannibal stationed them 'on the hill in front' (III. 83. 2). That is, the Romans in their march had to climb a hill.

"But on the theory of the Tuoro site there existed no hill for the Romans to climb. Unless indeed the lake in 217 B.C. reached also the base of the spur on which the village of Tuoro lies, and this has not yet been imagined" etc.

"Champions of the theory have in fact either to endue the Roman van with an unnecessary love of mountain-climbing and make them, like the king of France, go up to the top of a hill to come down again—which is improbable," etc., etc.

"For the Romans in Polybius do climb a hill, find the foe on top, force their way through, climb yet higher above the mist and look thence down upon the scene of massacre."

The wording of the last sentence is unfortunate. Those Romans, unless very keen-sighted, ought to have looked down upon the mist.

But the historical parallel drawn in the sentence preceding is more unfortunate still, because it is all due to the fact that Mr Henderson has not read Polybius' account carefully.

Of course Polybius says that Hannibal stationed his troops on a hill, not "in front," as Mr Henderson says, but "facing the

line of march"—*κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας*. This is however but a slight deviation from Polybius.

But that author further says (III. 84. 2): *καὶ τῶν πολεμίων* (sc. the Carthaginians) *κατὰ πολλοῦς τόπους ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καταφερομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων*.

If this means anything, surely it means that the Carthaginians charged down hill on the Roman column. So the latter would not have to climb at all, and there is much good sarcasm wasted.

As far as the head of the Roman column is concerned, it would be charged obliquely in front and flank by an enemy descending from the hill of Tuoro, supposing the road ran at the foot of that hill.

Mr Henderson's argument with regard to the account given of the fate of the Roman rearguard is founded on :

(1) His own interpretation of the expression "*pars magna*" as used by Livy.

(2) An incredulous reference to "the Procrustean ability of the genius of the pass."


(3) His own (mistaken) conception of the length of the *πάροδος* round Point A.

Of these miscellaneous bases I will only attempt to deal with two, viz. (1) and (3).

(1) If Mr Henderson is able to persuade readers of Livy of the correctness of his interpretation of that author's confessedly vague expression "*pars magna*," I can only congratulate him.

(3) Mr Henderson evidently reckons as *πάροδος* merely that portion of the road which is at the southern extremity of Point A.

It is, as a matter of physiography, infinitely more probable that the whole of the road under the slope of the ridge to the E. of Point A should be reckoned in as part of the *πάροδος* than that it should not. If so, I do not see that Livy's vague expression "*pars magna*" is in any way a serious difficulty for those who believe in the Tuoro site.



I cannot seriously discuss the site for which Mr Henderson argues. The admitted absence of any *αὐλῶν ἐπίπεδος* from it seems to me to place it outside the range of historical discussion.

There is one point I should like to mention before closing this article. Mr Henderson treats the possibility of the lake having come up to the foot of Tuoro hill-slope 2000 years ago as outside the range of practical topography. I venture to

think that the evidence which I have adduced in this paper as to the rapidity with which detritus is deposited and forms new land, even in a deep lake like Ulleswater, may suggest such a possibility in the case of an unusually shallow lake like Trasimene. I am even bold enough to go further than I have done in that article which Mr Henderson has dealt with in such unsparing language, and say that on the evidence we have at present before us, it is more likely that the road in 217 had to traverse at any rate the south slope of Tuoro hill than that it had not.

I believe that the controversy between Mr Henderson and myself might have been avoided had we met to discuss the question. When I first heard that he meditated criticism, I offered to discuss the matter with him, but he was unable to give me the opportunity of doing so. I regret this because Mr Henderson and I are both, I believe, keenly interested in the same field of work, and I, naturally enough, believe that we are both attempting to employ a right method of getting at the facts of history. If I have, in this case, formed the opinion that Mr Henderson has not employed the method with success, I have not, at any rate, put forward that opinion without giving reasons for doing so.

G. B. GRUNDY.

ON PASSAGES IN PLATO'S *PHILEBUS*¹.

12 DE Π. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐκ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων; Σ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὃ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι.

W. W. Goodwin in his *Greek Moods and Tenses* § 268 seeks, not so much to justify, as rather to excuse, the extraordinary syntax of πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐκ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη. "Here," he says, "εἴη ἂν takes the place of ἦ, and πῶς shows that the original force of μὴ is forgotten." Badham and Madvig reject the μὴ, and so dispose of the syntactical difficulty. But, so long as the words πῶς γὰρ—χρημάτων are read continuously, τοῦτο is superfluous, and τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ awkward. Hence, rejecting the commas before τοῦτο and after ἐαυτῷ, I would place a note of interrogation after ἡδονῇ, and, understanding ἐναντία ἐστι from the preceding sentence, would translate: "For how is pleasure contrary to pleasure? You do not mean to tell me that it is not exactly like itself?"

13 BC Πῶς λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες; οἶε γὰρ τινα συγχωρήσασθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, εἶτ' ἀνέξασθαι σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς ἐτέρας αὐτῶν κακὰς;

Badham brackets συγχωρήσασθαι and ἐτέρας, and appends the following note: "As εἶτα depends immediately on the participle θέμενον, if we retain συγχωρήσασθαι we have two infinitives συγχωρήσασθαι and ἀνέξασθαι with an equal right to a position which cannot belong to more than one, unless we

¹ These notes, with one exception (47 D), were read before the Cambridge Philological Society 8 December 1896.

suppose *this* to be Greek: νομίζω σφαλῆναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἰωθέντας ἀμαρτεῖν. 'Ἐτέρας is the supplement of a man who had never heard of τὰς μέν τινας.' In other words, συγχωρήσασθαι is an awkward excrescence, the participle θέμενον being normally followed by εἶτ' ἀνέξεσθαι: and on the assumption that εἶτα is sound, Badham's argument cannot, I think, be resisted. But if for εἶτ' we substitute εἴτ' the whole difficulty disappears. Protarchus asks—"Do you think that any one, if he assumes pleasure to be the good, will concede, or allow you to say," &c. In fact, εἴτε can serve the purpose which εἶτα cannot, that of connecting συγχωρήσασθαι and ἀνέξεσθαι. For the use of εἴτε with the second only of the two members of a sentence, see Ast. Understanding ἐτέρας αὐτῶν to mean "different from the pleasures which are good," I can see no reason for bracketing ἐτέρας. Compare 51 A, where ἐτέρας τινας stands in contrast to τινὰς ἡδονάς.

15 A ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῆ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ σπουδῇ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

That the words ἢ πολλῇ σπουδῇ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις are suspicious, is generally admitted. Schütz interposes καὶ before μετὰ. C. F. Hermann brackets σπουδῇ μετὰ διαιρέσεως as an interpretation of ἀμφισβήτησις. Badham (who had formerly added δὲ after μετὰ) in his second edition brackets σπουδῇ. I venture to propose ἢ πολλῇ σπουδῇ <ἢ> μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται: "These units are matters either of profound interest, or, when division begins, of controversy." That πολλῇ σπουδῇ γίγνεται is an admissible phrase, seems to be shown by *Phaedrus* 276 E πολὺ δ', οἶμαι, καλλίων σπουδῇ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται κτλ. That the units are matters of profound interest, before division takes place, we know from *Phaedrus* 248 B οὐ δ' ἔνεχ' ἢ πολλῇ σπουδῇ κτλ. That they are matters of controversy when division takes place, we know from the passage before us.

15 B Σ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας: εἶτα πῶς αὐ ταύτας, μίαν ἐκάστην οὐσαν αἰετὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχο-

μένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιοτάτα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γυγνομένοις αὐ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ' ἄν, ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἅμα ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι.

Holding that *πρῶτον*, *εἶτα*, and *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο*, mark the beginnings of *three* distinct questions, Badham in his second edition seeks to make an independent question out of *εἶτα πῶς αὐ—μίαν ταύτην* by inserting *μή* after *ὅμως*. The expedient is not a very attractive one. For (1) it is improbable that *μή* has dropped out; (2) the facts that the phrase *πῶς αὐ ταύτας κτλ* in the sentence which begins with *εἶτα* is incomplete without the word *θετέον* derived from the sentence which begins with *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ'*, and that the phrase *ἐν τοῖς γυγνομένοις αὐ κτλ* in the sentence which begins with *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ'* is incomplete without the words *πῶς ταύτας κτλ* derived from the sentence which begins with *εἶτα*, seem to show that the two sentences are indissolubly connected, and I think that the text as it stands gives an appropriate—indeed *the* appropriate—sense.

Socrates asks (1) Are there these monads? (2) How are we to suppose these monads—if they are each of them eternally, immutably, one, neither coming into being, nor ceasing to be—severally to retain this their unity, and yet, either by division or by multiplication, to be distributed amongst a plurality of particulars? That is to say, the participial clause *μίαν ἐκάστην κτλ* describes the monads as essentially units, and the words *ὅμως εἶναι κτλ* bring this their characteristic into contrast with the pluralization which somehow or other they must needs undergo in particular things.

16 E 17 A οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θάπτον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς.

The complaint made against the eristics is that in passing from genus to an infinity of particulars they are not careful to proceed gradually, and in consequence, like Protarchus in the present instance, overlook important differences. But it is not said, except in the words *μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς*, that they *altogether* ignore species. Indeed the words *μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ*

κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδη τιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν κτλ seem plainly to imply that they recognize ἐν, πολλά, and ἄπειρα, though in their passage from ἐν to πολλά and from πολλά to ἄπειρα they ignore intermediate steps. There is then no reason for bracketing or otherwise tampering with πολλά in the sentence which I am discussing. But if πολλά in the sense of species is retained, the words μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς become suspicious: for they distinctly affirm that the reasoners criticized pass at once from genus to particulars. Now in Ε τότε δὴ δεῖ τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν εἶν, each of the πολλά is regarded as a ἐν. Read then in 17 A μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς. The general drift of the sentence will thus be that clever people of the present day are careless in their selection of a genus, and pass, per saltum, from genus to such species as they recognize, and again from each such species to particulars. It remains to say a word about θάπτον καὶ βραδύτερον. When Socrates says that the eristics make species too quickly and too slowly, he means, I think, that they do not choose the right moment for making species: that is to say, instead of proceeding gradually so as to distinguish species all along the line, they cut off, as in the rejected διαίρεσις of the *politicus*, *man* from all other animals. When they do this, thus taking the species *man* too quickly, they may be said to be too slow in discriminating the other animal species. Hence I do not think it necessary to alter βραδύτερον into βραχύτερον.

17 B. Σ. Φωνὴ μὲν [ἡμῖν] ἐστὶ πού μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰούσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴ πλῆθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἑκάστου. Π. Τί μῆν; Σ. Καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτέρω γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὔθ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν κτλ.

Badham comments thus: "The books have οὐδὲν ἐτέρω, which is inadmissible. οὐδ' ἐν ἐτέρω for ἐν οὐδετέρω would be according to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that *wherein* a man is skilled, he would say οὐδέτερον not ἐν οὐδετέρω; the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skilful."

To every word of this comment, I heartily assent. For the two cases, and the distinction which Badham draws between

them, see Xenophon's *memorabilia* IV vi 7, and in particular πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις ἅ γε μὴ ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη; Ἄρ' οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμη σοφοί εἰσι; Τίνι γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλῃ τις ἂν εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμη; But when Badham excises ἐν and for οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ substitutes οὐδετέρῳ, I am no longer content: for I do not see how the superfluous syllable came into the text. I suspect that what is required is the substitution for οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ, of οὐδ' ἐνὶ ἑτέρῳ, 'by neither singly.'

23 B καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον, οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δ' ἴσως ἕνια καὶ ταῦτά.

It is necessary that some of the weapons should be different, but some of the weapons *will be* the same. Read therefore, for ἔστι δ' ἴσως, ἔσται δ' ἴσως.

26 D ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν τούτῳ τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

I think we may take it that the Preplatonics, if they had to express such a phrase as "living the life of the happy man," would usually write the equivalent Greek words in the following order, namely, τὸν βίον τοῦ εὐδαίμονος διάγων, or διάγων τὸν βίον τοῦ εὐδαίμονος; that Plato in the earlier years of his literary activity would commonly say τὸν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος βίον διάγων or διάγων τὸν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος βίον; and that Plato in his later years, and in general the Postplatonics, would prefer τὸν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος διάγων βίον. That is to say, Plato in his later years revolted from the trimness of the arrangement which had found favour with him in his youth and finds favour now with the authors of school books. Similarly he seems to me in his later writings to prefer βίον τὸν εὐδαίμονα διάγων or τὸν εὐδαίμονα διάγων βίον to τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον διάγων, and a *fortiori* τὸν πρὶν εὐδαίμονα διάγων βίον or τὸν πρὶν βίον διάγων εὐδαίμονα to τὸν πρὶν εὐδαίμονα βίον διάγων. Hence I suspect the phrase ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων. Furthermore ἀπειργασμένων is, I think, an unnecessary adjunct to τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος μέτρων, whilst ἀπειργασμένην, in agreement with γένεσιν, would conveniently connect that word with ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος μέτρων. In this way I am led

to conjecture that ἀπειργασμένην should take the place of ἀπειργασμένων.

And it may be thought that this speculation has some countenance in a sentence of Proclus in *Timaeum* 53 E—τὴν ὄλην ἀπειρίαν μετὰ τῶν τοῦ πέρατος μέτρων γένεσιν ἀπειργασμένην: for, though the turn of the sentence is not the same as that in the original cited, it would appear that the text which Proclus used did not join the participle to μέτρων.

29 C Σ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντός πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τούναντίον ὑπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ἅπαντ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;

The argument of the passage from which this extract is taken is no novelty. It is in fact, as appears from Xenophon's *memorabilia* I iv 8, the property of the real Socrates. Whence we should expect to find in it a terminology which is not strange but familiar. Now we have in *Phaedrus* 246 E τρέφεται τε καὶ αὐξεται, in *republic* 509 B τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὐξὴν καὶ τροφήν, in *Timaeus* 41 D γεννᾶτε τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε and 44 B τῆς αὐξῆς καὶ τροφῆς. Whence I would read here τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ αὐξεται. Badham excises ἐκ τούτου on the ground that the phrase "is quite suitable to γίγνεται, but by no means to τρέφεται." He seems to have overlooked E, where the phrase recurs.

30 AB Σ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκείνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασιν τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆν τε παρέχον κτλ.

The sentence which begins with these words has for its subject τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος: and it is impossible by any grammarian's artifice to account for the mention of the rest of τὰ τέτταρα ἐκείνα, i.e. πέρας, ἄπειρον, and κοινόν. Moreover the explanation of the term κοινόν at 31 C suggests that in that place this equivalent for the μικτόν of 25 E ff is still a novelty and consequently has not been mentioned at 30 A. Now there are in the context two quaternions: the quaternion of the four elements, πῦρ ἀήρ ὕδωρ γῆ, which is introduced at 29 A, and the quaternion of the four kinds,

ἄπειρον πέρας μικτόν αἰτία, which we last heard of at 28 c. That the phrases τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν, τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων, ἐν τούτοις refer, not to the four kinds, but to the four elements, is clearly shown by the allusion in καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν to 29 B—D. Hence Badham's argument that "the four γενη ought to be mentioned," and consequently that "the words τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα are not an interpolation," may be neglected. On the other hand, the words τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασιν τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο distinctly refer to the earlier quaternion. But of these words, whilst τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος is an integral part of the sentence, and ἐν ἅπασιν τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο an admissible supplement, the rest, as I have said, namely, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ, is an irrelevant, ungrammatical, appendage. I venture to suggest that τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασιν τέταρτον ἐνόν was the original text, and that the ten words τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τοῦτο were a note, appended by some commentator, and afterwards introduced into the text, nine of them before τὸ τῆς αἰτίας, and one, τοῦτο, after ἐνόν.

40 D Σ. Τί οὖν ; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ δοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις ;

The purport of the passage is that, as there are real opinions which are false in the sense that they do not correspond to facts, so there are real pleasures which are false in the same sense. Now at 40 c false opinion is described in the sentence Οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως αἰεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὔσι δὲ μηδὲ ἐπὶ γεγενοσὶ μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ἐνίστε, and at D the particular case cited to illustrate the general proposition is stated in the form Σ. Ὅς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως αἰεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὀπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῆ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὔσι μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγενοσὶν ἐνίστε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι. Thus in both places the attendant circumstances are brought into the sentence by means of the preposition ἐπί. Would it not seem that in the sentence before us ἐπ' ἐκείνοις should take the place of ἐν ἐκείνοις ?

47 D Σ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς

λοιπή μία. Π. Ποία, φής; Σ. Ἦν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ
πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν. Ποία, φής; is plainly
very odd: for, if Protarchus is the speaker, what is wanted is
the equivalent of "which do you mean?" Expunge Π. before
Ποία and Σ. before Ἦν, and give the three sentences (1) Ἐτι
τοίνυν κτλ, (2) ποία, φής, (3) ἦν αὐτὴν κτλ, to Socrates.
Socrates will then (1) affirm the existence of another mixed
state, (2) put the question ποία in behalf of Protarchus, (3)
answer the question so put.

48 DE Σ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τρία
ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον; Π. Πῶς; Σ. Πρῶ-
τον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν
αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.

So the recent texts, except that Badham, forgetting that the
subject of δοξάζειν is in the accusative, substitutes πλουσιώ-
τεροι for πλουσιώτερον. The Clarkianus however gives, not τὴν
αὐτῶν οὐσίαν, but τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν, i.e. τὴν τῶν χρημάτων
οὐσίαν: and Stallbaum prints αὐτῶν accordingly. This is, in
my opinion, most certainly right. Compare *Phaedrus* 240 A
οὐσίαν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως.

51 B ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς
πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδέϊας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.
The words καθαρὰς λυπῶν are not only awkward, but even
unsuitable, as a description of πληρώσεις, for, by assumption,
πληρώσεις are not painful. I think that Stallbaum is right
in bracketing the intruding words as an interpretation of
ἀλύπους above.

52 D Σ. Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι; τὸ καθα-
ρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα
καὶ τὸ ἰκανόν;

My friend Mr R. St John Parry proposed to me long ago to
insert \bar{a} = πρῶτον after εἶναι, or rather, perhaps, after φάναι:
and I am inclined to think that this is right. But further,
not merely the balance of the sentence, but also the whole
theory of the dialogue, requires that ἰκανόν should be asso-
ciated, not with σφόδρα, πολὺ, and μέγα, but with καθαρόν
and εἰλικρινές. Compare 66 B, where ἰκανόν is ranked with
σύμμετρον, καλόν, τέλειον. Read therefore τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ

εὐκρινὲς καὶ τὸ ἰκανόν, ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα.

59 D Σ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὄν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἔστιν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

It seems to me that either ἀπηκριβωμένα or ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι is an excrescence. For myself I should retain ἀπηκριβωμένα.

HENRY JACKSON.

31 May 1897.

EMENDATIONES HOMERICAE (IL. XIX—XXIV).

T 50 *καὶ δὲ μετὰ πρώτῃ ἀγορῇ ἕζοντο κιώντες.*

This is said of the wounded chiefs, Diomedes and Odysseus. No objection, so far as I am aware, has at any time been taken to the traditional *μετὰ πρώτῃ ἀγορῇ*, yet I do not hesitate to say that the meaning necessarily conveyed by these words is not at all appropriate to the particular circumstances. *Μετὰ ἀγορῇ* is a rare phrase, but of definite and ascertainable sense. It is in truth only applicable to those persons who are in the agora but not of it, who attend the assembly as outsiders and spectators only, however interested. From the peculiar nature of the case we cannot expect that many illustrations of this usage should be forthcoming, and in fact there is but one other example in the Homeric poems of *μετὰ ἀγορῇ*. That one example is however decisive. The circumstances fortunately are unique, and there is no possibility of misunderstanding them. In the *Odyssey* Odysseus appears as a stranger and an alien among the Phaeacians, and he describes the position he occupies in their assembly in these words:—

θ 156 *νῦν δὲ μεθ' ὑμετέρῃ ἀγορῇ νόστοιο χατίζων
ἦμαι λισσόμενος βασιλῆά τε πάντα τε δῆμον.*

He has joined their *ἀγορή*, though he does not belong to it as a member. Quite parallel is the usage of *μετὰ στρατῶ*, when prisoners of war are spoken of:—

X 49 *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ζώουσι μετὰ στρατῶ.*

It must not be supposed that the two Greek chiefs, disabled by their wounds, here occupy a somewhat analogous position, as virtual outsiders. This is clearly not the case; for *Odys-*

seus at any rate takes a very prominent part in the ensuing debate. From the foregoing considerations there is therefore fair reason for suspecting the recognised text. Can we hope to recover from the general usage of Homer with any probability the superseded reading? Here is my suggestion:—

καὶ δὲ μετὰ πρώτοις ἀγορῇ ἴζοντο κιώντες.

The expression μετὰ πρώτοις 'along with the foremost' is of frequent occurrence, e.g. Δ 341, E 536, 577, Λ 64, M 315, 321, N 270, T 151, Τ 338, nor is it confined, as in the above instances, to the battle-field. Nausicaa says to her father:—

ζ 60 καὶ δὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ἔοικε μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἔοντα
βουλὰς βουλεύειν καθαρὰ χροὸ εἴματ' ἔχοντα.

In reference to Agamemnon in a passage not altogether unlike the present one we read:—

I 12 αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ πρώτοισι πονεῖτο.
ἴζον δ' εἰν ἀγορῇ τετιηότες.

Finally ἀγορῇ used as a locative, though not so common as ἐν (εἰν, ἐνὶ) ἀγορῇ, is quite admissible, cf. Δ 400, I 33, β 37.

May we not then accept a change moderate in extent, warranted by undeniable usage, and recommended by the sense of the passage?

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T 194 δῶρα ἐμῆς παρὰ νηὸς ἐνεικέμεν, ὅσσ' Ἀχιλλῆι
χθιζὸν ὑπέστημεν δώσειν, ἀγέμεν τε γυναικάς.

The hiatus in the opening foot is remedied in the Syrian palimpsest by δ' inserted by a second hand, but clearly the services of that useful particle cannot here be accepted. At the same time the specious plea of hiatus licitus is not available according to the prevalent doctrine on that delicate question. Dr Leaf, I observe, suggests another defence, false archaism: but this also fails to carry conviction, as it presupposes that the whole passage is non-archaic, and it ought first to be fairly certain, that the few instances that are to be found of this particular hiatus are not rather the inevitable

flaws that length of time and inaccuracy of tradition have created in a once perfect original. My object now is to show how easy it is to accept this last hypothesis in the present instance. It may be added that I have elsewhere suggested restorations of A 533 Ζεὺς δ' ἴ' ἑόν and Φ 569 ἐν δέ F' ἴα ψυχῆ, and it is hardly doubtful that I 319 should be read ἐν δέ τ' ἴῃ. Here I would propose:—

δῶρ' ἔμ' ἐμῆς παρὰ νηὸς ἐνείκμεν,

“Bring from my ship my gifts, all those that I promised &c.”

The corruption is of a very simple character, and quite natural, whether we choose to refer it to a period when elisions were recognised in the writing of the text, in which case it is a lipography, or to refer it to a much earlier, though still indefinite date, when as is probable all the words appeared at full length, ἐκ πλήρους. Assuredly δῶρα ἐμὰ ἐμῆς would be just as liable as the other briefer representation to be reduced accidentally or designedly to the traditional δῶρα ἐμῆς.

Of course there is nothing, and can be nothing, of studied emphasis intended by this collocation of the two possessives, as there would certainly be in such a phenomenon in later Greek writing. Their position is merely accidental and fortuitous, as befits the artless simplicity of epic speech. If it were the result of deliberate purpose to secure a rhetorical contrast, no linguistic device could be more absolutely and entirely un-Homeric. Indeed this feeling may have assisted in some degree the development and retention of the traditional text.

In support of the emendation the argument for the insertion of ἐμόν in N 257 may be referred to. Similarly here we have ἐμὰ elucidated and further expanded by the following relative clause, ὅσσ'—δώσειν, cf. δ 736. To some extent the two emendations mutually support one another.

T 290

ὥς μοι δέχεται κακὸν ἐκ κακοῦ αἰεί.
 ἄνδρα μὲν, ᾧ ἔδοσαν με πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,
 εἶδον πρὸ πτόλιος δεδαϊγμένον ὄξει χαλκῷ.

In the first clause here the intransitive use of the verb seems to have the support of one passage and one alone in Greek literature, Hes. Theog. 800:—

ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἄθλος.

Unfortunately the flagrantly modern form of the noun deprives this of any claim to consideration it might otherwise have possessed in reference to epic usage, so that there is nothing startling in the proposal to correct the Homeric passage thus:—

ὥς μ' ἐκδέχεται κακὸν ἐκ κακοῦ αἰεί.

We may pass lightly over the elision of the diphthong of *μοι*, to which the corruption may be plausibly traced. This elision has ample authority in Homer, as is well known; and perhaps it is providential as well as natural, that *ἐκ-* was sacrificed in the tradition rather than *-οι*, for otherwise only too many scholars would have maintained ἐξ ἀσφαλοῦς that μ' here stood for με. As it is, we can now write μ' ἐκδέχεται with full confidence that no one will come forward to champion the accusative here. The doubling of the preposition has considerable justification in Homeric usage, e.g. θ 106, υ 21, Β 690, Ι 330. So with ἐν ε 260, Ψ 338, Ζ 243, Η 438, Λ 155, Φ 586, Ρ 570, ἀνά Ψ 709, κατὰ Σ 25, πρὸ Δ 156, ἐς δ 802.

Again as to the intransitive ἐκδέχεται it must be admitted that there is no other example of this use in Homer: but its occurrence in early Greek is certain, e.g. Hdt. IV 39 ἥ τε Περσικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐκδεκομένη Ἀσσυρίη καὶ ἀπὸ Ἀσσυρίης ἡ Ἀραβίη. Also IV 99 κόλπου δὲ ἀγομένου τῆς γῆς ταύτης ἡ Σκυθικὴ τε ἐκδέκεται ('comes next'). Later διαδέχομαι is used in this sense. In the present instance the usage of Herodotus will not be without weight, especially perhaps with those critics who hold, as many do, though I should be sorry to accept their views, that the whole of the lament of Briseis is a late accretion. Their arguments turn

in great measure on the language of the passage 282—302, which has been freely criticised as late. In the few lines at the head of this paragraph for example the spondaic *εἶδον* is very questionable in Homer. If it had to be accepted as genuine, the passage might be given up at once; but it may be permitted me to make a suggestion on this point, whereby such dire necessity may be avoided. It may be noticed that the phrase *εἶδον πρὸ πτόλιος* exhibits a strange peculiarity in point of language. It is archaic at one end, *πτόλιος*, and modern, so to say, at the other, *εἶδον*. My suggestion is that the original stood thus:

εἰσείδον πρὸ πόλιος

with the scansion — ∪ ∪ | — ∪ ∪ | —. I trace the corruption to the inability of the later Greeks to find that scansion with facility in the above words. That the dissyllabic *πόλιος* has more than once proved a stumbling-block, I hope to show on another occasion. As might be expected the Homeric poems present a few, and only a few, examples of *εἶδον* with diphthong; for these it is usually easy to find a remedy which will commend itself as at least probable. In κ 194 *εἶδον γάρ* a simple correction is *ἐς δὲ ἴδον*, as in the line above dealt with (*δέ* of course = *γάρ*). The most difficult instance is λ 102 *εἰς Ἰθάκην, οὐδ' εἶδες ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γυναῖκα*, but here *εἶδες* is a very satisfactory substitute for *εἶδες* v. ν 43, for Anticleia could not know whether Penelope had not quitted the house of Odysseus since her own decease. Δ 112 *εἶδεν, ὅτ' ἐξ Ἰδης* should of course be *εἶσιδ' ὅτ'*. ι 182 *ἔνθα δ' ἐπ' ἐσχατιῇ σπέος εἶδομεν ἄγχι θαλάσσης* completes the account and only requires with a very slight preliminary change the transposition *ἴδομεν σπέος* (Cobet).

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Τ 144 ὡς ἄρα φωνήσας ἠγήσατο Κυανοχαίτης
 τεῖχος ἐς ἀμφίχυτον Ἡρακλῆος θείοιο
 ὑψηλόν, τό ρά οἱ Τρῶες καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
 ποίεον, ὄφρα τὸ κῆτος ὑπεκπροφυγῶν ἀλέαιτο,
 ὀππότε μιν σεύαιτο ἀπ' ἠμόνος πεδίονδε.

The use of the article in 147, τὸ κῆτος, is admittedly un-epic and modern: but this admission need not involve any suspicion that the whole of the passage is a later accretion. Such inferences are often lightly made; but the appearance of τό may be easily accounted for as a mere modernisation of ὄφρ' ὃ γε κῆτος, the common Homeric use of the pronominal article, accompanying the change of subject. The following line however has been subjected, unless I am much mistaken, to more serious maltreatment. No one can say it is satisfactory as it stands. I pass over the notable *hiatus licitus*, which, I fear, will endear it to the hearts of many, but not without a protest against an over-devotion that converts a mere permissible licence into a positive metrical beauty. The word σεύαιτο is the feature to which I would direct attention. This particular form recurs in two other Homeric passages:—

P 463 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦρει φῶτας, ὅτε σεύαιτο διώκειν.

Ψ 198 ὕλη τε σεύαιτο καήμεναι.

In both these places it is intransitive; here only it has to be taken as transitive. I propose then to restore the normal usage in the recalcitrant line thus:—

ὅπποτε κέν μιν σεύαι ἀπ' ἠϊόνος πεδίονδε.

I say the normal usage, for the 1 aor. act. occurs at least eleven times in Homer (E 208, Z 133, Λ 147, 293, 294, Ξ 413, O 681, T 189, 325, ζ 89, ξ 35), and is of course always transitive; on the other hand the 1 aor. mid. is found eight times with an intransitive meaning (Z 505, H 208, Λ 415, Ξ 227, P 463, X 22, Ψ 198, ε 51). There are, it is true, two lines (Γ 26 and Λ 549 = O 272), afterwards to be considered, in which the transitive sense here required by the aor. mid. seems again necessary. The case of ὀρμάω, exhibited under N 62 ff., has an instructive similarity.

In connection with the proposed solution the question naturally arises, whether there is sufficient justification in Homeric usage for ὅπποτε κεν with the optative. It may be admitted at once that there is no direct witness in its favour. In technical language the optative after ὅπποτε is always

pure. Some may consider this objection fatal: yet there is, I believe, sufficient weight of evidence in analogous usage to make the introduction of *κεν* here not only excusable, but even acceptable. It may be remarked parenthetically that the over-hasty removal of the seemingly irregular particle would be almost sure to result in the production of the traditional text.

First of all *ὄτε*, which in other respects is parallel with *ὁπότε*, shows one clear instance in point:—

I 524 οὐτω καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπευθόμεθα κλέα ἀνδρῶν
 ἠρώων, ὅτε κέν τιν' ἐπιζάφελος χόλος ἴκοι.

I cannot appeal with any confidence to the use of *ἐπεὶ* ἄν with optat. and still less to that of *ἐπήν*, v. Monro H. G. § 309. These I admit afford but slight support to the innovation. Better authorisation may be found in the specially Homeric conditional protasis, *εἴ κεν* with opt. Instances in abundance are given by La Roche on E 273 and Monro H. G. § 313—4. Somewhat analogous are conditional relative clauses expressing indefinite frequency, iteration, &c., e.g. B 188 ὄν τινα—*κιχείη*, in which *κε* sometimes occurs as well as the pure optative; for instances v. Monro H. G. § 305 (d). So also *ὡς* with *κεν* or ἄν, § 306 (c) 2. Furthermore it may be urged that the use of *κεν* here would be natural and correct, as it would serve to bring forward the particular reference to the circumstances of the struggle between Heracles and the sea-monster.

Let me now return for a moment to the passages which exhibit the 1 aor. mid. of *σεύω* as transitive. The first is:—

Γ 25 πεινάων· μάλα γάρ τε κατεσθίει, εἴ περ ἂν αὐτὸν
 σεύωνται ταχέες τε κύνες θαλεροὶ τ' αἰζηοί.

Let this be compared with:—

Λ 414 ὡς δ' ὅτε κάπριον ἀμφὶ κύνες θαλεροὶ τ' αἰζηοὶ
 σεύωνται,

and it becomes at once apparent that in all probability the original reading in Γ 25 was not *αὐτόν*, which as an unemphatic pronoun is by no means free from suspicion both here and elsewhere, but *ἀμφί*. Compare also Λ 419, 482, I 80, P 65, Λ 475, E 476. There remains:—

Λ 549 = O 272 ἐσσεύαντο κύνες τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἀγριοῦνται.

In the first passage *λέοντα* is the object, in the second *ἔλαφον—ἡ—αἶγα*. In both let *σεύαντ' ἀμφὶ* replace *ἔσσεύαντο*. For the position in the line assigned to the preposition we may compare:—

Σ 528 *τάμνοντ' ἀμφὶ βοῶν ἀγέλας καὶ πώεα καλά.*

At the same time our chief concern, the proposed emendation of T 148, needs scarcely be made to depend on the acceptance of these latter suggested remedies, which however cannot, I hope, be said to lie beyond the limits of a reasonable probability.

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T 358 *οὐδέ κ' Ἄρης, ὅς περ θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐδέ κ' Ἀθήνη
τοσσησδ' ὑσμίνης ἐφέποι στόμα καὶ πονέοιτο.*

'Neither Ares, immortal god though he be, nor Athene would deal with the front of so great a battle and achieve success (lit. do the work),' or it may be, 'and engage in a struggle,' 'face the music,' if we adopt the metaphor now in vogue in the political world.

The unsatisfactory and suspected clause here is *καὶ πονέοιτο*, of which I have given two versions, for the exact meaning is not altogether certain. Dr Leaf indeed explains it as forming a sort of hendiadys with *ἐφέποι*, for *πονούμενος* 'by dint of labour.' This view, though possible, seems hardly necessary and not quite in the Homeric manner. At the same time *πονέομαι* does not appear to be used elsewhere absolutely in the sense of 'to be successful.' We are perhaps on the safest ground, when we treat this verb as equivalent here to *ἀγωνίζεσθαι*, 'to engage,' 'do battle.' This quasi-technical meaning is found occasionally in Homer, e.g. Δ 374 *ὡς φάσαν οἳ ἐΐδοντο πονεύμενον*. N 288 *εἴ περ γάρ κε βλῆο πονεύμενος ἠὲ τυπείης*.

It seems improbable that Achilles, who is no arrogant contemptor divom, should have here so far forgotten his habitual respect for the immortals and his own special patroness Athene, as to intimate that they would not venture to under-

take, or would not undertake with success, a contest against merely human adversaries. The ἀπρεπές is made rather worse, if the rendering of πονέοιτο above recommended be accepted. There is no need to go so far as to say that for this reason the vulgate is intolerable, but at any rate it seems so little satisfactory, that it is quite worth while to suggest that the original may have expressed a far less objectionable sentiment, one indeed more strictly in accordance with the ascertained tone of feeling in the Homeric age. There is, I make bold to say, good reason for thinking that the vulgate πονέοιτο may be a corruption of a not very dissimilar original ποθ' ὄνοιτο, so that the line would run:—

τοσσησδ' ὑσμίνης ἐφέποι στόμα καί ποθ' ὄνοιτο·

'would pass along this lowering front of battle and find a flaw at any point,—anywhere find it amiss.'

It is obvious that we might equally well write καί που ὄνοιτο, which accounts perhaps better for the corruption, in so much as the difference between ποσσοιτο and πονεοιτο is quite inconsiderable. Our tradition, it may be observed, does not recognise elision of the ι of ποθί, but always offers που before a vowel, e.g. εἴ που ἐφεύροι. For the sense attributed to the adverb cf. N 309, Ω 420, υ 114, A 124, Γ 450, P 681, Z 330.

There is no depreciation of the gods in saying that they could not impeach or question the formidable strength of the hostile array. We have the very echo of the idea in

N 126 ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' Αἴαντας δοιοὺς ἴσταντο φάλαγγες
καρτεραί, ἃς οὐτ' ἄν κεν Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο μετελθὼν
οὔτε κ' Ἀθηναίη λαοσσόος.

The parallel is singularly complete. In both cases the forces are in close array, πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισιν, ready to meet the onset of the champion warrior on the opposite side, of Achilles here, of Hector there. The two divinities appealed to are the same, and if ἐφέποι be taken in the sense of 'review,' 'pass along,' a quite possible meaning, cf. ι 121 κορυφὰς ὀρέων ἐφέποντες, it corresponds fairly well with μετελθὼν.

Other similar passages are Δ 539, N 287, P 398, which it is unnecessary to quote at length.

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Φ 37

ὁ δ' ἐρινεὸν ὄξει χαλκῶ

τάμνε νέους ὄρηκας, ἕν' ἄρματος ἄντυγες εἶεν.

The passage describes how Lycaon was engaged, when he was surprised and carried into captivity by Achilles. He was cutting into suitable lengths and trimming branches of a wild-fig tree to form a chariot-rail. If this be a correct account of his employment, I submit that we must read ἐρινεοῦ (ἐρινεό') of necessity. There is of course little or no metrical objection to the change, for which a brief defence may suffice.

Achilles secured his prisoner by a night-surprise, ἐννύχιος προμολών, and doubtless any one, who thinks midnight a convenient time for pruning or cutting trees, may retain ἐρινεόν as an example of the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος, although, as Dr Leaf remarks, this figure of speech is rarely found except of persons. The scene of the operations, the ἀλφῆ, which may mean either a threshing-floor, or a vineyard, or a garden, is unfortunately rather indefinite; but is a wild-fig tree, *sterilis mala robora ficus*, likely to have been allowed to grow in any of these situations? As we do not know whether the time was summer or winter, it is perhaps inconclusive to appeal to Virgil, *Geo.* 1. 291

Et quidam seros hiberni ad luminis ignes
Pervigilat, ferroque faces inspicat acuto;

Hesiod (*Op.* 413—21), I observe, recommends the summer evenings for wood-cutting, but not by any means midnight.

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Φ 106 ἀλλά, φίλος, θάνε καὶ σύ· τίη ὀλοφύρειαι οὕτως;
360 ἄστεος ἐξελάσειε· τί μοι ἔριδος καὶ ἀρωγῆς;

It may seem overbold to attempt to lay an emending hand even with gentlest touch upon so noble and so famous a line as the former of these two. There is a story, that it was

quoted to Alexander the Great on his death-bed by Callisthenes, his physician, who, if the tale be true, must certainly have been either a very rash man or a particularly skilful practitioner.

Each of the lines contains a hiatus at precisely the same point in the verse, where moreover no privilege has yet been claimed. I have placed them in juxtaposition, not only because they are both from one book of the Iliad, but because, if my idea be right, they are in a peculiar sense supplementary to one another. They have both suffered from the ravages of time and in an equal degree: but what the one has lost, the other has successfully retained. There is no serious disrespect shown to the merits of our tradition in supposing, that the original in both cases involved the elision of the diphthong *-οι* thus:—

τή μ' ὀλοφύρειαι οὔτως;
τή μ' ἔριδος καὶ ἀρωγῆς;

On this recognised elision I may possibly find occasion hereafter to dilate at length. At present it is enough to note, that from the supposed original, *τή μοι*, what may be called the less necessary portion in each instance, is the one that has suffered extinction. In l. 106 the sense is sufficiently complete without the ethical dative; whereas in l. 306 the pronoun is obviously indispensable, but the last syllable of *τιή* may be, and accordingly has been, discarded as needless. The motive for a couple of changes, at once so similar and so different, can very seldom be traced with such facility and, I may add, such sureness as this. The two examples are really worth the attention of those scholars who are inclined to lay down strongly as a principle of criticism, that the later Greeks never deliberately corrected or improved The Poet.

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X 199 ὡς δ' ἐν ὀνείρω οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν·
οὔτ' ἄρ' ὁ τὸν δύναται ὑποφεύγειν οὔθ' ὁ διώκειν·
ὡς ὁ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσὶν οὔδ' ὄς ἀλύξαι.

These lines have been condemned by Aristarchus (*ἀθετούνται*) as paltry in thought and expression (*τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ τῷ νοήματι εὐτελείς*), also as unsuitable, because in flat contradiction to the previous simile (162 ff.) they imply that the two heroes are absolutely unable to move. The great critic is undoubtedly too severe. That the simile is very finely conceived needs no proof. It appeals to every one who has had the nightmare. And who has not? The representation is not perhaps, as Dr Leaf says in his admirable note, one of helpless fatigue, (That would be derogatory to the heroes.) but rather of ineffectual though vigorous effort. Nothing that either can do is able to diminish or increase the distance between them. The inability to move is relative not absolute. They are like the two extremities of an express train. Though in rapid movement they are always at the same distance from one another.

With regard to the verbal expression, though it must not be supposed that severely simple language is anything of the nature of a blemish, we may admit an element of weakness is here discernible. The repetition of *διώκειν* indeed is quite Homeric, nor would even the triple recurrence of *δύναμαι* be an insuperable objection to the genuine character of the lines. Even this objection however, such as it is, I hope completely to remove. The real difficulty of the passage as it stands is, as has often been pointed out, that l. 200 is nothing but an expanded re-statement of l. 199. Now it is observable that these two lines both exhibit defects of metre. Neither the long quantity of *-φ* in thesis before a vowel nor the diphthong *-αι* before *ὑπο-* making a dactyl is satisfactory, and we may take these flaws as indications that the passage, though genuine enough, has not been transmitted to us in its original integrity. Some indeed may think otherwise, for in these days metrical imperfections are not infrequently by a curious perversity of taste jealously guarded and cherished as archaisms, and occasionally even imitated and reproduced with sedulous care in emendations on pretty much the same principle, that leads wholesale manufacturers of antiques deliberately to mutilate their productions, because the genuine

articles are necessarily in a more or less damaged condition. However I have great confidence that the new reading here proposed has something more to recommend it than mere metrical accuracy. I believe then that the original ran thus:—

ὡς δ' ἐν ὀνείρω ἐὼν δέεται φεύγοντα διώκειν
 οὔτ' ἄρ' ὁ τὸν δύναται ποσὶ φεύγειν οὔθ' ὁ διώκειν
 ὡς ὁ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσὶν οὔδ' ὅς ἀλύξαι.

“As a dreamer seemeth to be in chase of one who runs away: neither is the one able to flee apace from the other nor the other to follow in pursuit. So Achilles was unable to overtake Hector in the race, or he to escape.” *δέεται*, which I have substituted here, is a primitive form which has narrowly escaped extinction. It is vouched for by one passage only in Homer, where *δέατο* survives:

ζ 242 πρόσθεν μὲν γὰρ δὴ μοι ἀεικέλιος δέατ' εἶναι.

But Hesychius has *δέεται*, *φαίνεται*, *δοκεῖ*, and it is quite possible that he derives his verb from this very passage, X 199. Curtius (Gr. Etym.⁴ p. 558) says we can assume with certainty a middle verb *δέαμαι* like *ἔραμαι* (cf. *ἡράσσατο* *δοάσσατο*), because of the remarkable confirmation that Hesychius' statement has received from the Tegean inscription. It is obvious that the corruption of *δέεται* into *δύναται* is of the easiest: nor is the consequent development of *οὔ* from *ἐὼν* (ογ, εων) at all difficult to understand. It is often said in commentaries that *τις* is understood in this line, and we might certainly, if desirable, introduce it here instead of *ἐὼν*; but palaeographically it is more remote from the traditional *οὔ*, and Homeric usage favours the use of *ἐν ὀνείρω ἐὼν* as equivalent to the later expression, *ὁ ἐν ὀνείρω ὄν*, just as *φεύγοντα* here = *τὸν φεύγοντα* in Attic.

The change of *ὑπο-* to *ποσί*, by no means a violent one, is also something more than a metrical improvement. The introduction of the noun secures a touch in the picture desirable in itself. The one cannot move his feet to escape, neither can the other to pursue. The two verbs *φεύγειν* and *διώκειν* are properly and precisely contrasted: whereas *ὑποφεύγειν*, ‘to get

clear away,' requires rather for its correlative some such verb as *κιχάνειν*, which Düntzer and Nauck have indeed conjectured for both 199 and 200.

Lastly in the vulgate l. 200 has been deservedly censured (v. Leaf ad loc.) as tautological and awkward, as it certainly is with *οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν* preceding, on which it is little better than a gloss. I submit that with the suggested reading, *δέεται φεύγοντα διώκειν*, this objection no longer holds, and the simile becomes at once consistent and clear.

A word or two may be added in defence of the three lines immediately following:—

πῶς δέ κεν Ἐκτωρ κῆρας ὑπεξέφυγεν θανάτοιο,
εἰ μὴ οἱ πύματόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ἦντετ' Ἀπόλλων
ἐγγύθεν, ὅς οἱ ἐπῶρσε μένος λαιψηρά τε γούνα;

These have been even more roughly dealt with than the simile itself, v. Leaf's note, most needlessly I am sure. There is no inappropriateness in their occurrence after the simile, as Hoffmann supposes, if the view already stated that the heroes are running with undiminished speed be correct. The poet, unless I am mistaken, is answering a very natural objection that might be raised to his description of the flight and pursuit. How could Hector, who has never been spoken of as remarkable for his running powers, have held his own so long against the hero, who is perpetually described as *πόδας ὠκύς, ποδάρκης, πόδας ταχύς*, Achilles? Well, of course under ordinary conditions he never could have done so; he would have been overtaken and killed early in the race, and so the poet says in effect, except for the active intervention of Apollo, who put speed into his heels, and saved him though for the last time; for as we are presently told, he soon had to abandon him. What there is impossible or unnatural or un-Homeric in such a statement I should be glad to be informed. The implication of the aorist with *κε* is that Hector did not get Achilles' spear in his back as he ran: nor did he. There is certainly no implication that Hector escaped death altogether any more than there is an implication that he is alive to this day. We may therefore safely reject as worse than unnecessary

both Düntzer's extraordinary conjecture τῶς δέ κεν and Axt's πῶς δέ νυν.

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X 279 ἤμβροτες, οὐδ' ἄρα πῶ τι, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,
ἐκ Διὸς ἡείδης τὸν ἐμὸν μόνον ἢ τοι ἔφης γε.

The most advanced speculation on the origin of the Homeric poems accepts the whole of this passage as a portion of the most ancient nucleus of the Iliad (v. Leaf's Iliad, Vol. II. Introd. p. xii). Though I heartily dissent from the conclusions reached by the Higher Criticism, as it is called, I do not think I am precluded from availing myself of this admission, when I have to make a suggestion dealing with the remarkable use of the article in τὸν ἐμὸν μόνον. This later usage, I accordingly urge, is far less likely to be genuine here, than it would be in most other passages, and an attempt at correction may receive a wider toleration. I pass over the curious and much debated ἡείδης or ἡείδεις, v. Cobet, Misc. Crit. p. 301, and address myself to what may be considered the less important phenomenon. Nauck's proposal ἔφφῆδησθα ἐμόν, hiatu licito, does not seem in my judgement to secure a reading that can be accepted as at all satisfactory. In the first place there is no apparent reason why the article should have been inserted at all, and secondly I imagine rightly or wrongly that a better solution might be suggested. It is to the effect that the original case of the noun after ἡείδης was not the accusative, as we now have it, but the genitive, thus:—

ἐκ Διὸς ἡείδης ἐμόο μόνον.

The archaic ἐμόο was necessarily displaced by the more normal and equally correct accusative; and what could be more natural than that the article should then be inserted to eke out the scansion of ἐμόν?

The use of the genitive after οἶδα is commonly supposed to be limited to the cases in which the verb means 'to be skilled in,' v. Liddell and Scott, s. v. Of this usage, generally found with the participle, I need not accumulate examples. But the limitation must not be too strictly insisted upon. Here are two

close parallels to the present passage as emended, which are worth quotation:—

- Λ 657 οὐδέ τι οἶδε
πένθεος, ὕσσον ὄρωρε κατὰ στράτον
 γ 184 οὐδέ τι οἶδα
κείνων, οἳ τ' ἐσάωθεν Ἀχαιῶν οἳ τ' ἀπόλοντο.

The genitive also appears:—

- Μ 229 (ὃς σάφα θυμῷ) εἰδείη τεράων
 Ο 412 (ὅς ῥά τε πάσης) εὖ εἰδῆ σοφίης.

I take it the lengthening of the *o* before *μόρου* can hardly be challenged, as it has sufficient warrant in the known use of the cognate *μοῖρα* (*κατὰ μοῖραν*, &c.).

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Χ 429 *ὧς ἔφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο πολῖται.*

If there be, as I strongly suspect, a modernisation in this simple line, it is one that may easily be removed by reading

ἐπὶ δὲ στέναχον πολιῆται.

The word *πολίτης* or *πολιήτης* is of rare occurrence in Homer, and doubtless through the agency of the zealous improver the more archaic form has almost been completely superseded by the later and more familiar one. One passage only has successfully resisted and for an obvious reason, because it is absolutely intractable and incorrigible. We may consider it a fortunate circumstance that this passage is found in the Catalogue, where we are always told to look for Boeotian rather than Ionic influence. The line in question is:—

Β 806 *τῶν δ' ἐξηγείσθω κοσμησάμενος πολιήτας.*

First of all a word with respect to *στενάχοντο*. This particular form is well established: it occurs eleven times, unless we reduce the number to nine by reading *στέναχον* here and *στέναχον γούωντες* for the vulgate, *στενάχοντο γούωντες*, in ι 467. The active voice is found in one form or another no less than thirty times. So no conclusion can be drawn either way.

Let us now examine the usage of *πολίτης*. Omitting Hym. Dem. 99, we have:—

η 131 πρὸς δόμον ὑψηλόν, ὅθεν ὑδρεύοντο πολῖται.
ρ 206 τυκτὴν καλλίροον, ὅθεν ὑδρεύοντο πολῖται.

In both cases the original ending of the line may well have been

ὑδρευον πολιῆται.

Again the verb gives little if any assistance. There is only one more instance of its use κ 105 ὑδρευούση (*ὑδρεύειν* Hesych.), which is favourable to the change.

If *πολίτης* is to be saved as an epic form, it will not be by virtue of the only remaining passage, in which it is presented in our texts:—

Ο 556 ἀλλ' ἔπει· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἔστιν ἀποσταδὸν Ἀργείοισι
μάρνασθαι, πρὶν γ' ἠὲ κατακτάμεν ἠὲ κατ' ἄκρης
Ἴλιον αἰπεινὴν ἐλέειν κτάσθαι τε πολίτας.

Here the three infinitives with their threefold variation of subject afford rather a curious example of epic freedom. So marked a peculiarity indeed tends rather to strengthen our suspicions as to the genuine character of *πολίτας*. It may be a mere gloss on *καὶ αὐτούς* cf. Ξ 47, and this seems the most likely account of the matter, or there may be some more extensive corruption, which can no longer be remedied with the means at our command, e.g. *καταμένων πολιητῶν*. There is an impossible, but fairly supported, variant *κτᾶσθαί τε* (CDG Vrat. A), which at least indicates an early recognition of a difficulty in the line, and helps to justify some mistrust of its integrity being entertained.

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Ψ 226 ἦμος δ' Ἔωσφόρος εἶσι φῶος ἐρέων ἐπὶ γαίαν.

It is clear enough that Ἔωσφόρος is not an archaic form. Hence Ahrens proposed *εἶτ' ἠοσφόρος*, which Menrad adopts, neither is Fick's Aeolic *αἰοσφόρος* materially different. What advantage Rzach secures by his *ἦμος φωωσφόρος*, I dare not

stop to enquire. The substitution of εὔτε for ἦμος is commonly supported by the sequence of εὔτε—τῆμος in the similar passage:—

ν 93 εὔτ' ἀστὴρ ὑπερέσχε φαάντατος, ὅς τε μάλιστα
ἔρχεται ἀγγέλλων φάος Ἡοῦς ἠριγενείης,
τῆμος δὴ νήσφ προσεπίλνατο ποντοπόρος νηῦς.

I have quoted this at length, because I strongly suspect it contains the real key to the corruption here. There has not been, I submit, any substitution of ἦμος for εὔτε, but the intrusion of an obvious gloss. I conjecture that the line originally ran:—

ἦμος δ' ἀστὴρ εἴσι φάος ἐρέων ἐπὶ γαίαν.

That Ἐωσφόρος made an early appearance as a marginal explanation of ἀστὴρ is only what might be expected, nor is it a far-fetched assumption to suppose that the specific name soon succeeded in supplanting altogether the generic appellation. Liddell and Scott s. v. remark that Ἐωσφόρος is always trisyllabic in Homer: but it ought to be mentioned that this is the only instance of its occurrence. If the word be here rejected as a gloss, Homer has no name for the morning-star, though he has supplied the substratum of the later title.

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Ψ 319 ἄλλος μὲν θ' ἵπποισι καὶ ἄρμασι οἴσι πεποιθὼς
ἀφραδέως ἐπὶ πουλὸν ἐλίσσεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
ἵπποι δὲ πλανῶνται ἀνὰ δρόμον, οὐδὲ κατίσχει·
ὅς δέ κε κέρδεα εἰδῆ ἐλαύνων ἥσσανας ἵππους,
αἰεὶ τέρμ' ὀρόων στρέφει ἐγγύθεν, οὐδέ ἐ λήθει,
ὄππως τὸ πρῶτον τανύσῃ βοέοισιν ἰμᾶσιν[.].
[ἀλλ' ἔχει ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸν προὔχοντα δοκεύει.]

The usual interpretation of this passage seems to me to labour under the disadvantage of a fundamental misconception. I will therefore endeavour to set forth another view, which will, I hope, better satisfy the conditions of the problem. It is not my intention to make this view dependent upon any alteration of the received reading however slight. I have accepted ἄλλος

(319) from Syr. as preferable to ἀλλ' ὄς, following most scholars and editors, Bentley, Heyne, Bothe, Düntzer, Nauck, Fick, Leaf and Platt. πολύ (320) is van Herwerden's conjecture for πολλόν and of course makes no difference in the sense. For εἰδῆ (322) I should prefer εἴσεται' (cf. Θ 111, Π 243) as more metrical, but have made no change. Line 325 I believe to be a late insertion; but upon this no argument as to the meaning of the preceding passage is founded. Whatever view be taken, the irrelevancy of this line remains pretty much the same.

It is generally supposed that Nestor is here speaking of driving round the post (νύσσα, τέρμα, meta) before entering upon the home-stretch, as it may be called, of the δίαυλος. The translation would be to this effect:—'An ordinary charioteer, who puts his trust solely in his team and car, wheels wide of the meta at either end of the course, his horses swerve in the straight and he keeps them not in hand; but whoso is of artful mind, though he drive poorer steeds, ever keeping his eye upon the post turns closely by it, neither is he unaware how he should urge on his horses at the first with the leathern reins.' Here objection may be taken to the rendering of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, which implies a double δίαυλος at least. It is evident however from the race itself that there is only one νύσσα, which is fixed in the distance and is only once turned by the competitors. Dr Leaf rightly says that 321 is a mere expansion of 320, but ἀνὰ δρόμον, 'in the straight,' is hardly consistent with the view that 320 describes the turning.

The fundamental misconception, as I have called it, lies in assuming that Nestor in these lines is dealing with the turn at the post at all. The whole passage may better be regarded as an admonition touching solely the running in the straight, before the post is reached. What he has to recommend with regard to turning the post, he says at sufficient length later on, beginning from 326 and ending with 343. I suggest then that the present passage admits of the following satisfactory explanation and no other. I paraphrase closely thus: 'A charioteer, who unlike you relies solely on the merits of his team and car, thoughtlessly swerves to this side and to that, over a deal of ground, and his horses are all abroad in the straight and he

does not keep them in a right line; but he who has a crafty mind, though he drive worse cattle, ever with his eye on the post drives on the inside track and forgetteth not to do so, as soon as ever he has once put his team to the gallop with the leathern reins.'

ἐλίσσεται accordingly refers to lateral deviations from the straight line, that lies evenly between the starting-point and the turning-post. The meaning so given to *ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα*, 'first to the left and then to the right,' is far preferable in every respect to any interpretation, whereby it is referred to the turning round the post: *ἀνὰ δρόμον*, 'all along the course,' 'the whole length of the first lap,' is used with complete precision. It is only with regard to *στρέφει ἐγγύθεν*, which has been the fons et origo mali, the source of all the misunderstanding, that I have to defend a novelty. The whole course, the single *δίαιλος*, forms a loop, which by careless driving may be made to approximate more and more to an elongated ring; and I submit that there can be no more objection to the use of *στρέφειν* to express the traversing this elongated ring than to our own familiar expression for making an excursion out and home again, viz. to take a turn, or on a larger scale, to make a tour, faire un tour; we may even say 'a circular tour' according to the railway authorities, although the route would probably bear only a very remote resemblance to the circle of the mathematicians. If this be judged admissible, *αἰεὶ*, which is unnatural and overdrawn in reference to turning the post, becomes suitable enough when applied to the whole outward run. Again *οὐδέ ἐ λήθει* is certainly not the principal clause, upon which the next line (324) is dependent, but a mere parenthesis, as usual. In this I am in agreement with Mr Monro. The subject to *λήθει* may indeed be *τέρμα*; but I think it is better to regard *τὸ ἐγγύθεν στρέφειν* as the real subject. He never forgets to drive by the inside rail, as we might say. However this may be—the point makes no very material difference—I submit that the version first given, 'nor is he unaware how far he should put his horses to speed at the first,' is contrary to Homeric usage and untenable. On the other hand the temporal sense I have assigned to *ὄπως* is

indisputably right in M 208 and χ 22 ὄπως ἴδον, and the addition of τὸ πρῶτον here makes this meaning, if anything, more natural and easy than ever.

The first thing the driver has to do, so we may summarise Nestor's counsel, is to whip up his horses (τανύειν is precisely our sporting term 'to extend'), then to fix his eye on the post and make for it with the least possible deflexion from the direct line, taking in fact the nearest way (ἐγγύθεν).

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Ψ 492 μηκέτι νῦν χαλεποῖσιν ἀμείβεσθον ἐπέεσσιν,
 Αἴαν Ἰδομενεῦ τε, κακοῖς, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικεν.
 καὶ δ' ἄλλω νεμεσᾶτον, ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι.

Doubtless Mr A. Platt is right in adopting in the Cambridge Homer the nominatives Αἴας Ἰδομενεύς τε after Wackernagel and Cobet, v. Monro H. G. § 164, also in giving ῥέζη for the traditional ῥέζοι; but there is a further corruption in the extraordinary κακοῖς, which follows after such an interval the practically equivalent χαλεποῖσιν. The variant κακῶς (Vrat. A) offers a better, but still not very satisfactory, sense. The real reading may, I think, be slightly concealed in the ἄναξ of Schol. V., which is not necessarily a conjecture, as Dr Leaf supposes. I suspect that the line originally ran thus:—

Αἴας Ἰδομενεύς τε, ἄναξ' ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικεν.

There is perhaps just sufficient outward similarity between ἄναξ' (ἄνακσι) and κακοῖς to make the substitution of one for the other possible. The unusual but quite defensible trajection of ἄναξι (cf. A 32 and ι 15) together with the unacceptable elision of the iota would work strongly against the retention of the word. Still properly understood the meaning is a distinct gain to the tone of the passage, and makes the rebuke more worthy of the high courtesy of Achilles—'since for princes 'tis not even seemly.' On the other hand it must be acknowledged, that the only form of the dat. plur. of ἄναξ found in Homer is ἀνάκτεσιν (ο 557): but there is satisfactory analogy to be found for admitting ἄναξι also in such duplicate forms as ἔπαλξιν ἐπάλξεσιν, ποσσὶ πόδεσσι, μνηστήρησι μνηστήρεσσι &c.

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Ω 358 ὡς φάτο, σὺν δὲ γέροντι νόος χύτο, δείδιε δ' αἰνῶς,
ὄρθαι δὲ τρίχες ἔσταν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσι,
στῆ δὲ ταφών.

In order to eliminate the perfect from the midst of the surrounding aorists Brandreth proposed χύτο νόος, ἔδδιε δ' αἰνῶς. In the Cambridge Homer we find νόος χύτο, ἔδφιε δ' αἰνῶς (Leeuwen and da Costa). There can be little doubt that the imperfect is a true restoration here, and it is strange that Mr Platt did not admit it into the only other passage in which δείδιε appears as a historic tense:—

Σ 34 δείδιε γὰρ μὴ λαιμὸν ἀπαμήσειε σιδήρω.

Here Nauck recognises the error, but entirely fails in his conjecture τάρβειε to find a probable remedy. Again Brandreth has the priority in the suggestion of ἔδφιε. This emendation, the introduction of the imperfect, occurred to me independently, and I only refer to it now, because in one little detail I find myself differing from both the above mentioned readings. I devised:—

νόος κέχυτ', ἔδφιε δ' αἰνῶς,

which, I submit, is just as likely to be right as either of the others. I know the avidity with which a hiatus licitus is now welcomed and even sought after by some, e.g. ι 87: but as the primitive writing was probably κέχυτο without elision, the docking of the initial syllable, κε-, would seem a metrical necessity and would be resorted to without hesitation, as soon as the tolerably familiar δείδιε had ousted the true original, ἔδφιε, which could only appear as an unmetrical-looking ἔδιε, or an almost incomprehensible ἔδδιε.

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Ω 653 τῶν εἴ τις σε ἴδοιτο θοῆν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν,
αὐτίκ' ἂν ἐξείποι Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν,
καὶ κεν ἀνάβλησις λύσιος νεκροῦο γένηται.

Two MSS. only DS and Eustathius give γένοιτο for γένηται (655). Nauck, Fick, Leaf and Platt adopt it for the sake of symmetry. L. Lange advocates adherence to the subjunctive, which Mr Monro (H. G. § 275 b) explains as expressing 'the certainty of the further consequence, as though the hypothetical

case (*αὐτίκ' ἂν ἐξείποι*) had actually occurred.' I think it may be worth while to broach another explanation of this 'curious combination of Opt. and Subj.' Let us reverse the point of view, tracing the root of the malady, not to the corruption of the verb at the end of the clause, but to *ἐξείποι* in the middle and accordingly correct the line thus:—

αὐτίκ' ἂν ἐξείπη Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν,

"He would be sure to tell Agamemnon at once." The sentence proceeds, *γένηται* being of course retained, "And there would be sure to be delay in the ransoming of the body." Thus the obligation upon the discoverer to reveal the presence of Priam to Agamemnon would be as imperative as the consequence of telling him would be certain.

It is hardly necessary to point out how frequently in the MSS. of Homer an optative is found where a subjunctive is clearly right (v. La Roche on P 631) and of course vice versa. As a matter of fact the confusion between the terminations *-η* and *-οι* is one of those universally recognised and admitted by all scholars versed in MSS. Here the presence of *ἴδοιτο* in 653 could not fail to turn *ἐξείπη* into the correlative and usual *ἐξείποι*, and that this influence should have extended as far as the more remote *γένηται*, naturally in a weaker degree as the MSS. show, is a consequence of high antecedent probability.

For the subjunctive with *ἂν* or *κε* in apodosis following *εἰ* with optative in protasis compare:—

Λ 386 *εἰ μὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης,
οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμησι βιὸς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί.*

μ 345 *εἰ δέ κεν εἰς Ἰθάκην ἀφικόμεθα, πατρίδα γαίαν,
αἰψά κεν Ἑλίῳ Ὑπερίονι πύονα νηὸν
τεύξομεν,*

and if in

Ι 141 *εἰ δέ κεν Ἄργος ἰκοίμεθ' Ἀχαιῶκόν, οὐθαρ ἀρούρης,
γαμβρός κέν μοι ἔοι.* (so 283—4)

the ridiculous *ἔοι* were abandoned, and the apodosis changed to *γαμβρός κέν μοι ἔη*, 'he shall certainly be my son-in-law,' we should probably only be removing a modernisation and returning to the original appropriately emphatic form of expression.

There remains a metrical argument which might be advanced in support of *ἐξείπη* as against *ἐξείποι*. The subjunctive termination *-η*, standing for an original *-ησι*, except in those cases where the tense is non-thematic, is naturally long and incapable of being shortened even in thesis, although the present passage does not require that I should maintain this last position, against which it would be possible to adduce several passages still accepted as sound. On the other hand I regard it as certain that the *-οι* of the optative is regularly short before a vowel, and consequently, that all such passages as the present may be looked upon, notwithstanding any theory of permissible hiatus, as metrically suspicious and defective, e.g. A 64, Θ 270. In the former of these we should read:

ὄς κεν εἴποι, ὃ τόσσον,

and in the latter unquestionably: *βεβλήκειν*.

*

Ω 719 *οἱ δ' ἐπεὶ εἰσάγαγον κλυτὰ δάματα, τὸν μὲν ἔπειτα
τρητοῖς ἐν λεχέεσσι θέσαν, παρὰ δ' εἶσαν ἀοιδοῦς
θρήνων ἐξάρχους, οἳ τε στονόεσσαν ἀοιδὴν
οἱ μὲν δὴ θρήνεον, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες.*

Such is the usual reading of this perplexing passage. Its unsolved difficulties all arise from the third line. There is very fair documentary authority for *θρήνων*, but the best MSS. offer *θρήνους* and nearly all have *ἐξάρχουσ'*. This being so it is difficult to avoid suspecting that the acc. *θρήνους* is due to the prevailing *ἐξάρχουσ'*, cf. B 273 *βουλὰς ἐξάρχων ἀγαθὰς*. Hence, as it is an impossibility to construct the two words together, so as to obtain any intelligible sense, a difficulty either accidentally overlooked or deliberately slurred by those early critics who rashly introduced the accusative, we can hardly refuse to acquiesce in *θρήνων*.

Aristarchus according to the best attainable evidence is credited with a truly astounding idea. His reading, *rudis indigestaque*, is as follows:—

θρήνους, ἐξάρχουσ' οἳ τε στονόεσσαν ἀοιδὴν.

He is supposed to have treated *θρήνους* as an adjective, i.e.

θρηνηδούς, and to have taken ἐξάρχουσ' as trajected from its proper place after the relative. No doubt by these severe measures a tolerable sense is attained, but at the cost of a degree of verbal torture to the unfortunate θρήνους, which is simply incredible. In line 722, it may be remarked, the best authenticated reading is οἱ μὲν ἄρ' ἐθρήνεον, which would be acceptable enough, nay even desirable in itself apart from its documentary superiority, provided the preceding words can be so treated as to admit the placing of a stop after ἀοιδήν. Aristarchus after his semicolon of course has οἱ μὲν ἄρα.

Let me now state briefly the views that later critics have taken in re paene desperata. Dr Leaf, whose luminous discussion of this difficult passage is in every way excellent, suggests that σπονέσσαν is the source of all the mischief, and herein probably hits the mark, though his further suggestion of σπονάχησαν as the missing word is not altogether happy. Over and above the objection he himself mentions, the improbability that so familiar a word should have been lost, it is questionable whether οἷ τε would from its generality be consistent with any aorist describing the action of the bards in reference to this particular occasion.

Mr Monro inclines to the opinion, which is also Friedländer's, that a line has been lost after 721, containing of course a verb to govern ἀοιδήν. Leutsch, pursuing a still more drastic course, would remove all the words from οἷ τε to θρήνεον inclusive, fancying that the lacuna so created was once filled by a statement to the effect that the royal ladies, Hecuba, Andromache and Helen, acted on this occasion as ἐξάρχου. Of course there is no lack of scholars who take the simple course of rejecting l. 721 altogether. Lastly Axt with great ingenuity, but little probability, proposes to read σπονέσσαν ἀοιδῆς οἴμην δὴ (μὲν) θρήνεον or οἴμον ἄρ' ἐθρήνεον.

It may seem presumptuous to hope to restore a passage so manifestly and admittedly corrupt, nor would I venture to claim for my attempt more than a high degree of probability arising from the fact that it accounts, perhaps better than other suggestions, for the existing confusion. Believing then that the original was of a simple character, calculated from its very simplicity to invite corruption, and adhering strictly to

the indication given by *οἷ τε*, that the clause expressed a general characteristic and not a particular act, I propose to read:—

θρήνων ἐξάρχους, οἷ τ' ἐξάρχουσιν αἰοιδήν.

Primarily the corruption would be due to the apparent iteration in *ἐξάρχους—ἐξάρχουσιν*. The repetition of the idea, and not of the idea only but practically of the very word already used for its conveyance, would seem to an age ever becoming more estranged from the simplicity and inartificiality of the old epic, a blemish of some magnitude. To this feeling we may, I think, attribute the loss of *ἐξάρχουσιν*, with the inevitable consequence first that *ἐξάρχους* develops a tendency to become *ἐξάρχουσ'*, and secondly *θρήνων* to become *θρήνους*. Such may well have been the genesis and development of the lectionary variations mentioned. As to *στονούεσσαν*, the word that according to this theory has displaced *ἐξάρχουσιν* or filled up the void left by its elimination, it may be partly due to the suggestive presence of *στενάχοντο* in the next line, but mainly, I submit, to its suitability as an explanation of the nature of the *αἰοιδήν* chanted on such occasions. As an explanatory gloss on the noun it is admirable. It really almost deserves its promotion into the text, if it were not that *θρήνων* already conveys the touch of meaning, which it can only emphasise by repeating.

It may be objected, but I hope only by those whose study of Homeric expression has been less observant of minor details, that the suggested verse savours too strongly of the tautological to be adjudged possible for Homer—a creditable feeling that in all probability influenced the later Greeks to prefer even the muddled vulgate. To such I would say, let them repress the impulse to dismiss the argument with an incredulous smile or a dubious shake of the head, until they have fully considered such parallels as:—

- β 65 *περικτίνας ἀνθρώπους, | οἷ περιναιετάουσι.*
 ι 124 *πηγούς ἀθλοφόρους, οἷ ἀέθλια ποσσὶν ἄροντο.*
 γ 383 *ἀδμήτην, ἦν οὔ πω ὑπὸ ζυγὸν ἤγαγεν ἀνὴρ.*
 ι 271 *ξείνιος, δς ξείνοισιν ἄμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.*
 σ 1 *ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ πτωχὸς πανδήμιος, δς κατὰ ἄστν
 πτωχεύεσκ' Ἰθάκης.*

T. L. AGAR.



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